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Abstract 
Between 1914 and 1954 non-Labor federal politicians appealed for votes by 
claiming to guard property, the rule of law, and national loyalty, and 
denouncing the Labor Party as the enemy of these principles. Non-Labor 
electioneering comprised two aspects: 'limited', and 'threat and loyalty.' The 
former was based on proposals for national development and supposed that 
Labor's attitude to them was misguided, but not fundamentally dangerous. 
The latter was based on accusations that Labor sympathised with radicals 
who were disloyal to the state; and that Labor, therefore, posed an existential 
threat to the community. These tendencies overlapped, and were combined 
in election propaganda in order that threat and loyalty rhetoric might 
dramatise limited issues. 
In the 1914-18 war, the Nationalists demanded that national effort should be 
concentrated into support for British war aims, and defined the upholding of 
conscription as the criterion of loyalty. In the atmosphere of European war 
and Anglo-Irish violence, the Nationalists equated Labor's opposition to 
conscription with disloyalty, but promised to preserve a pre-war settlement 
that included the welfare and arbitration associated with Labor. From the 
early 1920s, the Anglo-Irish truce moderated the sectarianism of the non-
Labor image. Nationalists promised to suppress the threat that union 
militancy allegedly posed to the development of Australia as an economy of 
Imperial trade, investment and immigration. During the Depression crisis 
of 1930-31, non-Labor undertook to restore confidence by shunning 
unorthodoxy and adhering to policies idealised as traditionally British. 
Throughout the 1930s, the United Australia Party persisted with a rhetoric of 
financial orthodoxy, despite the abandonment of many elements of laissez 
faire. The Second World War was the trough of non-Labor's fortunes in 
this period. Robert Menzies' first government enjoyed little credibility as a 
war administration, and the United Australia Party became discredited, as 
the proliferation of independent non-Labor groups at the 1943 election 
testified. Re-grouping among extra-parliamentary supporters, however, 
together with the defeat of the postwar reconstruction referendum in 1944, 
created the conditions for Menzies to form a new party at the end of that 
year. The Liberal Party continued a traditional non-Labor politics of anti-
socialism and anti-communism, but recognised !he popularity of 1940s 
welfare and full employment policies, and attempted to promote a positive 
agenda of free enterprise, and alliance with the West. A heavy win over the 
Labor government in 1949 seemed to confirm the success of these tactics, but 
two years later the government failed to carry a referendum to ban the 
Communist Party. Nor did repetition of the anti-socialist and anti-
communist themes of 1949 arrest a decline in the government's popularity. 
The government was returned to power in 1954, however, in a campaign 
which combined the celebration of postwar prosperity with an emotive anti-
communist campaign, fuelled by a spy scandal. This association of themes 
was typical of the range of non-Labor's federal electioneering tactics in the 
forty years since 1914. 
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"THERE IS NO MIDDLE COURSE" between the Nationalist party and 
Communist-influenced Labor, warned one Nationalist advertisement in the 
1922 Federal election.I In the 1953 Senate poll the Liberal Prime Minister, 
Robert Menzies, proclaimed: 
[T]here is no middle course. Either the voters confirm us in a 
Senate majority, or they accept the imminent risk of having Dr 
Evatt in charge of our foreign relations, Mr Calwell in charge of 
our relations with South East Asia, Mr Ward in charge of our 
territories, and the Treasury conducted by a group of people 
whose policy is more expenditure, more inflation, and sheer 
irresponsibility. 2 
It is an axiom of political party theory that defining the alternatives is an 
important source of power.3 In this thesis I ask why non-Labor4 chose to 
define political alternatives in particular ways at particular times. I argue 
that in the first half of the century the non-Labor parties endeavoured to 
persuade voters that non-Labor was the guardian of permanent values, and 
1. 'Safety First', authorised by Archdale Parkhill, Smith's Weekly, 9 December 1922, p. 32; 
NLA MS 2823/1/2. 
2. R.G. Menzies, Opening Speech in the Senate Campaign, Brisbane City Hall, 14 April 1953. 
NLA MS 5000/9/334. 
3. E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, Hinsdale, Illinois, 1975, p. 66, cited 
Alan Ware, Citizens Parties and the State: A Reappraisal, Cambridge, 1987, p. 210. 
4
. I use 'non-Labor' as a generic term for the principal Australian federal non-Labor parties 
and their personnel - parliamentarians, officials and to a lesser extent, voluntary workers; 
and the name of the principal non-Labor party of the day (Liberal, Nationalist, United 
Australia Party [UAP], and Liberal Party of Australia [LPA, or Liberal], again) for particular 
references. 
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the only alternative to a Labor Party which was at best innocently misguided 
and at worst, traitorous. This thesis is an attempt to provide an overview of 
the positive and negative agendas which non-Labor politicians put before 
Australian voters. My subject is the content and style of the campaign 
arguments non-Labor used to generate and maintain popular support in 
Federal elections.5 Firstly, I seek to demonstrate the distinctiveness of non-
Labor ideology in the relationship between the different elements of this 
world view6, especially in the combination of positive and technical 
arguments with emotive warnings about existential dangers. Secondly, I 
examine the ways in which non-Labor campaign politics changed and 
remained the same between 1914 and 1954 as non-Labor maintained 
traditional wisdoms but adapted them to experience. 
Non-Labor parties formed the Commonwealth government for twenty eight 
of the forty one years from 1914 to 1954, and in ~ legal sense this was so 
because they won a majority of House of Representative seats in twelve of 
the sixteen general elections. Since at least 1956, writers have complained of 
the dearth of material on the Nationalist, United Australia Party & Liberal 
parties.7 There is now a scholarly biography of Menzies, and some valuable 
accounts of non-Labor leaders and organisations in unpublished theses. In 
addition, there is a considerable literature on the far-right secret societies 
5. Don Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics, Canberra, 1982 (1977), pp. 7 & 14. 
6. This methodological point is made by Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western 
Liberalism, Oxford, 1984, p. 12; and G.C. Webber, The Ideology of the British Right, 1918-
1939, London & Sydney, 1986, p. 133. 
7. Henry Mayer, 'Some Conceptions of the Australian Party System, 1910-1950', Historical 
Studies , vol. 7, no. 27, Nov 1956, pp. 253-70; Peter Tiver, 'The Ideology of the Liberal Party of 
Australia: A Sketch and Interpretation', Politics 11 (2), Nov 1976, p.156; Marian Simms, A 
Liberal Nation: The Liberal Party and Australian Politics, Sydney, 1982, pp. 3 & 6. 
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which, we are told, might have done something other than plan and drill if 
Lang had not lost office in 1932. There are studies of the junior non-Labor 
group, the Country Party.8 We have, however, no published biography of 
Lyons, who was prime minister for most of the 1930s; and no monograph on 
the United Australia Party - nor on its predecessor, the Nationalist party, 
which held office between 1917 and 1929. 
Original studies of the ideology and rhetoric of the main non-Labor parties 
are particularly scarce. There is a 'pragmatist' tradition in Australian 
political studies, dating principally from W.K. Hancock's Australia (1930) 
which stipulates that politics in Australia is essentially a competition 
between economic interest groups to secure benefits from the state; that 
parties are the vehicles of these interests; that their propaganda contains 
little of sufficient coherency to warrant the term 'ideological'; and that 
attitudinal differences between the parties are of slight importance because 
each offers a marginally different version of a centrist politics designed to 
appeal to swinging voters.9 Marxists have been more interested in the 
development of a revolutionary consciousness in the working class and 
8. A.W. Martin, Robert Menzies, a life, vol. 1, 1894-1943, Melbourne, 1993. Unpublished 
biographies: see in particular, Phillip R. Hart, 'J.A. Lyons: A Political Biography', PhD 
thesis, ANU, 1967; and D.J. Potts, David Potts, 'A Study of Three Nationalists in the Bruce-
Page Government of 1923-29: Stanley Melbourne Bruce, John G. Latham, and George Arthur 
Maxwell', M.A. thesis, University of Melbourne, 1972. The 'secret army' Right: Keith Amos, 
The New Guard Movement, 1931-35, Melbourne, 1976; Michael Cathcart, Defending the 
National Tuckshop: Australia's Secret Army Intrigue of 1931, Melbourne, 1988, pp. 29, 77, 181-
82; Andrew Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, Kensington, NSW, 1989; Ibid., The 
Right Road? A History of Right-Wing Politics in Australia, Melbourne, 1995; U. Ellis, 
History of the Australian Country Party, Melbourne, 1963; B.D. Graham, The Formation of the 
Australian Country Party, Canberra, 1966. 
9. W.K. Hancock, Australia, London, 1930, ch. 4; James Jupp, Australian Party Politics, 1964, 
pp. 209-10; Ideology is given more emphasis in recent textbooks: see Dean Jaensch, Power 
Politics: Australia's Party System, Sydney, 1995, ch. 7. 
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have tended to regard non-Labor parties as agents of economic power rather 
than sources of political power. From Labor's early days, Party sympathisers 
have been fascinated by its history - but they have tended to focus on 
internal machinations and ideological conflicts; while their accounts of the 
ALP's relationships with its main party rivals emphasise resistance to Labor's 
reformist mission.JO Liberals have shown less interest in their history,11 
perhaps because they have regarded themselves as the guardians of a self-
evident normality and have tended to admire entrepreneurial above 
intellectual achievement. In sum, Australian non-Labor rhetoric and 
~""-t..... ideology ~ been neglected because of the prevalence of assumptions that 
political ideas are of little importance; that the Left is aligned with the 
dynamic forces of history and the Right's opposition is automatic, 
unthinking, and unchanging; and that the ideas expressed in party 
propaganda are not sufficiently cerebral to merit academic study. It seems 
that people committed to what they regard as a rational politics of the Left 
have underestimated the potency of apparently irrational ideas12; while 
academics attached to putatively objective social science methods, such as 
quantification, have been dismayed by the unsystematic quality of party 
political expressions of ideology. 
10. This is the 'initiative and resistance' theory criticised by Mayer, op. cit.; and see Brian 
Fitzpatrick, A Short History of the Australian Labor Movement, Melbourne, 1944 (1940); L.F. 
Crisp, Australian National Government, Melbourne, 1965, ch. 9 - 'The Parties of Town and 
Country Capital'. 
11. Graeme Starr, 'The Old Man on the Stairs: The Menzies of Myth and Legend', in Scott 
Prasser, J.R. Nethercote and John Warhurst (eds), The Menzies Era: A Reappraisal of 
Government, Politics and Policy, Sydney, 1995, p. 46. 
12. Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, London, 1948 (1908). 
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Nevertheless there are a few studies based on the assumption that ideology 
has been a significant aspect of non-Labor power, in that it has provided a 
means by which politicians have told themselves, their supporters and their 
constituents who they were and what they stood for; and that this ideology 
has included positive values and policies. For example, Peter Loveday has 
contended that the notion of economic development has been used in non-
Labor politics to justify a variety of policies, some interventionist in 
tendency, others in a laissez faire tradition. The attraction of the idea of 
development has been its unequivocally positive status and its flexibility.13 
Marion Simms has discussed the combination of anti-socialist, 
interventionist, and laissez faire dispositions in the attitudes of the_ Liberal 
Party of Australia attitudes to economic development.14 Peter Tiver has 
argued similarly that non-Labor ideology, defined by him as a loose amalgam 
of ameliorative and individualist tendencies, has been an important aspect 
of LPA politics in providing "justification and legitimation" for party 
policies. Particular aspects of non-Labor dpctrine have come to the fore in 
different situations and times. For example, interventionist reform has 
always been valuable in the politics of seeking the uncommitted voter, and 
the incorporation of welfare state and Keynesian ideas became an important 
factor in the creation of a new non-Labor identity in the 1940s.15 More 
recently, Judith Brett and Allan Martin have published studies of Menzies 
which, while varying radically in method and scope, share an assumption 
that Menzies was an effective leader of non-Labor because he understood 
13 Peter Loveday, 'Liberals and the idea of development', Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, 23, no. 2, Aug. 1977, pp. 219-226. 
14. Simms, op. cit., Ch. 2 & 3. 
l5. Peter Tiver, 'The Ideology of the Liberal Party of Australia: A Sketch and Interpretation', 
Politics XI (2), Nov 1976, p.156-64; Ibid., The Liberal Party: Principles and Performance, 
Brisbane, 1978; Ibid. 'Political Ideas in the Liberal Party', PhD thesis, ANU, 1973. 
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and gave eloquent voice to middle class values.16 The approach taken by 
these writers has been that ideas have been important means by which non-
Labor politicians have told themselves, their supporters and their 
constituents who they were and what they stood for. Liberal principles 
have not simply been a disguise for the power of capital: rather, non-Labor' 
articulation of ideas about the good society has been a means by which power 
has been exercised. Not even the most sympathetic students of non-Labor 
deny that fear-mongering was an important method of seeking and 
exercising power.17 But there is a need to consider not only the more 
obviously extremist and scarifying aspects of non-Labor persuasion, but also 
its dependence on positive (in the double sense of 'substantive' and 
'desirable') values; and to take account of the circumstances which shaped 
and lent credibility to the fearful, and hopeful aspects of the non-Labor 
world-view.18 
Given the scarcity of studies of non-Labor rhetoric and ideology, there is a 
need for a survey history. Much remains to be said about the variations in 
non-Labor politics as practised in different States, regions, and cities; by men 
and women; and by particular individuals and organisations. But the 
persistence of themes in non-Labor politics requires explanation, too. While 
Federal voters chose local representatives, their votes also determined which 
party would form a government with national responsibilities. 
16. Judith Brett, Robert Menzies' Forgotten People, Sydney, 1992; A.W. Martin, Robert 
Menzies, a life, vol . 1, 1894-1943, Melbourne, 1993. 
17. Martin, op. cit., Ch. 4; Robert Manne, The Petrov Affair: Politics and Espionage, Sydney, 
1987, p. 98. 
18. Tiver, op. cit., p. 156. 
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Across the country, these imperatives were interpreted in similar ways by 
politicians and journalists who thought in terms of party traditions 
established in a single legislature. Retiring members had to defend positions 
taken by the party; new candidates would have been familiar with the 
parliamentary issues canvassed in the press, in extra-parliamentary 
organisations and pressure groups, and in the community. Politicians made 
speeches similar to those delivered by their colleagues in different areas; 
because the underlying purpose of election rhetoric was to justify an attitude 
to laws which applied nation-wide. Politicians assumed that Australian 
society was sufficiently homogenous for these party arguments - about what 
the state needed to do, or not do, to make life better - to bring out a non-
Labor, or Labor vote in electorates varying in wealth, prevalent types of 
work, religion and ethnicity, proximity to the main centres of population, 
and State, regional and local traditions of politics. In each House of 
Representatives district, local influence remained important, and while 
personal and local considerations were less significant in Senate voting, 
votes were nonetheless cast locally and issues varied between States, regions, 
and electorates. Furthermore, the popularity or otherwise of State parties 
rubbed off on their Federal counterparts. There was a tradition of appealing 
to regional political loyalties. But despite all the forces making for variation, 
politicians worked on the assumption that there were party constituencies 
that could be brought out by speaking the kind of language which voters 
expected to hear. Liberal Commonwealth election speeches made in 
Queensland were similar to those heard in Victoria: each could be expected 
to contain the arguments which had, in the years since Federation, come to 
comprise a recognisably Liberal rhetoric. 
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We need, then, to know more in a general sense about the politics of image 
and persuasion associated with the continuous presence and frequent success 
of the Australian non-Labor parties. So little work has been done that there 
is a need for a study which traces the progress of non-Labor through times 
often treated as distinct periods: the First World War, the 1920s, the 
Depression, the Second World War, and the Cold War. This is the 
contribution to knowledge which I hope to make with this thesis. My 
framing of the problem has placed variations at the margin and concentrated 
on national themes. I take some account of variations, particularly those 
caused by State politics, but always in relation to the evident consistencies in 
non-Labor politics at each election. 
I attempt to elucidate the positive elements in non-Labor doctrine. What 
little material there is on the principal parties has concentrated more on 
negativity than on the preservation of values. It is often assumed that non-
Labor had no ideas worth mentioning. Certainly, the Nationalist, United 
Australia, and Liberal parties were no more doctrinaire than Labor, and their 
amalgam of liberalism and conservatism is as difficult to capture as Labor 
Party socialism. But we can find evidence in election propaganda of the type 
of society which non-Labor politicians advocated, and of their conception of 
the ideal role of the state. These ideas were often crude and derivative, 
sometimes eloquently expressed, and never developed into systematic 
9 
theory, and in this respect right and leftwing campaign arguments were 
similar. 
Non-Labor candidates presented themselves as the champions of common 
sense conceptions of government and were limited and empowered by the 
conventional wisdoms of their times. They were opportunistic, but their 
rhetoric was constrained by the often contradictory imperatives of appealing 
to core supporters while wooing the uncommitted. Belief about public 
opinion influenced politician's appeals to that opinion. Non-Labor 
politicians were constrained by their perceptions of the mood of the people 
and the type of politics which they would endorse. Politicians also had to 
maintain the support of their colleagues in Parliament and their financial 
backers (the extent to which they had to conciliate lay party opinion is 
uncertain, but this was probably a less important consideration for the right 
than for Labor). Furthermore, they could only think in the ways which 
were available to them.19 Experience and conviction had combined to 
predispose them to see the world in particular ways. When we examine 
private commentary on politics, we discover that while non-Labor 
politicians exaggerated their warnings of danger from the left in order to 
exploit tendencies in public opinion, they themselves believed that the left 
really was dangerous. Non-Labor politicians amplified popular beliefs, and 
19. ''It seems that the place of thought in the record rarely amounts to that of an engine 
driving politicians forward ... More convincing is a conception of thought as a reservoir of 
political possibility." Michael Bentley, 'Party, Doctrine and Thought', in Michael Bentley 
and John Stevenson (eds), High and Low Politics in Modern Britain: Ten Studies, Oxford, 1983, 
p. 143. 
10 
the most effective of them understood these beliefs because they shared 
them.20 
Non-Labor ideology was often based on opposition to leftwing proposals, but 
was never entirely negative, and we add another dimension to our 
understanding of Australian Federal politics if we consider the positive 
arguments put by its dominant parties to the electorate. Several positive 
values stand out in the politics of this period: that national allegiance must 
be take precedence over loyalty to party, class and section; that Australia is 
linked by cultural affinity and strategic and economic self-interest to Britain 
and, from the early 1940s, to the United States; that it is better to stay with the 
time-proven ways of tradition than to experiment with new forms of social 
organisation; that self-reliance is preferable to state-dependence; that private 
property brings material benefits and political liberties which would be 
extinguished in a communitarian system; that property and liberty are 
preserved by a web of contractual obligations, which must be maintained 
even at the cost of hardship. Defence was always important in non-Labor 
politics as a national interest, trascending class; while individualist, 'sound 
money' values were ethical as well as economic, and were distinctively but 
not exclusively middle class; their emphasis on safety, responsibility and 
discipline also resembled the self-improving values of the respectable 
working class.21 
20 M · · 
. artm, op. cit. 
21. Janet McCalman, 'Class and Respectability in a Working Class Suburb: Richmond, 
Victoria, Before the Great War', Historical Studies, no. 78. pp. 90-103; Ibid., Janet McCalman, 
Journeyings: The Biography of a Middle Class Generation, 1920-1990, Melbourne, 1993, 
especially pp. 231-36. 
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The arguments of non-Labor politicians in support of these principles 
combined the contingent with the traditionally-determined, and also rested 
on a connection between what I call 'limited' and 'threat and loyalty' styles of 
politics. By 'limited' I mean debates over choosing the best state policy for 
the national interest, in which non-Labor did not accuse Labor of betraying 
that interest to a foreign power. These debates were limited in that non-
Labor agreed that Labor remained within the boundaries of a range of 
opinion suggested, ambiguously, by assumptions shared by each side. Non-
Labor acknowledged that Labor's dissent was nevertheless consistent with a 
legitimate attitude to the nation state. The effect of such thinking was to 
limit aggression: non-Labor believed that the harm caused by Labor victory 
would be partial and reparable. 
While this pattern of controversy was common in Australian Federal 
politics in the first half the century, the 'limited' style of politics co-existed 
with a mode of extremist argument which I call threat and loyalty politics.22 
When non-Labor politicians argued in this manner they insisted that Labor 
was unacceptably close, both organisationally and ideologically, to the 
Communist Party of Australia, or its syndicalist and Irish republican 
predecessors in beyond-the-pale dissent. This aspect of party controversy 
22. My idea of 'threat and loyalty' politics is derived from Richard Hofstadter's analysis of 
'The Paranoid Style in American Politics', in The Paranoid Style in American Politics & 
Other Essays, New York, 1965, pp. 3-40. 'Limited' is used by Noel O'Sullivan to describe the 
conservative disposition to preserve private life from extensions of state power. 
Conservatism, London, 1983 (1976), p. 12. 
12 
involved the argument that the extremist party was combined with a foreign 
power against the national interest, and that this misplaced loyalty produced 
an extraordinary threat to the community. The extremists had placed 
themselves outside the spectrum of legitimate dissent expressed in the 
formula 'Her [or His] Majesty's Loyal Opposition'. Citizens mindful of the 
national interest should recognise that the danger resulting from this party's 
extremist ideology and foreign associations necessitated the use of state 
powers normally offensive to liberal principles. An important part of non-
Labor election argument from around 1917 was that while non-Labor could 
be trusted to use Commonwealth powers to suppress sedition, Labor was 
suspiciously tolerant of the Communists. The evidence for this was that the 
two parties had a common heritage in a socialist tradition, and that both 
were parties of the union movement. Labor's ideological and organisational 
proximity to the CPA explained its ambivalent attitude to the repressive 
measures which non-Labor proposed. 
These aspects did not work together in a neat and schematic way, for the 
distinction between the positive and limited, and the threat-and- loyalty 
modes of politics was cloudy; they were tendencies rather than categories. It 
can be difficult to identify 'threat and loyalty' politics, for an obsession with 
conspiracy is not a singular phenomenon but an extreme case of the 
common desire to understand politics by concentrating on the personalities 
and intentions of individuals and particular groups.23 Nevertheless, we can 
discern a loose pattern. One theme of this thesis is that non-Labor 
23. Edeleman, op. cit., p. 193. 
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politicians sought to combine limited and threat and loyalty rhetoric so as to 
mobilise public opinion. The combination came from the need to generate 
interest in a conflict between two parties which shared a commitment to 
constitutionalism and the development of a mixed-capitalist economy. No 
matter how much Labor and non-Labor politicians might compromise and 
bargain in their legislative work, electoral contests necessitated a theatre of 
conflict. When non-Labor politicians appealed for support they chose issues 
which provided a chance to persuade citizens to prefer their party to Labor. 
A policy which Labor supported would be unsuitable. It was in non-Labor's 
interest to make the choice between the parties seem as stark as possible; to 
represent the left as the transgressor and the right as the custodian of 
communal standards. So non-Labor politicians invoked extreme issues: 
threats not merely to degrade but to extinguish such institutions as private 
property, the home, the rule of law, religion, the nation-state.24 This was 
how limited and threat and loyalty politics converged. Non-Labor leaders 
claimed that ordinary benefits (the subject of limited politics) were 
threatened by extraordinary dangers (the subject of threat and loyalty 
politics). It is apparent that politicians inferred from the low level of public 
involvement in political life that citizens were mostly interested in 
pursuing personal benefits, but did not see the need to pursue self-interest 
in the public world of politics, even to the limited extent of voting for one 
24. O'Sullivan finds "the reduction of all experience to a world of absolutes" in which "the 
alternatives confronting men are presented in the form of a grossly over-simplified choice 
between pure harmony and pure anarchy'' to be essential to extreme conservatism. Il:llii., p. 38. 
I consider that this polarisation is most characteristic of left and rightwing political 
extremism, but is integral to the general political task of differentiating oneself from one's 
opponents, and binding one's supporters together. 
14 
party in particular, unless their interests were dramatised by politicians as a 
struggle to preserve the existence of a way of life against its enemies.25 
Like their opponents, non-Labor politicians used the language of good and 
evil, for while administration was often predicated on compromise, the 
mobilisation of public opinion required melodrama. Non-Labor politicians 
have in government often adopted centrist policies and extremist rhetoric. 
The necessity to preserve state authority by avoiding serious offence to any 
significant section of public opinion has militated towards centrist policies.26 
On the other hand, the attraction of scarifying rhetoric was that it offered a 
way of identifying non-Labor as the guardian of essential institutions: here 
was a way of driving voters away from Labor, rallying one's own 
supporters and, by linking Labor to the extremist left, dividing the Labor 
coalition of left and centrist opinion. 
My main primary sources for this study of propaganda are newspaper 
advertisements and reports, pamphlets, and politicians' correspondence. 
The newspaper coverage of politics changed between 1914 and 1954. In the 
early part of this period, approximately 1914-1930, there were few feature-
style party advertisements with pictures and slogans. (These began to appear 
in the 1930s and were common in the postwar years as advertising agencies 
added gloss to the party message.) Instead, it was usual for newspapers to 
25. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, Urbana, 1964, p. 38. 
26. Brian Harrison, 'The Centrist Theme in Modern British Politics' in Peaceable Kingdom: 
Stability and Change in Modern Britain, Oxford, 1982, especially pp. 317-18; 339-40. 
15 
provide extremely detailed accounts of public meetings, based on verbatim 
reporting and extended paraphrasing. This style of reporting, designed to 
evoke the atmosphere as well as the formal content of the political meeting, 
receded in the 1930s perhaps because radio was taking over the role of 'on the 
spot' reporting. Unfortunately I have found few transcripts of radio 
broadcasts. There is, however, abundant pamphlet material from 
throughout this period. Speakers' notes - summaries of party arguments on 
likely subjects - were also a constant feature of electioneering. The parties 
evidently considered these manuals to be worth a considerable amount of 
money, as they could run to hundreds of pages. In that speakers' notes were 
intended to provide material for public debate but were to be seen only by 
candidates and trusted activists, these tracts were in some ways public and in 
others private. For private commentary I have used the correspondence 
and, in two cases, diaries, of parliamentarians and others who were involved 
in political life. This material has been useful in suggesting the confidential 
opinions of non-Labor politicians, although private correspondence is not, 
of course, free from artifice. Some collections include letters from activists 
and constituents, and I have used this material as evidence of the climate of 
opinion in which professional politicians operated. There are no substantial 
extant records of the non-Labor extra-parliamentary parties prior to 1945, but 
from that date the papers of the Liberal Party Federal Secretariat, particularly 
the Federal Public Relations ('Staff') Planning Committee, offer insights into 
Liberal perceptions of the political scene. 
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The analysis of this material centres on election campaign arguments rather 
than other aspects of politics which have interested historians, such as 
policy-making, party organisation, and voting behaviour. This thesis 
concentrates on election campaigns because in a democracy these are the 
main occasions on which politicians seek support for their programs by 
articulating to the public the values which they hope to advance by using the 
power of the state. Although it would be naive to suggest that policy derived 
directly from campaign promises, government action was influenced by 
commitments made in campaigns: a mandate provided both incentive and 
justification. Conversely, policy provided some of the material of campaign 
argument. Election campaigns influenced - and were influenced by - politics 
at other times. They were periods of intense efforts at persuasion which 
coloured political life between elections, and were shaped by the 
environment of the time. 
The range of the thesis is restricted in a number of ways. Examining the 
combination of limited and threat and loyalty politics involves a study of 
the problems of national allegiance, and the domestic implications of foreign 
affairs. These were national issues, so the Commonwealth is the focus of my 
study, and I examine State politics only when (for example, during the 
second Lang government) State issues had a marked effect on Federal affairs. 
For reasons of space I concentrate on the principal non-Labor parties - the 
Nationalists, United Australia Party, and Liberals - rather than the junior 
partner, the Country Party. I have concentrated on leaders' policy speeches 
and on speakers' notes because these were the most comprehensive 
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statements of the non-Labor agenda. I examine Labor electoral politics to 
provide a context for non-Labor: about one fifth of the space is devoted to the 
former. New South Wales and Victoria receive more attention than the 
less populated States. I am interested in the reasons which contemporaries 
gave for election results, and note the results briefly. This is not a 
psephological study: persuasion of voters rather than voting is my main 
subject. Nor is it a history of policy-making: I treat policy as the context for 
electoral politics. The narrative sections which link the accounts of election 
campaigns concentrate the prominent issues of those issues campaigns of 
the period, and those which seem to have influenced election rhetoric. 
The chronological scope of this study precludes an exhaustive discussion of 
every election between 1914 and 1954.27 Such an approach would be 
repetitive in any case as the material often varied only slightly from one 
campaign to the next. On the other hand, a narrative account of a long 
period provides the opportunity to discern the main themes as they emerge 
and recede: political attitudes tend to change slowly, and can best be studied 
over a long period; and the persistence of attitudes despite changes in 
circumstances is also most readily discerned over a long duration. This 
study concerns, in part, the domestic politics of external threats, and so the 
1914-18 war is an appropriate point to begin. 1914-18 was a period of intense 
excitement and political conflict over the human and economic costs of the 
war. The evidence presented in this thesis supports the argument that the 
war experience exacerbated social and political division and intensified left 
27. A total of seventeen, including the 1953 Senate election. The election dates are 1914, 1917, 
1919, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1929, 1931, 1934, 1937, 1940, 1943, 1946, 1949, 1951, 1953, 1954. 
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and rightwing extremism; and that the optimism inherent in early 
Commonwealth liberalism gave way to a more fearful and authoritarian 
style of non-Labor politics. These effects on political thinking make the war 
an appropriate starting point for a study of non-Labor electioneering in the 
first half of the century. The mid 1950s provide a convenient point of 
conclusion. Firstly, there is a continuity of media and campaign method in 
the previous four decades: the public meeting, the pamphlet, the Press and, 
more elusively, door-to-door canvassing were the principal media of these 
years. The only significant technological innovation was radio: Bruce's 1925 
policy speech was the first to be broadcast, and radio became an increasingly 
influential medium from there on. Broadcasting allowed politicians to by-
pass the Press, and gradually accustomed people to a more remote style of 
communication than that exemplified by the rowdiness and showmanship 
of the public meeting. The introduction of television in 1956 intensified 
this transition from public to private, home-based forms of entertainment 
and communication. Secondly, by the mid 1950s it was apparent that the 
postwar prosperity evident in rising personal consumption was not, after 
all, going to disappear in a new slump. The shortages of the Curtin and 
Chifley years, and the inflation and sudden deflation experienced in the 
first four years of Liberal government, had eased. Full male employment 
(that is, less than two percent) low interest rates (under five percent) and 
price stability contributed to a rising standard of living based on the pursuit 
of suburban home ownership and consumer goods.28 These new conditions 
of wellbeing, celebrated in the contemporary phrase, 'the Australian way of 
life', seem in retrospect more American than British. 
28 Greg Whitwell, Making the Market: The Rise of Consumer Society, Melbourne, 1989. 
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While immigration, the atomic weapons trials, and the popular 1954 Royal 
tour demonstrated the continued strength of British attachments, the 
United States was displacing Britain as a focus of cultural aspirations, a 
source of capital, and· as Australia's principal great power ally.29 So, very 
approximately, the mid 1950s mark the end of a period of pervasive 
'Britishness' and relative economic insecurity. More precisely, the 1954 
election confirmed that the new government had recovered from the 
troubles of the early 1950s and consolidated its ascendancy over a divided 
Labor Party. 
29. Richard White, ' 'The Australian Way of Life' ',Historical Studies, vol. 18, no. 73, Oct 
1979, pp. 528-45; Lorna Arnold, A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapons Trials 
in Australia, London, 1987; David Lowe, '1954: The Queen and Australia in the World', 
fournal of Australian Studies, no. 46, Sep 1995, pp. 1-10. 
Chapter 1. Commonwealth Liberal politics at the outbreak of the 1914-18 war 
The issues, leaders and organisations of the 1914 election were those of the 
early Commonwealth, and before we turn to the Liberal campaign it will be 
useful to survey the image of Liberalism in previous years, to introduce the 
party leader along with two of his - arguably representative - followers, and 
to sketch the organisations responsible for electioneering. 
Historians have seen in this period the origins of the contemporary party 
system. Some have argued that by 1914, traditions of parliamentary faction 
and local patronage had been supplemented by a pattern in which voting 
was influenced by identification with party labels which represented 
consistent attitudes to national questions.1 In studies of the transition from 
three parties to two which took place in the first decade of federation, 
historians have identified two important strands in non-Labor: the New 
South Wales-based free trade, later anti-socialist party led by George Reid, 
and Joseph Cook, and the predominantly Victorian protectionist followers of 
Alfred Deakin. 2 
1. Stuart Macintyre, A Colonial Liberalism: The Lost World of Three Victorian Visionaries, 
Melbourne, 1991, p. 37. The main sources for this section on the early Commonwealth are 
Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law, 1901-1929, Melbourne, 1956; J.A. La 
Nauze, Alfred Deakin, A Biography, vol. 2, Melbourne, 1965; Peter Loveday, A.W. Martin & 
R.S. Parker (eds.), The Emergence of the Australian Party System, Sydney, 1977; and John 
Rickard, Class and Politics: New South Wales, Victoria and the Early Commonwealth, 1890-
1910, Canberra, 1976. 
2. George Reid, Free Trade MHR for East Sydney (NSW), 1901-09; Prime Minister, 1904-05; 
Leader of the Opposition, 1901-04, 1905-08. Joseph Cook: see below; Alfred Deakin, Liberal 
Protectionist MHR for Ballaarat (Vic), 1901-13; Prime Minister, 1903-04, 1905-08, 1909-10; 
Leader of the Opposition, 1909, 1910-13. 
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In the first parliament, the free traders were committed to a low revenue 
tariff and therefore to a limited role for the Common wealth, and were 
sceptical also, of compulsory arbitration. From 1904 Reid attempted to 
build a free trade-protectionist coalition against Labor, and in doing so he 
placed less emphasis on tariffs and more on the dangers of state 
intervention. Anti-socialism was intended to embarrass the Deakin party 
over its reliance on Labor. The Anti-Socialist party, so-called from the 1906 
election when the publicity of this movement reached a peak, detected 
collectivism not only in Labor enthusiasms for state enterprise, but also in 
the New Protection policies of the Deakin government. Reid argued, for 
example, that provisions in the Trade Marks Act (1905) for a label certifying 
that the parliament was satisfied that goods had been made in Australia 
under fair working conditions, might encourage boycotts of goods and 
coercion of workers into unions.3 His cr~ed was never entirely negative: 
Reid made much of threats to capitalism but also emphasised its benefits: for 
example, that workers, as consumers, could obtain goods at competitive 
prices. Anti-Socialists attempted to persuade voters to put aside fiscal 
loyalties and discriminate instead between individualist and collectivist 
programs, a distinction which offered the opportunity of detaching 
conservative protectionists from the Deakin camp. 
3
. Socialism, as defined in the Australian Labor Party's Objective and Platform, [report of 
debate between Reid and William Holman, deputy leader of the New South Wales Labor 
party, Sydney, 2-3 April 1906], Sydney, n.d, p. 13; W.G. McGinn, George Reid, Melbourne, 
1989, pp. 231 & 235. 
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For the time being, Deakin and his followers resisted this re-orientation: they 
continued to insist that tariffs were integral to their purpose, and 
endeavoured to attract voters with a milder, centrist version of the 
interventionist policies increasingly associated with Labor. At the 1906 
election, Deakin warned that Reid's an ti-socialism " ... was a futile and 
meaningless cry ... [which offered] ... only destruction to protection and 
progressive legislation." Deakin confessed his unease at the subordination 
of Labor parliamentarians to the unions, but denied that socialism was 
alarming. He was confident that Labor's moderate leaders would contain 
the extremists, and distinguished between the practice of Labor and Liberal 
legislation, and the "visionary" ideal of a communitarian future: the latter 
was not a plan which anyone with power in the Labor party could 
implement. The question of contemporary socialism, by which Deakin 
meant state ownership of capital, should, he insisted, be considered 
empirically, with regard to the peculiarities of each industry or resource, and 
on these criteria even anti-socialists conceded. the benefits of public 
ownership of railways, postal services and schools. While Liberals remained 
wary of constitutional amendment, their " ... experience [has] justified 
certain forms of State socialism".4 To readers familiar with the anti-socialism 
which has been such a prominent feature of non-Labor politics in this 
century, the notion of a non-Labor prime minister, in the midst of an 
election campaign, giving limited praise to socialism, must seem 
extraordinary. Deakin's attitude is evidence of the strength in the 
Federation period of the liberal identification with a collectivist tendency in 
politics, and of the fluidity of party attitudes. 
4
. Protection and Practical Legislation or Anti-Socialism, Ballarat, 1906, p. 27; La Nauze, ~ 
cit., p. 386; The Liberal Party and its Liberal Programme, Adelaide, 1906, pp. 14-15. 
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At the 1906 election, Deakin's Liberal Protectionists were again unable to gain 
a majority. They lost seats both to the Anti-Socialists and to Labor, and 
formed government with the support of the latter. The second Deakin 
government was the final phase in the Liberal-Labor association, with the 
Old Age Pensions Act (1908) the last substantial measure on which the 
parties cooperated in government. This parliament was also responsible for 
enacting the New Protection, a name given to laws which were generated by 
different circumstances but had common tactical and intellectual sources. In 
the first place, these measures promised an extension of the 1890s Victorian 
alliance of working and middle-class protectionist opinion to a new 
constituency which included Labor's non-Victorian free trade sceptics. 
Conceptually, the laws derived from the new liberal assumption, current in 
Britain and the United States, that state power need not degrade, and could 
enhance individual liberty. The New Protection was typical of new liberal 
responses to the problem of poverty. In place of the classic liberal emphasis 
on self-help and the inviolability of business action, new liberals stressed 
state assistance and regulation. The mechanism of the New Protection was 
a connection between wage regulation and the Commonwealth's tariff 
powers, and its most important manifestation was the Excise Tariff 
(Agricultural Machinery) Act (1906), which placed an excise on 
manufacturers receiving tariff protection, and removed it provided that the 
arbitration court was satisfied that the employer was paying 'fair and 
reasonable' wages. When the manufacturer H.V. McKay applied for an 
exemption, Justice Higgins made his famous ruling that wages could not be 
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fair and reasonable unless they allowed a man and his family to live in a 
manner suitable for members of a civilised community. Higgins ruled that 
seven shillings a day was needed for this purpose, and added later that a fair 
wage was one which allowed a man to marry. In 1908 the High Court 
declared the Excise Tariff Act and the Commonwealth trade mark invalid, 
and the male basic wage did not reach the Harvester rate until 1921. 
Nonetheless the ideal of the New Protection, that the Commonwealth's duty 
to men, women and children was to guarantee a decent household standard 
of living by regulating male wages, became a public faith, which demanded 
homage even from sceptics. 5 
Labor was at once attracted to and dissatisfied with this variety of reformism. 
Liberals took a benign view of arbitration, but baulked at proposals for a land 
tax and a Commonwealth bank, and now that Labor had more members 
than its governing partner its position had become anomalous. In 1908 the 
leader of the parliamentary party, Andrew Fisher6, announced that Labor 
was withdrawing support from Deakin and forming a minority government. 
During the parliamentary recess the Deakinite Liberals and the Anti-
Socialists, now led by Joseph Cook, arranged a union to turn Labor out. The 
Fusion, as it was called, was difficult to make. Apart from the personal 
5. David Carment, 'Australian Liberal: A Political Biography of Sir Littleton Groom, 1867-
1936', PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1975, p. 91. Kenneth D. Brown (ed.), Essays 
in Anti-Labour History: Responses to the Rise of Labour in Britain, London, 1974, p. 7; Rickard, 
op. cit., p. 221; Marilyn Lake, Chapter 8 'Gendered Settlements', in Patricia Grimshaw, 
Marilyn Lake, Ann McGrath & Marian Quartly, Creating a Nation, Ringwood, Victoria, 1994, 
pp. 200-01; Jill Roe, 'Chivalry and Social Policy in the Antipodes', Historical Studies, vol. 22, 
no. 88, April 1987, 
p. 406; La Nauze, op. cit., p. 412. 
6. Labor MHR for Wide Bay (Qld), 1901-15; Prime Minister, 1908-09, 1910-13; Leader of the 
Opposition, 1909-10, 1913-14. 
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antagonisms between the parliamentarians of each camp, particularly the 
leaders, each to some extent owed his place in parliament to the support of 
voters accustomed to choosing a candidate identified with one or other of 
the old parties. The Liberal Protectionists were used to deriding their non-
Labor opponents as 'conservatives', a label which, for reasons I will discuss 
in the conclusion, has been a swear-word in Australian politics. Anti-
socialists were in the habit of denigrating the protectionists as 'wobblers', 
who lacked the moral fibre to resist collectivism. But the motives for 
Fusion were compelling, particularly for the Protectionists, many of whom 
had good reason to believe that without Labor immunity they would lose 
their seats in any three-way contest. The anti-socialists had for some time 
argued that the danger of socialism made Labor and non-Labor the logical 
division of politics. Most importantly, perhaps, the passing of the tariff in 
1908 established the apparently permanent arrival of a protectionist 
orthodoxy. With the fiscal -issue sunk the way was clear. But a problem 
remained in the determination of Deakin and his followers to retain what 
they regarded as the distinctive elements of Victorian-style progressivism. 
The anti-socialists, however, could not be expected to countenance any 
program which seemed too radical. The platform which Cook and Deakin 
agreed to was drawn up by the latter, and its New Protection clause, crucial 
to the Fusion accommodation, contained a dilution of that. The new Liberal 
Party determined that it would eliminate any interstate differences in wages 
which constituted unfair competition. The implication from past policy was 
that differences would be levelled up, but there was no guarantee of this. 
The ability of employers to compete on fair terms with their peers replaced 
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as a first principle the key tenet of the old New Protection, the fair wage. In 
this sense the Fusion was a shift to the right. 7 
This was evident during the 1910 election, in Deakin's campaign as leader of 
the new Liberal party . He devoted much of his time to warning voters that 
Labor would curtail their liberties; his position resembled the negative anti-
socialism for which he had criticised Reid's campaign of 1906.s Labor was 
elected with a majority in both houses, and proceeded to implement its 
. / frt't/lr'Y'\.I • 
mildly radica» The attitudes of the opposition to the Fisher government, 
1910-13, anticipated those of the 1914 election. Liberals welcomed the 
purpose of the Fabian-inspired Maternity Allowance, but were uneasy about 
encouraging motherhood out of wedlock, and paying public funds without 
requiring individual contributions. The strongest resistance to the new 
Commonwealth Bank was aroused by its savings bank section, on the 
grounds that this encroached on State revenues. The extension of 
arbitration to rural and domestic workers was opposed, as was the 
introduction of union preference in government employment, and the 
abolition of postal voting, which Labor alleged had been corrupted. Labor 
regarded the rising cost of living as one the main problems facing its 
constituents, and was convinced that deliberate restriction of supply by 
monopoly capitalists was the cause. In constitutional amendments the 
Government sought powers to prohibit and to nationalise monopolies, and 
to exert complete control over employment conditions. Liberals campaigned 
7. La Nauze, op. cit., p. 560; Rickard, op. cit., p. 211. 
8. La Nauze, op. cit., p. 599. 
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successfully against the referenda, claiming that the proposals were 
potentially tyrannical. 
The rejection of these amendments in 1911 and again in 1913 when the 
Liberals regained government signalled, perhaps, a popular reaction to the 
Labor. Certainly the attitude of Liberal politicians had shifted to the right 
since 1906. Liberals were disturbed by the collectivist and interventionist 
trend in Labor legislation, and by the growth of the trade unions. The Labor 
record of 1910-13 may have been moderate, but now that Labor had broken 
with the middle class progressives, there was no telling how far to the left 
the party would go. Liberal politicians believed that experimental 
Commonwealth legislation had been taken far enough for the time being, 
and it was on this basis that they sought popular support. Before we consider 
the organisations which Liberals used to promote these and other 
arguments in 1914, a review of the careers of three politicians may offer 
some illumination of the formation of Liberal politics. 
Since 1913 the party had been led by Joseph Cook. He was born in 1860 into a 
coal mining family in Staffordshire, and worked in the pits from the age of 
nine. He emigrated to New South Wales as a young man, and was 
employed at Lithgow in the responsible position of check-weighman. Active 
in the union, Cook was elected on the Labor ticket to the Legislative 
Assembly in 1891, and became leader of the parliamentary party two years 
later. The next year, however, he led a group which resigned from the party 
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rather than pledge to vote in parliament as a caucus majority determined. 
Cook became a minister in the Reid government and winning Parramatta at 
the 1901 election, followed Reid in Commonwealth politics. As an 
independent member of the New South Wales Parliament he had been 
responsible for laws addressing miners' grievances, but in Federal politics he 
became increasingly identified with conservative causes. Once he had 
supported compulsory arbitration as a means of raising wages, but now he 
insisted that arbitration was socialistic, artificial, and inefficient. Cook was 
prominent in the anti-socialist campaign of 1906, and led this group after 
Reid's retirement in 1908. During the 1914 election, the Sydney Morning 
Herald carried a character sketch by former Reid minister, J.A. Hogue, who 
rendered Cook's life as a fable of sel~-help. The hardships which the young 
Cook had endured, Hogue explained, had impelled him to seek to improve 
the lot of the workers, but the caucus system had affronted a manly spirit 
forged by a life of striving. He had already learnt that individual effort was 
the path to success: to lead the party of individualism was the next logical 
step.9 
Sir William Irvine was Cook's attorney-general in the 1913-14 government, 
and one of his closest advisers. Educated at Trinity College, Dublin, and the 
University of Melbourne, he had practised at the bar before winning the 
country seat, Lowan, on a free trade ticket in 1894. Irvine associated himself 
with the rural populist Kyabram movement which, with the backing of 
9. ADB, 8, pp. 96-99, article by F.K. Crowley; J.R.M. Murdoch, 'Joseph Cook: A Political 
Biography', PhD thesis, University of New South Wales, 1968, pp. 160-63; Sydney Morning 
Herald , 11 Jul 1914, p. 7. The theory and practice of the 'manly mastery' of four of Victorian 
liberalism's public men is discussed in Macintyre, A Colonial Liberalism. 
29 
Melbourne employers' groups, was calling for retrenchment in order to lift 
taxes from drought-stricken producers. The Kyabram group won the 1903 
election, but retrenchment provoked a strike by railwaymen, which Irvine 
suppressed by sacking the organisers and introducing non-union labour. His 
handling of the strike made him popular with the country and the middle 
class, and notorious with Labor opinion. Determined that government 
should be independent of pressure by organised workers' groups, he went so 
far as to introduce separate parliamentary representation for public servants 
and railway workers. Irvine was elected to the semi-rural Federal seat of 
Flinders in 1906, and his reputation followed him: choosing ministers three 
years later, Deakin was warned by one follower that to include Irvine 
would direct the railway and public service votes against Liberal candidates, 
particularly in Victoria.JO 
Littleton Groom had been one of the most prominent Deakinite Liberals. 
His father, William Groom, an emancipist shop keeper and press proprietor, 
had been a power in the Toowoomba area, which he represented in the 
Legislative Assembly. Littleton, born in 1867, combined a legal career with 
enthusiasm for federation, and lay Anglican humanitarian and liberal 
causes, in particular adult education. In March 1901 William Groom was 
elected to the Commonwealth Parliament as the member for Darling 
Downs, but died five months later. His son was elected in his place, on the 
votes, it was said, of his father's followers, and of Labor supporters. Groom 
regarded Commonwealth arbitration as a means of realising Federation's 
10. ADB, 9, pp. 439-441; Hume Cook to Deakin, 22 May 1909, in La Nauze, ~.,, p. 571. 
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reformist opportunity. Industrial conflict could be resolved by tribunals 
judging workers' claims, which were usually reasonable. In the 1906 
election Groom enjoyed immunity from Labor candidacy, and like his hero, 
Deakin, maintained that he was for socialism in so far that he agreed with 
the public ownership of utilities such as railways. As a minister in the 
second Deakin government, Groom had been responsible for promoting the 
New Protection, and for the introduction of old age pensions. He was 
uneasy about the Fusion but was convinced that union with Cook's 
evidently more popular following was the only way in which liberalism 
could survive: he doubted that he could retain Darling Downs in a three-
cornered ballot. The shift was made easier by his belief, made plain in 
opposition to the Fisher government, that Labor had moved too far to the 
left. Groom moved an amendment to the Maternity Allowance Act that the 
Commonwealth institute contributory national insurance. He discovered 
class bias in the government's refusal to send troops to Brisbane during the 
1912 strike, and warned that preference for unionists would force employees 
to profess socialism. 11 
Cook, Irvine, Groom and their colleagues were responsible for their own 
election campaigns, but were assisted by a variety of organisations, based 
separately in the States. Official statements of policy were written by 
parliamentarians, or officials responsible to them. In 1914 Cook wrote his 
own policy speech, consulting Irvine and his other counsellor, the Defence 
11
. ADB , 9, pp. 130-33. article by David Carment; Ibid., 'The Making of an Australian 
Liberal: The Political Education of Littleton Groom, 1867-1905', fournal of the Royal 
Australian Historical Society, vol. 62, 4, March 1977, pp. 232-50; Ibid .. 'Australian Liberal' , 
pp. 65, 139-41; Sawer, op. cit., p. 96. 
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minister Edward Millen.12 He could count on a sympathetic reception in 
the daily Press, with the exception of the Age, which was unreconciled to the 
decline of Victorian-style liberalism. There was no national organisation, 
but it was expected that leading politicians would assist other Liberals. ·For 
example, although he was not contesting a seat, the former Deakinite 
member for Bourke, Hume Cookl3, undertook a speaking tour of Victoria, 
and asked Groom to provide him with statistics on public finance. William 
Wattl4, recently retired from the Victorian Premiership, was considered an 
effective platform speaker and, having secured preselection for the safe seat 
of Balaclava, campaigned in rural Victoria, and in Adelaide and Sydney. 
Liberal speakers' notes, compiled by an able New South Wales backbencher, 
Walter Massy Greene, were printed in Melbourne. The notes quoted from 
Sydney and Melbourne newspapers; how widely they were distributed is 
unclear.15 
A portion of the money for literature and other purposes was raised by 
groups of businessmen in the capital cities, through personal appeals and 
form letters. Due to the secrecy surrounding political donations at the time, 
12. New South Wales Senator (Free Trade; Liberal; Nationalist), 1901-23; Minister for 
Defence, 1913-14. 
13. Liberal Protectionist MHR for Bourke (Vic), 1901-10. 
14. Liberal Premier of Victoria, 1912-13, 1913-14; Liberal/Nationalist MHR for Balaclava 
(Vic), 1914-29; Treasurer, 1918-20. 
15. Murdoch,~., pp. 251-52, 282; Cook to Groom, 26 June 1914. Groom papers: NLA MS 
236/1/1274. The statistics were to refute claims by Labor that the government had been 
extravagant; J.S. Anderson, 'W.A. Watt: A Political Biography', M.A. thesis, University of 
New South Wales, 1972, p. 184. The Liberal Speakers' Handbook for the Federal Campaign 
1914, Melbourne, 1914; Sir Walter Massy Greene, Liberal/Nationalist MHR for Richmond 
(NSW), 1901-22; Senator (NSW), 1923-28; Minister for Trade and Customs, 1919-21; for 
Health, 1921; for Defence, 1921-22; Assistant Treasurer, 1932-33; foundation member Institute 
of Public Affairs (Victoria), 1942-52; KCMG, 1933. 
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little is known about the collectors, but they were usually representative of 
the largest financial and industrial companies. Some groups were self-
appointed and informal, others were responsible to meetings of affiliated 
donors. There was a regular collection from Sydney businesses in 1914, but 
the identity of the fundraisers is unknown. Collins Street, in the heart of 
Melbourne's financial district, was home to the Constitutional Union, which 
had been formed after the election of the Labor government in 1910. The 
Union president was a prominent solicitor, William Riggall. In Sydney, too, 
the committee had rooms in the business district and a permanent secretary 
and treasurer. Similar arrangements prevailed in other States, although the 
organisations were less powerful. The two largest States subsidised the 
smaller States: it was understood that New South Wales would support 
Queensland, while Victoria would subsidise Western Australia, South 
Australia, and Tasmania. The outlying States were not without means, 
however. In Adelaide, for example, a committee of the Liberal Union 
collected money from regular "city subscribers" and paid for press 
advertising, organisers at election time, and some local costs.16 Evidence of 
the amounts involved is sketchy: in the 1905 Western Australian State 
election, the campaign in the East Perth electorate of the non-Labor Premier 
cost fifty pounds; a donation of £750 was made for the goldfields seats. The 
Liberal leagues in New South Wales would have aimed to match or exceed 
the £2000 which Labor raised for the 1910 State election. In 1913, 
Queensland's Liberal Fund Trust Committee made a public appeal for £5000 
l6 J.R.Williams, 'Financing Conservative Parties in Australia', Australian Quarterly, vol. 
43, no. 1, March 1971, pp. 9-10; B.D. Graham, 'The Place of Finance Committees in Non-Labor 
Politics, 1910-30', Australian Journal of Politics & History, vol. 6, no. l, May 1960, p. 42; 
J.B. Hirst, Adelaide and the Country, 1870-1917, Their Social and Political Relationship, 
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for the next year's work. The next year, however, one organiser claimed that 
he could run all six Senate candidates in that State for £500; and this was the 
amount of one, possibly composite, donation to the Liberal Association in 
Victoria.17 
Working with the fundraisers were temporary committees composed of 
members of parliament, organisation activists, and representatives of 
employers' groups, which were convened to co-ordinate the election 
campaign in each State, and disbanded afterwards. In addition, all States 
had a permanent executive, often self-appointed and small in number, 
which carried out work between elections, such as the 'cleansing' of electoral 
rolls. In New South Wales there was a permanent State secretary, Archdale 
Parkhill, who was responsible to the State parliamentary leader. 
Non-Labor organisations also raised money through permanent branch 
organisations. Membership subscriptions were nominal (in New South 
Wales in 1904 the minimum was 3d. per quarter) and would have been a 
relatively poor source of revenue, but the branches also organised donations 
for local campaigns. Furthermore, they carried out publicity work, and by 
holding meetings and social gatherings endeavoured to maintain 
Liberalism as a local presence. Formally at least, the branches preselected 
17. Brian De Garis, 'Western Australia', in Loveday et al,~., pp. 349 & 351; Peter 
Loveday, 'New South Wales', in !Jlli!., p. 241; T.D. Chattaway to Herbert Brookes, 15 Jul 1914, 
NLA MS 1924/18/717; E.P Simpson, of Minter, Simpson & Co., notaries and solicitors, to 
Brookes, 30June1914. NLA MS 1924/18/708. Herbert Brookes (1867-1963) was a Melbourne 
businessman. Wealthy and well-connected (he was Deakin's son in law), Brookes was the 
recognised leader of the extra-parliamentary Commonwealth Liberal Party. 
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candidates: here, the pressure from parliamentary leaders was strong, but 
not always irresistible. Organisations separate from the main Liberal groups 
also played a role. For example, prior to the 1913 Federal election, the 
Farmers' and Settlers' Association in New South Wales selected eight 
candidates without consulting the local Liberal Leagues. The Leagues 
contemplated standing their own candidates, but Cook visited each electorate 
and persuaded League members to support the FSA nominees.18 
The composition of the branch groups varied: but one common feature was 
that organisations tended to be dormant between elections, particularly in 
the bush, where distance and working hours made political organisation 
difficult. In New South Wales the Liberal and Reform Association, which 
boasted 70,000 members in 1907, had grown out of the Free Trade party, and 
incorporated temperance, single tax, and Protestant movements. A 
Women's Liberal League was associated with the LRA, while the Farmers' 
and Settlers' Association and the Orange Lodge-sponsored Protestant 
Political League were separate although generally sympathetic. Like its 
Eastern States counterparts, the Western Australian Liberal League had 
branches which raised funds and endorsed candidates, while parliamentary 
leaders and employers' groups remained influential. In Tasmania, the 
committee of the Liberal League was carefully balanced between North and 
South. South Australia's Liberal Union had formed from a merger of 
farmers' and urban liberal and conservative groups; the country committees 
guarded their right to select candidates, but were adept at extracting funds 
18. Murdoch, .Ql2._Q1., p. 229. 
35 
from the city. In Queensland, Federal Liberalism was served by the People's 
Progressive League (PPL), formed by the non-Labor Premier, William 
Kidston19, in 1909; preselection was by local ballot. The Queensland 
Women's Electoral League had been active in Federal politics since 1903, and 
derived from the conservative tendency in the State's non-Labor politics; the 
QWEL maintained a separate organisation but generally supported PPL 
candidates. The League had participated in an interstate conference of 
women's anti-socialist groups, held in Melbourne in 1908.20 In Victoria, 
Liberal men and women could join separate branches of the predominantly 
urban People's Liberal Party, the descendent of the Commonwealth Liberal 
Party which had been founded in 1911 in an attempt to preserve Deakinism. 
A separate rural non-Labor organisation, the People's Party, expressed 
country grievances in anti-socialist terms. In 1914, women might choose to 
join the Australian Women's National League, which from the number (a 
membership of 15,000 was claimed in 1908) and enthusiasm of its members 
had become one of the most influential non-Labor constituency groups. The 
A WNL was based in Victoria, but maintained branches in Tasmania and 
Western Australia.21 'Pro Deo et Patria', the League was fiercely imperialist 
and conservative, and its adherents got on badly with the PLP. Its branches 
seem to have been the most active in country centres such as Bendigo, and 
in the middle class southeastern suburbs of Melbourne; and in Victoria at 
19. Premier of Queensland, 1906-07, 1908-11. 
20. Hirst, op. cit., pp. 208-12; R.B. Joyce, 'Queensland', in Loveday (ed.), op. cit., pp. 155 
&165; Loveday, op. cit., p. 435. 
21. Ibid. p. 448. 
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least, the A WNL was the only organisation capable of campaigning in both 
country and city electorates. 22 
These organisations and their leaders had served the pre-Fusion parties, and 
in promoting the cause of Liberalism continued to explain politics in the 
broadly libeta~ and conservative terms established in the first decade of 
Federation. Post-Fusion Liberalism combined the Liberal Protectionis~and 
Free Trade-Anti-Socialist dispositions which are significant for our purposes 
as each had once served to identify a separate party,\ but were not the only 
sections of non-Labor. Personal rivalries between parliamentarians, in 
which ideological differences were difficult to discern, were another division 
and, no doubt, there were similar feuds in the popular organisations. 
Regional and State sentiment, and the mutual suspicion of bush and city, 
were other sources of loyalty which cut across the national divisions of 
ideology. 
Nevertheless, by 1914 a recognisably Liberal creed had appeared. Compared 
to Labor, Liberals favoured a greater role for the States, and although state-
assisted development of private enterprise was common to both party 
programs, Liberals were more enthusiastic about assisted immigration, 
which to the Labor mind threatened the swamping of the labour market. 
The Liberal rhetoric of national identity was more Imperialist. Liberals 
22. Ibid., pp. 236, 434-35, 466-74, B.K de Garis, 'Self-government and the emergence of the 
political party system 1891-1911', in C.T. Stannage (ed.), A New History of Western 
Australia, Nedlands, Western Australia, 1981, p. 350; D.W. Rawson, Ch. 2 - 'Victoria', in 
Ibid., p. 111. 
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were wary of taxation and extravagant public spending, and sceptical of 
business regulation, state enterprises, and coerced union membership. They 
claimed to be individualistic, both in their anti-socialist public policy, and in 
their organisation, which was supposed, unlike the Caucus system, to rely 
on the conscience of the individual member. 23 
In all these matters, Liberals promised to govern for the nation, rather than 
for a section. Recent studies of Labor have sought to qualify the notion of a 
working class politics by emphasising the party's populist claims to represent 
a constituency comprised of 'the people': that is, everyone except for a small 
minority of 'parasites'. In populist argument, not all capitalists were anti-
social, only the especially manipulative and unproductive ones such as 
bankers, land agents, and the 'middlemen' who stood between farmer and 
consumer. Often the villains were Jewish. 'The people' included everyone 
else: farmers, professionals, clerks, housewives: anyone who by productive 
effort qualified for a category, worker, which was defined as much in ethical 
as in economic terms.24 In the early Commonwealth, populism offered an 
opportunity to win votes from groups other than male manual workers 
who were never a majority of the electorate. The electoral imperative for an 
inclusive politics also pressed on the Liberal party, which tended to define 
'the people' as everyone except for a particularly aggressive section of 
23. Loveday, op. cit., pp. 477-79. 
24. Frank Bongiorno, 'Class, Populism and Labour politics in Victoria, 1890-1914', Labour 
History, no. 66, May 1994, p. 25; Peter Love, Labour and the Money Power: Australian Labour 
Populism, 1890-1950, Melbourne, 1988; Raymond Markey, The Making of the Labor Party in 
New South Wales, 1880-1900, Kensington, New South Wales, 1988. 
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unionists.25 But Liberalism appealed more to some kinds of social identity 
than to others. Liberalism's positive philosophy was that capitalism was 
imperfect, but sufficiently just and efficient to warrant preservation in its 
current, essential form. This was attractive, of course, to those who enjoyed 
greater material wealth, as voting in the prosperous suburbs attests, and 
capitalists had obvious reasons to resist a party of unionism. But Liberalism 
also spoke to those who were alienated by organised labour for other reasons. 
Unionism's masculine exclusivity may explain non-Labor's assumed 
advantage among women. 'Shabby genteel' white collar workers such as 
such as clerks and teachers, were regarded as a Liberal constituency, in that 
they aspired to middle class status, and seldom belonged to unions. Many 
farmers, too, were attracted to a party which offered to resist a movement 
they regarded as an urban imposition.26 But unionism and arbitration were 
too popular for any Liberal politician to offer a crusade against these 
institutions, even if he had wanted to. Instead, the tendency was for Liberals 
to try to strike a balance between supporting what was seen as legitimate 
unionism and arbitration, and criticising its excesses. 
In attitudes to religion and ethnic loyalties, also, Liberals had to address 
different interests. Non-Labor had acquired an anti-Irish Catholic image 
from its association with the Anglo-Scottish establishment, but given the 
size of the Catholic minority - about one in five - this was not in every way 
advantageous. But the basis of the image was strong. Liberalism's business 
25. As Ross McKibbin observes of the Conservatives: 'Class and Conventional Wisdom: The 
Conservative Party and the 'Public' in Inter-war Britain, in The Ideologies of Class: Social 
Relations in Britain 18~-1950, Oxford, 1991, pp. 284-85. 
26. Rickard, op. cit., pp. 198-99, 299-301. 
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supporters were supposed to be influenced by Orange and Masonic networks, 
and its core voters, the middle classes, were predominantly Protestant. 
There were direct links, too. In State politics, non-Labor was supported by 
temperance campaigners, who identified Rome and the liquor interests as 
backers of the Labor parties. In New South Wales, the support of the 
Orange lodges for free trade candidates had carried over into Federal politics, 
supplemented by a new wave of militant Protestantism: a movement 
generated by anxieties about the numerical expansion of Catholic and decline 
of Protestant congregations and adherents, and the likely effects of these 
changes on the economic opportunities and political influence which each 
enjoyed.27 Orange lodges supported non-Labor in Victoria, too, and the 
membership of constituency organisations, particularly the A WNL, was 
thought to overlap considerably with church and chapel-going Protestants. 
Just as Liberal opposition to the organised working class brought dangers as 
well as benefits, so too was its Protestant identity a help and a hindrance. 
Militant Protestantism was emotive in the evangelical style, and its crusades 
could inspire enthusiasm in voters and activists, although liberal-minded 
Protestants may have been repelled by the militants' vulgarity and 
extremism. As a sin against social cohesior\ and liberal notions of 
individual justice\ anti-Catholicism, like anti-Protestantism, was 
disreputable but widespread. Anti-Catholicism may have made Liberalism 
attractive to some working class Protestants, but repellent to middle class 
27. Richard Broome, Treasure in Earthen Vessels: Protestant Christianity in New South 
Wales Society 1900-1914, St Lucia, 1980; Robert J. Brown, 'The Catholic Federation of New 
South Wales 1912-23, with particular reference to the Democratic Party 1919-25', Government 
III honours thesis, University of Sydney, 1954. 
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Catholics whose economic interests might otherwise have drawn them to 
the party.28 
These were some of the conditions of Liberal politics when in July 1914 
Joseph Cook formally opened the Liberal campaign for the federal election. 
He had governed for the last year, but without a majority in the Senate, and 
had finally secured the conditions for a double dissolution by sending up 
bills for the abolition of government preference and the restoration of postal 
voting, which the Senate was bound to reject.29 Cook spoke at Parramatta 
before an audience which included "[L]arge numbers of ladies", and 
representatives of the Farmers and Settlers' Association.30 His program was 
based on individualism, racial exclusivity, imperialism, public frugality, and 
state-aided private development of the economy. 
Responsible government came first. Cook complained that his ministers, 
supported in the House of Representatives, had been thwarted by Senators 
acting not on State but on sectional lines, who had boasted that "the will of 
the nation shall be made subservient to that of the caucus". Labor were the 
true reactionaries: their obstruction of the people's house had exceeded 
"the worst days and moods of the unreformed House of Peers." The Liberal 
Party's main plank was the preservation of " ... a Parliament unfettered by 
28. A.W. Martin, 'Henry Parkes and the Political Manipulation of Sectarianism', Journal of 
Religious History, vol. 9, no. 1, Jun 1976, p. 92; Rickard, op. cit., pp. 199-200; 249-50. 
29. The dissolution was announced on 5 Jun, and polling day set for 5 Sep. 
30. Age, 16 Jul 1914, pp. 9-10. 
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outside agencies alien to the constitution." 31 While one remedy was to elect 
a Liberal Senate, the electoral system itself required reform. Preferential 
voting for the House of Representatives would provide electors with greater 
choice, and encourage the candidature of independent-minded men 
unwilling to subject themselves to preselection by one of the "two huge 
electoral organisations" which dominated politics. Cook, no doubt, wished 
to introduce a system in which a vote divided among non-Labor candidates 
would be less likely to favour Labor. The attraction of preferential voting 
was the protection it offered from 'farmers' ' and 'independent Liberal' 
candidates32, although Liberals might have predicted that the possibility of 
exchanging preferences would also encourage such challenges. But 
whatever its advantages for politicians, Cook was able to advocate 
preferential voting as a means of preserving from the intervention of that 
unwanted modern development, the party machine, the transmission of 
authority from citizen to representative. Voters, Cook argued, were also 
poorly served by the Senate electoral laws, ~hereby one party could take all 
three seats with a simple majority of the State poll. Proportional 
representation for the upper house would reconcile majority rule with the 
representation of "the leading lines of opinion". Cook also promised to 
restore postal voting; to remove the restrictions which the Fisher 
31. Cook referred to the confrontation between the Asquith government and the House of 
Lords over Lloyd George's 1909 budget, which imposed new taxes to pay for welfare, and 
naval building. The 1911 Parliament Act brought a drastic restriction of the Lords' powers. 
Anthony Seldon, 'Conservative Century', in Anthony Seldon & Stuart Ball (eds), 
Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900, Oxford, 1994, p. 27. 
32. In 1911, the Victorian Liberal government, led by W.A. Watt, had introduced preferential 
voting for these reasons. J.S. Anderson,~., p. 144. There is some evidence that Liberals 
had to compete with rural independents at the 1914 election. John Forrest advised Littleton 
Groom that the "situation [was] troublesome here" [in Western Australia]. 14 Jul 1914. Groom 
papers: NLA MS 236/1/1289. Sir John Forrest, Premier, 1890-1901; MHR for Swan (WA), 
1901-18; Postmaster General, 1901; Minister for Defence, 1901-03; for Home Affairs, 1902; 
Treasurer, 1905-07, 1909-10, 1913-14, 1917-18. 
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government had placed on newspaper reporting of politics; and to unify 
State and Federal electoral rolls.33 
The Prime Minister then turned to the issue of immigration safeguards. 
The value of exclusivity was demonstrated by "racial complications in other 
countries." Cook assured his audience that the imperial ethos of fraternity 
did not mean that Australians should welcome Indian immigrants. Indians 
were British subjects, but an "alien civilisation" nonetheless, and 
Australians were right to insist that only "kinsmen and blood brethren" 
should be allowed to settle on their continent. White Australia, Cook 
continued, should be seen as more than an immigration restriction. It was 
also an ideal of justice and prosperity, which demanded fair play and 
national unity. Labor's policy of government preference for unionists 
threatened the social harmony which was part of the White Australia ideal. 
Cook invoked values espoused by both parties - rac;ial exclusivity, and social 
cohesion - in justification of a controversial policy, abolition of preference; 
and he claimed that his policy was the latest instalment of the British 
people's cumulative reformation of arbitrary power and privilege.34 
To be a really 'white Australia' we ought also to be a free, fair, 
federal and just Australia; federal in spirit and purpose, as 
33. Labor's amendment of the Commonwealth Electoral Act (1911) had introduced compulsory 
registration, abolished postal but retained absentee voting, required returns from 
organisations and newspapers on political advertising, and also compelled newspapers to 
label political advertisements, and to print the signatures beneath election commentary. 
Sawer, op. cit., p. 94. 
34. "Liberalism existed because it was believed to exist as the guiding force of political progress, 
writ large between the lines of constitutional lexicons since the coming of William of Orange." 
Michael Bentley, The Liberal Mind, 1914-1929, Cambridge, 1977, p. 14. 
contemplated in the constitution and fair and just in all our 
social and human relationships. (Cheers). The very elements of 
this ideal require us to encourage co-operation rather than to 
promote strife; to share the profits rather than to limit and 
destroy them. (Hear, Hear). This ideal would demand social 
reform without the accompaniment of social hatred, and the 
solidarity of the nation instead of the solidarity of the class or 
the section. 
But above and beyond all there is no appropriate or rightful 
place in a 'white Australia' for the selection and preferential 
treatment of a section of the community by a Government 
which is sworn to be just and equal to all...discriminations ... are 
specially odious in a free young democratic community. 
(Cheers) Our institutions, social and industrial, are an offshoot 
and an extension of those institutions which owe their strength 
and potency to a long, incessant struggle against disabilities of 
all kinds in the kingdom from which we come .... to impose 
artificial tests in government employment at the demand of a 
section of the people, however important to the welfare of the 
community that section may be, is a blow aimed deliberately at 
the whole structure of British liberty. (Hear, hear)" 
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As heirs to a tradition of timely and moderate reform, Cook continued, 
Liberals realised that to implement Federal ideals in a growing community, 
the constitution would have to be amended from time to time, and that no 
government should remain attached to "ossified" laws and institutions. 
Liberal policy was to seek whatever amendment was necessary to control 
harmful monopolies. A Liberal government would use Commonwealth 
powers to suppress harmful combines. 
Defence required a steady policy. The government would continue to make 
use of expert imperial advice on building naval bases and ships, and 
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providing professional training, especially in rifle shooting, for citizen 
forces. The other imperative was to guard against waste and extravagance, 
and here again imperial advice pointed to the need to devolve supply to 
businessmen, so that officers could concentrate on commanding their 
troops. 
Defence became more expensive all the time, and like other policies of 
national development required an increased population. Cook promised to 
raise by £150,000 the vote for immigration advertising and assisted passages, 
in order to settle: 
... the vast areas of fertile land which the States still offer to men 
of enterprise, capital, or that persistent and intelligent industry 
which, under the favourable conditions which this continent 
affords, seldom fails to produce a healthy competence. (Hear, 
hear) 
Despite his insistence on economy in administration, the Liberal leader 
proposed to spend £4,000,000 on irrigation from the Murray, a scheme 
which would cost, on estimate, £4,600,000. The benefits were even greater, 
however, for he predicted an annual production of £50,000,000 (which was 
equal to current total agricultural product) and the direct permanent 
employment of 700,000: all in all, a "a wonderful transformation in the 
interior". The project had been bogged down in inter-State disputes but a 
Liberal Commonwealth government would break the impasse by becoming 
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a shareholder, and thus allow this "great and real effort for closer 
settlement" to proceed. 
Liberal policies on social security included a pension for the public service 
and defence forces: the latter was vital for efficient defence. Old age 
pensioners living in institutions would be allowed to keep any difference 
between their pension and their fees. The government would raise the 
pension if finances permitted.35 Liberal policy was to create a contributory 
national insurance scheme to provide sickness, accident, unemployment, 
and maternity benefits. This meant that payment of the maternity 
allowance would be conditional on contributions. 
Cook concluded, to "[L]oud cheers", on a note of Empire-unity idealism, 
with a promise to amend the Naturalisation Act in line with the Imperial 
Parliament's extension of citizenship to naturalised Dominion citizens. The 
goal of Empire citizenship, he predicted, was closer than ever before. 
I submit this outline of our proposals to the people of Australia 
for their reasoned judgement, and I trust [,] cordial approval. 
My object will have been obtained if they regard it as instinct 
with freedom, staunchly federal and wise in its constitutional 
setting, progressive in its aim and intention; fair and just to all 
the people of this land; respecting and honouring the best 
35. Only 1.8% of the population received the old age pension (a maximum of 10/- per week) 
which was conditional on property and income tests, a minimum twenty five year's residency 
in Australia, and 'good character'; and could not be granted to 'Asiatics' nor, in most 
circumstances, to Australian Aborigines. T.H. Kewley, Social Security in Australia, 1900-72, 
Sydney, rev. ed. 1973 (1965), pp. 74-76; p. 134. 
traditions of the past, and looking forward with hope and 
confidence to the future. 
Fisher had delivered Labor's policy a week earlier, at Bundaberg.36 
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He began 
by criticising the duplicity and extravagance of the government's financial 
policy. In June the treasurer, Forrest, had predicted a surplus, but in the new 
financial year he had been forced to admit to having spent all of the revenue 
for 1913-14, and £1,819,000 of the £2,643,305 surplus left behind by the Labor 
government. Labor had left a trust fund so that the Commonwealth would not 
have to "appeal to the cold world outside", but the Liberals admitted that they 
would finance spending through overseas loans. 
But the Labor leader identified industrial unrest and the high cost of living 
as the major problem·s facing Australia. Both required increased 
Commonwealth powers of regulation. Monopoly control of the supply of 
goods was the problem: only in Western Australia where the Labor 
government had forced competition with state enterprises had prices 
remained steady. Nor was there any shortage of production. The drought 
had ended, but combines continued their "interference with supply, both at 
its source and during its passage to the consumer." In the United States, the 
Meat Trust of America had inflated retail prices while depressing the price 
paid to producers. The government admitted the Trust was now established 
in Australia, but refused to do anything about it. State parliaments were 
36. Australian Worker, [Sydney], 9 Jul 1914, p. 17. The speech was delivered on 
6 July. The report was obviously abbreviated a great deal. 
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powerless. A Commonwealth Labor government would ask again for 
increased powers. 
Fisher insisted that the Navy should be "Australian-owned, manned and 
controlled"; and that this policy , along with compulsory military training, 
had been initiated by Labor. There had been criticism of the inconvenience 
and loss of earnings suffered by trainees, and of harsh punishment. Labor 
policy was to compensate trainees for wages foregone, and to be flexible 
about the days on which training occurred. Breaches of the Act must be tried 
before special magistrates, and not the criminal courts. It was never intended 
that cadets should be subject to solitary confinement and George Pearce37, 
while minister, was not aware of any such cases. 
Fisher warned of the power of the extremist, conservative wing within the 
Liberal party. Its leading figure was the Attorney General, Sir William 
Irvine, who was openly hostile to non-contributory welfare, including the 
maternity allowance.38 Irvine and his followers believed that the allowance 
"sap[s] the moral fibre of the nation". Others were more circumspect, and 
objected merely to the absence of any requirement for a declaration of 
financial need. Irvine, "the Conservative idol" was no more fond of old 
age pensions which, he had told a cheering crowd of ladies at St Kilda 
37. Sir George Pearce, Senator (WA), 1901-38 (Labor, 1901-17; Nationalist/UAP, 1917-38); 
Minister for Defence, 1908-09, 1910-13, 1914-21, 1932-34; Home and Territories, 1921-26; 
External Affairs and Territories, 1934-37: KCVO 1937. 
38. The cartoonist Claude Marquet depicted Irvine as the theatrical hypnotist, Svengali, and 
Cook as his automaton. Australian Worker, 2 Jul 1914, p. 9. 
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(probably the AWNL), were /1 'gratuitous doles' ". These attitudes, Fisher 
maintained, should warn electors that a Liberal government could not be 
trusted to retain the pension in its present form. Pensioners had been 
impoverished by the rising cost of living, and Labor would look to raising 
the pension if finances permitted. 
Cook complained that the few worthwhile provisions in Fisher's, such_ as 
tariff protection, and unification of railway gauges, had been "jumped" fr~m 
the Liberal agenda. "They are sugar-coating the referenda, which is the heart 
and soul of~ their proposals." Fisher had ignored the development of the 
Northern Territory, and the need for immigration. He had failed to defend 
his party's advocacy of "spoils to the victors in Government employment", 
and its attempts to pressure the Governor General into ignoring ministerial 
advice. The. Caucus leader tempted farmers with his promise to bypass the 
middle man, but said nothing of the rural worker~' log of claims which the 
Australian Workers' Union was pursuing, or of price fixing. 39 
Liberal candidates defended the government against the charges made in 
Fisher's policy speech, and elsewhere in the Labor campaign. That they were 
the more trustworthy custodians of public finances was an important part of 
the Liberal image, and government supporters were keen to rebut 
allegations of profligacy. The Liberal line was that the spending to which 
39. Courier, 8 Jul 1914. NLA MS 236/6, box 26, folder 31. Higher taxes: see also Liberal 
Speakers' Handbook for the Federal Campaign, Melbourne, 1914, [authorised Walter Massy 
Greene], p. 21; W. Farmer-Whyte, election notes column, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 Sep 1914, 
p.6. 
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another Fisher government would be committed would necessitate new 
taxes.40 Littleton Groom, addressing a meeting at Yangan, explained that 
the Commonwealth was already burdened by the maternity allowance, 
pension, the development of the post and telegraph service, the building of 
railways, and naval ships and bases. Fisher had been extravagant and had 
only been able to produce a surplus because he had drawn revenue from a 
thriving economy.41 
The Labor allegation that the government had connived in the development 
of price-hiking and strike-provoking monopolies demanded rebuttal. Irvine 
contended that Labor was raising an exaggerated fear of monopolies. While 
the Commonwealth needed greater power over combines, nationalisation 
was not the answer. A Royal Commission appointed by the Fisher 
government had concluded that the Colonial Sugar Refining Company 
should not be nationalised, because public ownership of refining works 
would fail to reduce the retail price.42 One contributor to The Woman 
cautioned that Federal Labor had adopted the nationalisation of monopolies 
plank as a disguise for its real purpose, the nationalisation of the means of 
production, distribution, and exchange.43 Liberals reminded voters that beef 
was cheapest in the state in which the Beef Trust traded, Queensland, and 
dearest in Western Australia where the Scaddan Labor government had 
40. Liberal Speakers' Handbook , p. 21. 
41. Chronicle, 8 Jul 1914, NLA MS 236/6, box 25, vol. 1, pp. 154-55 .. 
42. Ibid., 21 Jul 1914. NLA MS 236/6, box 25, vol. 1, p. 163. Irvine referred to the Royal 
Commission on the Sugar Industry, which reported in 1912 and 1913. Ian McAllister et al, 
Australian Political Facts, Melbourne, 1990, p. 171. 
43. The Woman, 28 Jul 1914, pp. 133-35. Nationalisation of production, distribution, and 
exchange was the Victorian Labor platform. 
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founded state-owned butcheries. 44 State provision was regarded with 
scepticism by Liberal-minded people. After the election, one supporter 
complained, " ... Mr Scaddan is going to give us cheap fish - at least[,] some of 
us are to get some at a low rate plus innumerable taxes - something on the 
lines of 'free' education."45 
Liberals blamed inflation on the wage claims pursued by unions, and also 
warned that unions had exceeded their legitimate role as industrial 
advocates and become agents of revolutionary socialism. Strikes were not 
attempts by workers to regain living standards eroded by combine-
engineered price hikes, but were fomented by unionists bent on class 
warfare. According to the A WNL' s journal, the new rural workers' log was 
"even more objectionable and harassing than previous one. " Attempts to 
enforce the claim threatened to delay that year's harvest; ultimately, the 
Australian Workers' Union hoped to bankrupt farmers so that a Labor 
government could nationalise their land for minimal compensation.46 The 
Liberal organisation provided campaigners with statistics purportedly 
demonstrating that Australian unions spent much of their money on 
publishing newspapers full of political propaganda. British unions, by 
contrast, devoted a much greater share of their resources to members' 
sickness, unemployment and strike payments.47 
44. Liberal Speakers' Handbook, pp. 32-36; Chronicle, 8 Jul 1914, NLA MS 236/6, box 25, vol. 
1, pp. 154-55; W. Fanner-Whyte, election notes column, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 Aug 1914, 
p. 16. SN 
45. J.W. Griffiths to Herbert Brookes, 11December1914. Brookes papers: NLA MS 
1924/18/824. John Scaddan was Labor Premier of Western Australia, 1911-16. 
46. The Woman 28 Jul 1914, pp. 150-151. The log included a 48 hour week, preference for 
unionists, and increases in the rates of pay. 
47. Liberal Speakers' Handbook , pp. 12-14. 
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Similar objections to the political role of unions had been made, albeit in a 
more emotive style, in a speech to the Chambers of Manufacturers by the 
president of the People's Liberal Party, manufacturer Herbert Brookes. 
Employers took part in wages board hearings only to be threatened with 
strikes and boycotts; unionists flouted unpopular awards and contrived 
interstate disputes in order to have their cases heard before the 
Commonwealth court, whose president had described employers as 
"highwaymen". From these relatively mild complaints, Brookes progressed 
to a fiery rhetoric, reminiscent of evangelical preaching: "[W]HY NOT LET 
A LITTLE LIGHT INTO THE DARK PLACES OF THE SECRET CAUCUS OF 
THE LABOUR TRUST, THE A.W.U .... " Illumination would reveal that the 
AWU leaders were syndicalists, determined to absorb all other unions and 
then initiate a general strike designed to destroy capitalism. The source of 
this danger was the idea of socialism, which tempted workers with the 
promise of wealth without work, and encouraged them to turn against their 
employers. This false doctrine must be eliminated " .. .IF WE ARE TO 
FLOURISH AS A NATION AND KEEP OUR PLACE IN THE SUN." But the 
time for negotiating with political trade unionists was over. They had 
shown by their determination to disrupt industry that they regarded 
employers as their enemies, " ... NOT ALLIES IN THE COMMON 
CONQUEST OF NATURE". Employers must defend themselves from the 
socialist take-over of institutions, evident in state trading, and the radical 
perversion of unionism. Brookes had sought to show that the only safety lay 
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in emulating the unity, and aggression, of the unions. What, he asked, had 
been the point of his address? 
LITTLE, I FEAR, SA VE TO KEEP AN EDGE ON OUR 
OPPOSITION, AND TO INSPIRE US WITH MORE VIGOUR, 
MORE VIGILANCE AND MORE SOLIDARITY .. .' .LET US GIRD 
UP OUR LOINS AND DO BATTLE HERE AND NOW. WE 
LOOK TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE STATE PREMIER 
TO LEAD OUR POLIDCAL FORCES IN THIS CRUSADE, AND 
TO BRING FAIR DEALING FORTH FROM THE CONFLICT 
MILITANT AND TRIUMPHANT. 48 
In 1919, when conscription and Anglo-Irish violence had raised the 
temperature of domestic politics, Brookes made a speech similar in tone at a 
loyalist demonstration in the Melbourne Town Hall. His diatribe is 
evidence that loyalist-style rhetoric, c:haracterised by a 'last days' urgency, and 
a conflation of all types of dissent into a single, unacceptable heresy, was 
present in Liberal politics before the war.49 
Rhetorical militancy also characterised the propaganda of the Australian 
Women's National League, which warned that unionism threatened to 
extinguish independent manhood, the basis, on Gladstone's authority, of 
constitutional government. Nor was the confiscation of capital the only 
depredation consequent on socialism, a doctrine which led, as Lord 
Rosebery had warned, to "[T]he negation of faith, of the Family, of Freedom, 
48. People's Liberal Party, The Industrial Drift, Melbourne, n.d. Address by Herbert Brookes 
to the Associated Chambers of Manufacturers, 15 Jun 1914. Capitalisation in original text. 
49. Hofstadter, op. cit. 
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of Monarchy' ... the foundations on which our glorious British Empire has 
been built up and maintained." 50 According to the Age , Liberals were 
raising a cry that socialism "menaces our most sacred rights and liberties, 
and is stalking the marriage tie with positively damnable intentions ".51 It 
is a reasonable guess that AWNL workers, canvassing women voters door to 
door, contributed to spreading this story, which was, perhaps, too far-fetched 
to be suitable for an official journal. The League cited the Fisher 
government's record as evidence of a of incremental advance towards 
socialism, which apparently meant the state ownership of all capital, but did 
not furnish proof that Labor advocated free love, the collectivisation of 
women, or whatever the revolutionary alternative to marriage was 
supposed to be. Rather, the destruction of marriage was suggested by The 
Woman as the corollary of Labor's socialistic disregard for other contracts.52 
While Brookes' PLP and the AWNL were rivals within Victorian 
Liberalism, the rhetoric of each represents a tendency in Liberal rhetoric to 
attempt to arouse a fear of dispossession and degradation. But this was not 
the only characteristic of Liberal propaganda. The 1914 speakers' notes, for 
example, were full of facts and figures, such as the Cook government's 
saving per mile on railway earth works (£221-15-5). That Liberal organisers 
thought it worth spending money to distribute such information suggests 
50. The Woman, 1 Sep 1914, p. 167. Rosebery, a Liberal, was the British Prime Minister 1894-
95. 
51. Age, 25 Jul 1914, p. 12. 
52
. The League's later anti-socialist propaganda linked accounts of rape by Bolsheviks 
during the Civil War (1918-20) and 'collectivisation of women' by the Soviet regime, to male 
concerns about the expropriation of capital. Meredith Foley, 'The Women's Movement in New 
South Wales and Victoria, 1918-1938', PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 1985, p. 71. 
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that they believed that some of their potential supporters took a rationalistic 
view of politics, and could be convinced by apparently objective 
demonstrations. The amount of space devoted in the notes to various 
issues may also signify, very approximately, some of the priorities of the 
Liberal campaign; although this may reflect more accurately the suitability of 
some topics, such as the largest, public finance and administration, for 
'factual' exposition. 
Allocation of space in Speaker's Notes, 1914 Federal election53 
% of total pages 
double dissolution 10 
------------~ Senate obstruction 7.5 
preference for unionists 8.8 
public finance 16.~ 3 
national shipping line 3.8 
electoral reform (integrity of 
rolls, postal voting, proportional 
representation in Senate) ___________ lO 
administrative efficiency 20 
beef trust 12.5 
Commonwealth Bank 2.5 
solitary confinement of cadets 2.5 
avowals of socialism by Labor politicians 3.8 
rural workers' log of claims 1.3 
New South Wales Labor government 
favours city over country in freehold 
land policy _______________ 1.3 
Not surprisingly, Labor publicists reversed the Liberal version of Australian 
politics to present the Liberals as practitioners of the worst types of 
53. The Liberal Speakers' Handbook for the Federal Campaign 1914 , Melbourne, 1914. 
Percentages are of the 40 pages of content, and have been rounded to one decimal place: this is 
why the column totals 100.~ ~ . 
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commercial sharp practice. One of the main concerns expressed in the 
Australian Worker was that Liberals were attempting to remove from urban 
electoral rolls the names of men who were absent from home while 
working in the country. Members were advised that AWU offices in 
Sydney, Adelaide and Ballarat would forward declarations of residence to 
the Electoral Registrars. But this might not be sufficient: in an "official 
circular" the Liberal organisation had counselled that in order to avoid the 
five shilling fee, objections should not be lodged on an official form. Any 
such objections, the Worker's correspondent remarked, should be ignored 
by the Registrar, unless he " ... happens to be a Liberal who, as Sir William 
McMillanS4 says, '[C]arries the standards of commercial honour and morality 
into the political arena.' " Liberal standards, evidently, were those of shoddy 
builders, and vendors of adulterated infants' milk.SS (One Sydney Liberal 
politician believed that the socialists were up to similar tricks: he and his 
supporters were on the look-out for fraudulent "stuffing" of electoral rolls.)S6 
Other Labor publicists warned that while Labor had legislated for safeguards 
on and substitutes for wage labour, these protective measures would be 
jeopardised by a Fusion government. If Forrest became treasurer again, his 
extravagance could necessitate the reduction of the maternity allowance and 
old age pension.S7 Pensioners living on ten shillings per week were harmed 
by the rising cost of living, wrote 'Parramatta' in the Victorian Labor Call, 
54. McMillan was Free Trade MHR for Wentworth (NSW), 1901-03, and was active in 
patriotic and charitable organisations. ADB, 10, p. 343. article by A.W. Martin. 
55. Australian Worker, 2 Jul 1914, p. 9. See also Ibid., 9 Jul 1914, p. 19 & 16 Jul 1914, p. 2. 
56. W. Elliot Johnson [MHR for Lang (NSW), 1903-28] to Littleton Groom, 6 Aug 1914. NLA MS 
236/1/1302. 
57. Australian Worker, 2 Jul 1914, p. 1. 
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although "[T]o people who have got plenty of fat cattle and sheep to dispose 
of it might be wekome;"ss Mary Gilmore59 recalled the days prior to 
workplace regulation, when conditions included seventy hour weeks, fines 
of five shillings from fifteen shilling weekly pays, instant dismissal without 
notice, and unsanitary conditions, such as those at the leading Sydney 
business which provided only one lavatory for several hundred employees. 
"Shop girls" would do well to remember that "what was the rule in the past 
will be the rule again WHENEVER THERE IS POWER TO MAKE IT THE 
RULE."60 If pensioners and shop girls saw where their interests lay, they 
would vote Labor. But some voters, explained R.N. Walton, of Coburg, 
lacked sense. Walton identified "[T]he man of money bags", "[T]he fireside 
voter", and "[T]he silly young clerk" as core members of the "anti-Labor" 
constituency. 61 
The outbreak of war, four weeks before polling day, changed the 
preoccupations of the election campaign, but domestic issues did not 
disappear entirely: rather, politicians claimed that the war had made their 
policies and leadership more necessary than ever. At least one Liberal 
supporter thought so, too: "[I]f clean government and honest finance are 
desirable things in good times surely they are a thousand times more 
58. 30 July 1914, p. 4. 
59. Mary Gilmore, poet, journalist and political activist, was editor of the Australian 
Worker's women's page, 1911-31. 
60. Australian Worker, 16 July 1914, p. 17. 
61. Labor Call, 6 August 1914, p. 2. Menzies' wooing of 'fireside voters' in the age of radio is 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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important in a crisis like the present."62 For both parties, there was a tension 
between the need to appear to be putting contention aside, and the wish to 
take advantage of the war. 
On 30 July, Cook had received a cablegram from the Foreign Office warning 
that war was imminent. That night, at Horsham, he warned voters to 
prepare themselves to carry out their responsibilities as citizens of the 
Empire.63 Cook hoped that through negotiations "honour may some way 
be appeased without resort to arbitration of arms, but one does not know 
when this fire starts where the conflagration will end." Yet 
... whatever happens, Australia is part of the Empire, and is in 
that Empire to the full. (Cheers) Remember, too, that when the 
Empire is at war, Australia is at war. 
Australia would be ready to play its part: the economies pursued by the 
Minister for Defence, Senator Edward Millen, had never affected fighting 
capability. The question of defence drew the Prime Minister back to the 
argument he had made in his policy speech: that immigration was required 
to increase the number of "burden bearers". If Australia's population of 
four million could be doubled, per capita defence costs could be reduced from 
62. J.J. Griffiths to H.B. Brookes, 18August1914. NLA MS 1924/18/778-80. Griffiths worked 
for the Telegraph Department in Perth. He had been a founding member of the Liberal Club 
(he does not say when it was founded). "I have ... ", he told Brookes, " ... for many years .... been 
waging wordy warfare in various newspapers with socialists of all species, and know most of 
their literature better than they do themselves." 
63. Murdoch, op. cit., p. 284. 
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twenty to ten shillings. After devoting nearly half an hour to the trusts 
issue (Cook was not opposed to consolidation of businesses, which was the 
modern way) and to pointing out that Fisher's promise of £300,000 for 
widow's pensions would allow a payment of only 1/3 per week, Cook began 
to denounce class warfare. The politics of class loyalty had been shown by 
recent events in Europe to be a much weaker loyalty than the politics of 
national allegiance. Rebellious Russian workers had rallied to the flag when 
war was declared, and Austrian socialists were signing up to fight their 
erstwhile Serbian comrades. There was a lesson here for Australia, and 
Cook, as he had done when he equated white Australia with equal access to 
public employment, phrased the homily to appeal to voters, perhaps men in 
particular, who favoured trade unionism and immigration restriction. 
Socialist feeling is within the State but there is something 
stronger - that is the feeling of nationalism that is behind all of 
the principles that have come down to us. If it is a good thing 
to close up our ranks against outsiders, isn't it a good thing to 
close up our ranks and try to help each other here? .... [T]his class 
feeling which sets men against each other as bitter enemies is 
bringing untold evils in its train, and the consequences may be 
serious.64 
The leading Labor politicians espoused similarly patriotic sentiments. 
(I... Fisher had addressed a meeting at Colac on the s~me night that Cook had 
warned of the likelihood of war. He made the usual points about the deficit, 
preference, and state steamers, and offered a vague suggestion of assistance 
for orphans. Like Cook, he expressed a hope that "international arbitration" 
64. Age, 1 August 1914, p. 16. 
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might still avert war, but if the calamity came, then 'Australians will stand 
beside our own to help and defend her to our last man and last shilling.' 1165 
Fisher and his supporters also claimed sole credit for the creation of an 
Australian Navy and Army, and in doing so pointed to the antipathy which 
some Liberal politicians had shown to the formation of separate forces. 
Hughes66, for example, recalled that prior to the Fusion, Cook had opposed 
both a separate Navy, and compulsory training. The war was also said to 
vindicate Labor's non-military policies. According to Fisher, the war had 
exposed the harmfulness of Liberal opposition to the Commonwealth bank, 
and the note issue, for without these institutions, financial panic would 
have been inevitable. 67 
Other Labor and unionist responses were less conventionally patriotic. There 
were fatalistic predictions that while the fighting would bring useless suffering 
to the workers, Australia's membership of the Empire made costly 
participation unavoidable. In Victoria and New South Wales, one line taken 
in pro-Labor journals was that while the war would benefit only the Krupps 
and Armstrongs, this was not the real issue and should not be allowed to 
distract from the question of whether men of the Labor or the "Tory stamp 
who shoot down the people" should govern. R.N. Walton warned that the 
Liberals were attempting to emulate the Conservatives' khaki election 
campaign of 1900, but were unlikely to succeed because the voters realised that 
65. Argus, 1 August 1914, p. 20. 
66. William Morris Hughes, Labor MHR for West Sydney (NSW), 1910-17; Nationalist 
member for Bendigo, 1917-22; North Sydney, 1922-49 (Liberal 1945-49); Liberal member for 
Bradfield 1949-52; Prime Minister 1915-22. 
67. Fitzhardinge, Qlh..ill., p. 7. Advertiser, 24 August 1914, p. 13. 
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Fisher and Hughes were no less patriotic. Labor should, to paraphrase the 
famous infantry command, " 'prepare for calumny.' " Labor people should 
. 
also beware of attempts to exploit the war to further class politics: already there 
were "sinister proposals" to suspend wages board. determinations. Such· 
suggestions were already coming from within the Labor ranks: Holman caused 
disquiet among unionists when, the day after the British declaration, he 
suggested that awards might be frozen. Labor, Henry Boote wrote, had 
preserved Australia from "THE WORST EFFECTS OF THE CAPITALIST 
SYSTEM" but "[T]here is still much to be done to protect Australia from the 
enemies who attack it from within" - the Fusion party, opponents of social 
security, anti-trust law, and an Australian defence force. 68 
William ('Billy') Hughes69, the shadow Attorney-General, led a campaign to 
out-do the Liberals as proponents of a politics which demanded that all other 
considerations be subordinated to wartime unity. His demand to postpone 
the elections was endorsed by the Labor executive and candidates in New 
South Wales, and according to the Liberal secretary, Archdale Parkhill, enjoyed 
greater currency in that State than in any other; Elliot Johnson complained that 
68. Australian Worker, 30 Jul 1914, p. 8; Labor Call, 6 Aug 1914, p. 4; 20 Aug 19194, p. 4; 13 Aug 
1914, p. 2; Australian Worker, 2 Sep 1914, p. 1. Capitalisation in original; H.V. Evatt, 
Australian Labour Leader: The Story of W.A. Holman and the Labour Movement, Sydney & 
London, 1945 (1940), p. 346. 
69. W.M. Hughes, MHR for Western Sydney (NSW), 1901-1917 (ALP); Bendigo (Vic), 1917-22 
(Nat); North Sydney (NSW), 1922-49 (Nat-UAP-LPA); Bradfield (NSW), 1949-52 (LPA). 
Minister for External Affairs, 1904, 1921-23, 1937-39; Attorney General, 1908-09, 1910-13, 1914-
21, 1939-41; Prime Minister, 1915-23;Vice President Executive Council and Minster for Health 
and Repatriation, 1934-35; Minister for Industry, 1938-40, for the Navy, 1940-41. 
70. Parkhill to H. Brookes, 1Sep1914. NLA MS 1924/18/796; Johnson to Groom, 6 Aug 1914, 
NLA MS 236/1/1302. 
61 
the Telegraph and "other Liberal papers" had been fooled.71 Hughes 
insisted that party competition was incompatible with wartime unity: the 
solution was either for each party to withdraw candidates so that sitting 
members would be returned unopposed, or to petition the Imperial Parliament 
to revoke the writs. As a gesture of goodwill, the party executive withdrew its 
candidate for Cook's seat, Parramatta; no doubt his German name, Von Hagen, 
made this seem doubly advantageous. Labor withdrew no other candidates, 
but its advantage was clear: either Cook agreed to return to the situation he was 
trying to escape, government with a hostile Senate, or he exposed his party to 
the charge of putting partisan advantage before patriotic co-operation.72 The 
Liberal Premier of Victoria, Sir Alexander Peacock73 added his voice to the 
'truce' call, but Cook was urged by his Federal colleagues, who were 
convinced that they would win the election because voters regarded them as 
the more patriotic party, not to give way to this ploy; and the Prime Minister 
was of this opinion himself. In any case, revocation of the writs would have 
required the Imperial Parliament to re-convene in order to amend the 
Constitution and this extraordinary measure, Cook explained, presented 
much greater difficulties than "complying with the Constitution". The Prime 
Minister was able to appeal to nationalist sentiment (the Catholic Advocate 
opposed repeal for these reasons) , and to the desire to achieve a functioning 
government, stating that to accede to Hughes's plan would be to invite 
Westminster to "deprive the people of a great self-governing Dominion of the 
71. Parkhill to H. Brookes, 1September1914. NLA MS 1924/18/796; Johnson to Groom, 6 
August 1914, NLA MS 236/1/1302. 
72. L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, 1914-1952: William Morris Hughes, a Political 
Biography, vol. 2, London, Sydney & Melbourne, 1979, pp. 3-7; Murdoch, op. cit., p. 292. In 
Fisher's electorate of Wide Bay, the Queensland Farmers' Union candidate withdrew as a 
patriotic gesture, but polled 36% of the vote nonetheless. Colin A. Hughes & B.D. Graham, A 
Handbook of Australian Government Politics, 1890-1964, Canberra, 1968, p. 312. 
73. Peacock was Premier of Victoria 1901-02, 1914-17 and 1924. 
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right to choose their own legislature", and to return to the deadlock of 1913-14. 
The elections could proceed without harm to the war effort, for "[O]ur race has 
always been characterised by its self control, even in times of the greatest 
national stress .... "74 
As Fitzhardinge remarks, the truce proposal, "sets the note for Hughes' attitude 
throughout the war."75 
insistence on legality. 
The Shadow Attorney General ridiculed Cook's 
One hardly knows whether to laugh or cry .... He abstains from 
doing what he says he would like to do [resume the last 
Parliament] because of some technicalities of the law! Amidst 
the clash of arms the laws are silent, and we may yet have to 
sweep aside as mere cobwebs any laws that stand between us and 
the safety and welfare of the people.76 
Irvine rejoined that Hughes was indulging in a type of personal abuse which 
was not only "ineffectual" in moving voters, but "mischievous" given the 
responsibilities which voters were now facing up to with such gravity. 
Honorary minister W.H. Kelly77 claimed that while ministers had dropped 
the issues which had exercised them prior to the outbreak of war, Opposition 
members were continuing to propagandise. Liberals favoured the formation 
74. Advocate, 5 September 1914, p. 28; Advertiser, 17 August 1914, p. 11. 
75 p· h d' . 6 
. 1tz ar mge, op. cit., p. . 
76. Argus, 17August1914, p. 6. 
77. William Kelly, MHR for Wentworth (NSW), 1903-19 (FT, 1903-10; Lib, 1910-17; Nat, 
1917-19). 
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as quickly as possible of a government capable of exercising the wide powers 
needed to prosecute the war. 78 
Despite this controversy, there was co-operation between the parties. Cook 
convened a conference of State and Federal ministers to consider what 
measures needed to be taken to prevent a collapse of business and 
employment as a result of the disruption of international trade and the 
scarcity of British capital. Fisher and Hughes participated at Cook's 
invitation. The conference authorised a communique, signed by Kelly, 
Hughes, and Holman79, which announced that the Commonwealth 
government would provide sufficient finance to maintain State public 
works.SO In terms of war administration, a 'party truce' was unnecessary, 
although Cook himself, and Millen, were preoccupied with administration 
for most of August. The preparations they were engaged in, placing the 
Navy under Admiralty command, and organising for. the dispatch of a 
voluntary force of 20,000 men, were not, of course, impeded by the 
continuation of party meetings, canvassing and distribution of literature. 
Kelly said that he welcomed Labor's offers to support the war policy of a 
Liberal government, but drew attention to the arguments put forward in 
Labor Call: that Australia should only come to England's aid if this seemed to 
78. Sydney Morning Herald , 20 August 1914, p. 10; 25August1914, p. 9. 
79. William Holman was Labor MLA for Grenfell (NSW), 1898-1904 and Cootamundra, 1904-
1916. Expelled from Labor Party 1916, continued as Nationalist member until 1920. Premier of 
New South Wales, 1913-20 (Nationalist from 1916). MHR for Martin (NSW), 1931-34 (UAP). 
80. Fitzhardinge, Q12.:....ci!., pp. 6-7. 
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be really necessary. There was a discrepancy here, Kelly contended, between 
the loyal utterances of the Labor leader, and the "anti-British" sentiment 
prevalent among his followers.81 Other Liberals took up this theme more 
vigorously, citing pacifist and isolationist opinion in the Labor press, and 
anti-imperial statements made by Labor politicians, such as Arthur Rae82 
who had told the Senate that he refused to allow his children to attend 
school on Empire Day because the Empire was founded on " 'force and 
fraud.' " A pamphlet authorised by the Liberal secretary in New South 
Wales, 'Disloyalty! Traitors in the Ranks', recalled Holman's statement that 
he hoped the Boers would win the South African war. The leaflet also 
carried the allegation that while attending the 1911 Imperial Conference in 
vJ. London, Fisher had told the journalist)\ T. Stead, that much mischief had 
come of the use of the word 'Empire', and that Australia should come to 
England's defence if the English cause was right; otherwise " 'we should just 
haul down the Union Jack, hoist our own flag, and start on our own!' " 
Parkhill concluded with the question, " 'Can you place any reliance on these 
men at this critical stage?' " 83 
Despite these appeals to view the war in party terms, many believed that the 
war had merely distracted from the election. Some Liberals considered that 
this was to their advantage, others that it was not. A few days before the 
declaration of war, one of Brookes' correspondents suggested that Liberals 
81. Ibid. 
82. Rae was Labor MLA for Murrumbidgee, 1891-94; Labor Senator (New South Wales) 1910-14; 
1929-35 (Lang Labor 1931-35). 
83. Courier, 31 August 1914, p. 4. Sydney Morning Herald , 29 August 1914, p. 17. Parkhill 
papers, NLA MS 4742, Folio 1, pp. 16-24. 
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should raise a "war cry" that the Fisher government had endangered 
security by its reluctance to encourage immigration, and to provide 
otherwise for local and imperial defences. "It might be said that we were 
trying to have a khaki election, but in my view the war question is 
swamping all political questions and our candidates should recognise this 
fact."84 Elliot Johnson thought that Labor had come up with the truce 
proposal because the war had enervated their campaign, and given them a 
''bad scare", while David Gordon reported from South Australia that "we can 
feel the swing coming our way largely on account of the war." The candidate 
for Bass remarked that while he considered daytime personal canvassing the 
more valuable method, he was heartened that attendance at his meetings 
remained "good" despite the war.BS On the other hand, one Liberal feared 
that the war-obsessed Western Australian's neglect of the election was 
dangerous for the party, while the member for Lilley, Jacob StummB6, found 
that the hostilities were a factor against him. 
I find that the war has overshadowed everything and I fear that 
unless our people are stirred up there is a real danger of their 
neglecting their electoral privilege on Sept 5. The enemy are 
very active in Lilley and are not fighting clean - trying to raise 
prejudice against me on account of my German descent & doing 
84. T.D. Chattaway to H. Brookes, 31July1914. NLA MS 1924/18/731. Chataway wrote on 
Federal Correspondents Bureau letterhead. He provided an extract from Hansard of the 
allegation about Fisher's comments to Stead. (9 Sep 1911, p. 183); Gordon to H. Brookes, 10 
August 1914. NLA MS 1924/18/732; Alexander Marshall to Brookes, 16 August 1914. NLA MS 
1924/18/785. Gordon, a newspaper editor by profession, was active on the executive of the 
Liberal Union, and was MHR for Boothby (SA) 1911-13, and an MLC, 1913-44. 
85. W. Elliot Johnson, MHR for Lang (NSW) 1903-28, to Littleton Groom, 6 August 1914. NLA 
MS 236/1 /1302. 
86. Jacob Stumm, Liberal MHR for Lilley (Queensland), 1913-17. 
it in such an underhand way that one cannot tackle them 
openly.87 
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Cook commiserated with Groom on the large German population in his 
electorate, Darling Downs.88 He did not state his reason, but probably 
considered that German voters would turn against Groom in protest against 
the mooted disenfranchisement of German-descent citizens, and internment 
of military-age men, or simply in malice against the representative of a 
government which was at war with their presumed home country. 
Although the question of whether German-Australians would be loyal to 
their old or new homeland was already in currency, the more significant 
ethnic division was between Irish and British-Australians. Among other 
actions which irritated Liberal-minded people in the months preceding the 
election, the Senate had passed a resolution in favour of Home Rule, as had 
the Labor-controlled Legislative Assembly in New South Wales. In that 
State, Anglican Bishops had released a statement affirming their 
commitment to the Union. Events in England and Ireland seemed to 
moving towards a climax. In May, the Commons had passed a Bill granting 
Home Rule, but negotiations over the exclusion of the Ulster counties were 
forced by the threat of armed uprising in the north. Until the end of July, 
Anglo-Irish conflict featured more prominently in the newspapers than did 
the slide to war in the Balkans, and contributed, or so some Liberals hoped, 
87. J. S. Griffiths to Brookes, 18August1914. NLA MS 1924/18/778-80; Jacob Stumm to Groom, 
24 August 1914. NLA MS 236/1/1108. 
88. Cook to Groom, 6 August 1914. NLA MS 236/1/1303. 
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to the activation of imperialist opinion in the electorates. This calling-in of 
the obligations of British Protestantism was carried out more in private 
conversation than in print. According to the People's Liberal Party secretary 
in Bendigo, " ... with good organisation [Eaglehawk] will give 'Arthur' a good 
shock on this occasion through the Home Rule question and we are working 
it well (quietly).1188 
For the time being, however, this negative aspect of loyalism was less 
obvious than the contest to take credit for building the means to fulfil 
Australia's obligation to the Empire, which was seen by almost everyone as a 
duty of self-preservation. There were no serious differences of opinion 
among the party leaders on the questions which obviously mattered most; 
and attempts by each side to question the loyalty of the other seem to have 
fallen flat. Memories of the Fisher administration, which had instituted 
moderate social democratic reform in a time of prosperity, were fresh: Labor 
in government was a familiar entity difficult to portray as a dangerously 
unknown proposition, and its principal innovations, the Commonwealth 
Bank and note issue, the maternity allowance, and land tax, either beneficial 
or unthreatening to the majority of voters. 
Liberal publicity towards the end of the campaign warned of the uncertainty 
entailed by Labor's 'socialism' and appealed for a Liberal vote as a patriotic 
88. R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972, Harmondsworth, 1989 (1988), pp. 462-71; George 
Bolton to Brookes, n.d., NLA MS 1924/18/826. John Arthur, an Anglican lawyer, was elected 
Labor MHR for Bendigo in 1913, retained the seat in 1914, but died later that year. 
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duty. Cook returned to the campaign with a public meeting at the Sydney 
Town Hall. He proclaimed that "the workingman's home is as much his to 
defend as the rich man's pasturage"; and that voting was "an obligation laid 
upon us by reason of our citizenship and our manhood." The Women's 
Liberal League, New South Wales, implored men and women to make use 
of their "one day of power" to choose the responsible and patriotic Cook, 
who had invited Kitchener to Australia, and was implementing a defence 
policy based on his advice, and to avoid the risk of disaster by spurning the 
unpredictable Labor party. On polling day, the Sydney Morning Herald 
printed a photograph of Cook and Kitchener, captioned "[A]uthors of our 
defence policy". Cook, in his last word to voters, attempted to bring out the 
Liberal vote by extolling the poll as a patriotic duty: the soldiers were doing 
their part, and civilians should do theirs. And, once again, he offered the 
safety of tradition. "[T]he future is full of pitfalls and dangers. Who shall 
guide you through and past them - the Liberals, with their age-long 
experience, or their opponents, with their unproveq panaceas?"89 
On polling day, 72.6% of the people entitled to express an opinion on this 
question did so. Perhaps the preoccupation with the war which some had 
noticed was manifested in the participation rate, which was 1.1 % less than at 
the 1913 election, although much higher than the 57.36% average for the first 
five Commonwealth elections.90 The Age's correspondent noticed a mood of 
gravity at the polling places, and: 
89. Town Hall: Sydney Morning Herald, 3 Sep 1914, p. 6; Women's Liberal League: Ibid. 2 Sep 
1914, p. 10; photograph: Ibid. 5 Sep 1914, p. 16. pitfalls: Ibid. 2 Sep 1914, p. 10. 
90. McAllister, op. cit., p. 64. 
.. none of the excitement and enthusiasm that have been 
noticeable at former elections .... the groups around the polling 
booths were small; in fact at some polling places the presence of 
a candidate's motor car was the only evidence of an 
election ... Under normal conditions crowds linger round the 
booths earnestly discussing the prospects of the poll. It was not 
so on Saturday. People recorded their votes quietly and having 
done so left the booth without engaging in discussion.91 
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Labor won five seats from the government: three in NSW, and two in 
Victoria.92 The returns established the pattern that while Labor's safe seats 
were urban, the marginals it needed to win office were rural or semi-rural. 
Four of the seats taken from the Liberal party were in the country, and possibly 
the drought contributed to disaffection with the government. 
1913 1914 
% seats won % seats won 
Lib 48.9 38 47.21 32 
Lab 48.5 37 50.89 42 
Ind 1.89 1 
Elections for the House of Representatives, 1913 and 1914 
Cook's biographer surmises that Labor won because its leaders were more 
closely identified with the formation of an Australian Defence Force: his 
evidence is the uniformity of the swing to Labor, which ranged between three 
and four percent in every State.93 But even if we accept that this similarity 
91. Age, 7 Sep 1914. 
92. Hughes & Graham, op. cit., p. 310. Percentages are of the valid primary vote. 
93. Sawer, op. cit., p. 129; Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p. 8; Murdoch, op. cit., pp. 293-94. 
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points to the unimportance of local issues, this outcome is not sufficient to 
establish that defence, rather than some other national question, like the cost of 
living, was the main cause of voters switching from Liberal to Labor. 
Contemporary comment provides insights into the attitudes of the day, but no 
firm evidence of the cause of the result. Explanations of election results tend 
to be coloured by what people think should have happened, and this is 
particularly so of published sources. The Woman attributed the Liberal defeat 
to activists "slackening" after the declaration of war, while Labor campaigners 
maintained a vigorous effort, particularly in the "the house-to-house 
canvassing, the work above all others in political organisation that tells on 
election day .... "94 At least one other Liberal supporter expressed this view, 
which rested on the assumption that a full turn-out at the polls would bring a 
Liberal majority: 
... the voting power was there if the people had risen to the 
occasion, and put aside the indolence which does so easily 
overtake them, and which causes these disasters again and 
again.95 
The Catholic Advocate suggested that Labor had been rewarded for its greater 
enthusiasm for Home Rule.96 The Age hinted that the government had been 
94. The Woman, 1Oct1914, p. 190. 
95. Arthur C. Cocks to LE. Groom, 8Sep1914. NLA MS 236/1/1343. Cocks was 
Liberal/Nationalist MLA for St Leonards (NSW) 1910-20; for North Shore, 1920-25; 
Treasurer, 1921, 1922-25. 
96. Advocate, 12 Sep 1914, p. 24. 
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punished for its free trade leanings and antipathy to the initiative and 
referenda: this policy, and protection, were Age crusades. The paper remarked 
that there had been talk of Labor disloyalty but that it had little effect.97 One 
People's Liberal Party member commented privately that the Liberal' s 
denunciatory style had been counter-productive; another approved it.98 
97. Age, 7 Sep 1914, p. 8. 
98. James Agnew to Brookes, 14Oct1914. NLA MS 1924/18/814; [signature illegible] to 
Brookes, 14 Oct 1914. NLA MS 1924/18/815-17. 
Chapter 2. Win-the-War Nationalism triumphant, 1914-17 
In September 1914, Labor was in a powerful position: a majority in both 
houses gave legislative freedom of action, and winning a election in which 
patriotic credentials had been an important issue seemed to lend the party 
legitimacy. The expectations of the party's supporters in the unions and the 
Labor leagues were high: in particular it was thought that a chance had 
come to protect living standards by re-submitting the prices referenda. 
Supporters of Irish independence, too, could take comfort in the passage of 
the Home Rule Bill, although it was deferred until the peace, and Anglo-
Irish reconciliation was symbolised by Nationalist endorsement of British 
war policy. In Australia, also, there was a partial realisation of the political 
truce which had been mooted during the campaign: Liberal politicians, as 
they had promised, supported Labor's war measures. When the 
government put forward a War Precautions bill to enable ministers to make 
any regulation deemed necessary for national safety, Cook and Irvine 
assented, although not without voicing misgivings about the extent of the 
powers. 
While the second half of 1914 promised the relief of popular living 
standards through redress of Labor's prices and monopolies grievance, an 
easing of the sectarian tensions brought by Anglo-Irish conflict, and a party 
consensus on extraordinary wartime executive powers, events in the first 
three years of the war unfolded in such a way that each of these issues 
became more rather than less divisive. The political developments which 
followed put non-Labor back into power, albeit in a form almost 
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unimaginable before the war. Non-Labor's authoritarian new politics 
seemed to confirm the decline of centrist Deakinism, and Labor also 
withdrew from the centre to a defensive leftism. From August 1914, the 
most influential assumption in non-Labor and to some extent in Labor 
politics was that all considerations must take second place to winning the 
war, and that Australia's policy must be based on absolute political unity 
behind the government, and the devotion of all available resources to the 
war effort. This assumption of the primacy of the war effort led to clashes 
with and within Labor between the proponents of uncompromising 
loyalism, and those who, while rarely opposing the war outright, became 
increasingly disenchanted with injustices in the raising of men and 
shillings, with British policy in Ireland, with the refusal to negotiate an 
early armistice, with censorship and, perhaps most importantly, with the 
proposal to introduce conscription for overseas military service. 
The rhetoric and policies of the 1914 election campaign had demonstrated 
the importance to Liberal politics of the belief that national needs must take 
precedence over sectional requirements. To the Liberal mind the wartime 
vulnerability of the nation-state made this imperative more compelling 
than ever. There was no place in the Liberal conception of the war for the 
idea that reform might accompany or even strengthen the war effort. 
Rather, they considered that reform was disruptive and must be deferred 
until victory. Consequently, the preservation of the present economic order 
became the only domestic policy compatible with patriotism, which lent its 
moral authority to the usual economic positions of the Liberal party. 
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But this summary of loyalist opinion is misleadingly rationalistic, for 
loyalism was as much felt as thought, and the tone of the Nationalist 
campaign in the 1917 election can only be understood as a manifestation of 
the passionate mood of the times. Reporting for the Soldier on a women's 
conscriptionist meeting at the Sydney Town Hall in October 1916, 'Dolly' 
remarked that she had only been able to catch one in ten of Hughes' words 
over the noise of the crowd. Nonetheless, "'[N]ot for worlds would I have 
missed this wonderful, thrilling historical, meeting of women of Australia.' 
"Two months earlier Dolly had confessed to readers that, like most women, 
she felt rather than understood issues.1 In this she may have had much in 
common with male readers of Soldier. Men's and women's responses to 
patriotic issues during the war were suffused with emotion: often anger and 
fear. Wartime politics were notoriously bitter, and the most powerful 
reason for this was, no doubt, the most obvious: that the costs of policy 
were measured not only in pounds (and the economic strain was 
enormous2) but in lives. This added tO the intensity of the feelings of those 
who came to oppose official war policy, and of its supporters, which 
generally included adherents of the Liberal party. In May 1915 Australian 
casualty lists began to appear in the newspapers, but even before then 
emotions were aroused by the atrocities which the German army was 
alleged to be perpetrating in Belgium. The truth of these allegations is not 
the issue here: what is important is that stories of brutality against Belgian 
civilians were believed, and that as the subject of propaganda this version 
of events was an important part of the justification of the war effort. By 
means of atrocity stories and the corresponding celebration of the virtues of 
1. Soldier, 13 Oct & 11 Aug 1916, cited Michael McKernan, The Australian People and the 
Great War, West Melbourne, 1980, p. 89. 
2
. The Commonwealth's average annual expenditure on the war for 1914-19 was £62, 832, 
175; by contrast the Commonwealth's total expenditure for 1913-14 was only £24, 741, 775. 
Ernest Scott, Australia During the War, Sydney, 1937 (1936), pp. 480 & 495. 
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the Allied nations, publicists made the war into an ideological crusade. The 
restoration of Belgian neutrality was an indispensable justification of the 
war in Australia because until January 1918 the British government issued 
no other statement of war aims.3 
Nevertheless, the suffering of the Australian troops made the most 
powerful contribution to the fervency of wartime attitudes. Debating the 
1901 Defence Act, George Reid had praised the courage of Imperial soldiers 
but warned that the skilful leadership which avoided slaughter was a 
quality even more valuable than bravery. 4 This skill seemed to be in short 
supply in the 1914-18 war - in the First Battle of the Somme, 1916, 
approximately 28, 000 members of the AIF were killed or wounded in seven 
weeks.s One parent of an injured soldier, an amputee perhaps, told 
Littleton Groom, "[O]ur great consolation is that he will be able to say with 
pride that his loss was sustained through his having fought bravely, for 
both his King and Country".6 The earnestness of non-Labor politics during 
the war derived in part from a determination to protect from real and 
imagined slights the cause for which such suffering was being endured. 
The consolation of honour seemed to be threatened by those who argued, or 
implied by their dissent from orthodox patriotism, that the war was 
dishonourable. 
3
. Ideological crusade: Paul Fussell, The Great War & Modern Memory, Oxford, 1975, p. 
109; War aims: Judith Smart,' 'Poor Little Belgium' & Australian Popular Support for 
War, 1914-1915', War & Society, vol. 12, no. 1, May 1994, p. 27. 
4. CPD, vol 3, p. 3106 [26 Jul 1901]. 
5. Scott, op. cit., p. 338. 
6
. R.[?]K. Parker, Toowoomba, to Groom, 31Mar1917. NLA MS 236/1/1465. 
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But the emotional life of non-Labor's constituents could also encompass a 
satisfying sense of purpose. Another of Groom's supporters wrote: 
[W]ell, the war is a terror, but has been productive of some 
good, insomuch that it has shown us the necessity of being 
prepared against Enemies, masquerading as friends, and has 
rescued thousands of well[-]to[-]do folks from a life of 
innocuous desuetude to one of active participation in matters 
necessary to our Freedom and safety.7 
This was a time of organised excitement. Non-Labor people were told by 
their Protestant clergy that the war was providential; teachers endeavoured 
to channel patriotic enthusiasm into a greater 'school spirit'.8 It became 
evident that nationalism was also a force for a greater party spirit. 
Paradoxically, loyalist orthodoxy held that party divisions were inconsistent 
with national duty, but denunciations of dissent from orthodox patriotism 
became a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, the Labor-Catholic nexus 
was strengthened by the Protestant bias of the daily press, which generously 
reported the pro-conscription statements of Protestant clergy and ensured 
that, apart from the Catholic press, only the Labor newspapers gave 
sympathetic coverage to anti-conscription Catholic priests.9 
One side of the party divisions which shaped attitudes in the 1917 election 
was Labor discontent with the win-the-war philosophy. Many Labor people 
held that the war should not prevent the party pursuing its normal 
7
. Mayor Josh Wilshire, Toowoomba, to Groom, 22 Feb 1917. NLA MS 236/1/1435. 
8. McKernan, op. cit., pp. 18 & 49. 
9
. D.J. Murphy, 'Religion, Race and Conscription in World War One', Australian Journal of 
Politics & History, vol. 20, no. 2, Aug 1974, p. 161. 
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objectives of working-class amelioration; as prices continued to rise while 
awards remained fixed, a sense of grievance increased, which Labor voiced 
in class and nationalist terms. The view strengthened that, compared to 
their wealthy compatriots, working class Australians were giving too 
much to the war effort. This opinion overlapped with a nationalist protest 
that compared to the Empire as a whole, Australia was already sacrificing 
enough, or too much. Both doctrines were anathema to non-Labor, which 
held that there must be sacrifices in living standards in order, in a 
utilitarian sense, to channel resources into fighting power; and in a 
symbolic sense, so that people at home might by suffering proclaim their 
solidarity with the men at the front. The non-Labor conception of national 
identity was also more imperialist, and maintained that duty and self 
interest demanded that Australia should make as heavy a sacrifice for the 
imperial cause as it was able; the notion that Australian and British 
interests diverged was repudiated. This was a peacetime commonplace, 
elevated by the war into a dogma. Furthermore, wartime loyalism 
intensified the usual non-Labor antipathy to strikes. For example, in his 
prize winning essay The Rule of Law During the War, published as a 
pamphlet in 1917, University of Melbourne law student Robert MenzieslO 
declared that the rule of law was threatened less by the War Precautions Act 
than by strikes in defiance of tribunals. Some were serious enough to 
threaten the stability of society, for "the rule of law cannot rule unless it is 
respected." 11 
10
. UAP /Liberal MHR for Kooyong (Vic), 1934-66; Attorney General 1934-39; Prime 
Minister 1939-41, 1949-66. Kt., 1963; Lord Warden of Cinque Ports, 1965. 
11
. Robert Menzies, The Rule of I.aw During the War, Melbourne, 1917, p. 30. 
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In June 1915 the government replaced union preference with priority for 
returned servicemen.12 The fate of Labor's price control referendum 
proposals was similar. The referendum bill, debated by Parliament in 1915, 
was denounced by the Opposition as an untimely indulgence in sectional 
advancement, which could only distract and divide the people. Pressure 
from State and Commonwealth Liberal members, and Labor and Liberal 
Premiers led the government in November 1915 to abandon the 
referendum in return for a promise from State governments to cede the 
equivalent powers; predictably, the Legislative Councils prevented this.13 
Union preference and price control had been defining issues in the 1914 
election; it seemed that the Liberals had won after all. They lacked formal 
power, but the lessons they derived from the war seemed irresistible. The 
government drew closer to the opposition and further from its supporters 
in the labour movement. Another Fusion was in the making. 
The tensions which led to the reformation of non-Labor into a union of 
Liberals and loyalist Labor were also exacerbated by events in Ireland. 
When in April 1916 a group of rebels seized control of buildings in central 
Dublin, Irish-Catholic Australians seem to have been dismayed by the 
rising and its destruction of the long-awaited Home Rule settlement. But 
in Australia, as throughout the world of the Irish diaspora, opinion swung 
the other way as the British government began to execute the rebels, and to 
implement a policy of deportation and martial law.14 The rising and its 
suppression hardened attitudes on both sides. Moderate nationalists were 
12. Judith Smart, 'Was the Great War Australia's war? A domestic perspective with 
particular reference to Victoria', in Craig Wilcox & Janice Aldridge (eds), The Great War: 
Gains & Losses - Anzac & Empire, Canberra, 1995, p. 55. 
13. Ibid., p. 57. 
14. Advocate, 6 May 1916, p. 12; 20 May 1916, p. 21. 
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disillusioned; loyalists had all their suspicions confirmed. Australian 
sectarianism, notable for its cyclical character, with outrageous events 
triggering the release of long-standing enmities, flared up in a new period 
of controversy. The Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, Dr Daniel Mannix, 
became the advocate for Irish grievances, which were combined with the 
economic resentments felt by the Church's predominantly working class 
adherents. Anglo-Irish conflict led to a resurgence of militant Protestantism 
in which organisations such as the Victorian Protestant Federation, and in 
New South Wales the Loyalty League, lent their support to the Nationalist 
cause.15 
The emotional excitement of the home front, the conviction that the crisis 
of war demanded the suspension of domestic politics, resentments over the 
economic burden of the war, and the effect of the Anglo-Irish conflict on 
Australia's ethnic divisions: all these factors contributed to the conflict over 
the conscription plebiscite of 1916. The story of conscription is well 
known.16 What is relevant here is the overlap between the Liberal party and 
the organised conscriptionist, the importance of compulsion to Liberal 
thinking about the war, and the opportunity which conscription provided 
for the formation of a new non-Labor party. Firstly, Liberal politicians were 
among the most prominent proponents of a 'yes' vote: Irvine had been an 
early advocate of conscription, and while the dominating personality in the 
15
. Gerard Henderson, 'The Deportation of Charles Jerger', Labour History, 31, Nov 1976, 
p. 65. 
16. See, for example: F.B. Smith, The Conscription Plebiscites in Australia, 1916-17, 
Melbourne, 1981, (1965), K.S. Inglis, 'Conscription in Peace & War, 1911-1945', in Roy 
Forward & Bob Reece (eds), Conscription in Australia, St Lucia, 1968, pp. 22-65; J.B. Hirst, 
'Australian Defence & Conscription: A Re-Assessment: Part 1', Historical Studies, vol. 25, 
no. 101, Oct 1993,.ae. 101, pp. 608-27; a bibliography is included in Glen Withers, 'The 
1916-17 conscription referenda: a cliometric reappraisal', Historical Studies, vol. 20, no. 
78, 
Apr 1982, pp. 36-47. 
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1916 plebiscite was Hughes, in New South Wales Joseph Cook, and in 
Victoria, William Watt were important supporters of the 'yes' campaign.1 7 
Secondly, in the loyalist mindset prevalent among Liberal politicians, 
conscription crystallised the paramount issues of the war: the identity of 
Australian and imperial interests; the need for an unrestrained war effort; 
the precedence of civil duty over civil rights. All these themes continued 
in the 1917 election campaign; all that was missing was the advocacy of 
immediate conscription. 
Perhaps, as some historians have argued, the defeat of the 1916 proposal 
suggests that loyalist sentiment was effusive but superficial, and stopped 
short of providing a motive for commitment to real sacrifice.18 But the 
Liberal conscriptionists were energised rather than demoralised by their 
narrow defeat. Loyalist feeling was powerful enough to detach Hughes and 
twenty-four of his followers from the Labor party and bring them into a 
coalition with the Liberals.19 During the 1916 campaign, Watt had 
discussed with the principal organiser of the National Referendum Council, 
Hume Cook, the possibility that Hughes' departure from the Labor party 
might provide the opportunity for a national unity government. On the 
day Hughes walked out of caucus, Watt chaired a meeting at the Council's 
offices in Melbourne, to discuss the formation of a new party. The meeting 
authorised him to consult with Hughes and Cook, and to organise a 
conference representing the Referendum Councils in each State.20 In 
17 - , I/ "6 /.i ,(...,.(. / ~·o -.,/,I ' I"( .'f 'T'_.L5 \. 
. Anderson pp cii., pp. 205-06. ...; - 5 · ~,, /V..J&?"', w· A· t-v-. : rr ~' •7 - ~- / :J , /ft ~ 
18
. T.A. Metherall, 'The Conscription Referenda, October 1916 & December 1917: An () /11~ w 1 p(J· 2os-1't 
Inward-Turned Nation at War', PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 1971, p. 41; Paul 
Thornton-Smith, 'The 1917 Australian federal election: a case study of politics in the 
Great War', PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 1987, iv. 
19. Fitzhardinge, op. cit.,, p. 228. 
20. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 207-209. 
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January 1917 non-Labor parliamentarians (ex-Labor and ex-Liberal) joined 
together formally in the National Federation. The objects of the Federation 
were an all-out war effort, effective repatriation, responsible government, 
conciliation and arbitration, white Australia, economic development and 
free trade within the Commonwealth.21 According to Scott, there was an 
upsurge of enthusiasm for the new organisation, with National-minded 
citizens forming "unusually large branches" in the capital cities and in 
regional towns: in Geelong, for example, secretaries at the inaugural 
meeting were unable to sign-up all who wanted to join.22 
It may be that the Federation grew rapidly because it provided an outlet for 
the frustration which loyalists felt at the defeat of the plebiscite.23 What is 
more certain is that in Victoria, at least, the Federation was well-organised, 
by Hume Cook, and generously funded, at first by William Baillieu of the 
Collins House financial group, and later by the National Union, which was 
a reconstituted version of the Constitutional Union. During the 1917 
election, the Melbourne-based Federation was able to employ ten full-time 
organisers and, along with the AWNL, which remained a separate 
organisation, to assist in the Southern Riverina.24 The strength of the 
Federation varied in strength in the different states, but the common 
element was the attempt to combine the traditional forces of Liberalism 
with the new element of loyalist Labor. The composition of the Nationalist 
Senate ticket in Victoria symbolised this association: the Nationalists chose 
21. Fitzhardinge, op. cit., pp. 245-6. 
22. Scott, op. cit., p. 376. 
23. Thornton-Smith, op. cit., p. 344. 
24. Ibid., pp. 346 & 365. 
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an ex-soldier, William Bolton, a businessman, George Fairbairn, and a 
former Labor member of the Legislative Assembly, William Plain.25 
The image of the new Nationalist party was shaped by its leader, W.M. 
(Billy) Hughes. Born in Pimlico, London, in 1862, Hughes' early life had 
been difficult. After working as a pupil teacher, he emigrated to 
... + 
V"Vit/L- Queensland at the age of twenty two, w~ he worked"a series of bush 
labouring jobs. In Sydney, he found steady work and married Elizabeth 
Cutts, the daughter of the landlady of his boarding house. The Hugheses 
moved to Balmain and opened a small general shop. Their shop's wares 
included political pamphlets, and it became the meeting place for the 
socialists and single taxers with whom Billy Hughes was beginning to mix. 
In the early 1890s he became involved with the new Parliamentary Labor 
Leagues; and following Labor's first parliamentary split over the fiscal issue, 
was instrumental in re-organising the Leagues so as to require of candidates 
a preselection pledge to abide by the wishes of a caucus majority (it was this 
development which had prompted Joseph Cook's departure). Rising in the 
Labor party through energy, intelligence, organisational ability, and 
ambition, Hughes was elected member for the inner city seat of Lang in 
1894; and for Western Sydney in the first Federal election. He was admitted 
to the bar in 1903 and served as a minister in the Watson and Fisher 
governments. Hughes shared the contemporary concern that Australia 
enjoyed only a precarious existence as a white civilisation in Asia, and in 
1905 founded the National Defence League, to press for stronger defences, 
including compulsory military service. A convinced state socialist, Hughes 
believed that socialism would come about as part of an inevitable evolution 
25. Ibid., p. 350. 
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of institutions towards greater integration and conscious direction by the 
state. By 1914, his experiences of struggling to make a living (especially, 
perhaps, as a small and frail man in the rough conditions of outback 
Queensland) and his absorption of social Darwinist ideas, had combined 
with his apprehension of the rise of Japan to produce a worldview in 
which competition was the essence of life. Once convinced that 
conscription was necessary for national survival, Hughes threw himself 
into the cause with all his considerable energy. Apart from his desire to 
retain office for its own sake he was certainly motivated by a belief that 
conscription was needed to maintain Australian forces; and, perhaps also by 
the hope of retaining after the war British protection against Japan. 
Autocratic in temperament, and with a gift for emotive oratory, Hughes 
was an appropriate leader for a movement which hoped to sweep aside all 
opposition to a policy deemed essential for national safety; as an ex-Labor 
man he was th~ught to attract the 'loyal Labor' and returned men's votes.26 
The election was being held against the wishes of the Hughes government, 
which had been prevented by the rebellion of two of its supporters from 
passing through the Senate a resolution requesting an Imperial Act to 
prolong the life of the parliament.27 The polling day was 5 May. In 
summary, the main National arguments were that Labor's loyalty was 
suspect, and the election an undesirable distraction forced by the Labor 
senators; the poll could only be justified if the Government gained a Senate 
26. General references: Fitzhardinge, op. cit.; and his article in ADB, 9, pp. 393-400; W.M. 
Hughes, The Case for Labor, Sydney, 1910; Inglis, op. cit.; Diane Langmore, Prime 
Ministers' Wives: the public and private lives of ten Australian women, Ringwood, 1992. 
Hughes' experiences as a small man working in the bush: Malcom Booker, The Great 
Professional: A Study of W.M. Hughes, Sydney, 1980, p. 15. 
27. Sawer, QlLci!., p. 130. 
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majority.28 Conscription would not be introduced without another 
referendum. Government candidates attacked Labor Senators for delaying 
Australia's attendance at the Imperial Conference, and promised a vigorous 
prosecution of the war and generous funding of repatriation. A National 
Government would be responsible to the Parliament and the people; Labor 
was directed by outside organisations; furthermore, Labor politicians valued 
the pursuit of their vendetta against Hughes over the restraint of party 
strife. Labor was a shell: true Labor men had moved to the National party. 
The alleged shell and its leader, Frank Tudor29, also promised generous 
support for repatriation. Labor criticised the high cost of living, supported 
the use of tariffs to foster employment and economic growth, opposed 
Imperial Federation if it seemed likely such a union would become a means 
of imposing conscription on Australia, and insisted the Government 
intended to introduce conscription by one means or other. 
Hughes delivered his policy speech at the Town Hall in the centre of his 
new electorate, Bendigo. He began with the Senate's decision to prevent 
him from attending the Imperial Conference, a choice which demonstrated 
Labor's determination to place sectional interests ahead of Empire unity. 
Australia was the only dominion not to be represented, a failure which 
dishonoured the dead, and denied Australia a say in the post-war control of 
the Pacific. This was only to be expected of a party dominated by "secret 
executives". Some of these were loyal only to the red flag; others, 
28. Labor senators opposed the passage of a resolution requesting an Imperial Act to 
prolong the current Parliament. The resolution could not have been blocked however, 
without the rebellion of two Nationalist senators who disapproved of Hughes' attempts 
to use the casual vacancy created by the suspiciously convenient resignation of Senator 
Ready (Labor, Tasmania). Sawer, QJ2:...ci!., pp. 130-31. 
29. MHR for Yarra (Vic), 1901-22; Leader of the Opposition, 1917-22. 
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innocently, earnestly believed it was possible for Australia to be safe 
without the Empire; others favoured a "premature peace". 
Hughes insisted that he and his National Labor colleagues had been left 
with no choice but to leave such a party, and in doing so they remained 
faithful to its original, uncorrupted principles. Labor's 1914 manifesto 
pledged unconditional support for the war effort; this was "the contract 
made .... with the electors."30 In advocating conscription, the Hughes camp 
had endeavoured to discharge their obligations: but they would respect the 
people's answer, and persist with voluntary recruiting. The Nationalist 
government existed "to do whatever is necessary" to win the war. The 
conflict was between nations, and not merely a contest on the battlefield. 
Australia must emulate the industrial organisation from which Germany 
drew its strength. 31 
Hughes promised to protect the standard of living, during and after the war. 
The government, he contended, had ensured cheap bread by fixing the 
domestic price of wheat. Nationalists were also concerned that wealth 
should pay its shares: income tax had been raised by twenty five percent, 
and the government would proceed with the War Time Profit Bill. It was a 
lie that the government had deliberately fostered unemployment in order 
to encourage recruitment. Employment, and foreign exchange reserves, 
would be preserved by continuing the British policy of licensing non-
30. Account based on Win-the-War Policy: Prime Minister's Speech, Melbourne, 1917. 
Authorised by A.S. Whyte, National Campaign Council. 
31
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essential imports. The Commonwealth would take full responsibility for 
"repatriation", and provide widow's pensions, suitable work for the 
disabled, pensions for the utterly disabled, and land for the able-bodied. 
When the war was over, the government's policy of fostering national 
development would be based on the assumption that Australia could 
support a population of one hundred million. With this in mind, the 
Commonwealth should offer, via the States, land settlement for British 
soldiers on the same terms as for Australian returned men. Guaranteed 
wheat prices were also designed to attract immigrants. 
Hughes concluded by imploring voters to work so that " .. .it shall be seen 
that Australia does stand for the Empire and all that it means ..... See that you 
arouse the apathetic electors. See that you meet every lie that is uttered." 
Nationalists stood against the "Caucus party" and for a decisive victory and 
a lasting peace, a "fair deal for all men, irrespective of class", arbitration 
rather than strikes, development of national resources. The back cover of 
the pamphlet which reproduced Hughes' speech bore slogans summarising 
the values which Nationalist candidates represented: Australia, the Empire, 
industrial peace, responsible government, and "Economical 
Administration". But Hughes had said nothing of the last. Rather, he had 
acknowledged that spending had to rise, and explained that this would be 
covered by taxes and loans: there had been no mention of retrenchment or 
efficiency. Nevertheless, the compilers of the pamphlet evidently wished 
that Hughes had espoused these normal Liberal goals. Here was a small 
anticipation of the conflict between the former Labor Prime Minister and 
his new followers which five years later led the Nationalists to replace 
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Hughes with a leader more sympathetic to non-Labor thinking about the 
role of the state. 
Tudor announced Labor's policy two day later, at the Richmond Town Hall. 
He defended the legitimacy of the Labor party, proposed measures to protect 
living standards and to exact from the wealthy a greater share of the war's 
costs, and warned that the government still wanted to introduce 
conscription. Labor had been elected with a majority in both houses after 
the declaration of war, and had held office for two years, during which time 
it had proved its commitment to prosecution of the war. Labor had not 
changed since 1914, except that the Hughes group had chosen to leave. 
Tudor said that he had never during his sixteen years as a Labor member 
been subject to dictation, and that the 'Junta' was simply the equivalent of 
the Nationalist conference. The ''IWW [Industrial Workers of the World] 
Bogey" had been prominent in the referendum and New South Wales 
elections (November 1916); and since then the government had acquired 
the broad powers given by the Unlawful Associations Act, but there had 
been no prosecutions. Nationalists accused Labor parliamentarians of 
collaborating with the IWW then, in January, invited them to join the 
Nationalist government.32 
Voters should discount the government's disavowal of conscription, and 
attend to the statements made by ministers. Irvine, for example, had said in 
January that he could only support a party which was determined to re-
submit the referendum at the earliest opportunity. Hughes himself, at 
32. Australian Worker, [Sydney] 5 Apr 1917, p. 15. See also the Labor manifesto: Ibid., 29 
March 1917, p. 15. 
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Bendigo, indicated that the government was only pausing in its effort to 
introduce compulsion. 
Tudor's policy on repatriation was the same as Hughes' in that he promised 
pensions for widows, and the incapacitated. Labor, not Hughes, deserved 
the credit for creating the wheat pool. Tudor promised to introduce a 
wartime excess profits tax rising from 50% for 1914-15 to 100% in 1916-17. 
The Commonwealth would ask again for the price control powers requested 
in 1911 and 1913. Most now favoured the principle of protection, but the 
government had done nothing to strengthen this policy, which was needed 
to provide employment for returned men. 
Tudor complained of the dishonest methods used by the government. 
Censors were denying the public access to infortnation that had nothing to 
do with the war. Soldiers' ballot papers at this election were not marked 
with the candidates' name, but only with 'ministerialist' and 'oppositionist'. 
Approximately two thirds of government members, Tudor said in 
conclusion, were ex-Liberals, and voters should remember that they had to 
choose an administration which would be responsible for matters other 
than the war: he asked his audience to "remain true and vote solidly" for 
Labor, and to spurn the "triple Fusion", the "wreckage" of the Deakin, Cook, 
and Hughes parties. 
The Labor mentality was isolationist and suspicious. J. Ashton, writing in 
Labor Call, claimed that the war cost one and a half million pounds per 
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week, and that if the AIF stayed at home, and the same amount was spent 
on home defence, then Australia would be safe from any nation. Another 
contributor, W. Wallis, warned that a great effort was being made by the 
trusts and combines which supported "Toryism" to defeat Labor, and that 
this concentration of economic power threatened "Australian democracy". 
One shipping company had already donated more than the Labor party 
would spend in the entire campaign. The Constitutional Union directed 
the non-Labor organisations which included the National Federation, the 
A WNL, Farmers' and Settlers' Associations, Property Defence Unions, the 
Employers' Federation, and 'Labor Solidarity' Committee.33 
Do not be deceived. The workers are up against the greatest plot 
ever devised in any country. 
These men [Wallis did not identify them] are the agents and 
emissaries of a secret organisation of capitalists, with the object 
of insidiously breaking down your DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS, YOUR RACIAL IDEALS, AND YOUR 
PROGRESSIVE LEGISLATION. 34 
Labor regarded conscription as the means by which this plot would be 
carried out. It was essential to win the Senate, which in preventing 
Hughes from legislating for compulsion "stood between Australia and the 
Red Plague of Prussianism." Many people, one supporter reported to 
Groom, thought that if the Nationalists won a large majority they would 
introduce conscription, and their sons would be killed.35 Another 
commented that local anti-conscription "speakers" intended to use this 
issue against Groom. "Political matters will be a side issue". They were so 
33. Labor Call, 19Apr1917, p. 5; 12Apr1917, p. 2. 
34. Ibid. 3 May 1917, p. 5. 
35
. Senate: Australian Worker, 3 May 1917, p. 5; Mark Izzard, Plainby, to Groom, 4 Apr 
1917. NLA MS 236/1/1471. 
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confident of defeating Groom that they had laid_ bets.36 'Nothing Else 
[except conscription] Matters Just Now', Boote insisted. The Nationalists 
promised to retain Labor legislation, but only to disguise their intentions. 
How could it be otherwise when the government contained so many who 
had opposed Labor policy throughout their careers?37 
Nationalists, however, insisted that their party combined patriotism with 
the best of the Labor tradition. Groom was informed that " ... the red-hot 
labor [sic] element particularly that of the Ryan-Fihelly type is right up 
against your party in fact very bitter but I think the respectable Labor vote 
will go for your party."38 Before the 1917 'fusion', Liberals claimed that 
pensions and arbitration originated with them. Now it was important to 
convince Labor voters to support a party in which, with the very important 
exception of Hughes himself, the 'national Labor' element was small, and 
government publicists promised to retain "Labor legislation", not to 
suppress trade unions, and maintain "good wages and reasonably short 
hours."39 Hughes specifically promised not to reduce the old age, soldiers', 
or invalid pensions, nor the maternity allowance. 40 Nationalists 
acknowledged Labor's past achievements but argued that the party of 1917 
was " ... an empty house from which the Labor Party has removed to the 
36. Thomas Henderson to Groom, 29Mar1917. NLA MS 236/1/1463. 
37. Australian Worker, 22 Mar 1917, p. 17. 
38. C.G. Deacon to LE. Groom, 1Apr1917. NLA MS 236/1/1466. T.J .Ryan was Labor 
Premier of Queensland, 1915-19; MHR for West Sydney (NSW), 1919-21; John Fihelly, 
who became notorious in loyalist opinion for his outspoken Irish nationalism, was Labor 
MLA for Paddington, 1912-22; Minister without Portfolio, 1915-18; Secretary for 
Railways, 1918-22; Minister for Justice, 1919-22; Public Works, 1920-22; Treasurer, 1920-22. 
39. How to Vote for the Nationalist Candidates, Brisbane, n.d. [1917]. NLA MS 236/6/669, 
pp. 134-35; Good wages: Women of Queensland, Brisbane, 1917, Thi.Q., p. 131. [both 
pamphlets authorised by M.H. Ellis] 
40. Anon.,[authorised by M.H. Ellis] Labor Legislation and the National Government, 
1917, NLA MS 236/6/669, p. 144. 
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higher ground of national politics, national honour, and national 
security."41 Labor could not claim any credit for the Navy or the cadets -
these policies were the creation of Hughes alone.42 Only winning the war, 
which Labor would not or could not do, could preserve workers' benefits. 
"Where are the Belgians' advantages of socialistic legislation, workmen's 
compensation, all the rest of it, today, with their blackened homes and 
charred villages?"43 
One feature of the election was the circulation of anti-sacerdotal cartoons 
reprinted from 1850s issues of Punch. These originated with the shady 
publishing entrepreneur Critchley Parker; and were obviously directed 
against the Labor Party. The involvement of Nationalist organisations in 
funding and distributing this material is uncertain. Some important figures 
in the Liberal ~ovement, such as Herbert Brookes, were closely involved 
with anti-Catholic organisations. The South Australian Legislative 
Councillor David Gordon44 shared Brookes' views on the problem of Irish 
Catholicism, and advised an openly Protestant campaign: the National 
party had nothing to lose by making its sectarian allegiances clear. 
Re the Ecclesiastical question. Although it is with us it does not 
obtrude itself but it certainly is a menace and will have to be 
faced boldly in Australia sooner or later. I see nothing to be lost 
in fighting it straight out since that party vote has in my 
experience always been given solidly to extreme Labor.45 
41. SMH, 26 Apr 1917, p. 6. 
42. Ibid., 12 Apr 1917, p. 13. 
43. Ibid., 20 Apr 1917, pp. 7-8. This was said by the Lord Mayor, R.D. Meagher. 
44. See note 86, chapter 1. 
45. David Gordon to H. Brookes, 3Apr1917, NLA MS 1924/19/26. 
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Not surprisingly, the Sydney Worker was convinced of Nationalist 
involvement, and claimed that the tracts were abundantly supplied and 
thoroughly distributed throughout the State, particularly in Holman's 
electorate of Cootamundra. The literature also circulated in South 
Australia, where Father D.M. O'Reilly of the Coolah Catholic church 
complained at an Anzac memorial ceremony, that on the anniversary of an 
engagement in which "all creeds had taken part", the win-the-war party 
were distributing circulars and cartoons "most insulting to the Roman 
Catholic Church in this country".46 On the other hand, not all Nationalists 
welcomed this propaganda. Presumably it appealed to the type of voters 
who warned Groom that "the R.C.s led by the Priests are strong against 
you"; and that Catholics hoped for a Germany victory to bring them Home 
Rule. Watt, however, who had been touring New South Wales, and the 
Victorian seats of lndi and Bendigo, advised Groom that 
[T]he Critchley Parker campaign is doing us no good here either, and I 
have had a consultation with the Prime Minister to-day and am now 
in touch with [the Solicitor General] Sir Robert Carran with the object 
of taking certain definite steps in the direction you suggest. 47 
While touring South Australia, Joseph Cook denied that the National party 
had anything to do with the distribution of sectarian literature. 48 The 
46. Australian Worker (Sydney), 29 Mar 1917, p. 21; SMH, 25 Apr 1917, p. 12. As the 
Herald was a morning paper, O'Reilly must have spoken on the 24th. 
See Advocate, 28 Apr 1917, p. 16. 
47
. George Newman to Groom, 14 March 1917. NLA MS 236/1/1455. E. Patrick to Groom, 1 
May 1917, NLA MS 236/1/1488; Watt to Groom, 30Apr1917. NLA MS 236/1/1485-86. The 
government would have been able to ban the pamphlets under the War Precautions Act as 
prejudicial to recruiting: I have been unable to find out whether it did so. 
48. SMH, 25 Apr 1917, p. 10. 
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Member for Kalgoorlie, Hugh Mahon49, who had stayed with the official 
Labor Party, accused Hughes of issuing a War Precautions regulation to 
protect Critchley Parker from being sued by a United States company with a 
strong German interest. This would, Hughes retorted in a speech at 
Kyneton, Victoria, have been a justifiable policy, but the regulation was 
authorised while Mahon himself was Attorney General. The regulation 
indemnified anyone being sued for making an allegation of an "enemy 
connection". Hughes pointed out that he had left Australia on 24 January 
1916 and returned on 1 August. Turning to a more general attack on 
Mahon, Hughes claimed that the former Attorney General had remained 
strongly pro-conscription throughout the referendum campaign, and clung 
to office for as long as possible. Then he changed his mind on conscription. 
"'He is on intimate terms with Archbishop Mannix. Did he change his 
opinion after he had seen the Archbishop? He does not say so, but we can 
draw our own conclusions."'so 
Much of the National campaign depicted Labor as anti-soldier and anti-
British. One of the more sensational tracts of this type was the pamphlet 
Tudorites Charged and Condemned for Soliciting German Money, 
distributed by the Federation in Western Australia. The tract alleged that 
during the 1916 referendum, Labor Senator J. Grant and candidate for 
Cootamundra P.J. Minihan wrote to Paul Schwarz - an "enemy alien" 
now interned at Liverpool - requesting money for the 'no' campaign. The 
author of Tudorites' compared Grant and Minihan to Judas, and urged 
readers to "[E]xpress your opinion of this kind of thing through the ballot 
49. MHR for Coolgardie (W), 1910-3; Kalgoorlie (WA), 1913-17; 1919-20; Postmaster 
General, 1904; Minister for Home Affairs, 1908-09; Honorary Minister, 1914; Minister for 
External Affairs, 1914-16. 
50. 1 May 1917, p. 7. The regulation was no. 7, drafted 7 May and passed on 21June1916. 
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on May 5."51 In that the two were supposed to have solicited donations, 
this was an unusually· concrete allegation. Most Nationalist 'disloyalty' 
propaganda quoted objectionable statements, and asserted dubious 
personal associations. According to The Woman : " ... although many 
members of the P.L.P. are loyal, all the disloyalists and pro-Germans 
support that party. Does any Britisher wish to vote with them?"52 
Still more notorious was J.K. McDougall's parody of Kipling's 'White 
Man's Burden'. McDougall was Labor member for Wannon, 1906-13. The 
parody first appeared in the Worker [Sydney] during the Boer war.5 3 
McDougall began with 'Ye are the sordid killers .. .'; the last stanza (11) was 
particularly provocative: "'Ye fall in alien places,/On foreign wastes ye lie,/ 
Stiff-limbed, with putrid faces,/Turned livid to the sky."' Labour Call 
printed a revised version of the poem - apparently as filler - in January 1915. 
When McDougall stood for Labor in the Grampians by-election in February, 
these lines appeared in local newspapers such as the Horsham Times and 
in the Victorian Employers' Federation journal Liberty and Progress. 
Hughes and Fisher were amongst the Labor luminaries who campaigned 
for McDougall, and they defended him by arguing that the poem was about 
the Boer war, not the present one. McDougall lost the by-election by about 
six hundred votes. The 'Sordid Killers' featured in Nationalist literature 
51. Anon., [authorised by G.E. Wheatley, Secretary, National Federation (WA)], 
Tudorites Charged and Condemned for Soliciting German Money,. 1917. Pearce Papers: 
NLA MS 213/12/33-35. 
52. The Woman, 1May1917, p. 93. 
53. Terry King states that the poem was probably first published on 18 August 1900, and 
definitely during the South African war (1899-1902). 'The Tarring and Feathering of J.K. 
McDougall: 'Dirty Tricks' in the 1919 Federal Election', Labour History, No. 45, November 
1983, p. 59. Kipling's 'White Man's Burden' (the white men were the those of the United 
States, and the burden was the Philippines) was published in 1899. Stanley Applebaum 
(ed.), Gunga Din and other favourite poems, New York, 1990, p. 69. 
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during the 1917 election; the full text of the poem was printed in a memo to 
Hughes on 'Official Labor Utterances•.54 
Thomas Crouch, who wrote pro-government columnist for the Herald, 
tried to use the disloyalty argument to win women's votes. He explained 
the importance of the female vote to the government's Senate prospects: at 
the 1914 Senate elections 70.7% men but only 58.9% of women voted. While 
admitting both parties claimed that the unpolled voted would benefit 
them, Crouch felt sure that "[T]he overwhelming majority of women in 
Australia are national in sentiment." It is they who worry about fathers and 
sons at the front, and who tirelessly pack parcels and knit socks and 
mufflers. 
No woman in Australia wants to see the IWW vindicated and 
uplifted. No woman in Australia wants to see the men who 
told their boys they were fools to go away and who are now 
urging Britain to fix up a peace with the murdering, outraging 
Hun, before their honoured and beloved dead have been 
avenged in victory, placed in power in this freest and fairest 
democracy in the world. 55 
Voting in Federal elections was voluntary, so emotive rhetoric such as this 
may have been partly designed to motivate people who would certainly 
vote National if they voted at all, but who had to be cajoled into making the 
effort to visit the polling booth. The National Party's campaigners, 
however, also desired to win votes away from Labor. Many of the Party's 
54. King, op. cit., pp. 59-60. Anon., 'Official Labor Utterances', 1917, Hughes Papers: 
NLA MS 1538/20/403. 
55. SMH, 24Apr1917, p. 6. 
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most prominent members were ex-Labor, and if they were to maintain 
their numbers the new group could not rely entirely on Liberal votes. 
The dangers facing Australia demanded that party rivalries be put aside, 
said the Nationalists. Labor puts "party issues" first, but the Government 
was "non-party."56 The Warwick Argus took a dim view of party strife and, 
comparing the election to Nero fiddling while Rome burned, urged the 
return of a non-party Party.57 So, elections were inappropriate for a nation 
at war: Australia was the only country in the Empire which had attempted 
to have an election in war time, Senate candidate H.E. Pratten told a 
meeting of the Women's Reform League, but voters should take the chance 
to re-elect patriotic leaders.SS 
Nationalists emphasised that the British cause with which they identified 
their party was a mission of honour. Irvine depicted the election as an 
opportunity for Australia to atone for the shame of its 'no' vote of October 
last. He was confident no "intelligent man" would want Australia to 
become a "defaulter" in her duty to Britain. "Those who had voted 'no' 
had already stained Australia's honour."59 Those who fought and died for 
the Empire, Watt told one meeting, proved that the English were still a 
virile race. Germans claimed that after three generations of peace the 
Englishman's 
56. The National Policy. A Comprehensive Catchism. Answers by Mr Hughes, Melbourne, 
1917, NLA MS 236/669, p. 145. 
57. Warwick Argus, 5 Apr 1917, NLA MS 236/6/669, p. 104. 
58. SMH 13 Apr 1917, p. 6. HE. Pratten, Senator (NSW) 1917-21; member for 
Parramatta, 1921-22; Martin, 1922-28. 
59. Ibid., 9 Apr 1917, p. 6. Irvine, as National candidates felt impelled to do throughout 
the campaign, denied nonetheless that conscription would be imposed on the people. 
... blood had run thin and that he could not fight as his sires 
fought at Waterloo. (Applause). Every man who had gone out 
to fight had proved that he had red corpuscles in his blood, and 
they had that achievement of the other day, when our lads met 
the flower of the Prussian Guards, and slaughtered them. 
(Applause).60 
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English-Australian men proved their virility by fighting; in part they were 
fighting to preserve the 'honour' (that is, freedom from being raped) of 
Australian women. Thomas Crouch noted that a Miss Mathews had joked 
to a Labor meeting that she must belong to the 'lose-the-war party'; and 
sternly reminded his readers that Labor was indeed the defeatist party, and 
no woman should support defeatism, "A man may be able to afford to lose 
this war; a woman dare not. She has too much too lose - her honour and 
her future. "61 
Nationalists encouraged the public to venerate Australian soldiers, and 
hoped that patriotic fervour would translate into support for the self-styled 
patriots' party. Percy Hunter, chief organiser for New South Wales, 
appealed for volunteers to work for government control of the Senate. 
(The Sydney Morning Herald agreed: a "stalemate" between the two houses, 
it said, would be akin to the kind of peace now being offered by Germany.) 62 
Not all could fight in Flanders, Hunter said, but there were "scores of 
thousands of both sexes who ... have ached for an opportunity to do 
something to help this country in her time of need. Here is the 
60. Ibid. 20 Apr 1917, pp. 7-8. 
61. Ibid., 28 Apr 1917, p. 12. 
62. Ibid., 11 Apr 1917, p. 10. 
98 
opportunity. An army of voters is wanted to see that the metropolitan 
Senate vote is polled."63 National publicists even came up with a jingle to 
jolly this army along. 
For the sake of Colonel Ryrie - he's a General today. 
But you love the game old Colonel, love the man you sent away -
You must hear his message calling from the field where men are 
falling, 
To remind you of your duty and to bid you go and vote; 
Vote for Millen, Pratten, Thomas - get your lesson off by rote, 
And remember they're with Ryrie when you vote, vote, vote! etc.64 
Whether because, regardless or in spite of their loyalist arguments, the 
Nationalists won decisively. Senate voting was then on the first-past-the-
post system, and the government won all eighteen vacancies, giving it 
twenty four seats against the opposition's twelve. All ministers were 
returned. 65 
1914 1917 
% seats won % seats won 
Lib/Nat 47.21 32 54.22 53 
lab 50.89 42 43.95 22 
Ind 1.89 1 1.83 0 
Elections for the House of Representatives, 1914 & 191766 
63. Ibid., 4Apr1917, p. 12. 
64. Ibid., 4 May 1917, p. 4. Granville de Laune Ryrie (MHR for North Sydney, 1911-22; 
Warringah [NSW], 1922-27; KCMG, 1919) commanded the Third Light Horse Regiment. 
He was elected to the Legislative Assembly seat of Queanbeyan in 1906; during the 
campaign he is supposed to have treated voters to "'rollicking ballads sung to his own 
accompaniment."' ADB, vol. 11, pp. 502-03, article by A.J. Hill. 
65. Sawer, op. cit., pp. 157-5.9 
66. The vote was 78.3% of enrolment, an increase of 4.77% on the 914 turn-out. Hughes & 
Graham, op. cit., p. 315. 
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Hume Cook told the secretary of the National Union that the election had 
been won by the addition to the normal Liberal poll of " 'loyal Laborites' ". 
These "moderates", however, would not automatically continue to support 
the Nationalists, and a continued effort to canvass their votes was 
required. 67 The Sydney Morning Herald, publishing a photograph of two 
soldiers striding out of a polling booth tent at the Liverpool army camp, 
rejoiced in the " 'soldiers' vote' " cast by a dutiful people (Figure 2.1). The 
Daily Chronicle said that the result demonstrated the Australian people's 
determination to make an all-out effort to win the war, and their mistrust of 
Tudor's capacity to lead such an effort. The Daily Mail compared Labor to 
the Civil War era Democratic Party of which Lincoln said "They are for the 
war, but against the prosecution of it", while the Financial Times expressed 
its relief that Labor would not be able to weaken the war effort through the 
extravagant spending to which it was addicted.68 
The election result of May 1917 can been seen as the high point of win-the-
war politics. Six months later its limitations were demonstrated again 
when conscription was defeated at a second plebiscite, but for the moment 
Australian politics was dominated by Nationalism, a force which all 
historians of Australia in the 1914-18 war have had to explain. Since the 
publication in 1936 of Ernest Scott's volume of the official history, Australia 
During the War, interpretations of the wartime psychology amplified by 
the Nationalists have changed considerably. Scott could be critical of 
67. Hume Cook to John West, 19 Jul 1917 [copy]. Hume Cook papers: NLA MS 601/2/36 
68. SMH, 10 May 1917, p. 7. 
THE SPIRIT 011' THE ELECTIONS: 
Tiii!: PROTOORAPH SHOWS THI!: SOLDIERS' POLLISO BOOTH AT UYEi!POOL C.UIP OS SATURDA\". TT WAS A 
""SOLDIERS' VOTE" THAT nu: SATIOS GAVE JS RETCRSJSO Tiit: \"TS-THt:-WAR GOVl!:RS!.Jt:ST. 
Figure 2.1 'The spirit of the elections 
Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 1917, p. 7' 
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martial patriotism: he noted, for example, the "hysteria" and "malice" 
which seemed to motivate the spurious denunciations of German 
espionage sent to military authorities. Furthermore, he admitted that the 
conscription controversies were fierce, and that the patriotic consensus 
apparent in 1914 weakened once the costs of the war became evident. For 
the most part, however, Scott gave a benign gloss to home-front politics. 
Australia emerges in his history as a nation innocent of the internal 
divisions and external feuds of the old world. The legacies of the war 
included a sense of separate identity among the ex-soldiers, isolationism 
and pacifism, and, from the 1916 party split, a weakened Labor party and a 
non-Labor grouping compelled to adopt many items of the Labor program. 
But war, in Scott's account, did not engender a mood of aggression or 
chauvinism.69 
The contrary view that politics became unusually repressive during and 
immediately after the Great War is the thesis of most studies of 
Nationalism published in the last thirty years. Something of a counter-
revolution has begun, but most students of the period would contest the 
assertion by one revisionist that the Australian experience of 
mobilisation in an ideologically-driven war against German militarism 
entailed national "maturation", a coming to terms with the world of real 
politik.70 In general historians have rejected the official war history 
argument that the main political effect of the war experience was to unite 
the people behind a newly-glorified standard. They have instead 
69. Scott, op. cit., pp. 106, 241-42, vi-vii, 4, 864-65. 
70. John A. Moses, 'Australia's Academic Garrison, 1914-1918', Australian Journal of 
Politics & History, vol. 36, no. 3, 1990, p. 372. See also: Anthony Cooper, 'The Australian 
Historiography of the First World War: Who is Deluded?', Australian Journal of Politics 
& History, vol. 40, no. 1, 1994, pp. 16-35; Hirst,~· 
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emphasised the way in which loyalists sought advantage by dividing the 
community between patriots and traitors; and the connections between 
an atmosphere of hate created by the rhetoric of editors and politicians, 
and the violence which soldiers dealt out to 'disloyalists', such as 
opponents of conscription. Historians have argued that the experience 
of 1914-18, especially the conscription controversy, polarised politics, and 
that non-Labor's shift towards the right involved taking a more negative 
and conservative attitude to most issues, and that this change persisted 
for as long as the generation which came of age in 1914-18 held 
institutional power. 
When historians contrast pre and post-Great War non-Labor politics, they 
often compare unfavourably the extremism and negativity of Nationalist 
governments, in office 1917-29, with the moderation and creativity of 
Deakin's Liberal Protectionists. In terms of organisation, the argument 
runs, the joining in 1917 of Cook's Liberal opposition and Hughes' pro-
conscription Labor members set a new, jingo identity for non-Labor. 
Nationalists were prone to denouncing their opponents as traitors. 
Nothing could be further from the reasonable appraisal of Labor which 
was one of Deakin' s signature themes. It is also argued that mistrust 
between 'Irish' and 'British' Australians was deepened by reactions to the 
Anglo-Irish conflict 1916-21, and that these ethnic, religious, and class 
conflicts were exacerbated by disputes over the fairest way of meeting the 
human and economic costs of the war.71 
71. Smith, op. cit., p. 22; Warren G. Osmond, Frederic Eggleston: An Intellectual in 
Australian Politics, Sydney, London & Boston, pp. 52-54; Bill Gammage, 'Was the Great 
War Australia's War?', in Wilcox & Aldridge, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 
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Historians of the principal non-Labor parties have argued that the 
physical and psychological violence and disorder of wartime conditions 
weakened liberal and strengthened conservative opinion. The 
'discipline and punish' and 'national efficiency' tendencies in social 
reform politics gained strength at the expense of optimistic 'assist and 
encourage' reformism. The priorities of liberalism changed: constraint 
became more, and liberation less important; and this shift from reform to 
discipline had a polarising effect on the left, weakening reformist 
compromise and strengthening radical intransigence.72 In these 
accounts, non-Labor politicians and their core Anglo-Scottish Protestant 
constituents were harsher and more divisive in their attitudes after the 
war than before it. 73 The post-war settlement engineered by the 
Nationalists is depicted as backward-looking: in domestic politics, 
committed to resisting the reform of pre-war society; in external policy, 
clinging to the illusion of British predominance long after the reality of 
Imperial power was gone. Historians have contended that the 
glorification of the soldier and the self-sacrificing wife and mother 
ossified gender relations in the 'separate spheres' pattern of the early 
Commonwealth and retarded the development of feminism; and that 
the Anzac cult implied that no changes should be made to the society 
that produced the diggers.74 
72. Smart, op. cit., (1995) pp. 24-25. 
73. Marilyn Lake, A Divided Society: Tasmania during Word War One, Melbourne, 1975, 
~P· 195-196; Fischer, op. cit., p. 425; 
4
. Gammage,op. cit., pp. 6-7; W.J. Hudson, Blind Loyalty: Australia and the Suez Crisis, 
1956, Melbourne, 1989, pp. 10-11; Carmel Shute, 'Heroines & Heroes: Sexual Mythology in 
the Australia, 1914-1918', Hecate, vol. 1, no. l, Jan 1975, p. 20; Geoffrey Serie, 'The Digger 
Tradition & Australian Nationalism', Meanjin Quarterly, no. 101, vol. 24, 1965 (2), pp. 
156-57; 
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For the most part, the account presented in this thesis of Commonwealth 
electoral politics 1914-17 supports these interpretations, but some 
qualifications need to be made. Firstly, it is worth remembering that the 
left also used conspiratorial, extremist, fantastic arguments. The political 
style of those villains of Nationalist propaganda, the Industrial Workers 
of the World, paralleled that of their loyalist persecutors: the IWW were 
emotional and intuitive rather than rational, and saw the motives and 
plans of their enemies as part of an overarching intrigue. The Left had 
its enemies within the gate: the profiteer and militarist. Moreover, 
Labor's vendetta against its renegades revealed an obsession with 
betrayal which resembled loyalist attitudes.75 Secondly, Nationalist 
politics were mostly but not entirely negative. The scarifying rhetoric of 
wartime non-Labor is vivid, but does not encompass all Nationalist 
attitudes. Some scholars have criticised the tendency to extrapolate the 
mood of an entire com~unity from the rhetoric of loyalist groups; and to 
ignore the wartime fears which made these wild accusations plausible.76 
We should also recognise that, even at the peak of Nationalist alarm over 
disloyalty in 1917, there was a positive element in their campaign politics: 
victory, and with it the preserv~tion of the benefits of the pre-war world. 
Nationalist publicists took these benefits for granted and said little about 
them: that the Australia of 1914 was worth fighting for was not a 
proposition which required explicit justification in the discourse of non-
Labor, but it was no less powerful for being implied more often than 
asserted. Without this assumption of the benefits of the British-
75. P. J. Rushton, 'The Revolutionary Ideology of the Industrial Workers of the World in 
Australia', Historical Studies, vol. 15, no. 59, Oct 1972, pp. 435 & 443; Love, op. cit., Ch. 3; 
King, op. cit., , p. 55. 
76
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Australian world, the rhetoric of threats to the Empire and Australia 
would not have made sense. 
Chapter 3. The Persistence of Wartime Issues, 1919-22 
In November 1919, war remained a presence in many aspects of national life. 
Troops were still returning from Europe; approximately one thousand ex-
servicemen a week were joining the Returned Soldiers' and Sailors' Imperial 
League of Australia; 'Artilleryman' won the Melbourne Cup. At a Royal 
Society of Saint George peace dinner, Victorian Employers Federation 
member E.E. Keep implied that Australia's contribution to the war had been 
shamefully slight; a Labor election meeting at Box Hill included a "Returned 
Soldier[s'] Grace".1 Party controversy in the Federal Election campaign, 
November-December, involved threat and loyalty issues derived from the 
war or reminiscent of it. Politicians and journalists often discussed economic 
issues in terms of the war: for example, some warned that the responsibility 
imposed by .war debt made sound financial management more essential than 
before. The phrases 'cost of living', 'sound finance', and 'profiteers' were 
heavily used by both sides; the government asked voters to endorse a 
referendum proposal to give the Commonwealth price-fixing powers. Labor 
politicians regarded the proposed alteration as an unacceptably diluted version 
of old Labor policy; their responses ranged from indifference to antipathy. 
According to an editorial in the Australian Worker, nationalisation was the 
only remedy for profiteering.2 
1. Age, 28 Nov 1919, p. 8; G.L. Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism: The Pressure Group 
Activities of the Returned Servicemen's League, Canberra, 1966, p. 14; Age 5 Nov, 1919 p. 7; 
12 Dec 1919, p. 1; 12Nov1919, p. 10. 
2. Australian Worker, [Sydney], 6 Nov 1919, p. 7. 
107 
Hughes' policy speech recalled the war record of the parties. After the defeat of 
the second plebiscite the Nationalists had persisted with voluntary 
recruitment. Labor, by contrast, had hampered recruiting, and in 1918, when 
the Germans were in a strong position, pressed for a negotiated peace. Such 
people were unworthy of citizenship. The Age noted that Hughes spoke at 
length on the peace treaty, but did not report what he said, devoting the rest 
of the article to the Prime Minister's discussion of domestic concerns. 
Hughes, for example, recalled that during the war mercantile shipping had 
been reduced by fifty percent; the government had assisted producers with 
finance and marketing, and obtained higher than pre-war prices for wheat and 
wool. The war, Hughes explained, had made goods scarce relative to the 
supply of money. He implored Australians to raise production, and promised 
to reduce the issue of paper money. The government would hold a Royal 
Commission on profiteering, and submit a referendum on trusts, industrial 
relations, trade and commerce. Nationalists were opposed to the idea of class 
war promulgated by the Bolsheviks, IWW and One Big Union. The decline 
of real wages had contributed both to industrial unrest, and to the spread of 
Bolshevism. In response, the Government would hold a Royal Commission 
into the basic wage; its policy was also to recognise the legitimacy of workers' 
representatives and to provide for the quick redress of grievances. Hughes 
then turned to Australia's prospects in the post-war world. The continent 
could and should, he argued, support a population of one hundred million. 
One half of Australia's five million people lived in the cities; the proportion 
of country residents should be much higher. But before immigration could be 
increased, agriculture must be made more attractive, and to this end the 
government had guaranteed prices for wheat and sugar, encouraged the 
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organisation of co-operatives, and provided cold storage and economic 
transport in order to give producers an advantage over suppliers. The 
government would introduce a tariff to encourage new industries and to 
protect those, including metals, which were started during the war. 
/'vJ/.-°c, 
But there had been less desirable features of wartime economy.A $pending had s 
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risen from £23, 150, 000 in 1913-14, to an estimated €48, 6§Q, QOO in 1919-20. Tax 
had to be increased, and the government would continue to raise revenue 
fairly, exempting producers affected by the drought; a royal commission would 
enquire into taxation. The public debt was £740,000: a situation which 
required frugal public spending, and vigorous production. The world was 
struggling to re-build after the destruction of the war. Finance, goods, and 
labour would be expensive, Australia's task of national development 
impossible without social cohesion. The spirit of "our splendid boys" had 
won the war, and could win the peace. A motion of confidence was moved 
by supporters, including representatives of the Bendigo Returned Soldiers' 
Association, and the Australian Women's National League president, Mrs J.H. 
Craig. Someone gave Hughes a slouch hat, which he put on to cheers and 
laughter. The meeting closed with the national anthem.3 
Labor detected conspiracy in the machinations of the war-time 'profiteers' 
who kept prices artificially high and the 'militarists' who had entangled 
3. Age, 31Oct1919, p. 7. 
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Australia in an unnecessarily costly Imperial war.4 These attitudes provoked 
accusations of conspiracy from the Nationalists, not that much provocation 
was needed. The Government, Opposition candidates argued, could have 
controlled inflation through the War Precautions Act. Labor promised to 
protect the sugar industry: to allow sugar to fail would be to admit that white 
people could not successfully live in the tropics. The Labor campaign was a 
nationalistic one: Tudor, in his policy speech, accused the Nationalists of 
accumulating a large war debt by failing to insist that Imperial authorities 
grant Australia fair terms - for example Canada's financial contribution was 
proportionately less; their wheat farmers received more per bushel than ours 
did. The Opposition leader advocated constitutional amendments to 
implement complete sovereignty; Hughes condemned these as a plot "to cut 
adrift from all existing ties with our countrymen on the other side of the 
world ... 5 William Watt, the Treasurer, pointed to "the sinister fact" that the 
Labor Party was trying to incite resentment against Britain's alleged 
interference in Australian affairs. 6 Labor's 1919 manifesto displayed the 
anti-militarism which was to characterise the Party during the interwar 
years: Labor demanded the repeal of the War Precautions and the 
compulsory clauses of the Defence Acts. The candidate for Ballarat 
denounced the inculcation of militarism in school children. "As a returned 
soldier he could say there was no glory in war, and little children should be 
trained in the gospel of love - not hate. "7 Hughes and the Argus gave much 
publicity to McDougall's 'Ye are the sordid killers .. .' poem; in the course of 
4
. For example, Paradise, 1 Nov 1919, an ironically-titled election sheet edited by Frank 
Anstey. Groom papers. NLA MS 236/6/747; Australian Worker, 18 Sep 1919, p. 11, Ibid., 27 
Nov 1919, p. 5. 
5. Age, 7 Nov 1919, p. 7. 
6. Ibid., 26Nov 1919, p. 9. 
7. Ibid., 5 Nov 1919, p. 7; Ibid. 22 Nov 1919, p. 13. 
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the election a group of ex-soldiers kidnapped McDougall and tarred and 
feathered him.8 
Probably the most prevalent argument in Nationalist campaigning, and one 
which introduced both economic and loyalty issues, was that Ryan, not 
Tudor, was the real leader of the Federal Labor Party. Look at Queensland, 
Government publicists urged, the home of Bolshevism and high prices. Ryan 
was profligate, and his wartime conduct showed him to be hostile to 
Australia's bonds with the Empire. Conspiratorial-style denunciations of the 
former Premier often centred on his alleged Sinn Fein sympathies. 
Fitzhardinge argues that Ryan himself appealed to sectarian feeling, 
addressing Irish meetings and welcoming the endorsement of Mannix, "thus 
encouraging the sectarianism which some elements of the Nationalists were 
all too ready to invoke .... " Hughes; Fitzhardinge insists, "was always careful 
to confine his attacks to Sinn Fein as a political movement", but Hughes and 
his colleagues were anything but 'careful' in their approach to the Irish 
question.9 The Advocate complained that "a vast number" of anti-Catholic 
pamphlets "couched in the language of hate" had been distributed throughout 
Australia.1° While sometimes professing to support Home Rule if a majority 
of the Irish people approved it, Nationalists tended to conflate Catholicism, 
Irish nationality, constitutional Irish nationalism, support for Sinn Fein and 
armed insurrection, legal criticism of Empire policy, and actual treason. This 
was evident in Watt's response to a loyalist deputation which demanded the 
8. Ibid. Age, 10 Dec 1919, p. 10. For a full account of this incident see King, op. cit. 
9. Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p. 429. 
10. Advocate , 22 Nov 1919, p. 18. 
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suppression of the pamphlet Republic, issued by the Irish National 
Association and the Young Ireland Society to coincide with the Irish Race 
Convention, 3 November. Watt declared the publication of Republic during 
the election campaign "ill-advised", and promised to notify the Prime 
Minister and to obtain advice from Government law officers. The Treasurer 
asserted that those who wanted an Irish republic also desired to sever 
Australia's links with the Empire and to leave the island nation alone in the 
world. This prospect was all the more alarming now that Congress's refusal 
to ratify the United States' membership of the League of Nation had "crippled 
or destroyed" the League. "'Although I have never been and never will be a 
sectarian in politics ... "', Watt told the deputation, "' ... you need not entertain 
any doubt as to where I stand on such a matter, which is not a matter of 
religion, but of pure nationalism. "'11 
At a speech in Moree, the Post Master General, William Webster, warned: 
[T]oday we are in a more dangerous position in this country than 
we were even in the anxious years of the war. During the war we 
had to face the enemy without ... but to-day we are face to face with 
the enemy within our land. One of the aftermaths of war, when 
the people are unhinged .. .is the opportunity afforded those who 
seek to evade the authority of Government and thus endeavour to 
thrust upon our free people the fetters of despotism. 
11. Age, 25 Nov 1919, p. 6. The deputation comprised representatives of the Victorian 
Protestant Federation, Loyalist League, Protestant Alliance, Loyal Orange League, 
Freemasons, and the Ulster and Loyal Irishmen's Association. 
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Webster had been provoked by Ryan's statement that "'this country should 
have the greatest amount of self-government"' which he took to mean that 
one section should tyrannise the other.12 Sergeant RF Tracy, candidate for 
Bourke, accused De Valera who, he said, was Ryan's friend, of supplying 
German submarines with fuel and food.13 Sir Robert Best, member for 
Kooyong, reminded his audience that Ryan had once been the chairman of 
the Sinn Fein Convention; abroad, Sinn Fein had perpetrated "every crime 
upon the calendar" and now "efforts are being made to establish it in 
Australia." Ryan's Irish nationalism became in Best's speech a paradigm of 
Labor disloyalty. "In the present conflict the broad issues, apart from a variety 
of political questions, were to be loyalty or disloyalty. (Cheers)."14 
Sedition, the Nationalists implied, was a problem which the Commonwealth 
Government could legislate out of existence. Hughes promised that if re-
elected he would " ... make a law which would prevent any man preaching in 
this country ... the breaking of the British Empire ... "; a pronouncement which 
led the Sydney Sun to compare him to an Oriental despot.15 The Prime 
Minister admitted he had been "somewhat hard on traitors" but pledged 
12. Chronicle [Qld] 17 Nov 1919. NLA MS 236/6/737, p. 47. William Webster, MHR for 
Gwydir (NSW), 1903-19 (ALP 1903-17; Nationalist 1917-19); Postmaster General 1915-20. 
13. Age, 5 Dec 1919, p. 7. Visiting London to raise loans in April 1919, Ryan made a side-trip to 
Dublin where he met the Lord Mayor, and the leader of the Irish Labour party. "Ryan was 
also able to have a lengthy interview with Eamon de Valera, and was photographed shaking 
his hand ... He came away convinced that de Valera was the leader Irishmen wanted and that 
Ireland was now an international as well as an imperial problem which required a solution "'in 
accordance with the principles of self determination."' Irish Times 24 Apr 1919, cited D.J. 
Murphy, T.J. Ryan: A Political Biography, St Lucia, 1975, p. 413. 
14. Age 21 Nov 1919, p. 7. Sir Robert Best, Senator (Protectionist, Victoria) 1901-10; 
Liberal/Nationalist MHR for Kooyong (Vic), 1910-22. 
15. Sun 23 Nov 1919, reproduced in the Advocate, 6 Dec 1919, 13. 
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himself to be "harder yet if the people would give him their support.16 In a 
generally optimistic speech which otherwise eschewed the condemnation of 
conspirators, Littleton Groom proposed a law to exclude from Australia 
foreigners who advocated the doctrines of the IWW/ or the forceful 
overthrow of the government.17 
Nationalist campaigners also concentrated on their party's superior defence 
credentials: the Japanese, they warned, were increasing their control of the 
Pacific, so Australia needed a strong Navy; Labor would reduce naval strength 
and abolish the cadet system.18 Economic development, Hughes insisted, 
would bring security as well as prosperity for Australia, " ... the last outpost of 
the white man, hemmed in by the coloured races of the world."19 The Prime 
Minister had saved White Australia at Versailles, one Nationalist candidate 
claimed; there Australia had been "recognised as one of the nations of the 
world".20 
But while Nationalists implied that their record of wartime government 
made them the only legitimate governing party, new non-Labor groups 
challenged the government's war record and patriotic credentials. Hughes's 
implementation during the war of agricultural pools and other regulations 
had aroused hostility in the country, and in 1919 a new electoral organisation, 
16. Chronicle [Qld], 20 Nov 1919. NLA MS 236/6/737, p. 53. 
17. Bundaberg Daily News, 20 Nov. NLA MS 236/6/737, PP. 64-66. 
18. Age, 4 Nov 1919, p. 5. 
19. Ibid., 6 Nov 1919, p. 7. 
20. Ibid., 1Dec1919, p. 8. 
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the Farmers' Union, stood candidates against the Nationalists. Ex-soldiers 
protested Hughes's plan to pay veterans' gratuities in bonds rather than cash. 
A group of about five thousand assembled in Martin Place, which resounded 
to cries of "'we want cash"' and "'where is Billy Hughes'". After failing to 
gain entry to the meeting Hughes was addressing at the Town Hall, some of 
the men followed him to his hotel. A group of thirty or forty tried to force 
their way inside, and one man was charged for throwing a stone at the hotel; 
another for injuring a policeman. The Prime Minister asserted that "while a 
few wore badges" the demonstrators were mostly civilian Ryan supporters 
and their protest against the bond gratuity "mere camouflage". Ryan and his 
people "proposed to use the soldiers for their own purposes".21 Four days 
after the Martin Place demonstration Hughes backed down and authorised 
banks to redeem the certificates for cash on request, but continued to imply 
that the protesters were either imposters or dupes. Over shouts from the 
audience of "'pay up in cash"' Hughes told a meeting in Adelaide that 
"[T]here were certain people outside who wore badges. It might be that the 
soldiers were being made fools of by a section of the people who formerly 
would have left the soldier to die like a dog."22 On another occasion Hughes 
compared barrackers unfavourably to the selfless and virile Anzacs. 
'The man that drove me to this place tonight ... has only one lung, 
and has a rib missing. He was at Pozieres. Your fellows took good 
care not to be at Pozieres. (Cheers and uproar). You could not fight 
a bantam rooster in a fair fight.' (Cheers and prolonged disorder.) 
21. SMH, 7 & 8 Nov 1919, p. 14. The estimate of the crowd size is the Herald 's. 
22. Age, 11Nov1919, p. 7. 
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One of his more disorderly critics at this meeting reminded the Prime 
Minister of the soldiers who had shamed the A.I.F: a man ejected by police for 
fighting "'would have made a fine soldier at the battle of the Wazir."'23 
It would be misleading to give the impression that diggers' participation in 
politics was always turbulent. James McNair's experience of the 1919 election 
was probably more typical than that of Hughes's hecklers. A twenty eight year 
old Post Office clerk, McN air returned from AIF service in France to his 
family home in St Kilda, on 13 December 1919, election day. After a 
celebratory lunch, the McNairs went to a local primary school and voted; 
James was pleased to find his name still on the electoral roll after four years.24 
Most - but not all - loyalist and veterans' organisations supported the 
Nationalists. The A.I.F.'s failure in 1916 and 1917 to resoundingly endorse 
conscription had revealed that Hughes and the diggers were not, as the Prime 
Minister would have it, of one mind. Now, the President of the R.S.& 
S.l.L.A., Captain ~ Dyett, expressed astonishment at the sudden change of 6·:7·C. 
plan for gratuities, and warned that Hughes's advice to the diggers to "go 
direct to him with their complaints" threatened to compromise the League's 
"non-party, non-political, non-sectarian" status.25 For the most part, however, 
23. Ibid., 18 Nov 1919, p. 7. 
24
. Alastair Thomson, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend, Melbourne, 1994, p. 107. 
25. Courier [Brisbane], 12 Nov 1919. NLA MS 236/6/737, p. 24. 
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the R.S. & S.1.L.A sympathised with the win-the-war government, and in 
return was granted an unusual degree of access to ministers.26 
Other (and smaller) organisations which claimed to represent veterans were 
disillusioned with the Nationalists. N.R. Worrall, a candidate for newly-
formed People's Federation of Soldiers and Citizens, told an open-air meeting 
that Watt, while Acting Prime Minister, had failed to deal resolutely with the 
recent seamen's strike. He had "showed the white feather, and allowed 
licence and threats and violence to awe him into submissiveness. " Worrall 
insisted he was applying to Watt's conduct a standard "neither contemptible 
nor altruistic. It was the standard of the A.l.F." During the war, men 
/. C~; t:-J 
weakened by disease and fatigue who "showed basiq m a crucial moment" 
were court-martialled; Watt, despite Worrall's entreaties, had insisted on 
shaming the men's relatives by publishing names. Worrall told the audience 
that the Nationalist had refused his challenge to debate these issues; having 
failed in his own duty he '"squealed' when a dose of his own medicine was 
applied.... (Applause.)"27 
At times, press commentary on the election anticipated the political concerns 
of the 1930s. In an editorial addressing both symbolic and practical issues, 
Benjamin Hoare called attention to the size of the war debt and to the danger 
of politicians taking the easy and disreputable way out of their responsibilities. 
26. Kristianson, op. cit. Ch. 1. 
27. Age, 3 Dec 1919, p. 11. 
There are only two possible modes of dealing with it - honourable 
payment or· dishonourable repudiation ... We can ill afford to pay 
this heavy debt; but as an honourable people, who value probity as 
the brightest jewel in the national diadem, we can still less afford 
the stigma of voluntary default. Therefore repudiation is a word 
which is abhorrent to all but diseased and tainted nations.28 
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Another anticipation of 1930s concerns was the way non-Labor people 
dissatisfied with the Nationalists sometimes found fault in party politics 
itself. Since the R.S & S.I.L.A.'s formation in 1916, its spokesmen had 
insisted, publicly, on the need for 'non-party' solutions to ex-servicemen's 
problems, and the executive had in the last year of the war issued a manifesto 
calling on the League to transform itself into a '"non-party political 
organisation."'29 Similarly, during the 1919 election an Age journalist, R. 
Austin, commented in the last days of the campaign that people were tired of 
the "treachery and deceit" they associated with party politics. Austin advised 
readers to vote against "[P]arty warfare" by "making a non-party selection." 
Apparently 'non-party' was a state of mind: he suggested three candidates 
each from the Farmers' Union, Nationalist, and Labor Parties.30 
The Nationalists won thirty five seats, losing ten to the Farmers' Union; and 
four (in net) to Labor; Labor won twenty six, four more than in 1917. 
Preferential voting had benefited the two non-Labor parties by allowing them 
28. Ibid. 29 Nov 1919, p. 14. The principal was £400, 000, 000, and the annual interest £20, 000, 
000. An editorial by W.S. Mathew in The Woman contended that the need for retrenchment 
was one of the most important issues of the election. 1Nov1919, p. 343. 
Kristianson, op. cit.. p. 230. 
30. Age, 13 Dec 1919, p. 9. 
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to exchange preferences; Hughes retained office as the leader of a minority 
government, which was normally supported by the new rural party. The 
Government garnered eighteen Senate seats and the Labor Party one; this 




























Elections for the House of Representatives, 1917 & 191932 
The Woman argued that the loss of Nationalist seats had been caused by the 
advent of the Country Party, and the inevitable swing back from the 
extraordinarily high non-Labor vote of 1917.33 George Cockerill of the Age 
thought that the government, which spent lavishly on campaign literature, 
had been given another "trial" by an electorate which did not trust Labor. 
There was no comfort in defeating Labor, burdened as the Party was with a 
disreputable program of fiscal largess, a "blundering addition to its leadership" 
(Mannix, perhaps) and "cheap foreign cant" about socialisation and workers' 
control of industry. The "secret propaganda" of the election had been 
vicious.34 'Open' (that is, attributed rather than anonymous) propaganda on 
31. Sawer, op. cit.., pp. 185-88. 
32. The vote was 71.59%, of enrolment, a fall of 6.71 % from the 1917 turn-out. Hughes & 
Graham, QP.,...Q!., pp. 315 & 320. 
33. The Woman, 1Jan1920, pp. 445-46. 
34. Age, 16 Dec 1919, p. 8. 
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mundane questions was probably influential as well: Hughes told a meeting 
of Nationalist members in 1920 that his promise to rescind the 
Entertainments Tax "had assisted largely in securing a victory at the last 
elections ... 35 
..................... 
In 1920 a group of militant socialists formed the Communist Party of Australia, 
and applied successfully for membership of the Communist International. 
The CPA was avowedly a loyal follower of Comintern policy; and this 
subordination to a foreign political force lent it a more threatening image than 
that projected by the IWW, which despite its American origins and 
internationalist rhetoric paid little attention to international organisation.36 
This was a time when the example of the Russian revolution, and the 
disillusioning experience of intransigent Nationalist government and 
weakened Labor opposition, combined to intensify socialist radicalism in the 
political wing of organised labour. Syndicalist One Big Union philosophies, 
which had been influential before the war, flourished in this climate. The 
expulsion of the Hughes faction had left the party's radicals in uneasy 
combination with moderates of Irish Catholic origin. The Labor Party's 
adoption in 1921 of a socialist objective demonstrated the strength of radical 
35. Anon, minutes of Nationalist meeting, party room, Parliament House, 14 October 1920. 
Pearce papers: NLA MS 213/12/1. Admittedly, Hughes was trying to convince Nationalist 
Senators to pass a bill abolishing the tax (they eventually did so). L.F Crisp, 'New Light on 
the Trials and Tribulations of W.M. Hughes, 1920-22', Historical Studies, vol 10, Nov, 1961, 
No. 37, pp. 87-88. 
36. Frank Cain, 'All the Way to Vietnam: The Politics of Threats', Arena, 95, 1991, p. 117. 
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ideas. Admittedly, moderates persuaded the conference to add a reassuring 
gloss that Labor only sought to socialise industries when their private 
ownership had proved to be socially harmful, but this concession was made in 
terms of an agenda established by the left.37 
Other effects of events of the war years were noticeable in the persistence of 
Catholic-Protestant enmity. The war in Ireland between republicans and pro-
British forces exacerbated Australia's ethnic rivalries, which occasionally flared 
up around provocative incidents. One involved Sister Ligouri (Bridget 
Partridge), a thirty year old nun who in July 1920 ran away from Mount Erin 
convent in Wagga Wagga, and was taken in (in both senses of the phrase) by 
militant Protestants. The Bishop of Wagga, Dr Joseph Dwyer, had Partridge 
detained under suspicion of insanity; at the hearing T.J. Ryan tried - and failed -
to have Partridge released into the custody of Labor MLA P.J. Minahan and his 
wife. Partridge was released, remained living with her Protestant sponsors 
and, backed by the Orange Lodge sued Dwyer for unlawful imprisonment. The 
case, which was won by Dwyer, attracted a great deal of attention in the press, 
and was also debated in Parliament. Catholics denounced persecution of the 
Church - and drew parallels with the deportation in 1920 of Catholic priest 
Charles Jerger for disloyal comments allegedly made during the conscription 
referenda and Protestants warned that the Church defied the laws of the state.38 
37
. Patrick O'Farrell, 'The Russian Revolution and the Labour Movements of Australia and 
New Zealand, 1917-1922', International Review of Social History, vol. 8, 1963, p. 187; and 
generally, Frank Farrell, International Socialism and Australian Labour: The Left in 
Australia, 1919-1939, Sydney, 1981. 
38. Patrick O'Farrell, The Catholic Church and Community in Australia, Melbourne, 1977, pp. 
348-49; Freeman's Journal, 12 Aug 1920, p. 25; Henderson, op. cit.,; NSWPD, vol. 79, pp. 531-
33. [31 Aug 1920]. 
121 
While the papers were reporting the Dwyer versus Partridge case, Mannix's 
Irish nationalism continued to be focus for sectarian politics. He had sailed for 
Ireland but was intercepted by the Royal Navy and diverted to England. 
Extremist Protestants in Australia demanded that he only be re-admitted to the 
country after taking a loyalty oath; Hughes considered this, but decided that the 
Archbishop would only exploit such a measure. Mannix was welcomed back 
by a large crowd. The Archbishop's rank and popularity seemed to have lent 
him an immunity unavailable to less influential Irish nationalists, such as the 
Labor member for Kalgoorlie, Hugh Mahon. At an open-air rally in 
Melbourne, in November 1920, Mahon had denounced British rule in Ireland 
as 'this bloody and accursed despotism'. Hughes, who wished to win support 
from the ultra-Protestant elements in his party, with whom he was 
unpopular39, secured Mahon's expulsion from Parliament on the grounds of 
disloyalty. Tudor argued that Mahon should be tried by judge and jury, if at 
all. The Nationalists won Kalgoorlie in the subsequent by-election, giving the 
party a majority; Mahon never returned to political life.40 The Advocate and 
Freeman's Journal, however, remarked in 1921 on evidence that anti-Catholic 
prejudice had peaked and was becoming discredited in Protestant circles. 
Among the evidence these Catholic papers cited were the failure of the 
attempt to impose a loyalty oath on Mannix; the Melbourne Town Hall 
Committee's refusal to allow the Orange Lodge to use the Hall; and the 
recriminations in the Protestant World against the sponsors of Bridget 
Partridge's failed suit against Bishop Dwyer.41 
39. Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p. 456. 
40. ADB, 10, pp. 379-80. 
41. The Advocate commented of the Argus' decision to report the Committee's rebuke that 
"Satan reproving sin is a mere circumstance in comparison". Advocate, 4 Aug 1921, p. 22; 
Freeman's Journal, 11Aug1921, p. 23. 
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Furthermore, dramatic trouncings of disloyalty such as the Mahon expulsion 
were insufficient to secure for Hughes support among the former Liberals who 
made up the vast majority of the Nationalist party. In 1922 Hughes was in 
trouble. Once, "[N]ot even the boorishness of his manner and the tyranny of 
his power could shake their [the Nationalists'] loyalty"42. The Nationalist 
Federation's ex-Liberal majority had hoped that at the end of the war Hughes 
would terminate such barely-tolerable experiments in state socialism as the 
Commonwealth Shipping Line. That he persisted in his penchant for state 
enterprise, and proved reluctant to rescind the War Precautions Act, 
aggravated tensions within the unlikely coalition.43 Now that the glamour of 
the Little Digger's wartime leadership was fading, Nationalist resentment of 
Hughes's policies and style of leadership manifested itself in rumours of 
leadership bids44, and the Country Party's dislike for the Government was 
restrained only by a greater antipathy to Labor. Newspapers normally 
sympathetic to the Nationalists speculated on how long the Prime Minister 
could survive.45 
Nor were the Government's problems confined to Parliament. At a party 
meeting in June, 
42. Sunday News, 20 August 1922. Archdale Parkhill Papers NLA MS 4742, Folio 1. 
43. Round Table, 13, 13 Dec 1922, p. 414. 
44. H.E. Pratten, said the Sunday News, opposed the Government's control of the sugar 
industry, and was plotting against Hughes. Ibid. 
45. Smith's Weekly, 20 August 1922. 
... the Prime Minister pointed out the danger of having an election 
when there were so many unemployed, and thought that the 
unification of railway gauges and other large works should be 
undertaken as early as possible to absorb the unemployed men.46 
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Two months later Sir Robert Best commented on '"a feeling prevailing 
outside"' that the Government profited handsomely from its interest in sugar 
distribution and could afford to reduce prices. Best thought that this should be 
done before the election, due in November.47 
Cost-of-living issues had been prominent during the inflationary war years, but 
in other ways politics was changing. As new problems emerged for the 
combatant nations, some of the political questions of the war receded. The 
conservative parties in Britain and Australia, however, had found patriotic 
campaigning to be very much to their advantage and were reluctant to remove 
the flags from their hustings. So, in 1919 the Nationalists campaigned on their 
wartime loyalist credentials, just as they had done two years before. 
The themes of the menace of Labor socialism, and the necessity of a middle 
way between capital and labour resounded in the Nationalist campaign. 
Nationalist slogans resembled those the Bonar Law's Conservative Party: "For 
Safety First Vote Nationalist and No Sovietism"; "For Your Own Protection, 
46. Minutes of Nationalist meeting, Parliament House, 27 June 1922. George Pearce papers 
NLA MS 213/12/1. 
47. Ibid., 10 Aug 1922. 
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Vote National."48 In his policy speech at the Chatswood Town Hall, Hughes 
insisted his administration had been a national, non-class government, 
denounced in turn by Bolsheviks and reactionaries. The speech was generally 
technical, economics-oriented, and positive: for example, Hughes spoke of the 
need for pastoral development in the Northern Territory and promised an 
Oodnadatta-Alice Springs railway line, but neglected to mention the Territory's 
exposure to threatening Asia. Perhaps this approach was appropriate to a time 
in which the outbreak of another world war seemed possible yet remote. 
During the campaign Hughes claimed credit for peace, and restated his 
credentials for war. Of the Washington Conference he announced: "the mad 
race for Naval Supremacy has ended .... the dark clouds of another world war 
had disappeared." The Government's declaration of support for Britain 
against Turkey in the Chanak crisis (a confrontation over control of the Straits) 
had also helped to avert another war by encouraging the Kemalists to back 
down. Australia's experience in the 1914-18 war had demonstrated that the 
island nation could not remain aloof from the troubles of other lands, and 
might yet require the statesmanship of war (see figure 3.1). 
We walk today in slippery places ... out of the distant and apparently 
cloudless sky of Foreign Affairs may come blight and ruin to our 
economic prosperity and our national greatness.49 
48. 'Safety First', authorised by Archdale Parkhill, Smith's Weekly, 9 Dec 1922, p. 32; 'For 
Your Own Protection', authorised by J. Shaw, Courier [Brisbane) 16Dec1922, p. 23. Andrew 
Bonar Law was leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Commons, 1911-21; Prime 
Minister, 1922-23. 
49. National Policy & Record, 1922, Chatswood, NSW, pp. 1-2. NLA MS 1538/28/228. 
Hughes was publicly zealous for Empire intervention in Turkey; privately, he complained to 
Lloyd George that the British government had risked dragging Australia into a war without 
the consent of the Australian government. Peter M. Sales, 'W.M. Hughes & the Chanak Crisis 
of 1922', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 27, No. 3, Dec 1971, p. 403. 
'l'lll:.' Fl.Y.J.f,, 
r:r.oT \\".1::: (lo ui~ uoss 111t•r:h1111ic): "'l'1'1is Jlioht of Ru~s Smilli'; !11C1ke:1 me ~/,ink 
.~n11u;_j1111 11·r:: 111i')irt 111ui.-e u trip u11t !u .lus:rrtliu and 1iici; 11r c! /lri:::." 
Figure 3.1 'The Final/ /Pilot War ... ' 
Bulletin, 18 Dec 1919, p. 9 
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In 1919, the Commonwealth government offered a prize of £10,000 for the first 
Australian to fly across the world in a British-built aeroplane. The prize was 
won by two brothers, Ross and Keith Smith, who flew from England to 
Australia.so 
50 Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History, 
Melbourne, 1966, pp. 300-01. 
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For the most part, however, the Prime Minister's policy speech indicated a 
turning away from problems of Australia's external relations to concentrate on 
the challenges of the economy (of course, trade linked the two issues). For the 
farmer, Hughes promised to subsidise exports and guarantee domestic prices. 
He pledged to reduce taxes and the deficit; to maintain a strong defence force 
while taking advantage of the Washington agreement to cut naval spending; to 
continue the disease-prevention work of the Commonwealth Health 
Department; to convene a bi-partisan Constitutional convention to consider 
the new States question; to encourage civil aviation; and to maintain 
compulsory arbitration but to supplement the system with specialist tribunals. 
This last point was particularly important to the ideology of Nationalism, with 
its positive emphasis on sensible business solutions, and negative 
preoccupation with the threats to time-honoured rules and obligations which 
arbitration,new as the institution was, represented in Nationalist rhetoric. 
There was "no half-way house", the Prime Minister warned, between the 
industrial rule of law and the direct action of capitalists and Bolsheviks.51 
These were typical of the arguments advanced by Hughes' Nationalist 
colleagues and press sympathisers.52 In his opening speech at Dandenong the 
Treasurer, Stanley Melbourne Bruce53, warned of the need to repair the 
51. SMH, 25 Oct 1922, p. 13. 
52. The Herald [Melbourne] identified the main Nationalist themes as control of the sugar 
industry; encouragement of primary production; the benefits of immigration; new States and 
other Constitutional reforms; shipbuilding; retrenchment; and the relative merits of public 
and private enterprise. 16 Nov 1922, p. 3. 
53
. MHR for Flinders (Vic), 1918-29, Nationalist; 1931-33, UAP; Treasurer 1921-23; Prime 
Minister 1923-29. 
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network of international credit and exchange which had been damaged by the 
war. 
If the problem defied the wit of men to solve, the present suffering 
would be intensified and chaos would be substituted for the 
existing economic and financial systems. Into this soil so ready to 
receive it Bolshevism would be flung, and a crop of anarchy and 
revolution would be garnered that would imperil civilization. 
World events, Bruce continued, determined Australian conditions: Australia 
faced either success or disaster, but a strong government would be needed in 
either case to facilitate prosperity, or to resist Bolshevism. After this warning, 
Bruce outlined some of the Government's policies. Nationalists would 
strengthen the white Australia policy by encouraging British immigration. A 
growing population must drive economic development, which would 
nonetheless require public support - cheap water and power, and reliable 
transport. Debt was a serious problem best met by financing expenditure from 
revenue, reducing taxes, and restricting loan expenditure to productive 
schemes. Like the Country Party, Bruce argued, the government supported 
farmers; unlike them it adopted a broader national outlook. Apart from this 
question of parochialism, the parties were similar in policies and beliefs. 54 The 
Herald's 'special correspondent', Martyn Threlfall, who wrote a series of pro-
government Campaign Notes during the last fortnight of the campaign, 
combined in similar fashion idealistic rhetoric with specific policies, often 
directed at rural voters. In one column, for example, Threlfall defined 
54. SMH, 31Oct1922, p. 9. 
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Nationalist principles. "What, in a few words, does the National party stand 
for? .... for the Empire; for a White Australia; for stable government by duly-
elected representatives of the people." The remainder of that day's Notes 
were devoted to farming issues - mostly the desirability of the Nationalist 
policy of voluntary but publicly-financed wheat pools.SS 
Labor's arguments in 1922 were less concerned with threat and loyalty issues 
and more rooted in economic or 'limited' problems than in 1919. The 
Opposition leader, Mathew CharltonS6, "visibly disappointed" at an audience of 
only three hundred, delivered his policy speech at Maitland, New South 
Wales. His speech was mostly negative: the Nationalist government was 
composed of party cast-offs and dishonoured by scandal and broken promises. 
The government had fudged a deficit of £5,598,000 into a surplus of £494,000 by 
borrowing for normally revenue-financed spending and appropriating from 
trust funds the proceeds of the note issue. Ministers had made unjustifiable 
and suspicious concessions to private industries - for example, selling 
seaworthy ships for scrap - and planned to sell public enterprises, such as the 
returned servicemen's woollen mills, which were needed to provide 
competition against private industry. Nationalists wanted to reduce wages to 
lower the cost of living, but would not discount interest rates, which were 
"sacred". Charlton also complained of wasteful tiers of government, and in 
proposals typical of Labor's radicalism in the years following the 1916 split, 
proposed a Constitutional amendment to give the Commonwealth Parliament 
55. Ibid., 8 Dec 1922, p. 8. Threlfall was appointed Lyons' Political Secretary in April 1931. 
Phillip R. Hart, 'J.A. Lyons: A Political Biography', PhD thesis, ANU, 1967, p. 135. 
S6. MHR for Hunter (NSW), 1910-28; Leader of the Opposition, 1922-28. 
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"unlimited legislative powers". The amount of land under cultivation had 
fallen; co-operatives should be fostered to squeeze out "speculative 
middlemen". Hughes's government had neglected to control the CRA 
monopoly's ever-increasing prices and profits. Like the Nationalists, Charlton 
asserted the importance of a viable sugar industry to the survival of the White 
Australia Policy. Charlton, however, argued that assisted immigration was 
undesirable: Australia should encourage small-hold farming, then the British 
would not require subsidies to emigrate. "[V]ested interests" wanted to abolish 
arbitration, which Labor had created. Labor would strengthen the courts by 
placing them under single judges. Hughes valued arbitration as a moderator of 
class conflict and feared that it would be overwhelmed by the forces of it 
contained; Charlton esteemed arbitration as an instrument of popular 
amelioration and feared it would be destroyed by a monopolistic clique. 
Charlton, as Tudor had done in 1919, pledged to revoke the compulsory clauses 
of the Defence Act, and to reduce defence spending to pre-war levels. The 
savings would finance increases in old age and invalid pensions. He promised 
to take (unspecified) measures against a cartel which controlled banking, 
manufacturing and shipping. "[T]hese four men constitute the supreme 
economic council of predatory capitalism", Charlton insisted, reversing the 
charge often levelled against One Big Union supporters of desiring to supplant 
Parliament with a workers' 'supreme economic council'. Labor would 
formulate an independent foreign policy, its executors responsible not to the 
Imperial government in London but to the Commonwealth Parliament. 
Hughes, in contrast, had failed to consult parliament before committing 
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Australian forces to intervene in Turkey. Charlton concluded by addressing 
Nationalist criticisms of Labor. The 1910 Commonwealth Bank note issue had 
been derided as "'Fisher's flimsies"', but now the Bank's success and stability 
were evident. The land tax had broken up some big estates and increased the 
quantity of farm land. It was the Nationalists, not Labor, who were controlled 
by a secret junta. Labor was not anti-property but opposed to monopoly and 
unfair privilege. The Party stood for human rights and freedom. Charlton's 
speech ended with a plea to judge Labor on its 1910-13 record.57 
In the 1922 election, Labor was challenged by a number of rightwing and 
Protestant unofficial 'labor' groups. Self-proclaimed moderates within the 
Party, such as the Secretary of the Painters' Union, H. Watson, complained of 
Labor's drift from the "constitutional and practical" to the "theoretical and 
revolutionary." The extremists' ideology was foreign, as the Melbourne 
Herald explained. "There is a coterie of such theorists in Sydney, where they 
naturally exert a much stronger influence than here."58 Some, whose 
antipathy to 'extremism' was strong enough to compel them to campaign 
against Party candidates, objected most of all to radical socialism; others to 
deviation from British loyalties.59 The latter tended to speak more of excessive 
Irish Catholic influence within Australia than hostility to the nation's Imperial 
links. 
57. SMH, 25 Oct 1922, p. 14. 
58. Anon., 'Under Which Flag?', Herald [Melbourne], 23 Sep 1922, p. 4. 
59. SMH, 27 Nov 1922, p. 10; Ibid .. 12 Dec 1922, p. 9; Age, 3 Nov 1922, p. 11. 
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The Nationalists were also troubled by disunity. "Mr Hughes has been more 
bitter in his references to anti-Labor non-Hughesites than to those he is so 
constantly calling 'Reds'."60 Normally conservative newspapers criticised the 
Hughes government. The Melbourne Herald complained that Hughes's 
egoism and determination to govern alone had lead to appalling (and 
unspecified by the Herald ) administrative decisions. The £25, 000 gift to 
Hughes concerned the public greatly. "At many meetings the point is raised by 
interjections or questions .... "61 Rival conservative candidates had challenged 
the Nationalists in 1919. This time, however, although 'Independent Liberals' 
such as W.A. Watt condemned Hughes's socialistic tendencies62, the renegades 
spoke more of corruption and incompetence than of disloyalty to Nationalist 
principles. Round Table considered that "[A]n examination of the policies of 
the various anti-Labor parties reveals no radical differences of principle."63 
One cartoonist, who depicted the crew of the 'Nationalist' boat wearing 
'Liberal' lifebuoys, suggested that the mavericks were mostly concerned to 
preserve the option of forming or joining a new party if Hughes's party failed 
to win a clear majority.64 Ideology seemed generally unimportant in these 
rivalries, although in South Australia the Liberal Union stood candidates 
against ex-Labor Nationalists.65 
The official Nationalists faced similar problems in Victoria, where the 
president of the Victorian Employers' Federation, T.R. Ashworth, campaigned 
against what he regarded as the autocratic rule of the National Union over the 
60. Herald [Melbourne], 18 Dec 1922, p. 4. 
61. Ibid., 16 Nov 1922, p. 3. 
62. Ibid., 21Nov1922, p. 1. 
63. Round Table, 13, 13 Dec 1922, p. 420. 
64. Herald [Melbourne], 27 Nov 1922, p. 6. 
65, Round Table, vol. 13, 13 Dec 1922, p. 416. 
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Nationalist party and government. According to Ashworth there were 
connections between Hughes's arbitrary rule though War Precautions 
regulations, which had '"made his office the happy hunting ground of 
concession-schemers"; the Union's ascendancy over acquiescent Nationalist 
Members of Parliament; and the anonymous £25,000 gift to Hughes. 
Ashworth's other grievance, shared by the recently-formed Victorian 
Taxpayers' Association, was the Hughes government's failure to reduce 
expenditure.66 The Age derided the Nationalists as unstatesman-like machine 
politicians. 
When the political machines are allowed to choose the 
candidates for whom the elector may vote, and to bluff and 
bludgeon all others from the field, the franchise dwindles in 
value like the Russian rouble or the German mark.67 
'Responsible government' was one of the catch-cries of J.G. Latham, one of 
thirteen candidates endorsed by the Liberal Union, who opposed the 
Nationalists in Victoria.68 Describing himself variously as a 'Progressive 
Liberal' and 'Australian Legion' candidate, Latham stood against Best in 
Kooyong; his platform advocated retrenchment and the abolition of 
government trading enterprises.69 The Australian Legion's manifesto was 
66. SMH, 1Nov1922, p. 14; Trevor Mathews, 'Business Associations and Politics: Chambers 
of Manufacturers and Employers' Federations in New South Wales, Victorian and Australian 
National Politics to 1939', PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 1971, pp. 305-06. 
67. Age, 16 Nov 1922, p. 8. 
68. Ibid., 22 Nov 1922, p. 11. Sir John Latham, MHR for Kooyong (Vic), 1922-34 (Liberal, 
1922-25; Nationalist/UAP, 1925-34); Attorney General, 1925-29, 1932-34; Minister for 
Industry, 1928-29, 1932-34; External Affairs, 1932-34; Leader of Opposition, 1929-31; Chief 
Justice High Court, 1935-52; GCMG, 1935. 
69. handbill. Latham papers NLA MS 1009/24/l{a). 
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standard non-Labor fare: loyalty to Crown, Empire and Commonwealth; 
constitutional government and resistance to both open and disguised 
Bolshevism; "promulgation of a national sentiment as truly Australian as that 
of the A.l.F. abroad"; industrial peace in place of class conflict. The Legion 
charged the Nationalists with subverting responsible government to 
"monocratic dictatorship" and engaging in dubious business dealings. 
Australian Legion objectives included the "elimination of machine politics" -
evidently this included the Nationalists.70 
The expression of such sentiments should have attracted support in a 
conservative electorate such as Kooyong. Latham, however, suffered from a 
peculiar disability. A Fabian as a young man, he had since the war years held 
orthodox conservative views on economy and Empire. The exception was his 
atheism: he had campaigned against Scripture lessons in State schools.71 This 
was a provocative form of unorthodoxy in a. seat like Kooyong. The Age stated 
confidently in the middle of the campaign that " ... the Nationalist party can no 
longer raise the sectarian issue and consequently the election will be decided 
purely on the merits of the candidates."72 After polling, however, the paper 
commented: " ... at Kooyong ... the sectarian issue was unfortunately a factor .... "73 
The 1922 Kooyong campaign demonstrates that loyalism was not monolithic, 
and that militant Protestantism could be a force for division within non-Labor 
politics. 
70. The Australian Legion Fighting Platform, 1922. NLA MS 1009/24/8. Machine politics: 
Anon., The Australian Legion, 1922. NLA MS 1009/24/12. 
71. ADB , vol. 10. p. 2. 
72. Age, 25 Nov 1922, p. 15. 
73. Ibid., 18 Dec 1922, p. 8. 
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Latham's opposition to Scripture lessons, along with his endorsement by the 
Catholic Tribune against Best, featured in a leaflet issued by the Hawthorn 
branch of the Victorian Protestant Federation.74 Tribune , reported the V.P.F., 
recommended placing Latham first, Jean Daley (Labor) second, and Best third; 
'one' Best, 'two' Latham, and 'three' Daley was the V.P.F. 's choice. The 
Federation warned voters not to be deceived by Latham's literature, in which 
he described himself as a member of the council of Ormond College, and the 
son of a prominent Methodist layman. Latham had, nonetheless, been a 
leading member of the Rationalist Association and had agitated against State 
school Bible instruction. Best's credentials, on the contrary, were sound: 
"definite allegiance to the Empire ... strong advocacy of Protestant 
principles ... uncompromising hostility to disloyalty and sectarianism." Thus 
Tribune said of him: "'It would be a great triumph for tolerance if Sir Robert 
Best were defeated."' So, "Political Rome's attitude is that SIR ROBERT BEST 
MUST G0!"75 
Walter Albiston wrote to Latham asking his opinion of the V.P.F.'s loyalist 
objectives. Albiston drew particular attention to objective five (a law requiring 
the swearing of an oath of allegiance to George V by all who entered the 
74. F.H. Francis, the official Nationalist candidate for Henty (south east of Kooyong) had no 
such problems. He was described by the Herald as " ... a Protestant Federation man to the 
backbone .... blessed by the women's party in Henty, [presumably the AWNL] of Orange hue .... " 
11Dec1922, p. 5. 
75. T.J. Hall, honorary secretary, VPF (Hawthorn Branch). 7 Dec 1922. NLA MS 1009/24/7. 
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Commonwealth) and six (legislation to prohibit the operation of the Ne 
Temere decree). The Chief Secretary added, 
I may state that we are a powerful Body and will play a considerable 
part in the forthcoming Federal fight. We have, in the state of 
Victoria, over 265 branches, and a very live membership. 
Albiston professed himself "glad to have your reply at your earliest 
convenience", but Latham responded simply that he would reply to any 
questions from a public platform.76 At a meeting in Canterbury, Latham 
... declared that the sort of religion that was introduced into politics 
was not that intimate thing that meant such a lot to men and 
women. Frequently it was foul, loathsome and dishonest, and he 
intended to do his best to keep it out of politics.77 
One Hawthorn resident wrote to Latham offering support, but warning of the 
strength of Protestant sentiment in Kooyong. 
Not long ago there was a municipal election here: two candidates, 
one RC.; after careful enquiry and personal interview I came to the 
conclusion that the RC. was the better man and I voted for him 
and he was beaten three to one. Afterwards I talked the matter 
over with several of my fellow rate-payers [and] one of them a 
notable and very highly and justly respected man and when I gave 
76. W. Albiston to J.G. Latham, 17 Oct 1922; Latham to Albiston, 19October1922. NLA MS 
1009/24/21-22, 24. 
77. Sun [Melbourne] 17 Nov 1922. NLA MS 1009/24/4258. 
my reasons for thinking the R.C. the better man, he remarked like 
the other 'O! I wouldn't vote for a Roman Catholic'. To me this is 
shocking feeling .... lt has been created by Mannix. 
As long as you are not an atheist and not a R.C. I feel pretty sure 
that on your other merits you may [count?] on substantial support 
from the Protestant Federation though the 'Orange' section may be 
less amenable. Wishing you success .. ..78 
Another supporter from Hawthorn, a real estate agent, wrote: 
[I]n canvassing round[,] some of our friends inform us that you are 
a Roman Catholic and are run by the R.C.'s and you have 
undertaken to do something for them. When we tried to explain 
that it was not so, they informed us that there were reports in the 
tribune [sic] to that effect .... Of course we think it is only an 
electioneering dodge. We considered it advisable that you should 
be acquainted with these facts.79 
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Of course, none of these divisions was serious enough to divert the main 
Nationalist attack from Labor and its alleged links with international 
communism. "THERE IS NO MIDDLE COURSE" warned one 
advertisement. 80 The Sydney branch of the Communist Party proposed to 
support the Labor Party: '"Save us from our friends' will be the comment of 
most Labor politicians .. .'' remarked the Melbourne Herald. 
The Communist Party can swing very few votes in Australia for 
the [Labor] Party, but, on the other hand, its unsolicited 
78. J.H. Thompson to J.G. Latham, 4Nov1922. NLA MS 1009/24/4. 
79. J.R. Morton to J.G. Latham, 13 Dec 1922. NLA MS 1009/24/86. 
80. 'Safety First', authorised by Archdale Parkhill, Smith's Weekly, 9 Dec 1922, p. 32; NLA 
MS 2823/1/2. 
endorsement. .. puts an unsolicited weapon into the hands of the 
Nationalist leaders, who are declaring that the Labor Party might as 
well call itself the Communist Party.81 
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Nationalist politicians were indeed quick to make such assertions, and the 
theme was reinforced in the party's advertising. One cartoon urged the 
Australian worker to desert the ramshackle 'Moscow Villa' for the citadel of 
loyal British citizenship (Figure 3.2). Archdale Parkhill, candidate for North 
Sydney, claimed that the Socialist Objective was based on the Soviet 
Constitution. "'The new objective commences with the sinister phrase, 'The 
socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange. Australian 
sentiment and White Australia were delegated [sic] to the background .... "' 
Lenin had admitted that socialisation had been a failure - Australia must not 
learn the hard way. '"We need not plunge our country into economic chaos 
and inflict famine and pestilence on our people .... "'82 John Christian Watson 
also made the point that "as the A.L.P. had decided to embrace communism 
Russia had decided to abandon it."83 
Parkhill suggested that Australia's troubles were part of a world-wide pattern of 
subversion. Speaking at Longueville, he alluded to the recent "strike riots" in 
the United States and asserted " ... most of the industrial disturbances 
throughout the world, including Australia, [were] due to an international 
81. Herald [Melbourne], 5Dec1922, p. 1. 
82. Daily Mail, 22 Jun 1922. NLA MS 4742, Folio 1. Parkhill withdrew his candidature for 
North Sydney to make way for Hughes, and stood instead for Parkes. 
83. SMH, 16 Nov 1922, p. 9. J.C. Watson, MLA for Young, (Lab, NSW), 1894-1901; MHR for 
Bland (Lab, NSW) 1901-06; South Sydney, 1906-10; Prime Minister and Treasurer, 1904; 
Leader of the Opposition, 1901-04; 1904-07. In 1916, Watson had been expelled from the Labor 
Party for advocating conscription. 
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conspiracy of revolutionary comments". Parkhill quoted Samuel Gompers' 
(President of the American Federation of Labor) warning that "'red"' finance 
had been sent to America for propaganda. Gompers, Parkhill reported, accused 
W.Z. Foster, "arch-demon of Bolshevism in America" of fomenting the Gary 
steel strike.84 
Despite their emphasis on the danger of sedition established within Australia, 
Nationalists sometimes pointed to disruption overseas to warn voters of what 
might befall them if they allowed the evils of the outside world to penetrate 
Australia. Hughes told one audience that on his travels throughout Australia 
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he was impressed by the absence of class hatreds. A different order prevailed 
in Britain, America, Russia - and Africa, where "they bombed strikers from 
aeroplanes. "85 
Hughes also admonished Labor's financial irresponsibility and wartime 
disloyalty. Again, dangerous world conditions necessitated economic 
prudence, the Prime Minister told a meeting at Toowoomba. 
The troubles of the world today are caused largely by the 
depreciation of money. If Russia had to be caricatured it might 
perhaps be caricatured as constituting a gigantic printing press 
turning out paper money. 
The government, Hughes continued, had reduced the stock of paper money 
and increased the gold reserve. Charlton's policy speech, however, contained a 
proposal of "very sinister significance": to lower the interest rate the 
government paid on its war loan bonds. This was equivalent to an employer 
cutting wages after agreeing to pay a certain amount. "[R]epudiation" of war 
debt would increase unemployment by reducing profits and the supply of 
credit. "Such a policy ... would bring about the collapse of society ... It would not 
only be like the bank smash of 1893, but would paralyse society." The people 
had turned against Labor, a party enthrallE'.d by "'false prophets"', but they 
would continue to support the Nationalists, who stood for living standards 
protected by "competent tribunals".86 
85. SMH, 22Nov1922, p. 13. 
86. Ibid., 13 Nov 1922, p. 8. 
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Health and welfare were issues on which Nationalists warned of threats of a 
different kind, and proposed solutions. In 1919 the Age had drawn attention 
to the admonishments of Dr Truby King, the New Zealand infant health 
expert then visiting Melbourne. 
'Breast feeding is absolutely essential in justice to both mother and 
child, and for re-establishing the health and fitness of the 
race ... Dependence on first born and second born, and bottle-fed 
babies, together with general unpreparedness for motherhood, 
largely accounts for our fifty percent of army rejects, and the 
tendency to drift further and further towards a C3 instead of an A 1 
population. •87 
Such were the racial fears which Hughes tried to assuage by extolling the 
virtues of the new Commonwealth Department of Health. The creation of 
the Department had made been made possible by the expansion in 
Commonwealth functions which had occurred during the war. Following 
the Second World War, there would be a much greater development of 
Commonwealth responsibilities for health and welfare, and these issues 
would become prominent in non-Labor electioneering, but for now the 
health issue was present in a slight and early form.88 Hughes explained that 
the Department was investigating _hookworm and tropical diseases: 
controlling the ill-health of Europeans in the tropics was essential if the 
87. Age, 29 Nov 1919, p. 23. 
88. Michael Roe, 'The establishment of the Australian Department of Health: Its background 
and significance', Historical Studies, vol. 17, no. 67, Oct 1976, p. 191. 
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white race was to secure its control of the Australian continent. Health 
authorities would also combat "the red and white plagues" (syphilis and 
tuberculosis) while the government intended through its maternity 
allowance to raise the birthrate and reduce infant mortality. "The National 
Government aims at a clean, healthy and efficient Australia, realising that 
successful rearing of healthy Australian children is the only safe foundation 
for the country."89 
Political rhetoric was dramatic, in the fashion of the day, but newspaper 
summaries emphasised the quietness of the campaign. 
When Federal Ministers embarked upon the election campaign 
they confessed they had never set out in similar circumstances 
with less idea of the issue that would be likely to become 
prominent. Even now, within a few weeks of the polling day, it 
can be said that there is no great outstanding issue before all others 
which is likely to settle the fate of the parties.90 
The parties' efforts to excite the electors had been unsuccessful, commented the 
Sydney Morning Herald. Only in Queensland had attendance at meetings been 
"satisfactory"; crowds had been small in Tasmania; the campaign in South 
Australia "'lifeless"' according to one minister. Meetings had also been 
"disappointing " in Victoria, except when Hughes was speaking. Bruce had 
almost postponed a meeting at Healesville, because of low attendance. 
89. SMH, 17 Nov 1922, pp. 9-10. 
90. Ibid., 20 Nov 1922, p. 9. 
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"Federal members have no hesitation in describing the present campaign as 
the quietest in the history of the Commonwealth."91 The Advocate was 
pleased to report that opinion was turning against Hughes, who was heckled by 
returned soldiers at Horsham, where he had held several successful meetings 
during the war. Hughes had fed on the irrational passions of the war years, but 
this spirit was disappearing. 
It was easy to understand that during the war emotionalism 
should rule men's minds, and that those who loudly proclaimed 
their patriotism would receive office ... The public mind, stupefied 
with the magnitude of world disasters, and distraught with local, 
national losses amongst the flower of our men, simply ceased to 
function in its habitual fashion of questioning and examining .... all 
the time various bogies - disloyalty, sectarianism, Bolshevism, and 
so forth - were conjured up to occupy the naturally suspicious 
mind of the people with groundless and superstitious fears. This 
wide-spread mental state lasted long after the war, and we began to 
think that the swing back to normal would never take place.92 
Despite the loyal Sydney Morning Herald 's prediction of a working majority 
for Hughes, the Nationalists failed to win control of the House. 
91. Ibid., 25 Nov 1922, p. 18. See also: Herald [Melbourne], 16 Nov 1922, p. 3. 
92. Advocate, 2 Nov 1922, pp. 25-26. 
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1919 1922 
% seats won % seats won 
Nat 45.07 37 35.22 26 
Lib 4.7 5 
Ind Nat 1.7 1 
CP 9.26 11 12.26 14 
Lab 42.49 26 42.29 29 
Maj. Lab 0.65 0 
Ind 1.47 0 4.56 1 
Elections for the House of Re,gresentatives, 1919 & 192293 
The Nationalist losses, pronounced the Melbourne Herald , were due to a 
reaction against the autocracy, extravagance and probable corruption of the 
Hughes government.94 The Age attributed the poor showing of ex-Labor 
Nationalists to "[T]he war having ceased to be an issue". Liberals had 
abstained or voted Labor in protest at the government's arrogance - "since 1914 
the country has been governed according to the spirit of the War Precautions 
Act" - and the dubious propriety of its dealings, particularly the £25, 000 
testimonial."95 William Higgs, who had changed from Labor to Nationalist 
and been defeated in his seat of Capricornia, complained that his opponent 
had referred to Hughes's gift and asked what he had received to join the 
Nationalist Federation. Higgs deplored the poor quality of the local 
Nationalist organisation.96 Government sympathisers also tended to blame 
apathy for the result. 
93. The vote was 59.36% of enrolment, a fall of 18.94% from the 1919 turn-out. Hughes & 
Graham, op. cit., pp. 320 & 326. 
94. Herald [Melbourne], 19 Dec 1922, p. 6. 
95. Age, 18 Dec 1922, p. 8. 
96. Higgs to Hughes, 18 Dec 1922, NLA MS 1538/28/266-7. William Higgs, Senator (Qld, 
ALP), 1901-07; MHR for Capricornia (Qld), 1910-22 (ALP, 1910-20; Nat, 1920-22); Treasurer, 
1915-16. 
Our class does a lot of growling about politics but will hardly walk 
across the street to record a vote .. .I see that every man and woman 
in my family and their servants go to the poll. Once there of 
course, they must please themselves.97 
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Hughes had dominated Federal Politics since 1916, if not earlier: he had been 
the most prominent figure in the parliamentary Labor Party long before he 
became Prime Minister. His period in office had been characterised by strident 
denunciation of disloyalty, but compared to the fury of 1917 and 1919 his last 
campaign was the most positive and thus the least typical. Conservatives had 
welcomed the former Labor leader's Imperialist zeal, but were becoming 
increasingly hostile to his predilection for state enterprise. A point made in a 
National Union circular on non-Labor disunity in: Victorian State politics in 
1924 is apposite. "The war enthusiasms which, induced many people to sink 
minor political differences ... are necessarily waning."98 Now that the 
extraordinary circumstances which had placed Hughes at the head of a 
federation of ex-Labor and ex-Liberal members were gone, the unstable 
combination was inexorably disintegrating .99 Hughes shared his fate with 
Lloyd George and Massey: the Times remarked: "[O]ne by one the war-time 
government of the Empire have crumbled away."100 Round Table also found 
the downfall of Hughes and Lloyd George similar. 
97. Walter D. Bingle to Groom, 2 Jan 1923. Groom papers, NLA MS 236/1/1960. See also 
Alexander Poynton to Groom, 4 Jan 1923; J. Thomson to Groom, 6 Jan 1923, NLA MS 236/1 /1963 
& 1969. 
98. Anon., 'The Victorian election ofJune 1924', NLA MS 1924/19/1140. 
99. SMH, 28Nov1922, p. 10. 
100. Times, 20 Dec 1922. 
In both instances there was a popular revolt against the attempt of 
'the man who won the war' to carry on far into the peace a 'one-
man government' having most of the characteristics of a war 
government.101 
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"By Jove it's pretty bad! I ought to feel rotten and depressed: but curiously I 
do not", Hughes confided to Herbert Brookes.102 Once the negotiators agreed 
to Page's demand to depose the Prime Minister it became apparent that defeat 
had released Hughes from a difficult situation, and his party from its worst 
handicap. 
101. Round Table, 13, 27 Mar 1923. 
102. 27 Dec 1922, Brookes papers, NLA MS 1924/1/4721. 
Chapter 4. The politics of industrial law and order, 1923-29 
The scarlet woman 
now waves the red flag 
the green one is discarded 1 
From the outbreak of the war until the formation of the first Bruce-Page 
government in 1923, non-Labor threat and loyalty controversies had revolved 
mostly around the questions of war sacrifice and Empire allegiance. To a large 
extent Nationalists represented employers and the self-employed, while Labor 
stood for employees, so industrial disputes contributed to political divisions. 
But the parties and the communities they had developed from were also 
divided on ethnic lines - 'Home' was Ireland for some, England or Scotland for 
others - and in the war years and early 1920s these identities seemed the more 
powerful. Two interconnected reasons stand out, both flowing from the ways 
in which events in Ireland and Europe 1914-18 dramatised the problems of 
Australian relations with the old countries. Firstly, the war in Europe 
heightened Anglo-Australians' sense of the importance of their British 
connections, and the troubles in Ireland revitalised the emotional attachments 
of Irish Catholic Australians. Secondly, politicians were drawn by these 
different mental bonds through the re-alignment of parties which followed the 
defeat of the conscription referendum in 1916: the Labor Party became more 
disproportionately Irish Catholic; the Nationalists by contrast more 
conspicuously Anglo-Scottish. 
1. handwritten note by Herbert Brookes, c. 1923-28. Brookes papers, NLA MS 1924/19/556. 
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Ethnically, the Nationalists remained Protestant Anglo-Scottish throughout 
the 1920s while Labor's Irish-Catholic component increased.2 But the 
irruption of Imperial and anti-Imperial sectarianism from Easter 1916, its 
intensity during the Anglo-Irish troubles circa 1916-21, and the sudden decline 
following the Anglo-Irish truce of July 1921, suggest that the high pitch of 
ethnic and religious politics was dependent on the stimulus of overseas affairs. 
'British-Australian' and 'Irish-Australian' sectarians took it upon themselves 
to open a second front in the antipodes, where they fought a war without 
bullets over the idea of Ireland and the idea of Britain. From the Truce of 1921 
the Irish were no longer fighting the British: this removed the heat from the 
vicarious partisanships of Anglo and Irish Australians. The panacea of Home 
Rule had arrived. But soon, in the civil war of 1922-23, the Irish were fighting 
each other: Australia's Irish Catholic sectarians became disillusioned and 
inactive; Ulster-British Protestant sectarians became complacent and inactive. 
In Britain, the recession of Irish issues was symbolised by the decision, in 1925, 
of the Unionist Party, so-called since 1886, to change its official name to the 
Conservative and Unionist Party.3 
A minority on the Nationalist side continued to mistrust Irish republicans 
most of all. Albiston told Brookes early in 1925 that he feared the Baldwin 
2
. In 1910-16, the proportion of Catholics in the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (20.8%) 
was almost identical to that in the Commonwealth Parliament as a whole (20.6%). in the 
1917-30 Parliaments, however, the proportions changed to 49.1% and 19.5% respectively. Joan 
Rydon, A Federal Legislature: The Australian Commonwealth Parliament 1901-1980, 
Melbourne, 1986, 
3. Patrick O'Farrell, The Irish in Australia, Kensington, New South Wales, 1986, p. 253; A.J. 
Davies, We, The Nation: The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power, London, 1995, p.7. 
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government's refusal to recognise the Irish Free State would fuel republican 
discontent in the South. 
It will be no longer possible to confine the Irish Question to 
Ireland. Hence I believe our organisation [the Victorian Protestant 
Federation] will be needed more than ever and should demand a 
greater recognition of the work we do. 
Albiston added that the VPF did not receive the support it deserved. "The 
excuse that we hear everywhere today is financial stringency."4 Judging from 
his note on the scarlet woman, Brookes himself, a fanatical anti-Catholic, was 
now tending to worry more about Communists than Sinn Feiners. Even the 
Reverend T.E. Ruth, one of the most vociferous Protestant sectarians of the 
war years, had taken to preaching against Bolshevism.s So too, to the virtual 
exclusion of Irish issues, were other Nationalists. The objectives of the 
Constitutional Club, formed in Melbourne to assist the 1925 Nationalist 
campaign, could have been those of any non-Labor association formed in the 
previous decades: members were "'pledged to loyalty to the Throne and 
Empire and the maintenance of constitutional government"'.6 But the Club's 
fighting platform was anti-Communist rather than anti-republican. When Sir 
William McBeath, chairman of the National Union executive, initiated a 
fundraising appeal to businessmen, to rejuvenate Nationalist Federation 
branches in preparation for the election, the slogan he used was "'Insurance 
4. W. Albiston to H. Brookes, 9Feb1925. NLA MS 1924/20/39-40. 
5. Sydney Morning Herald, 12 Nov 1925, p. 8. 
6. Rules and Regulations of the Constitutional Club, Melbourne, 1925, cited A.W. Martin, 
Robert Menzies, a life, 1894-1943, Melbourne, 1993, p. 57. 
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against Bolshevism.'"7 L.V. Biggs, National Union organising secretary, 
described the National Publicity Bureau as "a general publicity office for anti-
communist propaganda".8 Archdale Parkhill's comments in the last year of 
the civil war (1923) are also revealing of the change in non-Labor priorities. 
According to Parkhill, 
... recent private advices from England indicated that the anarchy & 
bloodshed now in progress in Ireland were largely promoted by 
Bolshevik agents .... Just as Germany was behind the 1916 rebellion, 
so the Soviet Government of Russia was behind the red republican 
army today .... These international revolutionaries ... are attempting 
the same tactics in Australia and it behoves us to be warned against 
them.9 
This sort of rhetoric was also characteristic of the new Prime Minister, Stanley 
Melbourne Bruce, who had secured the support of the Nationalist and 
Country Parties during the negotiations which followed the 1922 election. Like 
Hughes, Bruce's patriotic credentials were impeccable - he had served with 
distinction in the war - but unlike the Little Digger, his attitudes to state 
intervention were orthodox. Bruce was born in Melbourne in 1883. His father 
owned a successful softgoods importing company; and S.M. Bruce grew up in 
a family whose business interests and cultural ideals were centred on 
England. Educated at Melbourne Grammar School, where he was captain of 
the cadets, the young Bruce was said to have been extraordinarily self-
controlled. He spent three years at Cambridge, devoting more effort to rowing 
7. Ibid., p. 60. 
8. L.V. Biggs, 'National Publicity Bureau', 17 Nov 1925. NLA MS 1924/19/257-59. 
9. Daily Telegraph , 19 Jul 1923. 
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than to study; and after graduating in 1905 took articles with a London firm 
specialising in commercial law; he was admitted to the Bar two years later. In 
1914, Bruce enlisted in the British Army, and saw action at Gallipoli. After 
being wounded in the knee, he was discharged from the Army in 1917, and 
returned to Melbourne to manage the family business. Bruce's marriage to 
Ethel Dunlop in 1913 had brought connections with Victorian non-Labor 
politicians; and the next year he was recruited to stand as Nationalist 
candidate in a by-election for the rural seat of Flinders. The Country Party 
abstained from standing a candidate in return for the introduction of 
preferential voting for the Representatives; a concern with maintaining the 
support of the Country Party was notable throughout Bruce's career in federal 
politics. Bruce feigned indifference to political rank, but his ambition and 
quick wits allowed a rapid ascent in the parliamentary Nationalist party. He 
remained a mystery to his colleagues and supporters, one of whom 
nominated his virtues as :"Self-controlled-I I Patriot[ic] I I Open-minded", and 
remarked "Seems to struggle to keep himself free from human entanglements 
and friendly attachments. Has never been humanised by possessing children. 
I I Seems sufficient unto himself. I I Is as indifferent to foes as he is to friends 
apparently." Bruce's upper class Anglo-Australian demeanour was 
lampooned by Labor as a symbol of his government's Anglophile 
conservatism; the image he projected to the Nationalist constituency was that 
of the strong leader, determined to quell industrial turmoil, and so to allow 
Australia to prosper as a trading nation within the British Empire.10 
10. ADB, 7, pp. 453-61; Cecil Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne: Man of Two Worlds, London, 1965. 
l.M. Cumpston, Lord Bruce of Melbourne, Melbourne, 1989; David Potts, 'A Study of Three 
Nationalists in the Bruce-Page Government of 1923-29: Stanley Melbourne Bruce, John G. 
Latham, and George Arthur Maxwell', M.A. thesis, University of Melbourne, 1972; Notebook 
entry by Herbert Brookes, n.d. [c. 1922-29]. NLA MS 1924/19/562. 
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In keeping with the heightened fear of Bolshevism, during Bruce's period of 
office industrial disputes became the prin9'fle focus of conservative !'"""'·/" / 
conspiratorial argument. The government blamed foreign agitators and 
legislated accordingly, amending the Immigration Act in July 1925 to prohibit 
the entry of 
... any person declared by the Minister to be in his opinion, from 
information received from the Government of the United 
Kingdom or any other parts of the British Dominions or from any 
foreign Government, through official or diplomatic channels, 
undesirable as an inhabitant of, or visitor to, the 
Commonwealth.11 
The 1925 maritime strike heightened the apparent urgency of the problem of 
sedition, and provided an emotive catch-cry for the Nationalists. Hughes put it 
this way: 
Although the issue of Constitutional Government versus 
revolution is presented to the people in much clearer outline than 
at any previous election it is not new. The 1917 and 1919 elections 
were turned on this very point.12 
11. Immigration (Amendment) Act, No. 7 of 1925. 2. (b). 
12. Herald [Melbourne], 21 Oct 1925, p. 1. 
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Strikes presented by Nationalists as revolutionary plots more probably derived 
from particular workplace grievances. Arbitration could be frustratingly slow 
for unionists, whose demands were nearly always limited ones: improved 
wages and conditions, job control. There were among union leaders, however, 
some members of the Communist Party, and it was this combination of 
striking workers with union leaders affiliated to a party of international 
revolutionary socialism that provided the main threat in the non-Labor 
rhetoric of the 1920s. 
Historians have noticed that the Nationalists made industrial law and order 
and the influence of Communists on unions one of the major elements of 
their campaign rhetoric; that the penal laws which the Bruce-Page 
government introduced to control strikes featured in government election 
campaigns; and this politics is sometimes regarded as an early example of the 
red scare tactics used by Menzies in the 1940s and 1950s.13 It has also been 
established that Bruce regarded industrial conflict as a threat to his rural, 
immigration-driven, Empire trade ideal of economic development.14 It is the 
theme of this chapter that these two aspects of Bruce's politics were connected: 
13. David Carment, 'Sir Littleton Groom & the Deportation Crisis of 1925: A study of non-
Labor Response to Trade Union Militancy', Labour History, 32, May 1977, p. 52; Cecil 
Edwards, Bruce of Melbourne: Man of Two Worlds, London, 1965, p. 114; Andrew Moore, The 
Right Road? A History of Right-Wing Politics in Australia, Melbourne, 1995, p. 18; Cain, ~ 
cit., pp. 118 & 125; Frank Cain, 'Some Aspect of Australian-Soviet Relations from 1800 to 
1960', Journal of Communist Studies, vol. 7, Dec 1991, no. 4, p. 515; Frank Farrell, 'Dealing 
with the Communists 1923-36', in Heather Radi & Peter Spearitt (ed.), Jack Lang, Sydney, 
1977, p. 52. 
14. W.H. Richmond, 'S.M. Bruce & Australian Economic Policy, 1923-29', Australian Economic 
History Review, vol. 23, Sep 1983, pp. 240 & 252; W.A. Sinclair, 'Economic Development & 
Fluctuation in Australia in the 1920s', Economic Record, v. 51, 1975, p. 410; C.B. Schedvin, 
Australia and the Great Depression: A Study of Economic Development and Policy in the 1920s 
and 1930s, Sydney, 1970, p. 63; Cumpston,~., xv-xvi, pp. 52, 59 & 65. 
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Bruce feared that strikes and subversion would undermine that prosperity in 
town and country which an industrious people could win (see figure 4.1), and 
he also calculated that an industrial law and order platform was popular with 
the Nationalist constituency. As one historian has pointed out, the Bruce 
government was the most eager to defeat strikes which seemed 'political', in 
the sense of posing a threat to the authority of the government. At a time 
when some non-Labor people were attracted to the image of public order and 
authority projected by Mussolini's Italy, and joined groups dedicated to the 
preservation of patriotic and law-abiding values, the Nationalists endeavoured 
to maintain the image of a party committed to resisting the illegitimate dissent 
which political strikes represented in non-Labor thinking. IS 
In 1925 Bruce justified calling an early election by citing the need to obtain 
additional Federal powers over industrial relations. The State governments 
(all except Victoria's were Labor) were unwilling to cede the desired powers 
and some had been provocatively unco-operative: Phillip Collier, the Western 
Australian Premier, had refused to appoint extra police to deal with rioting 
maritime workers; New South Wales Premier Jack Lang had declined to allow 
State police to serve summonses on two unionists: in response, the Federal 
government passed the Peace Officers Act which created a uniformed 
Commonwealth police force.16 Bruce was vague about the extra powers he 
15. Potts, Q12:...cit., p. 248; Roslyn Pesman Cooper,' 'We Want a Mussolini': Views of Fascist 
Italy in Australia', Australian Journal of Politics & History, vol. 39, no. 3, 1993, p. 355; K. 
Richmond, 'Reactions to Radicalism: Non-Labor Movements, 1920-29', Journal of Australian 
Studies, 5, Nov 1979, p. 61. 
16. Sawer, ov. cit.,, p. 239. Phillip Collier, Premier of Western Australia, 1924-30, 1933-36; 
Jack Lang, Premier of New South Wales, 1925-27, 1930-32. 
?~c.:?S:'.!7Y .. , 
Figure 4.1 'Prosperity in the towns ... prosperity in the country' 
Details from Nationalist advertisement for 1925 election 






wanted, although he promised to amend the Crimes Act to punish disruption, 
and to require secret ballots in union elections.17 
The waterfront was the source of much industrial trouble, and maritime union 
issues contributed to the questions which predominated in the 1925 election. 
Waterside workers had placed a ban on overtime late in 1924 in an effort to 
destroy the Overseas Shipping Bureau which had been formed during the war 
organised strike-breakers, and continued to provide non-union labour. The 
campaign was also supported by the seamen, and the strikers' grievances 
expanded to include pick-ups of seamen, and the use of non-union labour 
generally. Following the refusal of the Seamen's to return to work, the 
Arbitration court deregistered it. Bruce rapidly passed two Bills to deal with the 
dispute: an amendment to the Navigation Act allowing the introduction of 
low-wage foreign crews to shipping in Australian waters; and an amendment 
of the Immigration Act permitting the deportation of foreign-born unionists 
found guilty by a tribunal of disrupting Australian industry. The dispute was 
resolved by the employers acceding to most demands. Shortly after, however, 
the Union again went on strike, in support of a campaign by British seamen in 
Australian ports.18 
Two unionists, Tom Walsh and Jacob Johnson, were the subjects of a test of 
the new deportation procedures. Walsh was President of the Federated 
17. Round Table, vol. 16, 29 Dec 1925, p. 393. 
18. Heather Radi, Ch. 9 , in F.K. Crowley (ed.), A New History of Australia , Melbourne, 
1974, p. 398. 
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Seamen's Union of Australia and Johnson assistant secretary of the Sydney 
branch. Walsh had emigrated from Ireland to New South Wales in 1893; 
Johnson came from Holland in 1910 and was naturalised in 1913.19 Sydney 
barrister A.R.J. Watt, with his junior counsel H.V. Evatt, represented the 
unionists before the deportation tribunal, which recommended their 
deportation.20 Then, the Supreme Court upheld Watt and Evatt's appeal for a 
"rule nisi for habeas corpus". E. Lamb, KC, for the Crown, appealed to the 
High Court, where Evatt contended that because Walsh and Johnson had been 
permanently settled in Australia for a number of years they were no longer 
immigrants, and because they were no longer immigrants the Commonwealth 
could not deport them under its immigration powers. The case was proceeding 
during the elections but the Court did not make a ruling until after polling 
day.21 
During the 1925 campaign, the turmoil surrounding the maritime strikes and 
the Walsh-Johnson case was cited by Bruce and his colleagues as the antithesis 
of their variety of national leadership. Commenting on the election of the 
Bonar Law Conservative government in 1922, the Sydney Morning Herald 
predicted that: "Mr Bonar Law's policy would be sobriety, not fireworks; his 
watchword would be stability, not sensation. The whole country ... wanted a 
19. Ken Buckley, Barbara Dale and Wayne Reynolds, Doc Evatt: Patriot, Internationalist, 
Fighter and Scholar, Melbourne, 1994, pp. 47-49. Dr H.V. Evatt, MLA for Balmain, 1925-30: 
Labor, 1925-27, Independent Labor, 1927-30; High Court Justice, 1931-40; MHR for Barton 
(NSW), 1940-58; Hunter (NSW), 1958-60; Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs, 
1941-49; Leader of the Opposition, 1951-60; Chief Justice, NSW Supreme Court, 1960; 
President of the United Nations General Assembly, 1948-49. 
20. Interestingly, in 1923 Evatt and Watt had appeared before the High Court on behalf of 
two Irish envoys (on British passports) threatened with deportation. They lost the case. 
Ibid., p. 46. 
21. Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
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period of quiet in which to restore the equilibrium after war."22 This could 
have been a statement of Bruce's credo, however much the intention and the 
effect of his law and order policies differed. Stability and order were the 
principal themes of Bruce's policy speech delivered at Dandenong. (This was 
the first Commonwealth policy speech to be broadcast on radio.) The Prime 
Minister spoke of the need for industrial peace and the control of agitators. He 
sought a new mandate because the authority of parliament and "law and order 
[were] threatened." Trade unions had been captured by extremists: Bruce, like 
Hughes, claimed to oppose extremists of both left and right. To stabilise 
industrial relations Bruce proposed to implement lifetime tenure for 
Arbitration Court judges, and compulsory secret ballots for unionists. 
Nationalists would seek the "rule of law both in the national and international 
spheres". Accordingly, Bruce promised a variety of policies designed to 
strengthen national security and speed economic development. The 
government was expanding the Navy and supported disarmament and 
international negotiations through the League of Nations. Also, a Bruce 
government would seek the happy medium of independent national policy 
within a unified Empire. At home, the Prime Minister promised to introduce 
national insurance, and to provide more funding for roads, home loans and 
economically-useful scientific research. Bruce proposed national insurance as 
a solution to the labour problem. Much industrial unrest, he explained -
deviating atypically from the conspiratorial theory of strikes - was caused by the 
fear of privation, which an insurance scheme would alleviate. National 
22. Sydney Morning Herald, 26 Oct 1922, p. 9. 
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development required a scheme of encouraged immigration, which the Bruce 
government would assist by providing loan funds to the States. More was at 
stake than prosperity. Immigration was "imperative, in the interests of our 
national safety and if we are to retain this country." Bruce concluded by 
returning to his main point that "the paramount issue in this campaign is the 
maintenance of law and order, and the supremacy of Constitutional 
Government. "23 
Bruce's manifesto had been negative in that he concentrated on the severity of 
Australia's industrial problems, yet he proposed a number of concrete 
solutions. Charlton's policy speech, delivered at the Sydney Town Hall, was 
predominantly negative and defensive. The Opposition leader criticised the 
government on a number of issues, and attempted to rebut the charges made 
against Labor. Earle Page24 had been a profligate Treasurer, whose accounting 
methods were dubious. The government encouraged immigration, but there 
was not enough work available for people already in the country. Munitions 
should be manufactured in Australia, and defence must rely on submarines 
and aeroplanes rather than big ships, such as the two cruisers which were, 
mistakenly, being ordered from England. Charlton promised to continue the 
embargo on "black-grown sugar". As Sawer points out, Charlton significantly 
relegated the maritime issue to the end of his speech.25 The deportation law 
was unjust, he claimed: Walsh would not be deported if he were convicted of 
23. Age, 6 Oct 1925, pp. 11-12. 
24. Country Party MHR for Cowper (NSW), 1919-61; Treasurer, 1923-29; Minister for 
Commerce, 1934-39, 1940-42; Minister for Health, 1937-39, 1949-56; Prime Minster, April 1939; 
Leader of Country Party 1921-39. 
25. Sawer, op. cit., p. 258. 
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robbery with violence; furthermore, deportation was being carried out not by 
order of a court but at the discretion of a government "star chamber". The law 
was also unnecessary and counter-productive. Bruce had inflamed the dispute 
for his own political advantage. His policy promoted disorder. 
In countries where no Labor party exists, where union leaders are 
freely sent to the penitentiary, where the employers can call armed 
troops into the field in defence of their interests, there is not more 
peace, there is less. 
Charlton urged voters to look beyond the artificial crises manufactured by the 
Nationalists, who dealt in 
imaginary terrors ... [and] ... organise fakes, fears and frights, and 
conduct elections while the fright is on ... [T]he only variation is the 
name of the horror doing 'scarecrow duty' in this or that place or 
time.26 
Whether or not the frights were fake, fear certainly played a major role in the 
Nationalist campaign, which rested on accusations that Labor connived in 
industrial trouble-making, and through inaction remained suspiciously close 
to the Communists. The Nationalist organisation had been preparing 
information on Russia and Communism during the course of the year. 
Organising secretary L. V. Biggs noted in a post-election report on the National 
Publicity Bureau that "[N]early every book on Russia (in English) published 
26. Age, 10 Oct 1925, p. 17. 
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within the last nine months has been purchased, and added to the small library 
which has been built up, and frequently used during the Winter months."27 
Nationalist propaganda emphasised the enormity of the Communist threat, 
and the necessity of making a stark choice between freedom and slavery: 
Nationalists seemed to have been encouraged by the apparent success of 
Conservative anti-Communist propaganda in Britain. During the 1924 general 
election, the vehemently Conservative Daily Mail had obtained a copy of what 
appeared to be letter from the head of the Comintern ordering British 
Communists to intensify their revolutionary agitation; the final week of the 
campaign was dominated by accusations from the Press and the Conservative 
Party that the Labour government had suppressed the letter and was implicated 
in Communist-inspired subversion and industrial disruption. The origins 
and authenticity of the 'Zinoviev letter' have never been established. Nor is it 
certain that this stunt was the most important factor in the Conservative 
victory; but it seemed, as the deputy director of publicity at the Party's Central 
Office was to recall, to have exploited an "elemental prejudice" that Labour was 
the party of disorder and working class rebellion.28 Whoever compiled the 
Nationalist speakers' notes hoped that British Labour radicalism might 
influence Australian voters against Labor. Speakers were provided with a 
series of quotations from leftwing British labour leaders. For example, Glasgow 
MP Neil Maclean was quoted as stating that "'Labor does not want 
nationalisation of this or that. What we want is socialisation, which is vastly 
different" - to which the compiler added this gloss: 
27. L.V. Biggs, 'National Publicity Bureau': see note 8. 
28. Philip Cambray, The Game of Politics: A Study of the Principles of British Political 
Strategy, London, 1932, p. 67, cited Davies,~., p. 223; and for the Zinoviev affair in 
general, Ibid., pp. 221-26. 
The essential unity of the Bolshevik forces throughout the world is 
demonstrated by fresh proofs every day. Though the virus has not 
poisoned the whole of the working classes of any country, the so-
called leaders of the workers in politics make no attempt, except at 
election time, to hide the anarchistic extravagance of their view or 
the bloodthirstiness of their designs. 
Thinking - as the people of Australia have always accustomed 
themselves to think - of Great Britain as the central citadel of 
constitutionalism, of law and order, of justice and honour, of 
individual and national freedom, it has been difficult to imagine 
there the existence of a Bolshevik party. Yet by their fruits shall ye 
know them .... Mr Rams~y MacDonald, during his brief 
Parliamentary reign, deliberately sought to sell Great Britain to the 
Moscow deviI.29 
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Nationalist speakers were provided with material on which to base similar 
attacks on Australian labour leaders, particularly the former Queensland 
Premier, E.G. Theodore, and the secretary of the New South Wales Trad.es and 
Labour Council, Jock Garden.30 Theodore had resigned the Premiership in 
1924, and in Autumn 1925 took a prominent role in the successful State Labor 
campaigns in New South Wales and Victoria. His election to the Queensland 
seat of Herbert was generally accepted by press and politicians to be a certainty.31 
Theodore, like as Ryan before him, was a rising personality in a party 
noticeably bereft of parliamentary talent, and thus became an attractive target. 
29. National Campaign Notes, No. 2, Melbourne. 7 Sep 1925, p. 29. Liberal Party papers: 
NLA MS 5000/9/333. Britain's Communist Party was extremely small compared to those of 
France, Germany and Italy. Albert S. Lindemann, A History of European Socialism, New 
Haven & London, 1983, pp. 232 & 236. 
30 Edward Theodore, MLA for Woothakata (Qld), 1909-12; Chillagoe 1912-25; Premier of 
Queensland 1919-25; member for Dalley (NSW), 1927-32; Treasurer, 1929-30, 1931-32; John 
(Jock) Garden, Secretary, NSW Labor Council, 1918-34; founding member of the Communist 
Party, 1920; ACTU, 1927; 
31. Ross Fitzgerald, 'Red Ted': The Life of E.G. Theodore, St Lucia, Queensland, 1994, 
pp. 181-82. 
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The ex-Premier was, government campaigners were encouraged to proclaim, 
"A POLITICAL CHAMELEON". His flexibility was demonstrated by the way in 
which he had changed his tune on the Federal Labor Party and Communism 
since 1921. At the inter-State conference that year, Theodore had denounced 
the socialist objective, saying "' ... you may as well change the name of the party 
and call it the Communist Party."' Now he had forgotten this attitude and 
sought the Labor leadership.32 Theodore was a Labor parliamentarian who 
acquiesced in Communist infiltration; speakers' notes depicted Garden as the 
source of the malaise itself. Garden had renounced the Communist Party and 
re-joined the Labor Party. But there was "no need" for Garden to formally join 
the ALP as he "practically controls one wing of it." The notes repeated the 
frequently-made charge that Garden, at a meeting of the Comintern in 
Moscow, 1922, boasted that although the Communist Party had only one 
thousand members it controlled 400,000 unionists through its majorities on 
Trades Hall executives; and added a comment from the president of the Sane 
Democracy League, "'[C]an the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his 
spots?"'33 
This was the evidence for the seditious ideology of labour leaders, but what 
were the implications - according to Nationalists - for ordinary people? One 
newspaper advertisement announced that a Labor government would put 
even the humblest private property at risk. 
32. National Campaign Notes, No. 1, 20 Aug 1925, pp. 11-12. NLA MS 5000/9/333. 
33. Ibid., No. 2, 7 Sep 1925, pp. 13-14. 
Individual Freedom, Good Wages, the Right to Arbitration, and 
the ownership of property are at stake . 
... socialisation of industry strikes at every class, and more 
particularly at the worker who owns his own home and possesses a 
Savings Bank account. 
The majority of the depositors in the Savings Banks are 
workers .... To them it is imperative that what has been built up 
shall not be destroyed. 
THE BRUCE-PAGE GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES that no 
Confiscation, Repudiation or Fantastic Social Experiments will take 
place. By granting secret ballots, eliminating the strike curse, and 
upholding arbitration against brute force, it will MAINTAIN ALL 
THE ADV ANT AGES THE WORKERS HA VE WON .... Compare it 
with the tear and rend programme of the Extremists, and ask 
which is better for yourself, your wife and your home. 34 
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The all-or-nothing choice was expounded in a tract which presumably 
constituted a major item of Nationalist publicity, a printed card authorised by 
the Sane Democracy League but funded and distributed by the Nationalists, 
which was posted to 200, 000 addresses. The front showed a picture of the red 
flag and the blue ensign crossed over a map of Australia and warned: "[I]t has 
come to this at last! WHICH IS IT TO BE? You must decide on November 14 
at the Ballot Box. " On the back was an explanation: one flag stood for "equal 
rights, justice, united Empire", the other for "confiscation, despotism and 
bloodshed. "35 A sympathetic editorial writer for the Age explained that 
extreme choices had been necessary since the war, when the "sharp political 
cleavage" was between supporters and opponents of "Australia's war 
policy .... [but] .... The line of demarcation is now between those who desire an 
34. 'Unionists, Home Owners, Depositors in Savings Banks', Advertiser , 11Nov1925, p. 20. 
35. NLA MS 1924/19/1150. 
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Australian government ... and those who want a government influenced more 
or less by foreign Communists."36 
Charlton made imputations of his own against the government's loyalty. One 
sally - featuring the foreign agent of an undemocratic foreign political 
movement - seemed to be a mirror image of rightwing accusations regarding 
Communism. "The Fascist movement", Charlton alleged, "was being 
established in Australia .... "; and Labor's first task in government.would be to 
suppress it.37 Charlton and his colleagues also claimed that Bruce and Page 
"did not represent a truly Australian spirit": Bruce would "place Australia at 
the mercy of the Empire Council. "38 
Counter-attacks such as these aside, the Nationalists' accusations normally 
forced Labor to follow a defensive campaign: propagandists devoted much 
space to responses to the charge of Communistic collaboration. Australian 
Labor politicians argued that the Communist menace was exaggerated. Lang's 
riposte was more forceful than most. Bruce had been in office for three years, 
he noted, but had done nothing about the Communist threat. The 
government was actually aiding Communism by giving it unwarranted 
attention: "the glorious advertisement now being given to Mr Garden and his 
handful of non-descripts" - who could not gain admission to the ALP nor 
36.Age, 170ct1925,p.14. 
37. Herald [Melbourne], 5 Nov 1925, p. 7. 
38. Round Table , 16, 29 Dec, pp. 397-8. By 'Empire Council' Charlton might have meant an 
executive of the Imperial Conference. 
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election to any parliament. That Communists were weak was due not to 
employers' criticisms but to the appeal of "Labor ideas and the agitation of 
Labor leaders." Labor campaigned against the Communists, with no help from 
the Nationalists. Australians had no history of Czarism and were too well-
educated to succumb to Communism, but "Coercion and Deportation Acts" 
would arouse resentment and create "a Communistic atmosphere."39 John 
Keane, the ALP organising secretary for Victoria, pointed, as Lang had, to the 
conservatives' failure to prove their accusations. It was "but British justice" 
that the Melbourne Herald and other critics should produce evidence to 
substantiate their charges that Labor was "sheltering Communist wreckers". 
The Prime Minister, Keane continued, was 
... on the horns of a dilemma. Either he knows that these people 
are in Australia, and has failed in his duty to suppress them, or he 
does not know of them, and is simply trotting out another bogey to 
take its place with so many that have been trotted out in the 
past .... 40 
A newspaper advertisement announced that the Labor had at its 1924 Federal 
Conference voted to prohibit Communists from belonging to the Party, and 
that Communism was a "screen" designed to hide government failings, 
including the sale of the Geelong wool mills, restrictions (unspecified) on the 
Commonwealth bank, the building of cruisers overseas, the poor performance 
39. Sydney Morning Herald , 17 Oct 1925, p. 16. 
40. Herald [Melbourne], 14 Oct 1925, p. 8. 
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of Page as Treasurer and the "unrestricted influx of a low type of foreign 
immigrant. "41 
Apparently, none of these defences was sufficiently effective: the poll was an 
unambiguous victory for the government, which won fifty seats in the House 
of Representatives to Labor's twenty three, and took all eighteen normal 
Senate vacancies, as well as the three caused by the deaths of sitting members.42 
1922 1925 
% seats won % seats won 
Nat 35.22 26 42.46 37 
Lib 4.7 5 
CP 12.56 14 10.74 14 
Lab 42.29 29 45.04 23 
Maj. Lab 0.65 0 
Ind 4.56 1 1.76 1 
Elections for the House of Re12resentativesL 1922 & 192543 
Most commentators attributed the government's performance to the maritime 
strike and Red peril issues. Typical of press commentary was the Sydney 
Morning Herald 's opinion that the Nationalists' secret ballot policy had 
attracted working class votes, but "without doubt the greatest factor of all in 
bringing about the defeat of Labour was its association with the Red forces of 
socialism as represented by men like Mr Garden and Mr Grant."44 Round 
41. 'Voters! This is the Truth!', authorised by F.F. Ward, Advertiser, 6 Nov 1925, p. 8. 
42. Sawer, op. cit., pp. 259-60. 
43. Hughes & Graham,~., pp. 326 & 331. 
44. See, for example: Sydney Morning Herald, 16 Nov 1925, p. 10. The Melbourne Herald 
agreed: 17 Nov 1925, p. 6; as did the Age: 17 Nov 1925, p. 9. Donald Grant was an f.WW 
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Table commented that the Nationalists benefited from the continuance of the 
strike throughout the campaign.45 Its correspondent considered, however, that 
the substantial Labor vote (1, 262, 839 to the government's 2, 798, 634) indicated 
that "a great number" of voters did not accept the Nationalist argument that 
the election was a contest between Communism and freedom. Communism 
did not seem to the electorate a likely prospect in affluent, well-educated 
Australia. On the other hand Labor was undeniably associated by voters with 
strikes, which the Party refused to condemn. The extremism of the Lang 
government - especially to abolish the Legislative Council - also alienated 
New South Wales voters from the Federal ALP.46 
That the extremity of the issues had made the election unusually tense was the 
verdict of L.V. Biggs in his assessment for the Nationalist Federation of the 
effect of compulsory voting, introduced for the first time in 1925. Compulsion, 
Biggs noted, had increased the percentage of enrollees voting from 59.36 in 
1922, to 91.08. Biggs acknowledged that the high turn-outs at the 1916 and 1917 
referenda (82.75 and 81.34 percent) suggested that when issues were considered 
important, people would vote in large numbers without the need for 
compulsion. Biggs considered, however, that mandatory voting was necessary 
at quiet elections to ensure the participation of "the political shirker". "Some 
elections", Biggs commented (regretfully, perhaps) "cannot be narrowed down 
to a single issue such as Communism versus Constitutional Reform or 
activist jailed from 1916 to 1920 for conspiracy to commit arson and to pervert the course of 
justice, and incitement to sedition. He broke with the IWW in 1923. Associated with the 
'Trades Hall Reds', he stood unsuccessfully as a Labor Senate candidate in 1925. ADB, 9, pp. 
75-76. article by Frank Farrell. 
45. Round Table, vol. 16, 29 Dec 1925, p. 390. 
46. Ibid., pp. 398-99. 
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Industrial Anarchy versus Arbitration within the Law". 1925, however, was 
certainly one of these stark choice elections. 
The entire circumstances ... are without precedent: the lead given by 
the Prime Minister ... was superb; the support given to the 
government ... by the powerful press of this country was 
overwhelming in its strength and influence; the volume of 
voluntary work tendered by tens of thousands of earnest men and 
women in the Nationalist and Country Party and Labor Party was 
without parallel. Throughout Australia there was a feeling that 
nothing short of a record poll and an unequivocable verdict would 
meet the needs of a country which had reached the parting of the 
ways. The Government went to the people in the psychological 
moment in the life of a people and both the contending armies 
fought with an intensity which developed an extraordinary degree 
of public interest.47 
So said other Nationalist activists and sympathisers. An accountant who 
examined Nationalist book-keeping for the election attributed the surprisingly 
low cost to the campaign's constituting ~· .. probably the biggest voluntary effort 
ever made in a political way." A constituent writing to congratulate Groom on 
his re-election went so far as to state that "[D]uring the history of our land 
never has the results of an election been fraught with such possibilities and 
never were thousands of people so interested in the results." Another Groom 
supporter commented, "I never found a canvass so easy."48 
47. L.V. Biggs, 'Compulsory Voting in Australia', Dec 1925, NLA MS 1924/19/1146-8. 
48. E.A. Holden to Ivy Brookes, 10 Dec 1925, NLA MS 1924/19/504 (Holden did not specify the 
cost); James W. Curtis to Littleton Groom, 18 Nov 1925, Groom papers, NLA MS 236/2/3430; 
R.A. Howell to Groom, 
16 Nov 1925, NLA MS 236/2/3456. 
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To what extent voters returned the Bruce-Page government because they 
believed its arguments about strikes and agitators is impossible to say. 
Certainly the congratulatory letters to Groom from his rural Queensland 
constituents reveal that some conservative-minded people adopted the 
language of the Nationalist campaign. E. Patrick of Crows Nest bade the 
government to "rid Australia of the Moskowitskies". J. Dean considered that 
the electorate had chosen "law and order and commonsense government." "I 
now hope,", revealed Qantas founder, W.H. Fysh, 
to see all extremists deported and all inflammable literature 
suppressed and industrial disputes settled within the law .. .In the 
secret ballot I would like to see married men given two votes to the 
single men's one, it is generally the young and irresponsible that 
favour strikes. 
The hope and belief of the Reverend Samuel Atherton of Toowoomba was 
that "Prime Minister Bruce will effect a cleaning up of Australia now." 
According to Harold Thomsett, the result was "an undoubted expression of the 
people's opinion, in favour of the Empire and law and order."49 
If this mobilisation of opinion around the issue of industrial militancy had 
swung the Nationalists' 'natural constituency' behind them, and provided a 
cause which unified the disparate forces of non-Labor, the industrial victory 
49. E. Patrick to Groom, 14Nov1925, NLA MS 236/2/3441. J. Dean to Groom, 17Nov 1925, 
NLA MS 236/2/3434. W.H. Fysh to Groom, 16 Nov 1925, NLA MS 236/2/3442. S. Atherton to 
Groom, 20 Nov 1925, NLA MS 236/2/3466. Harold Thomset to Groom, 23 Nov 1925, NLA MS 
236/2/3484. 
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and political defeat of 1925 threatened to intensify the divisions within the 
Labor Party. The new Governor General, Lord Stonehaven, commented that 
"[T]here is a devil of a fight going on in the Labour Party between the 
Communists and the real labour men, but no results to report yet."50 W.G. 
Spence predicted before polling that a severe defeat would precipitate for Labor 
a "purification from all disrupting elements."51 Former Hughes minister 
Walter Massy Greene considered Labor's failure would prompt "the searching 
of hearts" and an eventual split between moderates and "extreme 
industrialists". Labor "may succeed in avoiding an open breach now. I think 
it must come sooner or later."52 
Three weeks after polling day the High Court forbade the deportation of Walsh 
and Johnson under the amended Immigration Act. This was the beginning of 
the steady decline of the Bruce-Page _Government. Bruce had won two 
elections fighting an industrial law and order line, but his autocratic 
leadership, and the policies which he and his minsters, most importantly 
George Pearce, and the new attorney general, Latham, introduced to try to 
prevent strikes seemed, in the period between the 1925 and 1928 elections, to 
be causing as many problems for the government as for Labor and the unions. 
The government was divided on the issues of tariffs and arbitration, with Page 
and his colleagues favouring less of each. Many city Nationalists, in keeping 
with business opinion, were also becoming disenchanted with arbitration; 
50. Lord Stonehaven to Lord Forster, 11Dec1925, Stonehaven papers, NLA MS 2127 /1/55. 
51. Herald [Melbourne], 29Oct1925, p. 6. W.G. Spence, founder Amalgamated Shearers' 
Union, 1886; general secretary AWU, 1894-1917; Labor MHR for Darling (NSW), 1901-17; 
Nationalist MHR for Dawin (Tas), 1917-19; Postmaster General, 1914-15; 
52. Walter Massy Greene to W.M. Hughes, 19Dec1925. Hughes papers: NLA MS 1538/1/515. 
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elections fighting an industrial law and line, but his autocratic 
leadership, and the policies which he and his mi sters, most importantly 
George Pearce, and the new attorney general, Latham introduced to try to 
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be causing as many problems for the government as for Lab r and the unions. 
The government was divided on the issues of tariffs and arbitr tion, with Page 
and his colleagues favouring less of each. Many city Nationalis , in keeping 
with business opinion, were also becoming disenchanted with 
although there was also a hostile minority (Groom and Hughes were the most 
50. Lord Stonehaven to Lord Forster, 11Dec1925, Stonehaven papers, NLA MS 2127 /l/55. 
51. Herald [Melbourne], 29 Oct 1925, p. 6. W.G. Spence, founder Amalgamated Shearers' 
Union, 1886; general secretary AWU, 1894-1917; Labor MHR for Darling (NSW), 1901-17; 
Nationalist MHR for Dawin (Tas), 1917-19; Postmaster General, 1914-15; 
52. Walter Massy Greene to W.M. Hughes, 19 Dec 1925. Hughes papers: NLA MS 1538/1/515. 
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prominent) who regarded the policies and ethos of Bruce and his coterie as the 
antithesis of the early Commonwealth ideal of accommodation between 
capital and labour. So, Bruce's peremptory methods fuelled personal and 
ideological discontents on the backbench. Disaffected government members 
would later destroy his government. These internal problems were caused by 
politicians disagreeing on how to respond to more important troubles in the 
country and in the world. The government's economic advisers were 
beginning to apprehend public indebtedness and the contraction of 
international trade as serious dangers. Furthermore, bush grievances were 
deepened by poor international prices and difficulties in finding overseas 
markets.53 The industrial situation continued to deteriorate: there was 
another major wharf strike in December 1927; the marine cooks went out in 
March 1928, and by early June the strike affected all interstate shipping.54 
Bruce' s determination to keep the wheat ships moving was increased by the 
precariousness of Australia's export markets and, no doubt, the demands of 
the Country Party. The government's legalistic solutions aggravated maritime 
strife still further. Latham am@lld@d th@ Crim@s .. A .. ct to d@clar& th& 
CoffiftlUftist Pafty aft illegal orgaaisatioll. A referendum to give the 
Commonwealth greater powers over industrial relations was rejected by the 
voters in September 1926.55 In October 1927 New South Wales voters elected a 
Nationalist-Country Party government under Thomas Bavin; but perhaps the 
removal from power of Lang, the villain of the Sydney Morning Herald, 
S3. Cumpston,~., p. 8S; Stuart Macintyre, The Oxford History of Australia, vol. 4, 1901-
1942: The Succeeding Age, Melbourne, 1993 (1986), p. 243. 
54. Cumpston, op. cit., p. 83. 
SS. Mercury, 26Sep1926, p. 7. 
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was to the Federal government's disadvantage. 56 In the last days of the 
Parliament the government passed a one-paragraph Transport Workers Act 
granting regulatory power to licence transport workers (most importantly, 
wharf labourers) and to prohibit the employment of unlicensed workers. 
According to Bruce, 
' [W]e'd had that legislation up our sleeves for some time. But we 
were as good as into the election. Parliament was practically 
dissolved when Pearce came to me one night and said: 'We've got 
to put that Licensing Bill through before we go the election.'57 
Bruce's 1928 policy speech, delivered at the Boomerang Picture Theatre, 
Dandenong, on 8 October, was similar to his 1925 manifesto in that it 
concerned industrial unrest and the necessity to maintain law and order 
(before the start of the speech, Bruce condemned the "revolt" of the WWF.)58 
This time, however, Bruce seemed to apprehend the approach of war; and to 
re-affirm his commitment to the White Australia policy with even greater 
vehemence. The Prime Minister began by outlining the ideals of Nationalism: 
loyalty to Crown and Empire; strong defence, most importantly, through the 
Royal Navy; a White Australia; constitutional government, and the rule of 
law.59 The way Bruce developed each of these points revealed some of the 
new pre-occupations of the late 1920s. Bruce hailed the Empire's role as "the 
greares' :orce in the world for peace ... the mainstay of the League of Nations" 
56. SMH, 10 Oct 1927, p. 11. 
57. Bruce and Latham were reluctant to introduce the Bill so late, but Pearce prevailed. 
Latham drafted the Bill. Edwards, op. cit., p. 145. 
58. What the Government Stands For, Melbourne, 1928, p. 1. 
59. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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and a leader in disarmament. No one could doubt the Nationalists' 
commitment to this protective British union, but Labor's views were "differing 
and uncertain"; some Labor people favoured the Empire's destruction, and 
therefore the destruction of Australia "as a white democracy".60 On defence, 
Bruce pledged support for the League of Nations, disarmament, and the 
recently-signed "Pact for the Outlawing of War"; and, despite these hopeful 
and pacifistic sentiments, warned against Labor's own mixture of pacifism and 
wishful thinking: namely, avoiding the need for a substantial army through 
complete reliance on aeroplanes and submarines.61 Nor, the Prime Minister 
continued, could Labor be trusted to keep Australia white when its fraternal 
Australian Council of Trade Unions was affiliated to the Pan-Pacific Trade 
Union Secretariat, which opposed immigration restriction. The parliamentary 
Labor Party's failure to deal with transgressions such as the PPTUS affiliation 
demonstrated the labour movement's domination by "a few extremists who 
are avowedly un-Australian in inspiration, sentiment and outlook." These 
were presumably the same "men in our midst" whose ambitions to substitute 
soviet for parliament endangered the survival of cherished institutions of 
authority.62 
Having outlined Nationalist ideals, magnificent yet so fragile, Bruce explained 
his policies for aggrandising Australia, "the greatest undeveloped whiteman's 
country". National development, like the Empire, was essential not only for 
60. Ibid., 4-5. 
61, Ibid., pp. 5-7. Bruce was referring to the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928-29). Sponsored by the 
French foreign minister and the United States secretary of state, the Pact banned war as a 
method of resolving international conflict; by 1929, fifty four nations (including Germany) had 
signed. Penguin Atlas of World History, vol 2, Harmondsworth, 1988, p. 137. 
62. What the Government Stands For, pp. 8-9. 
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prosperity but for security. "If the ideal of world's peace is not realised, we may 
be called upon to defend this great heritage." To expand population and 
production Australia needed many immigrants, of the right sort. The 
government had maintained the British proportion at ninety eight percent: in 
claiming otherwise the Labor Party "played upon the prejudices and ignorance 
of the people."63 Furthermore, the Opposition had warned that the 
government's decision to end cabotage by repealing the coastal clauses of the 
Navigation Act would allow the substitution of coloured for white Australian 
crews on coastal voyages, but the Government would prevent this by 
introducing prohibitive tariffs.64 Development also depended on industrial 
peace: Bruce would convene a conference to foster amity and co-operation.65 
He also pledged to found a national insurance scheme, and labour exchanges; 
and, once the Royal Commission on the Constitution had reported, to seek a 
referendum to endorse its recommendations. The government had placed the 
Commonwealth Shipping Line under the control of an independent board in 
1923, and had since then saved half a million pounds each year.66 After all 
this detail, the Prime Minister concluded with a rhetorical flourish: 
Today, Australia is being challenged by extremists who are seeking 
to disrupt the Empire; who are fomenting trouble in trade and 
industry, and are working insidiously to overthrow our national 
institutions. With these men there can be no compromise. We 
throw down the gage of battle, determined to keep the Empire 
63. Ibid., pp. 13 & 46. 
64. Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
65. Ibid., p. 21. 
66, Ibid., pp. 29-31; 32; 39; 35. Bruce proposed that the national insurance scheme should be 
administered by friendly societies and insurance companies, and distribute funds contributed 
by the Commonwealth, employers, and employees. 
united, Australia white, the Law supreme, and our policies and 
institutions pure.67 
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Defeated in 1925 by a campaign featuring just this sort of rhetoric, the ageing 
Mathew Charlton had resigned in April 1928; the new Opposition leader, J.H. 
Scullin had delivered Labor's policy speech in Richmond Town Hall on 4 
October. Bruce's and Scullin's speeches were similar in the conventional 
wisdoms each espoused. Scullin, like Bruce, refused to compromise on white 
Australia, and preferred prosperity to poverty, peace to war. 
The possibility of another war, in which new scientific discoveries 
would be employed to serve the most destructive purposes,~ too ~- ~ 
horrible to contemplate.68 
Some differences emerged in the detail of policy. While Nationalists favoured 
co-operation with the Royal Navy, Labor's defence program - the main 
proposal was to improve coast-interior air routes - emphasised self-reliance 
and civilian economic benefit; and, as mentioned above, rested mostly on the 
use of aeroplanes and submarines. 69 Scullin railed against financial laxity 
67. Ibid., p. 51. 
68. Labor Policy for the Commonwealth, Melbourne, 1928, p. 18. James Scullin: MHR for 
Corangamite (Vic), 1910-13; Yarra (Vic), 1922-49; Prime Minister, 1929-32; Leader of the 
Opposition, 1928-29; 1932-35. 
69. Ibid.. Commonwealth Bank: p. 9; Land Tax: pp, 7-8; shipping: p.13; Aboriginal policy: 
20; defence: p.19. J.M McCarthy comments that the Labor Party made much of the role of 
air power because aeroplanes (and submarines) seemed to promise a relatively cheap form of 
defence. Furthermore, Labor was attracted to air defence for reasons which derived from the 
Imperial and anti-Imperial politics of World War One: fuel constrained aircraft to fly only 
short distances; for this reason the aeroplane seemed suitable for defence sorties from the 
coast, but not for Imperial operations in Europe or the Middle East. Furthermore, personnel 
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(rising taxes and debt) in language - notably the great swear word "drift" -
which would in 1930-31 characterise conservative attacks on his own 
government. The Labor leader, however, blamed excessive overseas 
borrowing and inadequate tariff protection, whereas non-Labor critics tended to 
denounce industrial unrest.70 Scullin's faith in the state as a force for 
egalitarian reform was evident in proposals to extend the operations of the 
Commonwealth Bank in order to make it a "people's bank" (Scullin did not 
explain what that meant); to rescind reductions in the Land Tax; and also in 
his criticism of the sale of the National Shipping Line, which had placed 
shipping costs "at the mercy of wealthy sea lords". There was also a pledge on 
Aboriginal welfare: Scullin promised to acquire more land for reserves, but to 
discontinue segregation. Returning to his main theme, the living standards of 
white Australian citizens, Scullin introduced populist arguments: the lords of 
capital, he insisted, dominated the Nationalist Party as surely as they 
dominated Australia's sea-links with the world. The Nationalists had adopted 
the Labor Party structure of platform and conference. "But behind the 
operations of this apparently harmless machinery is the dominant influence of 
wealth gathered into the hands of a few masters, who are the real makers of the 
Anti-Labor policy. "71 Scullin must have known that industrial relations 
would be one of the main election issues, and it was on this question that he 
pointedly differentiated between Nationalist and Labor policy. Bruce had 
spoken of the need for conciliation, but spoke more of criminal sanctions 
against the agitators who, Nationalists averred, fomented strikes. They were 
were few and highly trained: no government could conscript an airforce. The Federal caucus 
rarely discussed defence. This changed circa 1936 ( 'The Australian Labor Party and the 
Armed Services: Theory and Practice', Labour History, No. 25, Nov 1973, pp. 62-3) as we 
shall see in chapter 6. 
70. Labor Policy for the Commonwealth, pp. 5-6. 
71. Ibid., p. 21. 
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respectable and legitimate, Scullin told his Richmond audience, as he promised 
to amend the Crimes and Immigration Acts so that these laws would "apply 
only to criminals, and not to decent working men".72 
Union rights, male unemployment, and racial purity were prominent issues in 
the Labor campaign. The Westralian Worker warned that the purpose of the 
Transport Workers Act 
... was to smash the unions concerned, just as Mussolini, who is so 
much admired by Mr Bruce, did in ltaly .... When men are to be 
employed only and solely because they are licensed to work it is an 
end to unionism ... If the Labor movement does not stir itself to the 
utmost to change the government in the next Federal Parliament 
the next three years may see no liberty at all left to the workers.73 
Addressing a meeting at Queanbeyan, Labor candidate John Cusack accused the 
government of favouring wealth with its reductions in the land tax, and 
encouraging immigration at the expense of sounder methods of increasing 
population: child endowment and free education. Immigration cost men jobs. 
"An unparalleled number of [the] virile manhood of Australia is seen today 
'Waltzing Matilda'."74 
72. Ibid., p. 16. 
73. Westralian Worker, 12 Oct 1928, p. 4. 
74. Queanbeyan Age, 9 Oct 1929. No page numbers. 
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Much of the Nationalist campaign concentrated on strikes and subversion, but 
there was also a strong positive emphasis on welfare and prosperity. The 
government's national insurance promised to assuage the " ... two chief fears of 
the small wage or salary man ... sickness and old age." The scheme would 
provide old age, permanent disability, widow's, and orphan's benefits.75 
Ordinary men and their families would also profit from the £20, 000, 000 
provided by the Commonwealth to the States for home loans: "[H]ome 
proprietorship by periodical payments is the desire of the average man .... "76 
'Vote for Nationalism and progress' implored one pamphlet, which featured a 
graph charting the growth of per capita factory production and wages.77 These 
benefits, however, were threatened. Speaking at Marrickville, Bruce deplored 
industrial unrest as a manifestation of division and selfishness which 
dishonoured the common purpose of the war years, and inhibited Australia's 
economic development: 
.. .if the people today remembered the sacrifices made in the war by 
the men who fought at the front, and by the women at home, it 
was not likely that they would allow to continue some of the 
conditions existing at the present time, when class was being set 
against class, when there was dislocation in industry .... The greatest 
necessity in Australia today was that the discontent which existed 
as a result of the efforts of the extremist agitators should be got rid 
of, and that the people should settle down to the task of developing 
the country, which had possibilities of future development which 
no other country had ever known.78 
75. You Are Entitled to Comfort in Old Age, Sydney, 1928. Sickness benefits (per week) were 
to be set at 27 /6 for male adults and married minors; 20/-for female adults and married 
minors; and 15/0- for unmarried minors of either sex. 
76. £20, 000, 000 for Homes for the People, Sydney, 1928. 
77. Smoking Chimneys and Ringing Anvils, Sydney, 1928. 
78. Sydney Morning Herald, 15 Oct 1928, p. 12. Bruce was introduced by the Mayor of 
Marrickville as a man who had '"done his bit"' in the war. · 
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Nationalist leaders clearly hoped that the 1928 poll would be dominated, as the 
last had been, by the issue of strikes and Communism. Literature contained 
much prosaic information and argument on topics such as taxes and debt, and 
also some conspiratorial linkage between Communism with miscegenation. 
"THE ISSUES WHICH FACE THE ELECTORS TODAY ARE OF A SIMILAR 
CHARACTER TO THOSE OF 1925", announced Nationalist speakers' notes, 
hopefully.79 Once again, Nationalist threat and loyalty rhetoric emphasised the 
nexus between Labor and Communism, and the global dimensions of 
organised revolutionary socialism. "'The shadow of Communism is over the 
Labor movement"' warned a Nationalist pamphlet, quoting the 1924 annual 
report of the Sydney Trades and Labour Council. That the shadow was cast by 
an international revolutionary organisation was implied by Pravda 's hailing 
strikes in Australia, Poland and Czechoslovakia as part of a new global surge of 
proletarian militancy. The cover of the pamphlet showed the red flag and the 
Union Jack crossed, and asked 'Under Which Flag?' Clearly, the Empire was 
the only union strong enough to shield Australia from such a far-reaching 
conspiracy: "[S]tand by Australia and the Empire: Vote Nationalist."80 
Jock Garden provided evidence for Labor's entanglement with Australian 
communists, and Australian Communists' subordination to Russian 
Communists. In 1925 the scandals surrounding the British Labour Party and 
Communism had featured in government propaganda; in 1928, the 'anti-
79. Facts about the Bruce-Page Government, Canberra, 1928, p. 6. 
80. Under Which Flag?, Sydney, 1928. 
/ "12:1... 
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white Australia' Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat was prominent. As in 
1925, Garden's boast to Comintern delegates in Moscow, 1;z{, of controlling 
the majority of New South Wales unionists was repeated in speakers' notes. 
A new twist was provided by Garden's membership of the committee assisting 
Theodore as campaign director, and his editorship of the Pan-Pacific Worker. 
The PPTUS was " ... another Moscow offshoot - which aims to link up the black, 
yellow and brindled races bordering the Pacific .... to forward the propagation of 
revolutionary socialism." 81 ACTU affiliation brought this danger closer to 
home; Scullin refused to comment on the issue. By voting against Labor 
politicians who "are concurring in or at least are not resenting" ACTU 
membership of the Secretariat, workers would be "repudiating" the PPTUS 
"and all its works".82 The front of one pamphlet showed a cartoon of Garden 
as a red rooster perching on the ACTU roof; looking over the fence were two 
sinister faces, Russian and Chinese. The caption quoted Garden: "'We of 
Sydney want Internationalism .... We want to help all our brothers - black, 
brown or brindle"'; and responded: "Australians are not 'Brindles"'.83 
Nationalist campaigners felt obliged to admit the moderation of Scullin's 
personal views, but insisted that he was compelled to follow the Labor 
platform or be dismissed; thus he was the captive of the extremists who had 
gained control of the Party and union bureaucracies.84 
81. Facts about the Bruce-Page Government., p. 131. 
82. Ibid., p. 140. 
83. Keep Australia White, Sydney, 1928. Under the heading 'European Aliens I I Checking 
the Influx' the pamphlet also that "[T]he 'ninety eight percent British' principle has never 
been in jeopardy." 
84. Judge a Man by the Company he Keeps, Sydney, 1928. 
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This matter-of-fact comment on the South Australian campaign by the Liberal 
Federation president and prominent backbencher, J. Duncan-Hughes, suggests 
the advantages which government campaigners believed the maritime strike 
provided. 
The strike has of course made a great difference to things here, on 
the political side as well as others: when I got back here it seemed 
to me that our people hadn't wakened up to the position- but they 
have now, and for the moment are quite tolerably disposed to the 
Liberals, - seem to have temporarily quite forgotten about the 
taxation put on by the State Liberal Government!...Parsons has of 
course been out some time flitting from township to village, 
telling them (I suspect) less of what he will do in the future than of 
his great deeds during the last Parl.; Verran is roaring against the 
'dirty rebels ' in a way which out-Fosters Foster and with great 
effect; Lucas - who at the moment is my mate - holds forth, less 
successfully, about Russia, China, America and the Pan Pacific 
Sect.t!BS 
The government was returned, but lost 7 seats to Labor, including Duncan-
Hughes'. 
The Westralian Worker took comfort in an apparent "censure" of Bruce's 
provocation of the WWF and his attempt to exploit the unpopularity of the 
resulting strike. The Nationalists had lost those seats "most closely associated 
with the issues on which he forced the popular judgement" - that is, urban 
85. J. Duncan-Hughes to J. Latham, 17 Oct 1928. Latham papers, NLS MS 1009/1/1830. John 
Duncan-Hughes, MHR for Boothby (SA), 1922-28; for Wakefield (SA), 1940-43; Senator (SA), 
1931-38; Walter Parsons, MHR for Angas (SA), 1925-29; John Verran, Senator (SA), 1927-28. I 
have been unable to identify Lucas. 
183 
seats were lost on industrial relations issues.86 Frederic Eggleston commented, 
"[T]he strike certainly did not have the effect on the elections which was 
anticipated. It dominated the discussion on the hustings but evidently deeper 
considerations were operating." These were intimations of economic malaise: 
tariffs which had not produced profitable export industries; the failure of closer 
settlement; and the stagnation of real wages: " .... the people were feeling a 
pinch which their leaders had not admitted to exist." There was "a feeling of 
doubt about our prosperity": the weakness of the interwar orthodoxies of rural 
subsidy and industrial protectionism was a common theme in Eggelston's 
writing,87 although on this occasion he also attached much weight to the 
unpopularity of taxes imposed by Nationalist governments in South Australia 
and New South Wales, the states where Labor gained the greatest number of 
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86. Westralian Worker, 23 Nov 1928, p. 3. Wharf strikes, however, were generally more 
unpopular in farming than in urban electorates. 
87. Australian Quarterly, vol. 1, No. 1, Mar 1929, pp. 13 & 20; Osmond, .Ql2:...ill., p. 149. 
Frederic Eggleston, lawyer, writer, politician, and diplomat, was prominent in the Round 
11o \ ~fr l""' Table movement, an~he Bureau of Social and International Affairs, and wrote frequently on ~(1N"> 1",. Australian public life. He was independent Liberal, then Nationalist MLA for St Kilda, 
·~ 1920-27; Minister of Railways, 1924-26; Attorney General and Solicitor General, 1924-27; 
Chairman Commonwealth Grants Commission, 1933-41; Minister to China, 1941-44; Minister 
to the United States of America, 1944-46; Kt. 1941. 
88. Hughes & Graham, Ql2.....ill., pp. 331 & 337. 
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Round Table 's correspondent remarked that the attempts by Nationalists and 
Labor to defend the white Australia policy, the entrenchment of which in the 
Australian political settlement no one could seriously doubt, gave the 
campaign an unreal quality; perhaps this was why the election proved "one of 
the dullest on record".89 Round Table attributed Labor's good performance in 
New South Wales not only to the Bavin government's tax proposals, but to 
State government members canvassing a reduction in the basic wage. Wage 
cuts provided Labor with a false and effective "'election cry' ... Australian 
politicians know that seat are won and lost on emotional appeals." Round 
Table reported on other explanations which people had advanced for the 
Nationalist losses, including the fear of Italian immigration; the (unspecified) 
discontent of the outlying states (West Australia, South Australia and 
Tasmania); government extravagance; and particularly, unemployment. The 
Labor Party, however, was still distrusted by voters because of its connections 
with the wharf strike, conflict between and the Party and the AWU, and the 
prevalence of extremism.90 
Not surprisingly, defeated New South Wales members, such as Thomas Ley, 
blamed the Bavin government's insensitivity. Elliot Johnson also attributed 
his defeat to 
Mr Piddington's declaration as to the probable reduction of the 
basic wage for New South Wales and [to] the unpopularity of the 
89. Round Table ,vol. 19, Dec 1928, p. 416. 
90. Ibid., pp 422-23. 
State Treasurer's income tax proposals .... towards the end we could 
get no one at all to listen to Federal Politics. 91 
185 
Duncan-Hughes was disappointed in the effect of the strike, and in the 
reputation of the South Australian Liberal government: 
.. .it is true that the strike was temporarily in abeyance, but the 
excitement of it was only just passed and might fairly have been 
expected to outweigh the fact that Liberals were not popular here 
on the Federal side and distinctly unpopular on the State.92 
Eggleston had commented in the March 1929 Australian Quarterly that the 
swing against the government had been a reaction to an economic downturn 
which the government had failed to address. This was also the advice he gave 
privately to Latham: 
... .I think you are in for a very difficult time. The finances of the 
States are so bad, and the failure of government intervention in 
economics is so conspicuous that I don't think any government 
can do what ought to be done without losing office. You people 
91. Thomas Ley to Littleton Groom, 26 Nov 1928. NLA MS 236/1/2833. Ley admitted that his 
seat was marginal, but told Groom that he did not expect to lose it in 1928. Thomas Ley, MLA 
for Hurstville (NSW), 1917-25; Minister for Public Instruction, Labour and Industry, 1921; 
Justice, 1922-25; member for Barton, 1925-28. Elliot Johnson to Littleton Groom, 22 Nov 1928. 
NLA MS 236/l /2827. Johnson described Lang as comprising roughly equal proportions of 
industrial workers and middle class public servants; Sir William (Elliot) Johnson, MHR for 
Lang (NSW), 1903-28; Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1913-14; KCMG, 1920; Albert 
Piddington, NSW Industrial Commissioner, 1926-27; President, Industrial Commission, 1927-
32. 
92. J. Duncan-Hughes to J. Latham, 31Dec1928. NLA MS 1009/1/1847-50. 
have not seen the drift of things in time and prepared people for a 
change in policy which is now over due.93 
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Latham insisted that the people had indeed been prepared: Bruce had made no 
significant promises and had foreshadowed an enquiry into tariffs - the aspect 
of economic policy which, along with arbitration, was most frequently criticised 
by proponents of laissez faire solutions to the late 1920s malaise. He agreed, 
however, that 1929 would be a difficult year.94 As it transpired, the radical 
'change in policy' which the Prime Minister took in response to the slide to 
depression forced the government to contest another election less than a year 
after its return. 
In the late 1920s doubts about the viability of the Australian economy led to a 
restriction of borrowing in London, and the resulting retrenchment in State 
public works caused unemployment to rise. Bruce told the Premiers 
Conference in May that the current recession was worse than previous slumps 
and, unlike these, would not be cured by a good season. Falls in commodity 
prices were compounded by an intensification in overseas competition, but 
Bruce had decided that the essential cause of the problem was industrial 
conflict and excessive wages.95 He blamed strikes for high costs and dual 
control for strikes, and asked the Premiers to cede industrial powers to the 
Common weal th. When they refused he announced a panacea: the 
93. F.W. Eggleston to J.G. Latham, 27 Nov 1928. NLA MS 1009/1/1841. This letter is also 
cited in Osmond, op. cit., p. 148. 
94. Latham to Eggleston, 4 Dec 1928., NLA MS 1009/1/1843. 
95. Schedvin, .Ql2...ill., pp. 108-10. 
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government would withdraw Commonwealth responsibility for arbitration in 
all except maritime industries. Then he notified Nationalist members of his 
decision. 96 
At the Premiers' Conference Bruce was able to cite two current strikes in the 
timber and coal industries as evidence that the Federal industrial relations 
system had failed utterly to produce industrial peace. In January, Justice Lukin 
of the Federal Arbitration court handed down an award for the 
Timberworkers' Union which increased the working week from forty four to 
forty eight hours, made piece work obligatory, and substituted juvenile for 
adult labour.97 Unionists in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and 
Tasmania refused to work under the new award, and their employers locked 
them out. The labour movement regarded the Lukin award as particularly 
harsh. Other unions levied their members for timber workers' strike pay, and 
Labor parliamentarians upheld the union's refusal to work under the new 
award.98 Theodore, who had been elected deputy leader in February initially 
96. Dagmar Carboch, The Fall of the Bruce -Page Government, Melbourne, 1958, p. 141. 
"'This will unquestionably cause about the biggest political turmoil we have ever had in 
Australia[.]'", Bruce confided to Casey, 22 May 1929 cited Richmond, op. cit., p. 253. Richard 
Casey: political liaison officer, London, 1924-27, 1927-31; MHR for Corio (Vic), 1931-40; 
Honorary Minister 1933-35; Treasurer, 1935-39; Minister for Development, 1939-40; Australian 
Minister to the United States, 1940; Minister of State for the United Kingdom in the Middle 
East, 1940-44; Governor of Bengal, 1944-46; President of the Liberal Party, 1947-49; member 
for La Trobe (Vic), 1949-60; Minister for Works and Housing, 1949-51; for Supply and 
Development, 1949-50; in charge of CSIRO, 1950-60; for External Affairs, 1951-60; Governor 
General, 1965-69; GCMG, 1965; life peerage, 1966. 
97. Lionel Lukin (1868-1944), justice of the Queensland Supreme Court, 1910-26; justice of the 
Commonwealth Court of Arbitration and Conciliation, 1926-30. 
98. NSW labour regarded the Lukin award as the first step in a general campaign to increase 
hours for New South Wales following the reductions made during the Lang government, 1925-
27. Lukin's award was also part of the reduction in the late 1920s of the relatively generous 
conditions established by Justice Higgins, whose court had awarded a reduction of the working 
week from forty eight to forty four hours in 1920. Miriam Dixson, 'The Timber Strike of 1929', 
Historical Studies , vol 10, No. 40, May 1963, pp. 479-81. 
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"played a prominent part" in supporting the strike, telling a meeting at the 
Sydney Town Hall, 
'I am a believer in Arbitration ... but not Arbitration as it is 
perverted by the Bruce government ... as it has been administered by 
the prejudiced court which makes crimes of those claims that are 
only the workers' due.'99 
Using the powers granted by the 1928 amendment of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act, Lukin ordered a secret ballot. Garden led a wild scene in 
which workers burned ballot papers in front of the Trades Hall, and then 
marched to the Domain and hanged the judge in effigy. The forty percent of 
papers which were returned showed a heavy 'no' majority. Lukin alleged 
corruption of the ballot. Further attempts to use the government's industrial 
legislation to quash the strike failed: the Federal Court fined the Timber 
Workers £1000 for striking against an award, and Victorian Trades Hall 
secretary E.J. Holloway £50 for inciting them. Neither fine was collected. 
Recession stacked the odds against the union: the timber business was slow, 
and employers were able to recruit strike-breakers from among the growing 
number of unemployed; the timber workers returned under the new award in 
June (Victoria) and October (New South Wales), but not before there had been 
violent confrontations between pickets, non-union workers, and police. The 
99. Sydney Morning Herald, 19 February 1929, cited Fitzgerald, op. cit .. p. 219. Theodore, 
fearful of the unpopularity, drew back from public support for the strike but later 
"reluctantly withdrew from the dispute as much for political expediency as anything else, 
thus angering those Labor supporters who expected more of him." Illli!. 
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violence associated with the strike - especially intimidation by the 'basher 
gangs' - was heavily publicised by the Bavin and Bruce-Page governments.100 
The timber strike provided grounds for Nationalist politicians to complain of 
Labor complicity in union lawlessness. Bruce's policy on the coal dispute, 
which began in the northern New South Wales fields in February, gave Labor 
politicians all the evidence they could wish of the Nationalists' plutocratic bias. 
Ten thousand miners had been locked out by the Northern Collieries 
Association, which insisted that pay reductions were the only way to keep the 
industry working. Repeated attempts were made to resolve the dispute in 
federal Arbitration Court hearings and conferences, but each side was 
intransigent.101 Latham had initiated a prosecution of one of the colliery 
owners, John Brown, for breaching an award und~r the Industrial Peace Act, 
but in April Bruce announced that the government had decided to withdraw 
the action because prosecution was unlikely to succeed, and would not resolve 
the dispute. It transpired later that the chairman of the Association, Charles 
McDonald, had made it clear to Bruce that negotiations could not succeed 
under the shadow of prosecution.102 The government had been zealous in 
prosecuting unionists, and this leniency caused an outcry. 
100. Holloway was prosecuted under the War Precautions Repeal Act (1920). Dixson, op. cit., 
pp. 484-89; Carboch, Ql1..£i.t., pp. 130-31. 
101. The Bavin government ordered a Royal Commission into the coal industry- including 
profits; this had been one of the Miners' Federation's demands. Miriam Dixson, 'Stubborn 
Resistance: The Northern New South Wales Miners' Lockout of 1929-30', in John Iremonger, 
John Merritt & Graeme Osborne (eds), Strikes: Studies in Twentieth Century Australian 
Social History , Sydney, 1973, p. 131. 
102. NSWPD, 118, p. 193, cited Illli!., p. 132. 
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The government's embarrassment increased when Parliament resumed in 
August. Theodore based a no-confidence motion on the government's partial 
administration of justice.103 The government response was, again, that 
prosecution was futile and Labor's criticism hypocritical: if the gambit had 
succeeded there would have been no complaints. Theodore made a wide-
ranging attack in which he alleged that the Bruce-Page governments had 
always treated the rich with clemency (he cited the withdrawal of the 
prosecutions for tax evasion against the Abrahams brothers) and the workers 
with severity, as was shown by the jailing of Seamen's Union official Jacob 
Johnson.104 Hughes and three other Nationalists sided with Labor. and the 
government won by only four votes.IDS 
In the same session Page brought down his budget, which instead of the 
estimated surplus carried a large deficit - an ·outcome he attributed to an 
unexpected shortfall in customs revenue. His remedies were a five percent tax 
es 
on the gross receipts of amusements business{ mostly cinemas, taking in over 
£100 per week; and an excise on luxuries - including those popular staples, beer, 
spirits, and tobacco. The balancing of budgets was widely considered to be a 
moral as well as an economic virtue and the government's credibility suffered 
greatly as a result of this debacle.106 
103. Carboch, Q12,..Qt., p. 137 
104. Sawer, op. cit., pp. 314-15. 
105. Carboch, ~., p. 139. 
106. The estimated surplus had been £12, 996, and the deficit was £2, 358, 975. Ibid. p. 140. 
191 
The budget was never debated in this parliament, however. On 23 August 
Bruce introduced the Maritime Industries Bill to create a new tribunal to 
arbitrate in maritime industrial disputes under the Commonwealth's foreign 
and interstate trade, rather than industrial powers. The Bill would have 
repealed the Conciliation and Arbitration, and Industrial Peace Acts - "a legal 
and industrial revolution."107 This break with the past provoked genuine 
disquiet in Nationalist ranks: "[T]he old liberalism that Mr Deakin stood for is 
dying", lamented Massy Greene.108 Abolition also provided the opportunity 
for a group of members who nursed personal grievances against the 
government to have their revenge. The Bill passed its second reading, but due 
to the rebellion of Hughes and several other Nationalists was defeated in 
Committee. Bruce, as he had warned the House, treated this as a vote of no-
confidence and on 12 September secured a dissolution of Parliament.109 The 
election was dominated by this extraordinary adventure in rightwing 
radicalism. 
Bruce's policy speech, delivered, once again, at the Boomerang Picture Theatre, 
Dandenong, was exclusively concerned with industrial relations. The Prime 
Minister argued that his policy was designed to bring about 'Sanity in Industry': 
cessation of disputes, "continuity of work"; and "the highest ... [wages and 
conditions] .. .industry can provide".110 Opponents had tried to misrepresent 
the Maritime Industries Bill; Bruce explained that its purpose was simply to 
107. Sawer, op. cit., p. 308. 
108. Massy~reene to Brookes, 19 Jul 1929. NLA MS 1924/25/1067. 
109. Ibid. p. 311. 
110. Sanity in Industry, Melbourne, 18 Sep 1929, p. 1. Capitalised phrases are from the sub-
headings to this pamphlet. 
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ensure that State and Commonwealth parliaments should legislate only for 
those industries over which they possessed Constitutional powers.111 The 
Prime Minister explained how the present strike-prone system had developed. 
The 'Evils of the Past' - sweating, the great strikes of the 1890s - had led to 
arbitration; but Colonial politicians had been reluctant to cede functions to the 
new Commonwealth, which acquired a power limited to interstate disputes.112 
Unions seeking access to Federal arbitration created 'Artificial [interstate] 
Disputes', which resulted in the overlapping of State and Federal jurisdictions 
(that is, one workplace or industry and two or more jurisdictions). The result 
was "confusion, wasteful expense, and constant industrial friction".113 
Bruce then explained why drastic action was both necessary, and justified by an 
electoral mandate. Prospects for constitutional reform were poor: the electorate 
had rejected augmentations of the Commonwealth industrial powers in 1911, 
1913, 1919 and 1926. The government had done it all it could: consistently 
urging industrial co-operation; trying unsuccessfully to negotiate a more 
sensible division of State-Commonwealth responsibilities; and, since 1925, 
introducing laws "to improve the machinery dealing with industrial matters" -
most recently the Transport Workers, and Conciliation and Arbitration 
Amendment Acts (1928) which were designed to reduce 'overlapping', 
promote conciliation, enforce compliance with awards, and ensure 
membership control of unions.114 The government's mandate to use its new 
legislation, however, had been frustrated by the timber workers' violent 
111. Ibid., p. 3. 
112. Ibid .. pp. 3-6. 
113. Ibid .. p. 7. 
114. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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defiance of the Federal Court. Without a police force the Commonwealth 
could not protect "citizens'' against these "outrages"; the States had police but 
no jurisdiction. The timber dispute provided final proof of the lawlessness 
endemic in Federal arbitration.115 ''The fundamental principle of Arbitration 
is legal acceptance of the awards of the Court, whether these awards are 
favourable or not."116 Other unions had flouted this principle by raising a levy 
for the Timber Workers; Labor politicians lacked the courage to denounce the 
strikers. Yet despite this defiance of arbitration, the success of the Transport 
Workers Act in promoting award obedience and "continuity of work" on the 
waterfront had demonstrated the efficacy of laws made under the trade and 
commerce power.117 In sum, Bruce averred, the government had tried its 
utmost to make arbitration work but had been frustrated by extremists who 
"exploited for their own ends the spirit of loyalty in trade unionism."118 
Recent strikes had dislocated industry, compounding other economic 
problems: scarce and expensive credit; falling revenue, and wheat and wool 
prices; increasing competition from overseas manufactures; 
unemployment. 
All these factors contributed to the realisation that there was 
something wrong in our industrial and economic life, and that we 
must take some action immediately to remedy the position.119 
rising 
115. The Brisbane Courier (19 Sep, p. 13) gave the headline 'How Federal Arbitration was 
Ruined by Union Extremists' to its report of Bruce's policy speech. 
116. Sanity in Industry, p. 11. 
117. Ibid., p.12. 
118. Ibid., p. 13. 
119. Ibid., p. 14. 
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Bruce anticipated the Labor argument that the government would reduce 
wages. He pointed out that Federal awards did not produce uniform 
conditions: only twelve of one hundred and fifty four applied in all States. 
But in any case, the government's policy would raise living standards. In place 
of the nominal wage increases of recent years, which had been rapidly eroded 
by inflation, the reduction in strikes would lower production costs and bring 
about a fall in the cost of living and a real improvement in standards. 
Nationalists would remove "obstacles" to Australia's economic development, 
and Bruce concluded by asking voters (especially "the workers") to consider his 
proposals "carefully and dispassionately". If they did so they would see that the 
government's objects were to strengthen rather than weaken "industrial 
regulation"; "protect and advance the standard of living"; foster co-operation 
and amity; and remove "pressing problems in our industrial and economic 
life" .120 
Scullin delivered his policy speech at the Richmond Theatre, Melbourne, on 
19 September.121 Bruce had acknowledged that the problems of sweating and 
strikes had in the 1890s and early Commonwealth period required statesmen to 
create the means of intervening in labour relations, but concentrated on the 
ruination of the Federal system in the 1920s by artificial disputes and the 
defiance of powerless tribunals. Scullin briefly alluded to contemporary 
120. Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
121. The following account of Scullin's speech is from Labor Call, 26 Sep 1929, p. 2. 
120. For example, very similar arguments were made by the Country-Nationalist candidate 
for Moreton, Joseph Francis, and Sir George Pearce. Brisbane Courier, 25 Sep 1929, p. 19. West 
Australian, 26 Sep 1929, pp. 19-20. 
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imperfections but affirmed the past and present greatness of arbitration. He 
rallied Labor to defend 
.... one of the proudest pages in our book of nationhood .... In this we 
have led the world. It has been a giant task. Probably there are few 
in this room who remember the beginnings of it - few who 
remember the great men who in the early days of Federation set 
upon our feet upon the path of progress. What would these men, 
if they were living to-day, say of the attempt to undermine the 
whole superstructure so laboriously built up on the foundations 
that were laid a quarter of a century ago. 
Scullin hoped by evoking history to inspire his followers to defend arbitration 
for its value in the present. Bruce, he recalled, had proclaimed his belief in 
the principal of arbitration, but 
[B]ecause the system is not perfect, because it still needs mending, 
he would end it, and cast hundreds of thousands of workers into 
the open economic ring, where for years wage-earners fought so 
many unequal fights. 
The inconsistency of government industrial relations policy, and its unfair 
and incompetent financial management, provided Scullin's other points. The 
Nationalists claimed a mandate for repeal: this should be rejected as "an insult 
to the intelligence of every thinking man and woman", for the government 
had been returned in 1928 with a mandate to retain Federal arbitration. 
Furthermore, Bruce's and Latham's statements gave the lie to their policy: the 
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former had maintained that shearing and shipping were not the only 
nationally-significant industries; the latter had admitted at the close of the last 
Parliament that abolition would exacerbate industrial conflict, and that most 
Federally-registered unions were peaceable. Abolition, however, was not to be 
welcomed even as an end to the punitive and one-sided legislative program 
engineered by the attorney-general. The same unfairness was manifested in 
the government's fiscal policy. The amusements tax and new excises drew 
money from "the mass of the people, irrespective of the amount of their 
income." But " ... the first thing to be done is to save Arbitration. Return the 
Labor Party to power and you will have saved that. The rest will follow." He 
concluded by warning of the 
... powerful commercial and financial forces behind the Ministry 
that would seek to dictate the policy of the nation, and would at 
this time in our history put the clock back thirty years and more to 
repeat the evils of the nineties. It was out of the terror and travails 
of those times that the Labor Party was born. Those days will not 
return, because the people of Australia have resolved that the men 
who spent their lives fighting for the righting of our wrongs shall 
not have fought and suffered in vain. (Cheers). 
Government candidates generally repeated the points made in Bruce's policy 
speech, and added local variations.122 They claimed that the current system 
had produced few benefits for workers; denied that Federal withdrawal would 
122. Facts for Use of National Campaign Workers, Melbourne, 1929, p. 1. These notes 
reiterated many of the justifications for the abolition of Federal arbitration which Bruce had 
advanced in his policy speech, for example that: the government had intimated that Fed 
arbitration could be abolished - Ibid. ( 3-4); Federal arbitration was unnecessary to protect 
conditions (6 &32); the Transport Workers' Act demonstrated that the Trade and Commerce 
power could be used to prevent maritime strikes (11); the timber strike finally demonstrated 
the worthlessness of Federal arbitration (21). 
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degrade wages and conditions; and asked voters to support a policy of 
strength. Nationalist speakers' notes opened with a statement of the Party's 
philosophy of industrial life. 
It is the right of every man to work ... without interruption at the 
task he has chosen in life; to know that, so long as he continues to 
give of his best, others cannot embroil him in their quarrels; and to 
know that his home will remain reasonably free from the poverty 
induced by industrial strife.123 
The damage which industrial conflicts inflicted on working class living 
standards featured in the Nationalist campaign. One frequently repeated 
statistic was the £18,000,000 of wages lost in strikes since 1911. That "[T]he 
workers" had only gained seven and a half pence per day in the past eighteen 
years made Federal Arbitration The Great Illusion , according to one 
pamphlet.124 The candidate for Oxley, J.G. Bayley, told the Queensland 
Women's Electoral League that the coal miners had already lost £1 200 00 in 
wages; if they had accepted the owners' wage reductions they would only have 
been £120 000 out of pocket.125 
123. Ibid., p. 1. 
124. The Great Illusion, ,Sydney, n.d. (1929). NLA MS 1538/33. Subseries 2, Box 2, Folder 14. 
The title alluded to Norman Angell's pacifist tract, The Great Illusion, (1911). Source: 
Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1928, p. 549. See also: Victory [ 
Nationalist newsletter, N.S.W.], Ibid.; Arbitration the Only Issue, Sydney, n.d. (1929), Ibid., 
Folder 17. 
125. Brisbane Courier, 4 Oct 1929, p. 19. 
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As well as criticising the status quo, the composers of Nationalist literature 
defended their proposals for change. They were particularly concerned to 
assuage fears about the basic wage. 
Don't be misled. The basic wage will not be repealed either 
Federally or in the States. The Labor Party is trying to gull the 
workers with this catch-cry .... the workers of Australia will be 
amply protected under the proposed STATE CONTROL. ... THE 
BASIC WAGE IS NOT IN DANGER.126 
The government campaign also stressed that Nationalist policy was resolute 
and deserved popular support in this time of national trouble: "The Prime 
Minister ... now asks you to strengthen his hand in his endeavour to stop the 
disruption that is caused by the conflict between Federal and State Awards." 
Devolution promised to "end this confusion in favour of a system of single 
authority" )27 A self-styled 'old pioneer of Queensland' told the Brisbane 
Courier that 
... one award is quite sufficient for Queensland .... Queensland ought 
to be sick and tired of strikes. We remember the sugar strike, when 
farmers were compelled to step in and safeguard their produce. 
Then take the timber workers. A free labourer isn't sure of his life 
because of bomb-throwing etc. Let us strive for peace by all means. 
Strikes are only a waste of money to the workers and to the country 
in generaL 128 
126. The Great Illusion. Victory bore the headline: 'No Reduction in Basic Wage' 
127. Arbitration the Only Issue. The Great Illusion. 
128. letter from H. Heinemann, Mt Cotton, Brisbane Courier, 9 Oct 1929, p. 12. 
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Western Australian Nationalists contended that the State Court could provide 
jurisdiction which was cheaper (there would be no need to send advocates to 
the Eastern states) and, because the State justices knew local conditions, more 
acceptable to unionists and managers. Federal arbitration was an Eastern states 
evil.129 Confusion between State and Federal courts, explained Archdale 
Parkhill, in a column for the Sunday Times [Sydney], ensured that "no 
respect is accorded either''. Yet, 
[T]here is in our Midst the will to industrial peace. The problem is 
how to make that will prevail, and to check those agitators, who 
see in Fed Arbitration a refuge from law and order. The States can 
take measures to police their awards; the Commonwealth is too far 
removed from the industrial field to be able to act in that way.130 
These were some of the positive arguments. The government also sought to 
undermine the opposition's credibility as a guardian of Arbitration: Labor 
politicians hypocritically claimed to support a system which they and their 
militant unionist comrades had damaged beyond repair.131 Speakers' notes 
quoted denunciations of the Timber Workers award by J.S. Garden, Senator 
Arthur Rae: " '[I]t [the Lukin Award] is a law made to be broken. Workers 
should consider it a duty to break it. E.G. Theodore, now deputy leader of the 
FPLP, was quoted as saying, " 1 agree heartily with the action taken by the 
129.West Australian , 23 Sep 1929, p. 18. Gregory argued that the framers of the Constitution 
never intended for the Federal court to "exercise control of all industries". West Australian, 
1Oct1929, p. 19. West Australian, 2Oct1929, p. 16. 
130. Sunday Times, 6Oct1929. NLA MS 1538/33. Subseries 2, Box 3, Folder 19, Item 28 .. 
131. Ibid. See also: Brisbane Courier, 8 Oct 1929, p. 17; Brisbane Courier, 26 Sep 1929, p. 15. 
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Timber Workers of Australia. I believe in Arbitration, BUT NOT 
ARBITRATION AS ADMINISTERED BY A PREJUDICED COURT." All these 
statements were evidence of the labour movement's "contempt for law". 132 
Facts also reproduced unionist denunciations of Arbitration as a bourgeois sop 
as evidence that allies of the Labor Party were bitterly opposed to the regimen 
which that Party claimed to defend.133 
Nationalists depicted Scullin as moderate but weak, and the Sydney Trades 
Hall Reds, and Theodore, as the real powers in Labor Party. 
meeting in northern Tasmania that Scullin 
Bruce told a 
.... was a man for whom he had great respect, though he disagreed 
entirely with his views. [But] If Labor won, Mr Scullin would 
become the Prime Minister, and in about three months time he 
would be put out by the extremists and the government would be 
led by Mr Theodore who had ruined Qld.134 
Theodore was criticised for condoning industrial lawlessness; and was also 
alleged to be corrupt. The front page of Victory warned "A Nationalist Vote 
not Recorded is a Vote for Theodore", and "The Issue: Bruce or Theodore. No 
Middle Course."135 Theodore was alleged to have ruined Queensland with 
taxation and extravagant spending and borrowing.136 A week before polling 
132. Facts, pp. 12-13. 
133. Ibid., pp. 16-17; 26-30. Similar quotations were reproduced in Arbitration the Only Issue. 
134. Sun, 2 Oct 1929. NLA MS1538/33. Subseries 2, Box 3, Folder 26, Item 47. 
135. Brisbane Courier, 21 Sep 1929, p. 17. 
136. Ibid., 23Sep1929, p. 12; Brisbane Courier , 27 Sep 1929, p. 15. 
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day, however, a member of the Queensland parliament alleged that Theodore, 
along with former Premier William McCormack137, had "utilised public funds 
and prostituted their high office" by dealing in shares in the Mt Isa Company 
silver mine.138 Allegations about the involvement of members of the Ryan 
and Theodore governments in corrupt mining business at Mt Isa and 
Mungana had been circulating in Queensland politics since 1926, and were the 
forerunners of the major scandal which erupted in 1930. For now these charges 
against Theodore were an embarrassing distraction from the arbitration issue. 
The Queensland government announced a Royal Commission into Mungana 
on 9 October, three days before polling day.139 A 'last minute appeal to the 
voters' issued by Premier A.E. Moore on the eleventh capitalised on this event. 
The times called for 
... the highest attributes of statesmanship and for honest and 
·patriotic endeavour. 
In these circumstances you cannot afford to entrust your affairs to 
the kind of government that was exemplified under Mr 
Theodore's Premiership in this State. In the Commonwealth 
sphere a Labour-Socialist Government would mean damaged 
credit, extravagant administration, foolish experiments, lack of 
137. Premier of Queensland, 1925-29. 
138. Country-Progressive Nationalist MLA for Nundah (Qld), W. Kelso .Daily Guardian 
[Sydney], 5 Oct 1929, reprinted article by R.J. Dick, Daily Mail [Brisbane?] Theodore papers. 
NLA MS 7222, Folio run, un-labelled volume, p. 19. Theodore named Bruce, Page, Gullett, 
Parkhill and Qld Premier Moore as the leaders of a "calumny and personal abuse" against 
him; and accused the Prime Minister of arranging with Moore for a Commonwealth Taxation 
Department official to investigate Labor's deputy leader. Theodore dismissed the allegation 
as a distraction: "[I]n previous elections attempts have been made to frighten electors with 
pictures of wild-looking Bolsheviks, hairy and dishevelled-looking men, with lust in their 
eyes and blood-stained beards .... That type of propaganda is now outworn. So now a new bogey 
must be raised. I have been singled out as the new bogey by Nationalists fighting a losing 
battle with a weak case. Labor Daily, 11 Oct 1929. NLA MS 7222, folio run, un-labelled 
volume, p. 29. 
139. Fitzgerald, .QlLQ!., pp. 249-53. 
confidence on the part of investors, and increasing 
unemployment.140 
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Moore promised that Federal Nationalists would provide independent 
leadership and conserve property rights. In defence of the amusements tax, 
however, ministerial candidates offered distinctly populist arguments. "[T]he 
picture people", Bruce told one Launceston audience, 
... did not care about anything but their own concerns. The Labor 
Party was going to crawl to them and give in ... The big picture 
palaces in the capital cities ... were far too elaborate for Australia, 
and it meant that Patrons had to pay more for their amusements. 
The big places had not been giving a fair deal to the smaller ones.141 
Facts reminded Nationalist speake_rs that the large cinemas made substantial 
profits, and that amusements operators had an advantage over many other 
business people in that their receipts were in cash.142 
Government supporters also felt obliged to defend the lenient treatment of 
John Brown. The National Publicity Bureau advised speakers to maintain that 
the prosecution had to be withdrawn because of lack of evidence, and the 
dubious legality of prosecuting under the Industrial Peace Act, the special 
140. Brisbane Courier , 11 Oct 1929, p. 15; A.E. Moore, Premier of Queensland, 1929-32; 
Nationalists usually claimed to be answerable only to the people, but the pain caused by the 
Hughes-Groom splinter made them give unusual emphasis to the virtues of party loyalty. 
141. Sun, 2Oct1929. NLA MS 1538/33/subseries 2, box 3, folder 26, item 47. 
142. Facts, pp. 40-42. See also: Brisbane Courier, 1Oct1929, p 19. 'Points for Voters', 
West Australian , 27 Sep 1929, p. 23. Ibid., 28 Sept 1929, pp. 19-20. 
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legislation covering the coal industry. Furthermore, a prosecution would have 
made settlement of the coal dispute impossible. There was no comparison 
with the charges laid recently against union officials for defying awards - these 
cases were legal under the Arbitration Act, and there was sufficient evidence. 
By the same token, Nationalist speakers were to point out that the Abrahams 
case had been passed to Victorian authorities, who administered stricter 
laws.143 
These points were mostly directed against Labor, but the government was also 
obliged to take issue with dissident Nationalists for their lawless opportunism. 
''Unprecedented bitterness has been manifest in the speeches of party leaders, 
particularly in regard to the attitude of the seven non-Labor members whose 
attitude caused the election[.]", the Daily Telegraph commented on the issue by 
the Nationalists of a 'charge sheet' against the rebel seven. The principal 
accusation was that the rebels "were mainly failures and very small fry"; whose 
career frustrations had been manipulated by Hughes. Marks was, perhaps, 
sponsored by American film interests.144 Parkhill commented elsewhere that 
Hughes had been a harsh critic of Federal Arbitration and that Marks had 
advocated its abolition.145 The little Digger's official Nationalist opponent 
accused him of "trying to create a mob psychology" by organising ex-soldiers for 
his campaign; Bruce averred that the diggers should be separate from political 
interests.146 Another opponent of repeal, the Age , was lampooned in 
Nationalist speakers' notes as 'the Age of miracles' for its recent conversion 
143. Facts, pp. 34-39. 
144. Daily Telegraph, 25 Sep 1929. NLA MS 1538/33, Subseries 2, box 3, folder 23, item 55. 
145. Sunday Times, 6Oct1929. NLA MS 1538/33. Subseries 2, Box 3, Folder 19, Item 28. 
146. Brisbane Courier, 21Sep1929, p. 17. 
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from foe to friend of Federal arbitration.147 One pamphlet reported that 
Hughes had said 'hear, hear' to the burning in effigy of Judge Lukin. "Can it be 
wondered that the law is brought into contempt when an ex-Prime Minister 
should side with the Labor Party in expressing contempt for the Federal 
Arbitration Court?"148 
Cast against type as the champion of a familiar national institution, Labor was 
able to capitalise on the disunity which the government's radicalism had 
exposed among its usual supporters.149 A Victorian leaflet quoted Hughes on 
the Nationalist party: " 'a parliamentary machine which had abandoned every 
pretence of liberty"; and the Age on the government's departure from its 
mandate: /1 '[l]f governments fresh from elections can break faith with the 
Australian people ... then the foundations of Australian democratic 
government are in peril.' 11 150 Even the ACTU, then in the militant camp of 
labour, could cite the Age as a guardian of established authority: /1 '[An 
institution which has become an integral part of a nation's life for a generation 
is not to be tampered with hostility, petulantly, or in a period of panic or 
industrial pessimism.' "151 From such unlikely quarters came support for 
147. Facts , pp. 33-34. 
148. Arbitration the Only Issue. 
149. Labor claimed during the 1928 election to defend white Australia, but there was no 
powerful reason to believe that the policy of racial exclusivity was threatened. Stuart 
Macintyre comments of the 1929 campaign " ... whereas he [Bruce] had campaigned twice 
before as the champion of law and order, this time it was the Labor Party that presented 
itself as the defender of living standards and industrial peace." Q12:.Jit., p. 248. J.R. Robertson 
notes that the threat of repeal "served to inspire Labor with a grand crusading zeal to keep 
things as they were.", J.H. Scullin: A Political Biography, Nedlands, WA, 1974, p. 158 
150. What Nationalists think of the Bruce-Page Government , Melbourne, 1929. NLA MS 
4738. Series 8, box 30, 'Elections 1920s & 1930s' folder. 
151. Devitalising the Nation! Surrendering Commonwealth Powers in Arbitration, 
Melbourne, 1929, NLA MS 1538/33, subseries 2, Box 2, folder, 14, 'Reactionaries Seek to 
Destroy Arbitration' was the Age headline on 7 Oct 1929. 
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Labor's claim that the government had given no warning of its intentions. 
"How these Nationalists twist their words", Theodore told Sunday Times 
readers, and quoted promises by Bruce and Latham to retain Federal 
Arbitration.152 
Labor propaganda emphasised the threat to living standards which abolition 
implied. The government was driven by "a clamour by employing interests for 
lower costs of production." "There is only one way in which employers plan to 
lower costs of production", Theodore warned, " - by reducing wages." The basic 
wage received particular emphasis.153 New South Wales voters were warned 
that it could be reduced to the lower, State level of £3/8/6. A picture of a 
mother with her children was captioned "[T]he happiness of all Australian 
workers' families is threatened by the Bruce-Page ministry's plan to scrap 
Arbitration." This was an issue on which to appeal to non-traditional Labor 
voters: 'give Labor a chance' implored one pamphlet, which depicted a 
smartly-dressed family standing outside their house. Labor cautioned male 
workers who lacked the protection provided by membership of a large trade 
union that state tribunals could not guarantee their wages.154 
152. Sunday Times ,6 Oct 1929. NLA MS 1538/33. Subseries 2, box 3, folder 19, item 28. The Latest 
Puzzle? Criss-Cross Words, Sydney, 1929, also quoted Bruce and Latham on the case for retention 
of Federal arbitration. Fitzgerald comments that the NSW pamphlets devised by Theodore 
concentrated on arbitration and were directed at ex-soldiers, farmers, "families", public servants, 
and manufacturers. op. cit., p. 224. 
153. Bruce's Best; Sunday Times ,6 Oct 1929. NLA MS 1538/33. Subseries 2, box 3, folder 19, 
item 28; Threat to Arbitration and Basic Wage,; Reduce the Basic Wage?, both published 
Sydney, 1929. 
154. What the Basic Wage May Be; Protecting Australia's Happy Families; Give Labor a 
Chance; Overheard on the Train!: all published Sydney, 1929. 
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Truth (Western Australia) thought that the public service arbitration issue 
could alienate many Nationalist voters. 
There are thousands of Nationalists, including a host of civil 
servants, who want alike a Nationalist government and the 
Federal Arbitration Court, but without reference to the great 
organisation which sent him to power, Mr Bruce says they shall 
have no such choice. Either abolish the Arbitration Court, he says 
in effect, or have a Labor Government! 
This 'Hobson's Choice' may wreck the Government!155 
The West Australian reported that despite the "acrimonious" campaign, 
polling day had been quiet in the Victoria and New South Wales. The Sydney 
public had taken keen interest in the result. 
The poll...closed in heavy rain, and the city was drenched till 
midnight, but thousands of people stood in the rain in the streets 
wherever the results were being announced by the use of 
amplifiers. Crowds from the theatres stood under verandah[s] 
waiting for the figures, but the rain sent most people home to 
listen on the wireless or to await the newspapers. This morning 
the newsboys had a busy day selling editions of the metropolitan 
papers.156 
155. Truth (WA), 22 Sep 1929. NLA MS 1538/33, subseries 2, box 3 folder 23, item 41. 
156. According to the West Australian , this quietness was now a feature of election days, and 
had been brought about by compulsory voting. Cars were no longer to be seen ferrying voters 
back and forth from the polling places, and the 11 'urger' 11 outside the polling place had been 
banished by the prohibition of canvassing near the booths. 14 Oct 1929, p. 16. 
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The news was of heavy defeat for the government. Five ministers fell, 
including - in an amazing upset - Bruce himself, who lost Flinders to Trades 
Hall secretary E.J Holloway.157 
1928 1929 
% seats won % seats won 
Nat 39.09 29 33.89 14 
Ind Nat 3.89 3 
Q> 10.47 13 10.27 10 
ALP 44.64 31 48.84 46 
C. Prog 1.61 1 0.97 1 
Ind 4.19 1 2.13 1 
1928 and 1929 Elections for the House of Re12resentatives158 
Most commentators attributed the government's defeat to the unpopularity of 
the abolition of Federal arbitration.159 Many people had expected a set-back for 
the Nationalists, but its scale came as surprise. Round Table considered that 
the electors were " ... shocked and alarmed by what seemed to them to be a 
precipitate, reckless and indeed almost sacrilegious attempt to abandon the 
157. The other defeated ministers were: W. Gibson, Country Party, MHR for Corangamite 
(Vic), 1918-29; Postmaster General,. 1923-29; Minister for Works and Railways. 1928-29; 
Charles Marr, Nationalist, MHR for Parkes (NSW), 1919-29; 1931-43; honorary minister, 
1925-27, 1928, 1932-34; Minister for Home and Territories, 1927-28; for Health, Works and 
Railways, 1932; for Health and Repatriation, 1932-34; Cha}k<s Abbott, Country Party MHR C·""' ·A · 
for Gwydir (NSW), 1925-29, 1931-37; Minister for Home Affairs, 1928-29; Sir Nevil~Howse, 
Nationalist MHR for Calare (NSW), 1922-29; Minister for Defence and for Health, 1925-27; 
for Home and Territories, 1928; for Health, 1928-29. 
158. Hughes & Graham, Ql1...ill., pp. 337 & 342. 
159. Bruce's biographer, Cecil Edwards, who worked as a journalist in the late 1920s, 
remarked that many "shabby genteel" male white collar workers feared a return to pre-
Federal award conditions. Edwards, .Ql2...,Qt., London, 1965, p. 171. Pearce complained that 
the Maritime Industries Bill contained a "logical" proposal which was "misrepresented" by 
the government's opponents. Peter Heydon, Quiet Decision: A Study of George Foster Pearce, 
Melbourne, 1965, p. 101. Schedvin considers that Labor's emotive warnings overpowered the 
"stiff academic argument" against dual control. op. cit., p. 117. 
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Federal control of wages and labour conditions"; and that the economic 
downturn was a secondary cause.160 Sir Charles Powers, a former president of 
the Commonwealth Court of Arbitration, commented to Latham, 
... Mr Bruce thought it [Federal Arbitration] ought to be abolished 
and that he was strong enough to force the issue by a General 
Election. I knew that the government had as much chance of 
doing so as they would have done if they attempted to abolish 
White Australia or Protection.161 
Judge H.S. Nichols commented: "the election was fought as a referendum and 
the people were tried too hard as they were when they were asked to vote for 
conscription."162 A supporter from Brisbane thought that "the worst hurdle 
was the public service."163 Another Brisbane Nationalist, however, told 
Groom, "[l]t was not Arbitration for 999 out of 1000 are entirely ignorant of that 
- it was the direct tax on women['s] entertainm~nt ... [and] ... liquor ... "164 A 
Tasmanian sympathiser considered that " ... the younger voters cooked the 
goose - thinking that a cut in their wages was to be expected - and that the 
movies would cost more. John Brown rose from the grave intermittently in 
company with Abrahams."165 Senator J.E. Ogden remarked: "[W]e had too 
160. Round Table, Dec 1929, vol 20, pp. 396 & 402. 
161. Powers to Latham, 13Nov1929. NLA MS 1009/1/1936. Charles Powers was deputy to 
H.B. Higgins 1913-1920, and president 1921-26. 
162. H.S. Nicholls (probably Tasmanian chief justice Sir Herbert Nicholls) to Latham, 15 
Oct 1929, NLA MS 1009/1/1913. 
163. Donald C. Cameron to Latham, 4 Nov 1929. NLA MS 1009/1/1931. 
164. Graeme Dickson [solicitor, Brisbane], to L. Groom, 17 Oct 1929. NLA MS 236/1/2928. 
165. Gellibrand to Latham, 14 Oct 1929. NLA MS 1009/1/1912. Sir John Gellibrand ( 1872-
1945), a renowned officer in the AIF, had been elected Nationalist member for Denison in 1925 
but was defeated in 1928, and again the next year. The government had been criticised by 
Labor for refusing to prosecute the Abrahams for tax evasion. 
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many hurdles to jump, not the least of which was John Brown. As you said, 
'we will never get over it' and it gave our opponents a terrific argument in 
favour of their main plea, viz, that we stood for one section."166 The 
Westralian Worker thought that while Arbitration had been the main 
grievance of those electors who came over to Labor, the deficit "muddle" also 
contributed. While rejoicing in Labor's return to government, the Worker 
cast a wary eye to the future, warning the "reactionary Senate" against 
obstructing the new government.167 Ogden took comfort in the bleak 
prospects for the new ministry. 
The Labor team is not a strong one apart from Scullin, Theodore 
and Lyons ... the financial and economic situation must get worse 
eventually .... Nothing but a succession of good luck will save them 
from failure.168 
166. J.E. Ogden to Latham, 27Oct1929, NLA MS 1009/1/1924. Ogden, formerly a Labor 
member, was Nationalist senator for Tasmania, and honorary minister. 
167. Westralian Worker , 18 Oct 1929, p. 1. 
168. Ogden to Latham, op. cit. 
Chapter 5. Sound Finance rallies the Right, 1930-31 
Arbitration had dominated the 1929 campaign, but now that repeal had been 
rejected, the issue receded. Nationalists announced that they accepted the 
electoral rebuttal. Such was the sharpness of the Bruce-Page government's 
defeat, and the urgency engendered by the slump in trade and employment, 
that the intense controversy over arbitration which had prevailed in 1929 was 
replaced by a new conflict over responses to economic decline. Of course, 
industrial relations issues continued to feature in political debate. Labor was 
embarrassed by its failure to fulfil Theodore's rash election promise to end the 
New South Wales coal dispute. The Senate, in which the Nationalists 
retained a majority, came into conflict with the Government over its proposals 
to extend award-making power to Conciliation Commissioners who, 
Nationalists feared, would be government-appointed trade union officials. 
The government also maintained a running battle with the Senate over the 
Transport Workers Act: while the government could not repeal the Act, it 
made regulations granting preference to members of the WWF; these were 
repeatedly struck down by the Senate and then re-issued. Touring Queensland 
in September 1930, the new Leader of the Opposition, Latham, found that: 
... audiences were generally crowded - always good - and said to be 
better than even at election times. They were obviously very 
interested - & listened well to hard truths .... The Transport Workers 
Act was sufficient material for me in all the Queensland ports.I 
1. Latham to C.A.S. Hawker, 8 Sep 1930. Hawker papers. NLA MS 4848, Series 3, Box 6, 
Subseries i (b). C.A.S. Hawker, MHR for Wakefield (SA) 1929-38. 
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Nevertheless, finance was the source of the government's most severe 
problems: Scullin and his ministers were under pressure from the banks, the 
press and the opposition to follow an orthodox policy of deflation and 
retrenchment, and from the party's own Members of Parliament to protect 
their constituents from the effects of this policy. The government's minor 
deviations from conventional financial wisdom enabled the Opposition to 
depict itself as the guardian of sound finance and Labor as the captive of the 
extremist left; but in fact the government, so far from being the left's creature, 
was weakened by its hostility. In a letter to Charles Hawker early in 1930, 
South Australian Nationalist, J. Duncan-Hughes, predicted that resistance from 
right and left would intensify in the course of the year. 
·Things are generally going so badly for Scullin a Co. since they 
came into power (much worse, I am certain than they ever 
thought possible) that they are certain to swing towards their 
extremist supporters on some points to keep them - I won't say 
'sweet', but moderately quiet: but when that happens, our people in 
the Senate, whether they want to fight or no, will be bound to put 
their foot down. What I mean is that both sides will want to avoid 
a fight, but irreconcilable differences at this very difficult time will 
force one on them- I suggest towards the end of the year.2 
In January 1930 Scullin announced that a Bank of England mission headed by 
Sir Otto Niemeyer would visit Australia to review public finances and suggest 
2
. J. Duncan-Hughes to C. Hawker, 4 Feb 1930. Hawker Papers: NLA MS 4848/3/ 6/i (a). 
" ... Scullin (honest man) has scalliwag followers who will wreck him more thoroughly and 
faster than any Nationalist Party could do it!", remarked J.M. [? illegible] Joshua to Latham, 
11April1930. NLA MS 1009/1/1975. 
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ways in which financial stability could be restored. This decision did a great 
deal to antagonise the 'extremist supporters'.3 Niemeyer and his colleagues 
arrived in July and gave advice to a special Premiers' meeting held the next 
month. His counsel - retrenchment and balanced budgets - was no more 
severe than that given by Australian conservative politicians and editorial 
writers over the past six months; that he was an English banker and a Jew 
made his advice provocative to Labor populists.4 State and Commonwealth 
ministers, meeting in Melbourne, agreed to reduce spending, but Federal 
Cabinet decided to postpone its spending cuts for three months in the hope that 
an economic revival would make reductions unnecessary. As his biographer 
has commented, Scullin " .. .incurred the wrath of conservatives because of his 
failure to make any serious attempt to abide by the Melbourne agreement; his 
nominal adherence to it was bitterly denounced by Lang's followers."5 This was 
typical of the way in which his government pleased neither right nor left. 
Throughout the term of the Scullin government, the opposition warned 
against the appealing but dangerous policies of inflation of the note issue to 
finance public works, and the repudiation of debt to bondholders. Latham's 
public denouncements of unorthodoxy were matched by private disapproval, 
and he feared that Labor's irresponsible populism could win it the next 
election. 
3. Denning, Ql2....ill., p. 109. 
4. J.R. Robertson, 'Scullin as Prime Minister: Seven Critical Decisions', in Robert Cooksey (ed.) 
The Great Depression in Australia , [Labour History , 17], Canberra, 1970, p. 30. 
5. J.H. Scullin , p. 264. 
There is a strong body in the Labour Party - probably a majority of 
the parliamentary party - in favour of repudiation as a remedy for 
all our troubles, and it is pretty certain there will be an election 
some time next year on the issues of banking and currency. The 
Labour Party will probably promise political control of banking, 
and there will be much talk of 'releasing of credit', 'maintenance of 
wage standards' etc, all to be obtained by printing and issuing notes. 
These proposals will be opposed by us, and it is quite likely that the 
Labour Party, putting the issue as 'the banks against the people', 
will win handsomely. If they do there will pretty soon be a general 
smash, and then we will get on sound lines again. 
It is quite possible, however, that the Labour Party will break before 
that stage is reached, and that without any smash but with a good 
deal of suffering and distress we will get back on sound lines.6 
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The break came first from the Right. Joseph Lyons and James Fenton who, 
during Scullin's visit to Britain in 1930, had served as Treasurer and Acting 
Prime Minister respectively, were increasingly alienated from the government; 
and when caucus voted to reappoint Theodore to Cabinet after his suspension 
following allegations of corruption, they both resigned from the ministry, but 
remained members of the party for the time being.7 Apart from Theodore's 
reputation for corruption, he was regarded by this time as one of the main 
powers in caucus for an inflationary policy. Both former ministers indicated 
that they would vote with the opposition in the forthcoming no-confidence 
motion over the Treasurer's re-appointment. 
6. Latham to Lord Riddell [copy], 12 Dec 1930. NLA MS 1009/1/1999. 
7. Joseph Lyons, MLA for Wilmot (Tasmania), 1909-29; Premier and Treasurer, 1923-28; 
member for Wilmot 1929-39; Prime Minister, 1931-39. James Fenton, member for Maribyrnong 
(Vic), 1910-34, Minister for Trade and Customs, 1929-31, Postmaster General, 1932. 
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Like the five other Labor members who eventually joined him on the cross 
benchesB, Joseph Lyons came from outside the big cities. He was born in 1879, 
in the small town of Stanley, northern Tasmania. His parents were Irish 
Catholic farmers; and the earliest political views which Joe encountered were 
probably in his mother's stories of the struggle for Irish independence. Lyons 
began work as a teacher, and became active in the union, and the Labor Party. 
Elected to state parliament in 1909, he was Treasurer and Minister for 
Education and Railways, 1914-16. In 1915, he married the seventeen year old 
teacher, Enid Burnell. Enid seems to have possessed a confidence less evident 
in Joseph; and her counsel remained influential throughout his career. Joseph 
Lyons had little notion of class conflict: his Labor politics were driven more by 
an abhorrence of poverty; and it was this humanitarian instinct which during 
the 1914-18 war fed his opposition to conscription. As Labor Premier and 
Treasurer, 1923-28, he was mostly concerned to manage Tasmania's precarious 
public finances, and drew on the advice of orthodox academic economists. 
Persuaded by Scullin to stand for Federal Parliament in 1929, Lyons was 
disturbed from the outset by the ruthlessness, and radicalism, of mainland 
Labor politics; and apart from the personal slight of his own removal from 
the Treasury portfolio, the reinstatement of the doubly 'dishonest' Theodore 
proved to be the final provocation. 9 
8. In addition to Fenton, these were J.M. Gabb, MHR for Angas (SA) 1919-25; 1929-34, J.L. 
Price, MHR for Boothby (SA) 1928-41, J.A. Guy, MHR for Bass (Tas) 1929-34; Wilmot (Tas) 
1940-46; Senator, 1949~ D.C. McGrath, MHR for Ballarat (Vic), 1913-34. 
9
. Philip R. Hart, 'J.A. Lyons: A Political Biography', PhD thesis, ANU, 1967; Langmore, Ql2.:. 
cit.; Anne Sells, 'Enid Lyons: The 'National Housekeeper' - A Biographical Study, 1897-1951', 
MA thesis, University of Melbourne, 1987. Dame Enid Lyons, member for Darwin (Tas), 1943-
51; Vice President Executive Council, 1949-51. GBE, 1937. 
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The defection of Labor parliamentarians coincided with an upsurge of right-
wing organisation at community level: in February 1931 the All for Australia 
League was founded in the prosperous Sydney suburb of Killara by A.J. Gibson, 
an engineer. The New Guard was formed at the same time by Eric Campbell, 
an accountant, in the equally salubrious suburb, Gordon. By late March the 
AFAL claimed 90 000 members; the New Guard's membership was always 
more uncertain. These groups, and others like them which sprang up around 
Australia, were committed to a fierce and simple set of ideas based around 
imperialism, national unity, abhorrence of party and class strife, orthodox 
public finance, and the sanctity of private property. They expressed a 
scepticism for parliamentary democracy; although not all were as frankly 
authoritarian as the New Guard.10· Hughes privately shared this impatience. 
A great deal might be done to make things better, but nothing at all 
can be done by talk.· Caucus or other. If you could shut up 
Parliament and the Press, give some man charge of the business 
we'd soon get through: no doubt we should lose a few tail feathers 
but no more than that.II 
At the same time Scullin and Theodore were moving away from the strictly 
deflationary policies they had espoused in 1930; but this was not enough to 
prevent a group of New South Wales members breaking away to support the 
populist position taken by Lang. At the Premiers' Conference which met in 
February, the Prime Minister and Treasurer advocated a note issue to finance 
10. John McCarthy, 'All for Australia: Some Rightwing Responses to the Depression in New 
South Wales, 1929-32', Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. 57, 2, 1971. , 
p.166; Peter Loveday, 'Anti-Political Political Thought', Labour History, 17, 1970, pp. 121-35. 
11. W.M. Hughes toJ. HumeCook,20Nov 1930. Hume Cook papers. NLA MS601/1/156. 
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public works; this was resisted by the conference, but carried on the 
Commonwealth's casting vote. The ministers agreed to reduce public 
service wages, ease credit, and impose a tax on bond interest. By the end of 
the conference Lang had announced that he opposed the Commonwealth 
government's policy, and revealed his own proposals - the 'Lang plan'. Its 
points were: no further bond repayments to Britain until Australia was 
granted equivalent terms to those Britain enjoyed with the United States; 
interest on government loans to be reduced by three percent; the gold 
standard to be replaced with a 'goods standard', based on Australia's natural 
resources and productive capacity.12 Here at last was the policy of 
repudiation. Lang's populism won him the acclaim of some, but the 
{,.,Jlt- contempt of others, such as Alice Jacks01~, of Liverpool, who complained 
bitterly of the disparity between the force of Lang's rhetoric and the weakness 
of his remedies: 
[T]he feeling in Liverpool is very bitter against Lang and his 
wonderful promises, you can see every day men in dozens 
camping under the bridge by Liverpool Station in a very sorry 
plight - gathering food and a few old clothes where they can.13 
Only slightly less alarming to those who distrusted Labor was the Fiduciary 
Notes Bill, introduced by Theodore in March 1931. Fiduciary meant, in this 
context, 'on trust': the component of the note issue which was not backed by 
12. Peter Cook, 'The Scullin Government 1929-32', PhD thesis, ANU, 1971,, p. 338. 
13
. Alice Castle, Liverpool, to Charles Marr. Marr Papers: NLA MS 3874/3/136. RJ!P 1941: Sir 
Charles Marr, MHR for Parkes (NSW) 1919-29; 1931-43; Honorary Minister, 1925-27; 1928; 
1932-34; Minister for Home and Territories, 1927-28;, for Health, Works and Railways, 1932; 
for Health and Repatriation, 1931-34. KCVO 1934. 
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gold, but rested on confidence in the stability of the financial system. Australia 
had effectively gone off the gold standard in January 1930 when most gold 
stocks were shipped to London to meet debt; in any case the note issue already 
included a fiduciary component. Theodore's proposal was to increase an 
existing rather than to introduce a new element to the monetary system. The 
issue was to be a one-off assignment of six million pounds for wheat growers' 
relief, and one million pounds a month for public works. This bill attracted 
strong criticism in parliament and press; critics predicted that its 
implementation would lead to hyperinflation such as that which afflicted 
Germany in 1923.14 
The panic about dangerous finance, and Lang in particular, led to what C.J. 
Lloyd has called an "unprecedented rallying of the conservative forces"15 
around simple notions of probity. The AWNL, which usually emphasised 
women's duty, warned its members that the times called for women to be 
particularly vigilant. 
Our country is passing through the greatest financial crisis in its 
history, and we are by no means sure how it will emerge from the 
ordeal...Woman has a natural aptitude for financial management, 
their thoroughness and application to detail would prevent 
waste ... The home is woman's first care, her country's management 
comes next and this is politics. The home is not women's only 
duty ... Women cannot manage their homes well if they neglect the 
finances of the country.16 
14. Robertson, Ql2...ill. p. 332. 
15. CJ Lloyd, 'The Formation and Development of the United Australia Party, 1929-1937', 
PhD thesis, ANU, 1984, pp. 164-65. 
16. The Woman, 1 Apr 1931, p. 28. 
Latham found the National Union pre-occupied with sound finance. 
Fri Mar. 27th. Melb. National Union. Presented draft of statement 
for whole of Opposition. I pointed out absolutely vague re tariff 
and arbitration. They said these unimportant compared with 
finance.17 
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Lyons toured State capitals in April: he was becoming the hero of the sound 
finance cause. He proposed a seven point plan for national recovery.18 Lloyd 
argues that the Nationalists feared that Lyons would assemble a new non-Labor 
party and defeat Nationalist candidates; he was recruited because his popularity 
made him a rival to the Nationalists and a valuable acquisition to them to as a 
leader who could defeat Federal Labor in an election, and counteract the 
influence of Lang.19 His appeal was his reputation ·as an honest, warm-hearted 
family man; his wife, Enid Lyons, and their nine children - "Mr Lyons' Nine 
17. J.G. Latham, 'Notes made on 6th April 1931' ["copied from diary"]. NLA MS 1009/49/106-
09, 113. 
18. The Seven Points: 1. Restoration of external and internal credit by re-establishing 
confidence in the integrity of Government finance. The national currency to be preserved from 
political control. No indirect repudiation of national obligations by debasing the currency. 2. 
The restoration of a balanced national budget on a basis of equality of sacrifice to be 
progressively effected as the financial capacity of the community permits. 3. Economy in cost 
of government by bringing cost of Government expenditure into reasonable correspondence with 
the fall in national income. 4. Economically sound tariff policy, with effective preference to 
Great Britain and inter-Dominion reciprocity. 5. Re-employment of the people by 
encouragement of productive enterprise. 6. A fair deal for every section of the community. 
Protection of the worker by industrial tribunals. Protection of the employer against undue 
interference with business management. 7. Immediate assistance to the man on the land by 
providing real money to be expended on keeping Australian land in profitable production. 
Lyons' Policy Speech, 2Dec1931, p. 22. NLA MS 1538/28/1635. 
19. Ibid .. 
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Points for Financial Stability", according to the Brisbane Courier - were part of 
this image. " 'Our children ... ' ", Enid Lyons told a meeting in Ballarat, " ... are 
going to live in Australia when you and I are no longer here, and, by heaven, I 
am not going to allow anyone to ruin Australia if I can lift a finger to prevent 
it.' 0 20 The press adulation of Lyons assisted moves which were under way to 
combine the Nationalist party with the AFAL in a broad populist coalition 
under his leadership. In May, Nationalist members of the Commonwealth 
Parliament re-named themselves 'United Australia Party'; Latham resigned the 
leadership and became Lyons' deputy. The merger of the non-parliamentary 
parties took the longest time to accomplish in New South Wales, where the 
AFAL regarded the Nationalists as part of the 'machine politics' evil, but was 
completed there in October.21 
Meanwhile, the Lang government had given substance to its critics' charges. 
The Government Savings Bank of New South Wales was the second largest 
savings bank in the Empire, with 129 branches and deposits of £74 million. 
Since the election campaign of October 1930, when rumours were current that 
a Lang government would confiscate savings, withdrawals had been exceeding 
deposits at an extraordinary rate. In February 1931, the New South Wales 
government defaulted on an interest payment due to the bank; when this 
became public the next month, the rate of withdrawals increased, until on 23 
20. Courier , n.d. Lyons papers. NLA MS 4851, Box 4. 
21. Canberra Times, 15 Oct 1931, p. 1. In South Australia, the noKLabor coalition was called 
the Emergency Committee. The Committee was essentially par of the UAP movement, as it 
accepted Lyons' leadership. Advertiser, 11 May 1931. NLA MS 848. Series 3, Box 6, 
Subseries (i) b. 
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April the Bank closed its doors; and re-opened on 3 May, with limited funds 
provided by the Commonwealth Bank for customers in desperate straits.22 
This collapse must have added to the atmosphere of foreboding when, on 25 
May, Federal and State ministers once again assembled for a Premiers' 
Conference. This meeting produced the most famous of the orthodox 
Depression agreements, the 'Premiers' Plan'. Its terms were those of previous 
compacts, with the new feature of a concession to egalitarian sentiment in the 
proposal to reduce interest. The Plan was for deflation, with costs to be shared, 
ostensibly, by all sections of the community. The main points were: a twenty 
per cent cut in adjustable government spending; conversion of internal 
government debts to reduce interest by 22.5%; increases in State and 
Commonwealth tax; reduction in bank interest; mortgage relief.23 Lang, as 
acting chairman, moved the resolution for the twenty per cent spending 
reduction. 
The acceptance of the Plan by the Commonwealth government, State 
governments (New South Wales's, Victoria's and South Australia's were 
Labor; Queensland's, Western Australia's and Tasmania's, Nationalist) and 
Federal opposition constituted a near-complete victory for financial orthodoxy 
which was almost complete. Some figures in business and non-Labor politics, 
such as the up-and-coming Victorian State member, R.G. Menzies, denounced 
22. Kenneth Polden, 'The Collapse of the Government Savings Bank of New South Wales, 
1931', Australian Economic History Review, vol. 12, No. 1, Mar 1972, pp. 53-60; Robertson, QJ2,.: 
cit., pp. 328-29. 
23. Cook, op. cit., p. 381. 
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as repudiation the Debt Conversion Bill (no. 2) - passed in September - which 
provided for compulsory reduction of interest rates for the three percent of 
bondholders who had not voluntarily converted. But most non-Labor 
politicians, afraid of social turmoil, regarded compromise as the only 
alternative to Lang-style extremism.24 As the UAP's selected candidate for 
Corio, R.G. Casey, put it: 
... .I take the view that if capital hangs back in this crisis, or is even 
reluctant to bear its share of the all-round sacrifice, we will be 
breeding a radical tendency that will give us tremendous trouble in 
the coming years. We have it in our hands, by agreeing voluntarily 
and at once ... to steal the thunder of those who say that a change in 
the social and economic structure is just and inevitable.25 
Similarly, although the Nationalist senators had since 1930 blocked much of 
the government's legislation, Latham had to resist pressure from businessmen 
who thought that "any compromise on arbitration or the finance proposals of 
the government was indefensible".26 The Scullin government's endorsement 
of the Premiers' plan did not assuage fears of confiscation by the Lang 
government. In the same month, the managing director of BHP, Essington 
24. 'The Group', which had negotiated Lyons' rise to leadership, remained opposed to 
compulsory conversion, and persuaded the Victorian AFAL to take the same stance; most 
U.A.P. parliamentarians accepted compulsion. 'The Group' consisted of Staniforth Ricketson, 
financier; Kingsley A. Henderson, architect and director of several JB Were & Son (Staniforth 
Ricketson) companies; Charles Norris, general manager of National Mutual Life Association; 
John Higgins, former chairman of the Australian Wool Realization Association; Ambrose 
Pratt, author and journalist; and R.G. Menzies. Hart, .Ql2...ill.,, pp. 87-88. For Menzies' 
speeches in the Victorian Parliament against compulsory debt conversion see Martin, .Q.J2....cil., 
~t 96-99 . 
. Casey to Maurice Hankey, 6 Jul 1931. Hankey papers, cited W.J. Hudson, Casey, 
Melbourne, 1986, p. 81. 
26. J. Latham to C.A.S. Hawker, 1 Oct 1930. NLA MS 4848/ 3/6/ i (b). 
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Lewis, informed Lyons that "we consider it most unlikely that anyone would 
spend large sums on the establishment of new industries in New South Wales 
until such time as reasonable security of tenure is assured."27 
Reassurance was to come more quickly than Lewis may have anticipated. Two 
months later the government fell, defeated by the combined votes of the 
Opposition and a group of pro-Lang Labor rebels, on a no-confidence motion 
concerning allegations that Theodore, Lang's rival, had misdirected 
unemployment relief funds in an attempt to buy votes. Scullin secured an 
election set for 19 December, too soon to allow Lang or any other member of 
the New South Wales parliament to resign and contest a Federal seat. After 
two years of ideologically charged conflict over issues which all protagonists 
insisted were of critical national importance, the government's final defeat 
came about as a result of a struggte for power within the New South Wales 
Labor Party. 
Prime Ministers making policy speeches usually boast of progress. Scullin 
could only claim that the government had avoided economic collapse and 
begun the slow process of regaining the standard of living which had prevailed 
when it took office. 
Though handicapped by a hostile Senate, with no money in the 
Treasury, but, on the contrary, a heavy deficit, we kept public 
27. Essington Lewis to J. Lyons [copy], 4 Sep 1931. NLA MS 4851/1/3. Lewis also maintained 
that uncertainty over the continuation of tariff protection deterred investment. 
services going, avoided default, maintained the national honor, 
and are now confident that the crisis has passed, and that Australia 
is on the road to recovery. 28 
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He blamed his predecessors for creating the conditions which made Depression 
possible, if not inevitable, and exacerbated the slump once it had begun. The 
Bruce-Page government's mismanagement had resulted in a high level of 
overseas borrowing, and imports. Tariff increases implemented by Labor had 
converted the trade deficit into a surplus which provided sufficient foreign 
exchange to meet all Australian government external obligations. This policy, 
however, had also reduced customs revenue, an outcome which, in 
combination with the effects of the fiscal laxity of the Nationalist-Country Party 
regime, had led to a budget deficit of ten million pounds for 1930-31, and a 
projected 1931-32 deficit of twenty million pounds. At this point the banks 
refused further credit and the government was forced to increase taxation and 
reduce expenditure, and bank and bond interest rates. The result was a 
fifteen million pound improvement in the 1931-32 budget. Cuts to pensions 
and wages had been unavoidable. If the government had not made these 
reductions the banks would have withdrawn loan funds, necessitating even 
more stringent economies - the government, in fact, would have been forced to 
pay only twelve shillings in the pound on its obligations - including pensions 
and salaries. There were signs, however, that the economy was beginning to 
recover, and pensions and wages would be. restored as possible. 
28. Labor Call, 3 Dec 1931, pp. 4-5. 
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This was the Prime Minister's rationale for the unusual and unpalatable 
decisions he had made in response to the economic crisis. His policy on trade, 
however, was more in keeping with Labor tradition. There was a hint of 
resentment of Britain: Labor intended to press for the extension of British 
preference for Australian goods, which was at present "very limited." Scullin 
promised to maintain the current high rate of exchange - despite the burden 
this rate imposed on government overseas debt - because it acted, in effect, as a 
subsidy to exporters (that is, primary producers). The reversal of the trade 
deficit by means of tariffs and embargoes was one of the few positive 
achievements which the government could claim. Scullin denounced the 
Opposition parties as "pseudo-protectionists and rank free traders", who had 
opposed tariff increases in the Senate. Overseas manufacturers hoped for the 
return of a National-Country Party (Scullin avoided using the name 'United 
Australia Party') government. 
The problem of unemployment, the Prime Minister declared, demanded co-
operation. "We must bring together the best brains of public-spirited men in 
all works of life to advise and assist in the work of reconstruction." But the 
restoration of employment depended mostly on reform of the monetary 
system, the medium of distribution, which throughout the world had failed to 
keep pace with the development of production. Monetary problems had been 
the first cause of the Depression: a withdrawal of credit had stifled spending 
power and, subsequently, trade. The government's plans to reform banking 
had been denounced as 'wildcat' (similar jibes had been made about the issue of 
Commonwealth bank notes by the Fisher government) and an unacceptable 
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extension of political control. Yet the Commonwealth Bank had operated 
previously with a government-appointed governor, Sir Denison Miller, who 
had never been subjected to political pressure. Labor would free the 
Commonwealth Bank from its central bank responsibilities and allow it to 
compete more effectively with the trading banks; the Central Reserve Bank 
bill would be re-introduced with the intention of consolidating and thereby 
enhancing the nation's credit. The government, Scullin complained, had been 
subjected by Press and Opposition to a campaign of vilification, particularly in 
regard to its policies on banking and finance. Critics had enjoined Labor to 
follow - as the only decent course - the example of the British coalition 
government: but the Commonwealth government had been the first to balance 
its trade and budget accounts and, moreover, had "preserved its political 
identity". Scullin concluded by warning that on the evidence of their Senate 
voting the Opposition parties remained hostile to arbitration, a system 
opposed by "the extremists - Conservatives and Communists." He recalled 
the attempt to repeal Federal arbitration and warned that non-Labor might try 
again. Labor's opponents would make life even more insecure; their 
recklessness was responsible for the present slump. Electors must choose 
between those who had created and those who were resolving the economic 
crisis. 
Lyons' policy speech combined Imperialist sentiment with abhorrence of 
inflation and insistence on the separation of banking from government 
control. These tenets, according to the UAP leader, were "tried and proved 
throughout the British world, and have been, perhaps, the greatest factor in the 
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building of our mighty Empire."29 Sound finance had been vindicated by a 
recent event in British history: the formation of the National government. 
All that remained was for Australians to follow this example: "I feel sure that 
the sturdy and solid commonsense which is the characteristic of our race will 
assert itself as it has in the Motherland."30 Once this occurred, confidence, a 
central idea in Lyons' politics, would return. Lyons alleged that while Scullin 
was overseas the government had failed to implement the Melbourne 
agreement; as a result subsequent economies needed to be even sharper than 
those first proposed (for example, reductions in public service salaries of twenty 
rather than eleven per cent were required). Ca"Ye"Ys iAsh~ad propoiQQ to 
introdYi~Q Gi'b'beAs' seheine. The "Drift to Inflation" continued with 
Theodore's plans for credit and note issue expansion; he pursed an "alien 
political purpose" in scheming for a government-controlled central bank.31 A 
UAP government would restore investment confidence by balancing the 
budget; reduce taxes in order to increase private sector employment; retain 
tariff protection, but remove those duties which fostered monopoly, and end 
the ministerial dictation of tariff policy against the recommendations of the 
Tariff Board; oppose unification and, Lyons implied, support the formation of 
new States. The UAP recognised that the electorate had chosen in 1929 to 
retain federal arbitration, and would keep basic wage and standard hours under 
federal control and devolve all other issues to the States. Communists 
"directed from Moscow" were becoming more "aggressive" in propaganda -
29. Lyons' policy speech, [Sydney Town Hall, 2Dec1931], p. 4. Hughes papers NLA MS 
1538/28/1635. 
30. Ibid., p. 3. 
31. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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existing laws were sufficient; the UAP would enforce them.32 Australia was far 
from Britain, and needed a local defence force sufficient to fend off attackers 
until Imperial forces could come to the rescue; Lyons promised to support the 
League of Nations and other attempts at peace-making, but to remain armed. 
Returned soldiers would enjoy preference in employment.33 Lyons concluded 
with another appeal to follow Britain's world leadership in maintaining 
tradition. 
Believing that the election has restored Britain to financial 
security, all nations are now taking a braver view of their 
problems ... .! can give you no better advice than to tune in with 
Britain. Trust the United Australia Party as the British people 
trusted the United British Party. Turn a deaf ear and blind eye, as 
they did, to proposals for financial tricks and devices. Resolve as 
they did to stick to the old sane ways in Government and in 
finance.34 
Lyons offered the safety of known policies and appealed to Imperial spirit. 
Labor also promised to safeguard familiar institutions (protection and 
arbitration) but cast its arguments in nationalistic terms. Government 
supporters also had to meet the challenge of Lang Labor. Scullin had made no 
allusion to the schismatics other than to dismiss the issue of Beasley's no-
confidence motion as "paltry" .35 But the Beasley group's combination with 
32. "Thunderous applause" greeted Lyons' promise to "eradicate" communism. SMH, 3 Dec 
1931, p. 9. 
33. Lyons' policy speech: Budget: p. 10; tax: p 11; tariff: pp. 14-15; federalism: pp. 16-17; 
arbitration: p. 17; communism: pp. 18-19; defence: p 19. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. Scullin said at Ballarat that his own department was responsible for relief work at 
Cockatoo Dock, and that he had complete confidence in its administration of relief; his main 
point, however, was that the government was engaged with problems much more serious than 
this complaint. Australian Worker , 9 Dec 1931, p. 2. labor Call was able to cite the Age's 
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opposition members (an "unholy alliance" according to Labor Call ) was a 
major issue in Labor's campaign, particularly in Lang's home State.36 The 
Australian Worker gave to its report of Scullin' s policy the sub-heading, 
' ... [H]e tells of the difficulties and treacheries the government had to face'; the 
front page showed a cartoon of 'The treacherous hand that struck the fatal 
blow' - a bloody dagger grasped in the fist of the 'Lang faction'.37 The renegades 
were a disgrace not only to their party but to their sex, alleged the Worker's 
'Cousin Ellen'. "Thank heaven no woman had a hand in the defeat of our 
Federal Labor Government! It took so-called Labor men to bring about that 
dastardly result."38 Lang Labor had very little support in Victoria but its 
attempt to win industrial seats in New South Wales was regarded as a serious 
threat by the Victorian Labor Call .39 Lang candidates were standing in South 
Australia. Scullin felt obliged to warn a meeting of waterside workers at Port 
Adelaide that they would be the ones to suffer most if the Beasley motion 
resulted in the electoral defeat of the government. He also attacked the 
egoism of his charismatic rival, complaining that the 'Lang plan' was named 
after one individual and was authorised only by that individual and not by any 
legitimate Labor organisation. 40 
opinion (from an editorial of 26 Nov 1931, p. 6) that the motion had "regarded no vital 
principle". 3 Dec 1931, p. 1. REF 1746. Each of Labor Cali's three election issues (3,10, 17 Dec) 
reproduced an Age editorial. 
36. The Sydney Truth considered that the rival Labor camps in New South Wales were 
devoting more energy to their internecine battles than to the contest with non-Labor. 6 Dec 
1931, p. 14. 
37. Australian Worker , 2 Dec 1931, p. 2. 
38. Ibid., p. 5. 
39. Labor Call, 10 Dec 1931, p. 11. 
40. Australian Worker , 9 Dec 1931, p. 2. 
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Federal Labor campaigners denounced Lang Labor in the hope of retaining the 
allegiance of voters attracted by the New South Wales faction's populist 
'money power' rhetoric. For the benefit of this audience, Federal Labor 
candidates stressed that they were the true Labor loyalists and their rivals the 
wreckers of solidarity. 41 But Federal Labor (from here on, 'Labor') also had to 
appeal to people of more conservative sensibility.42 It was, no doubt, with an 
eye on this group that government candidates stressed the differences between 
Lang and Theodore's economic proposals. 
Opponents of the government are being hard put to it to make a 
convincing mosaic out of such factors as Mr Scullin, Mr Lang, the 
Beasley group, Communists, strikers etc .... The rehabilitation 
scheme which Mr Scullin, in conference with the Premiers, agreed, 
he has honourably carried out. It was because he stood adamant 
on this issue that the Beasley group came to birth. 
Rather, it was the Nationalists with whom Lang Labor was "hand in 
glove ... and the Nationalist glove has a very discreditable stain". The ALP, 
furthermore, was the only Party with rules forbidding membership to 
Communists. Lang had no supporters in Victoria, but "the political miasma 
called Langism is being used to confuse the issues."43 Labor publicists were 
conscious of the prevalence of scare tactics. The Westralian Worker warned 
that 
41. Labor Call, 3 Dec 1931, p. 2. 
42. This group included many of those whose swing to Labor in 1929 had given the Party such 
unlikely seats as Flinders, and Wilmot, Lyons' rural, northern Tasmanian electorate. 
43. Labor Call, 17 Dec 1931, pl. From the Age, 9 Dec 1931,p. 8. 
[W]e may not be brought face to face with the Socialistic Tiger 
Bogey, the Marriage Tie Bogey and others which have done good 
service in the past, but we will certainly meet with the 
Communistic Bogey, the Inflation Bogey and others, for the anti-
Labor leaders know too well the value of bogeys to go into action 
without their help.44 
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Don Cameron in Australian Worker maintained that warnings about the 
Communist danger drew applause from AWNL meetings, but attracted little 
attention in the wider community; and noticed that there had also been a 
great deal of literature circulated asserting that a Labor government would be 
dominated by Rome. The Tribune complained of anti-Catholic literature 
which had been circulated by Walter Albiston and the Victorian Protestant 
Federation during recent Melbourne City Council elections. ''Those ever active 
fomenters of religious bitterness ... see in the disturbed conditions of the time an 
opportunity to divide the community."45 Cameron asserted that an "attitude 
of scepticism" prevailed concerning anti-Communist and anti-Catholic 
sentiment. Smith's Weekly seemed to regard as an irrelevancy the prejudice 
motivating Nationalist leagues in northern Tasmania to oppose Lyons: 
"[E]ven the sectarian issue is being dragged in, because Lyons is not a Protestant 
Laborite."46 
44. Westralian Worker, 4 December 1931, p. 2. The 'marriage tie bogy' was presumably the 
controversy over the Catholic Church's Ne Temere decree against mixed marriages, which 
exercised some sections of non-Labor in the early 1920s. 
45. Tribune, 12Nov1931. Calwell papers. NLA MS 4738, Series 27, Box 110, '1930-39 
Newspapers' folder. 
46. Australian Worker, 2 Dec 1931, p. 13; Smith's Weekly, 28 Nov 1931, p. 2. As when he first 
stood for Kooyong in 1922, Latham rebuffed a request by Walter Albiston to pledge himself to 
the anti-Catholic and anti-communist objectives of the Victorian Protestant Federation. 
Given that the Catholic leader of the UAP apparently enjoyed a great deal of popularity, 
Albiston's avowal that "the endorsement of the VPF will be a very important adjunct in the 
fight" seems implausible. Albiston to Latham, 3 Dec 1931; Latham to Albiston (copy) 4 Dec 
1931. NLA MS 1009/50/442-3. 
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The banks were Labor's bogey. Scullin told one meeting that "he did not 
intend to condemn the banks .... they could have done more than they did, but 
they had helped a good deal, and he thought they would do more with 
encouragement"47, but such generosity was atypical. For the most part, Labor 
depicted bankers as conspirators who had brought about the Depression, or had 
at least intensified its effects; non-Labor politicians were the tools of this 
'money power'. 48 Theodore implied that 'The Wretched Monetary System' 
had "broken down" accidentally, but other campaigners seemed to imply that 
financiers had deliberately engineered the Depression.49 Banking had caused 
and could cure the Depression. 
The Central Reserve Bank will be the Worker's Friend 
The tight fist of the trading banks opened only when there was 
·something to pick up. The Gospel of Grab and Grasp! Australian 
industry has suffered accordingly - and the worker has payed the 
price with his job. The establishment" of the CENTRAL RESERVE 
BANK for the financing of productive industries WOULD 
INEVITABLY INCREASE EMPLOYMENT.so 
47. Australian Worker, 9 Dec 1931, p. 2. Scullin, at Albury, had harsh words for the attempts 
made by the " 'stunt press' " to destroy confidence in the banks. Australian Worker , 16 Dec 
1931,p. 2. 
48. Labor Call, 10 Dec 1931, p.4; Ibid., p. 6. The Westralian Worker rallied, in essentially 
populist terms, "the producing, active section of the community" against the banking, free 
trade, shipping, New Guard, and Lang-Beasley "gangs". 4Dec1931, p. 2. 
49. Australian Worker, 2 Dec 1931, p. 4. 
50. 'Outstretched to Help not Reaching to Grab', Smith's Weekly, 12 Dec 1931, p. 22. Choosing Labor 
was "the only SAFE vote for the wage and salary earners of Australia." See also 'Smash the Ice Pack of 
Frozen Assets [by voting for a central reserve bank] -your job is frozen up with them' (Ibid., 19 Dec 1931, 
pp. 24-25.) which quoted President Hoover's exhortation (8 December 1931) to Congress to /1 'release 
credit and start to work on the country's immense resources and stores of money.'" 
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This argument rested on the assertion that the Depression was unnecessary. 
The season was good, and productivity high. Resources remained idle because 
loan funds were withheld by the private banks: release these funds and trade 
and employment would revive. Henry Boote confidently predicted that a 
Labor government with a majority in both houses would 
.... soon create the credit necessary to put the unemployed back into 
production, and by this simple act of sound finance, allied with 
commonsense administration, enable Australia to become the 
great and prosperous land that Nature designed it to be.51 
Labor's promise to create a central bank to release credit was a typical panacea: 
fast-acting, comprehensible, and singular. 
There was a nativist strand to this argument, and to other aspects of the Labor 
campaign. Theodore told a meeting in Leichhardt that "there was hardly an 
Australian banker who could discuss banking intelligently. Most of them were 
ledger-keepers for English bankers."52 The UAP pamphlet 'Under Which 
Flag?', which showed the red flag and Union Jack crossed, provoked Labor 
Call to condemn the "Imperialist thought of this pseudo Australian 
party .... The Australian flag is of course ignored." Labor had appointed a 
native-born Governor General, raised a "purely Australian tariff" and on was 
51. Australian Worker, 2 Dec 1931, p. 3. Ibid. 9 Dec 1931, p. 2. 
52. Age, 11 Dec 1931. Theodore papers: NLA MS 7222. Folio vol. 13,p. 134. 
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therefore the only authentically national party.53 Labor's nationalist 
sentiments were aroused also by Lyons' slogan, 'tune in with Britain'. On this 
issue, too, Labor was supported by the Age which remarked that "[l]t was 
because Britain's Labor [sic] Government had refused to do what Australia's 
Labor Government had done that a general election was precipitated."54 
The Age's hostility to non-Labor was probably motivated by fear of a free trade 
revivaI.55 The paper commented that while Lyons protested his commitment 
to protection, he had in the same speech praised the voting record of the 
Opposition Senators, who had blocked thirteen of the government's eighteen 
proposed tariff increases.56 The overturn of the trade deficit was the only 
benefit which Labor could claim of its tariff policy. Scullin contended that 
unemployment would have been worse without the increase in levies. An 
advertisement in the Australian Worker explained that the tariff barrier was 
"daily increasing your prospect" of secure employment; and that the policy was 
"steadily bearing fruit". This was another issue on which Labor sought to 
generate fear: cartoonist Will Donald had Scullin telling the custodian 
('Australian democracy') of the storm-racked 'tariff breakwater' " ' ... keep a 
sharp look-out, there are wreckers about' ". 57 
53. Labor Call, 17 Dec 1931, p. 5. This leaflet reprised a 1925 Nationalist flyer of the same 
name. A UAP advertisement in Smith's Weekly displayed the Union Jack and Australian 
flag crossed. 12 Dec 1931, p. 2. The Australian Worker"s South Australian correspondent 
interpreted Lyons' assertion in his policy speech that Australia must take its share in 
Imperial defence as a veiled proposal to reintroduce conscription. Conscription, however, was 
overshadowed in 1931 by the debate on depression causes and cures. Australian Worker, 9 Dec 
1931, p. 15. 
54. Labor Call, 10 Dec 1931, p.1 (reprinted Age editorial, 3 Dec 1931, p. 6). This leading article 
was also reprinted, in part, in the Australian Worker, 9 Dec 1931, p. 9. 
55. Smith's Weekly was also protectionist, but more suspicious of Labor's financial policies. 
5 Dec 1931, p. 21. 
56. Labor Call, 10 Dec 1931, p.l 
57. Australian Worker, 9 Dec 1931, p. 2; Ibid., p. 20; Ibid., p. 1. 
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Labor also warned of a threat to arbitration, and in this was supported by some 
unions, as it had been in 1929. In Victoria, public sector unions cautioned that 
"[A]rbitration is as much in danger today as it was two years ago."58 A 
delegation from the Merchant Service Guild, insurance clerks and other 
Federally-registered unionists called on Latham during the election campaign 
seeking his promise to preserve the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act. The deputy UAP leader undertook to do so, but Labor Call 
reminded readers that as Attorney General Latham had tried to remove access 
to Federal arbitration for all but maritime workers. His proposal for 
conciliation committees was possibly a reprise of his attempt in 1928 to allow 
the creation of company unions by amending the Act so as to allow any group 
of people to register with the Court. Labor Call recollected that public sector 
unions had spent heavily to help Labor to preserve Federal arbitration in 1929 
and would be foolish to believe Latham's promises now.59 Victorian branch 
president Arthur Calwell warned on Radio 3KZ that Lyons might suspend the 
Navigation Act (this had been advocated by Page), and so take the jobs of four 
hundred seamen; give preference on the waterfront to non-unionists and 
strike-breakers; and suspend all Federal awards and all wages board 
determinations in non-Labor States. "'These were the real dangers confronting 
58. Magna Carta vol 1, 14 Dec 1931, auth. J.F. Chapple and A.A. Calwell for the State 
Instrumentalities Unions Committee, Melbourne. Calwell papers NLA MS 4738, Series 27, Box 110, 
Folder 'mostly 1930s'. The letterhead bore the slogan' 'We demand full rights under the 
Australian laws and Constitution'". Non-Labor groups were usually the more ready to invoke the 
Magna Carta. This pamphlet also used another typical non-Labor catch-cry, 'loyal' ("every 
loyal Australian" should vote Labor). 
59. Labor Call , 17 Dec 1931, p. 8. 
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the electors of Australia."60 Calwell concentrated on male occupations, as did 
Australian Worker women's page contributor 'Cousin Ellen'. ''We must all 
realise that a Federal Labor Government means a great deal to Labor women. 
Take away our industrial awards and old-age pensions ... and the wives and 
daughters of workers lose all feelings of security." 'Cousin Ellen"s warning 
about awards was directed at women as keepers of the home rather than as 
wage earners: women " ... realise what a great blow it will be to the home if 
awards are swept away and pensions are again lowered."61 
Notions of security were also central to the UAP campaign. The pamphlet 
Safety First summarised most of non-Labor's themes: voter must choose 
between 'The path to safety' (production of real wealth, restoration of trust in 
banking and public finance, rational division of powers between States and 
Commonwealth) and 'the· path to danger' (printing money, politically-
controlled banking, unification).62 Banking was associated in UAP pamphlets 
with the two Labor leaders who overshadowed the Prime Minister: Lang and 
Theodore. Despite the radical disagreement between the New South Wales 
and Commonwealth Labor Governments on finance the UAP insisted that 
each was intent on gaining control of deposits. Lang was simply 'Labor' and 
only the election of a UAP government could prevent his entry into Federal 
politics.63 The Lang government had caused the collapse of the State Savings 
Bank by undermining confidence in state banking with its policy of 
60. Anon., 'A.A. Calwell Broadcasts', Ibid., p. 7. Arthur Calwell, MHR for Melbourne, 1940-
72; Minister for Information, 1943-49; for Immigration, 1945-49; Leader of the Opposition, 
1960-69. 
61. 'Australian Worker , 2 Dec 1931, p. 5; 9 Dec 1931, p. 5. 
62. Safety First, Melbourne, n.d [1931] NLA MS 1009/50/312. 
63. Every Picture Tells a Story No. 4., Melbourne, n.d [1931], NLA MS 1009/50/72. 
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repudiation, and by refusing to pay debts owed to the Bank. Theodore desired 
to replace the independent Commonwealth Bank board with a politically-
directed manager: the result could be the same disaster which befell the New 
South Wales bank.64 The individual crises caused by the failure were evoked 
in advertisements: "Government Savings Bank Book, £430, Sell £260 .... Bank 
Books - Private Gentleman will pay 10/6 [in the] £ net .... ".65 Ernest Turnbull, 
the leader of the AF AL in Victoria, also explained the dangers of Labor's 
banking proposals in personal terms which suggest the type of people to 
whom the League tried to appeal. 
A word to the thrifty. 
You are a thrifty, industrious man or woman. You have been 
hard-hit by this depression, and you are feeling very sore about it, 
for it was truly none of your fault. 
Do not let the sense of injustice which you feel lead you to accept a 
proffered remedy which will aggravate your sufferings. 
The Commonwealth Government wants more money than the 
banks or people are willing to lend. The banks have already made 
large temporary advances to Governments to assist them during 
the Budget-balancing period, but have not yet yielded to all 
requests. 
So the Government says, 'We will take over the control of the 
banks ourselves and compel them to lend us what we want. That 
64. Every Picture Tells a Story No. 12 A Story of Real Life - When Banking is Mixed with 
Politics', Melbourne, n.d [1931), NLA MS 1538/28.1671. One former supporter of W.M. Hughes 
complained that Nationalist publicity during the October 1930 State election had caused the 
collapse of the Savings Bank, and asked if the UAP intended to undermine the 
Commonwealth Bank in the same fashion. [illegible] to Hughes, 5December1931, NLA MS 
1538/28/1113. 
65. How Savings were Destroyed under LANG-SCULLIN, Melbourne, n.d [1931) NLA MS 
1538/28/1674. 
means your money and my money, taken against our will, to 
buttress a mis-managed system of which we do not approve.66 
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Confiscation of deposits was one threat to property, inflation another.67 More 
emphasis was given to the insecurity of deposits, perhaps because there had 
been a bank crash in April 1931 whereas hyperinflation was hard to imagine at 
a time when prices were depressed. On the other hand, Parkhill argued that 
Theodore's proposals were more subtle than Lang's, and therefore more 
dangerous. The Treasurer contended misleadingly that his proposed fiduciary 
note issue was similar to the issue made by the Bank of England. But in the 
second case the issue was backed by securities held by the Bank; Theodore's 
issue would be guaranteed only by loans to be raised in the future, and the 
government's reputation made the raising of such loans unlikely. The 
Treasurer's duplicity was also demonstrated by the way in which he had 
changed his views in the past: as Premier he had insisted that wage earners 
suffered the most when currency was inflated; as recently as June 1931 he had 
told Yates that an excessive note issue would be inflationary. He had changed 
his convictions before - who could say whether he would prescribe still more 
inflation to follow his £18, 000, 000 expansion? Scullin had also abandoned his 
66. Your Personal Interest in Banking, auth. E. Turnbull. NLA MS 1009/50/293. For other 
advertisements on this theme see: It's Your Money!, Truth [Sydney], 13 Dec 1931, p. 18; He 
[Lang] won't be happy 'till he gets it [the Commonwealth Bank], Ibid., p. 28; Every Picture 
Tells a Story No. 1, Hands off the People's Money -Its Your Chest [which pirate Theodore 
covets], NLA MS 1538/28/1643. All published Melbourne, n.d [1931). In 1928, Latham had 
included among the Nationalist constituency "the thrifty man of small means". Latham to 
Hawker, 20Feb1928. NLA MS4848/3/6/i (a) 
67. A 'bank note' issued by non-Labor in Queensland, was printed on the front with£ signs, 
pictures of Lyons, and the slogan 'Hands off the note issue or you will have a 'Lang' wait for 
your money ... '. The reverse side bore pictures of Theodore and Scullin, a red 'Danger' stamp, 
and was marked 'Fiduciary inflation note I I One Million Pounds I I Cash at Cranks Bank". 
Brisbane, n.d [1931) NLA MS 1009/50/88. 
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opposition to inflation. In his "famous cable" from London he warned that 
inflation would jeopardise the conversion of government loans and bills and 
cause a flight from bond to property investment - "[F]inanical panic may 
result". Now for the sake of expediency he had reversed his attitude. 68 
Inflation was represented in one cartoon by a bearded and booted Professor 
Inflationski,69 but Germany was more frequently alluded to than Russia. " 
'The German people are so terrified of inflation that they would stand any 
remedial measures, however hard they might be [,] to avoid it.' "70 UAP 
campaigners obviously hoped that the Australian people would feel the same 
way. Propaganda based on the Germany hyperinflation of the early 1920s 
stressed the ruin inflicted on the thrifty middle classes. 
THE GERMANS 'extended credit' as Mr Theodore proposes to do, 
and the printing presses rattled off 'inflated' money'. As inflation 
progressed, prices altered daily, and soon hourly. Eventually, the 
shops had to refuse to accept notes, and had to close altogether. 
'Widows whose husbands had carried life insurance policies for 
their protection found themselves quite as badly off as any other 
investor, their policies were worthless - amounted only to a few 
pence.71 
That Labor was suspiciously tolerant of Communism was a normal theme in 
non-Labor Federal election campaigns, and 1931 was no exception. A 
68. A. Parkhill, Wealth? From the Printing Press!, Melbourne, n.d [1931] NLA MS 1009/50/96. 
69. Every Picture Tells a Story No. 1 
70. This comment was attributed to the "distinguished German economist" Dr M.J. Bonn. Every 
Picture Tells a Story , No. 2., Melbourne, n.d [1931]. NLA MS 1009/50/100. 
71. Norman Angell, The Story of Money, cited Ibid.. See also: What does Inflation Mean? 
Ask the Germans, Melbourne, n.d [1931] NLA MS 1538/28/1669; UAP Speakers' Notes, No. 2, 
NLA MS 1009/50/207-32; script of broadcast by Latham on 3LO (Victoria), 16 Dec 1931. NLA 
MS 1009/50/407-16, pp. 3-4. 
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pamphlet issued by Hughes found the source of Communist influence in the 
ambitions of the Soviet government to spread their doctrine across the world; 
the British Empire stood against the power of international Communism. 
But local poverty made Communist doctrine attractive: a return to prosperity 
was the only solution.72 A more common argument in the UAP campaign, 
however, was that the remedy for Communism resided in the law. The 
Scullin government should have used the Crimes Act to suppress the Reds, 
but was unwilling. The FPLP had in 1926 supported the amendments to the 
Act, which passed without division: "[T]here has been a change in the Labor 
Party since then. I I What is it?" In November 1931 the conference of the New 
South Wales branch of the Party voted against a proposal to ban the 
Communist Party. At least one item of UAP publicity sought to pursue a theme 
which would become more prominent in Australian politics after the Second 
World War: Catholic anti-Communism. A leaflet for Fenton quoted Bishop 
Dyer of Wagga on the prevalence of Communism, an inherently irreligious 
" doctrine, and the need for caution in choosing members of parliament. 
'These are times when people should study closely the principles of every man 
seeking office .... and select only those worthy of confidence and trust.' " This 
quotation was followed by a note that Labor had in Victoria given its Senate 
preferences to the Communists before the UAP candidates.73 
72. W.M. Hughes, Communism - We Must Crush It!, Sydney, n.d [1931] NLA MS 1538/28/1661. 
J.P. Abbott warned that unemployment produced " .. sorrow, hopelessness and Communism." 
'The Battle of the Plans', Australian Quarterly, vol. 3, No. 11, Sep 1931, p. 116. 
73. Under Which Flag? , NLA MS 1009/50/311; Every Picture Tells a Story, No. 3, The 
Communists' Friend , NLA MS 1538/28/1644. This cartoon showed Scullin and Theodore 
passing over to the other side of the street while a Phrygian-capped communist assaulted a 
working man with a 'basher tactics' club. The UAP used 'communism' loosely. Taxation, for 
example, could be "communistic", and in the same sentence "socialistic". Rescue Australia 
[from high taxation], NLA MS 1538/28/1668. The Communists' REAL Friends, NLA MS 
1009/50/323. Fenton was a Methodist. All published Melbourne, n.d [1931] 
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Sound finance and, to a lesser extent, Communism were the major themes in 
the UAP campaign. Protection, 'the land', and - surprisingly - unemployment 
were secondary. Most of the propaganda consisted of attacks on the 
government; but the UAP was defensive about free trade. A Word on the 
Tariff explained that the new non-Labor party had inherited the protectionism 
of the old Liberal party, and the Nationalists.74 The Chamber of Manufactures 
made available to Latham "for use in the Melbourne papers" the text of a 
statement by its Political Committee endorsing Lyons' policy speech. Latham 
forwarded one copy to a colleague with a request to circulate it as widely as 
possible, and commented that the Age (5 Dec 1931) had misrepresented a 
statement on the tariff by the president of the New South Wales Chamber of 
Commerce, Gordon Bennett. The pamphlet UAP and the Tariff cited the 
Chamber's acclamation of the Party as " 'staunchly Protectionist.' ".75 
The UAP contended that while the Commonwealth could neither change 
world prices nor land settlement schemes (the latter were the responsibility of 
State governments) it could assist producers by reducing taxation and, again, 
restoring confidence by returning to orthodox public financing. 76 Electing a 
UAP government was also the best way to thwart Labor's plans for 
constitutional unification, which would allow city interests to dominate the 
farmer. Likewise, the government's attempts to introduce compulsory wheat 
74. A Word on the Tariff, Melbourne, n.d [1931) NLA MS 1538/28/1646. 
75. Frank Edwards [secretary of the Chamber] to Latham, 7 Dec 1931. Latham to Senator 
Edwards [date?]. untitled statement. NLA MS 1009/50/545-56; UAP and the Tariff, 
Melbourne, n.d [1931) NLA MS 1009/50/75. 
76. The Land, Melbourne, n.d [1931) NLA MS 1538/28/1645. 
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pools were steps towards socialisation, which was why the Opposition Senators 
blocked these bills~ 77 
Lyons and his colleagues had more to say about the risk of hardship involved 
in the government's proposals than about the poverty which had already been 
caused by unemployment, and reductions in public spending. In keeping 
with the rest of the campaign, unemployment was attributed to the 
intimidation of business by plans for dangerous government financing, and by 
taxation. Some Opposition literature reminded voters of the reductions Labor 
had made in wages and pensions, and contrasted these economies with the 
benefits which Scullin had promised in 1929. The lowering of unemployment 
was another promise broken by the government. Possibly UAP politicians 
were reluctant to criticise the effects of deflation as this was the policy which 
they had urged on the government; also, non-Labor State governments shared 
the responsibility for retrenchment. Non-Labor sought to deny the 
government the credit for implementing the Premiers' Plan: reform, they 
insisted, had been forced by the Opposition, and the government's 
procrastination had necessitated economies more severe than those required 
when the Plan was first put forward.78 
77. When Labor 'Unifies', Melbourne, n.d [1931] NLA MS 1009/50/79; Socialising the Wheat 
Industry, Melbourne, n.d [1931) NLA MS 1009/50/109. The Senate rejected the Wheat 
Marketing Bills (1930 and 1931) and accepted the Wheat Bounty Bill (1931), and the Wheat 
Advances Bill (1930). The latter was never implemented as the Commonwealth Bank refused 
to finance the proposed advances to growers. 
78. Unemployment, and wage and pension reductions: Labor Has Failed You!, NLA MS 
1009/50/322; Every Picture Tells a Story No. 14, NLA MS 1009/50/80; UAP Speakers' Notes, 
No. 7,. NLA MS 1538/28/1593-98; the newspaper advertisement 'Mates! help me get a job', 
showed a man with his hand stretched out towards the viewer, recalling a recruiting poster of 
the Great War. Truth [Sydney] , 6 Dec 1931, p. 17. Government's delay: 'Only 12/- in the £1 ' 
What Scullin has Brought Us To!, NLA MS 1009/50/98; see also The Truth About the 
National Plan, NLA MS 1009/50/1050.. All pamphlets published Melbourne, n.d [1931) 
242 
This survey of campaign literature implies that the election was contested only 
on issues of Commonwealth policy. But the activities of candidates and 
members in their communities must also have affected voters' attitudes, as 
two examples of patronage in widely different social settings may suggest. 
Labor candidates for Hindmarsh and Angas assisted unemployed single men in 
their dealings with relief authorities; a flyer for the 'independent Nationalist', 
Wally Marks, whose electorate included some of Sydney's more prosperous 
northern suburbs, mentioned no policy issues, but listed his "[R]eferences" as 
the "Municipalities of Waverly, Woollahra, Vaucluse I I The Diggers and their 
Clubs and Associations .... Surfers, Swimmers - and all Sportsmen and their 
Clubs .... Parents' and Citizens' Associations .... "79 
It is difficult to know what the public to which politicians appealed thought 
about this contest of Depression remedies. The Worker's correspondent 
commented of a Labor meeting in the Botanic Park, Adelaide: 
[T]he people of Adelaide are in a very peculiar mood at present. 
While the audience listened carefully, first to Mr Yates and 
subsequently to Mr Kneebone, neither of them was able to raise 
any enthusiasm. Here and there at times a solitary handclap could 
79. Anon., 'The South Australian Worker', Australian Worker , 9 Dec 1931, p. 15; Marks or 
Harrison?, (Sydney, n.d [1931] NLA MS 1009/50/367) Marks lost his seat to the endorsed UAP 
candidate, Harrison. Walter Marks: MHR for Wentworth, 1919-31. Eric Harrison, MHR 
(UAP-LPA) for Wentworth, 1931-56; Minister of Interior, 1934; honorary minister, 1938-39; 
Postmaster General and Minister for Repatriation, 1939-40; for Trade and Customs, 1940-41; for 
Postwar Reconstruction, 1949-50; for Defence, 1949-50; vice president of Executive Council and 
Minister for Defence Production, 1951-56; for the Army and for the Navy, 1955-56; Deputy 
Leader of the Opposition, 1944-49. KCMG, 1960. 
be heard, but that was all. As the campaign progresses, this apathy 
may disappear. Let us hope so, anyway.so 
Smith's Weekly doubted that public sentiment boded well for Labor. 
The one feature of the elections that promises to correct the 
confusion is that the people generally are doing some thinking for 
themselves. They are turning out to election meetings and 
listening attentively. There is little enthusiasm, but a popular 
demand of deadly purpose which betokens ill for those who are 
opposing their will. 81 
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The UAP easily defeated the government. "We have gone to dusty death", 
Curtin told Boote.82 
1929 1931 
% seats won % seats won 
Nat [UAP] 33.89 14 41.58 40 
Ind Nat 3.89 3 
CP 10.27 10 12.25 16 
ALP 48.84 46 27.09 14 
NSW ALP 10.57 4 
Country 
Progressive 0.97 1 
Ind 2.13 1 8.22 1 
Com 0.27 0 
Elections for the House of Re~resentatives - 1929 and 1931 83 
80. Australian Worker , 9 Dec 1931, p. 15, 
81. Smith's Weekly, 12 Dec 1931, p. 12. 
82. J. Curtin to H. Boote, 22 Dec 1931, Boote papers. NLA MS 2070/1/83. 
83. Hughes and Graham,~., pp. 342 & 346. UAP results include those of the Emergency 
Committee. Percentages are of the valid primary vote. The 1931 percentages total 99.98 
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Approximately half of the twenty percent fall in the ALP vote may be 
accounted for by the poll for Lang Labor, which won four seats in New South 
Wales (the Federal party took only three). In that State the 1929 Federal Labor 
vote of 51.49% was reduced to 29.25%; Lang Labor won 12.11 %. Lang Labor 
stood candidates in Victoria, Queensland and South Australia, but gained no 
seats and less than two percent of the vote in each. 
One obviously pro-Lang contributor to the Westralian Worker argued - on the 
evidence of the increased informal vote, and comments on ballot papers - that 
the government had been defeated because many voters refused to return 
Labor members who had recently voted for wage and pension reductions. 
Another considered that the main cause had been that voters blamed the 
government for unemployment.84 Round Table commented that the 
electorate had been subjected to "a campaign of terrors" in which Labor warned 
that the UAP would abolish protection and arbitration, and the UAP insisted 
that Labor would steal savings, and render the currency worthless. Yet " .. .it is 
very doubtful whether there was much public conviction of any of these 
dangers." Federal Labor suffered from the rivalry of Lang's supporters, and 
from association with the New South Wales Premier's record - particularly the 
collapse of the State Bank. Allegations regarding Mungana were made 
infrequently, but the charges were sufficiently serious to discredit Theodore 
84. Westralian Worker, 1Jan1931, p. 5; Anon., Ibid. p. 2. The informal vote for the House of 
Representatives increased from 2.65% in 1929 to 3.48% in 1931. Hughes and Graham op. cit., 
pp. 342 & 346. 
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and Scullin nonetheless. The main factor was that people thought that 
Scullin' s recovery ·policies had failed. Labor was unpopular everywhere except 
for Queensland, and its losses exceeded a simple correction of the favourable 
swing of 1929: for example, one of the lost government seats, Batman, had 
been held by Labor since 191Q.85 Bruce, who regained Flinders (while absent 
abroad) seized on the result as proof that his government would have suffered 
the same fate if he had not had the good sense to force it to contest the previous 
election on an impossible issue: "[T]he election was an amazing affair and 
certainly justifies to the hilt our action in refusing to carry on in 1929", he 
remarked to Page.86 
"Any government would have been defeated ... " one of Theodore's supporters 
commented, " ... and the rest is domestic Labor politics."87 Followers of the 
Treasurer, who lost Dalley to Lang candidate J.'R. Rosevear, were quick to blame S . 
Lang Labor . One also thought that Theodore's expansionary policies were too 
complicated to explain to the electorate, and were easy to misrepresent, 
"particularly in view of the sensitive public mind created by the closure of the 
Government Savings Bank." Boote, however, attributed the UAP triumph to a 
Communist scare campaign - which was discredited by the Communist Party's 
negligible returns.SB Labor's good showing in Queensland was the result of the 
unpopularity of the Moore government, some considered.89 The immunity of 
85. Round Table, Dec 1931, vol. 22, pp. 415-19. 
86. Bruce to Page, 13 Jan 1932. Page papers NLA MS 1633/1693-95. 
87. Keane(?) to Theodore, 22 Dec 1931. NLA MS 7222, Box 1, Folder 1. 
88. Australian Worker, 23 Dec 1931, p. 3. 
89. Lang to blame: Ted O'Loughlin, 27 Dec; O'Hagan, 23 Dec; Joseph A. Dalton, 28 Dec; 
Riordan, 30 Dec; R. Spencer Browne, 21 Dec. Re-inflation too complicated: C.J. Doherty, 22 
Dec 1931. Queensland: J. Huntingley (?),Brisbane, 3 Jan 1932, NLA MS 7222, Box 1, Folder 1. 
A.C. Morgan told Latham that the low stocks of the Moore Nationalist government had 
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the Labor vote in Queensland to the Australia-wide swing is evidence of the 
influence of local matters on Federal politics, even when national issues 
arouse powerful controversy. 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s fiscal orthodoxy largely replaced British-
Protestant allegiance as the main criterion of rightwing loyalism. The orthodox 
Depression policy supported by Nationalists, most newspapers, and the leagues 
was based on retrenchment, wage cuts and balanced budgets. These measures, 
argued the exponents of sound finance, would allow lower taxes, smaller payroll 
bills and cheaper credit: business would then be free to pull Australia out of the 
morass. The UAP was formed to get rid of the Scullin Government not because 
Scullin was a Catholic, and in the Great War - early 1920s a supporter of Irish 
republicanism, but because non-Labor people feared the Government would 
cause ruinous inflation, and by repudiating its own debts destroy that confidence 
. .,~(.... \. 
in repayment which underwroteKredit system. Lyons, the leader who in 1931 
attracted enthusiastic support from the activists of numerous conservative 
associations, was a pious Catholic, and had campaigned against conscription in 
the Great War, but these sins belonged to history, for Lyons passed what had 
become the more important loyalty test: commitment to sound finance. 
allowed Littleton Groom to win back Darling Downs as an independent non-Labor candidate. 
Groom had also won the Catholic votes that would otherwise have gone to Labor. Morgan to 
Latham, 20 Dec 1931. NLA MS 1009/1/2157. 
Chapter 6. The gradual decline of the UAP, 1932-43 
The 1931 elections confirmed the strength of Lang's challenge to Federal 
Labor, and left the divided labour movement in opposition to a 
government which, along with the Country Party, held fifty six of the 
seventy five seats in the House of Representatives. The non-Labor parties 
had been dominant in Commonwealth politics since the conscription split, 
and as the UAP settled into the Treasury benches, the short-lived Scullin 
Government, elected in reaction to Bruce's radical industrial agenda, began 
to look like an exception to the normal pattern of politics. Labor's problems 
seemed to allow the Government to make do with a weak extra-
parliamentary organisation. Senator Foll complained to Latham in 1934 
that the Queensland head office was so poor that it did not know where the 
next fortnight's pay was coming from; and that there was virtually no 
organisation outside Brisbane. Latham promptly forwarded a cheque to 
alleviate the crisis, but no single donation could have resolved the 
continuing problems of groups bereft of national organisation and 
independent sources of funding.1 Similarly, the member for Corio, R.G. 
Casey, was disturbed by the absence of a central research and publicity bureau, 
and warned that the UAP would be left more vulnerable by this neglect as 
time went on; but his proposal to establish such a bureau was defeated when 
the National Union refused to provide the necessary funds.2 
1
. HS. Foll to Latham, 20 Jun 1934. NLA MS 1009/59/5-7; Latham to Foll, 2 Jul 1934. Ibid/8; 
Casey to Latham, 31Jul1934. Ibid./11. Hattil Foll, Senator (Nationalist-UAP, Qld), 1917-
1947. 
2
. Richard Casey, political liaison officer, London, 1924-27, 1927-31; member for Corio (Vic), 
1931-40; Honorary Minister 1933-35; Treasurer, 1935-39; Minister for Development, 1939-40; 
Australian Minister to the United States, 1940; Minister of State for the United Kingdom in 
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Thirteen years later, when non-Labor was struggling to regain its ascendancy, 
Casey was to have the opportunity to put his ideas about organisation and 
fund-raising into practice. For the moment, however, these weaknesses 
were obscured by the effects of the Depression crisis on each of the parties. It 
is reasonable to surmise that the Nationalists might have won the 1931 
election without reforming under the leadership of Lyons; the fact that they 
were willing, and able, to take the path of fusion suggests some remarkable 
similarities with the party reformations of 1916-17. Again, a great ideological 
issue had served to detach a signjj!~nt section of parliamentary Labor, a 
- / ;v,!J,,,;::.., A.. t"~..n"1fH,~ ~ A,/,./.:> 
party whictfappeared to place loyalty above every other political virtue3, and 
to bring the rebels into the orbit of the major party of non-Labor. The split 
was seen by each side as a question of morality as well as rational policy-
making. Each regarded the other as illegitimate in an ethical sense, but it 
seems that non-Labor parliamentarians had the. greater self-confidence, 
both in the justice and in the likely popularity of their programs. In 1916 
and 1931 there were no members of the Liberal or Nationalist parliamentary 
parties who resigned to join Labor; but the Liberal and United Australia 
parties attracted non-Labor defectors. As in 1916, the renegades joined the 
main non-Labor party which, in keeping with its new members, who were 
defectors from an avowedly working class party, adopted a new, populist 
name. The split came from the top down, and was driven by interpretations 
the Middle East, 1940-44; Governor of Bengal, 1944-46; President of the Liberal Party, 1947-
49; member for La Trobe (Vic), 1949-60;Minister for Works and Housing, 1949-51; for Supply 
and Development, 1949-50; in charge of CSIRO, 1950-60; for External Affairs, 1951-60. GCMG, 
1965; life peerage, 1966. 
3
. Janet McCalman, Struggletown: Public and Private Life in Richmond, 1900-1965, Melbourne, 
1994 (1984), p. 35. 
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of popular politics: Labor politicians could be accepted by their former 
opponents because they were thought to bring Labor voters with them. 
Indeed, the leader of the new party came from Labor, and was considered to 
offer a personality and image suitable to the needs of the day. Lyons was as 
mild as Hughes was fiery; he seemed the perfect exponent of a policy of 
reassurance. 4 More importantly, perhaps, the leadership of the new 
rightwing party by a former Labor politician symbolised the all-party, 
national government ideal of civic patriotism which was a constant feature 
in the non-Labor identity and image, and which became particularly 
important at times of increased social division when non-Labor ·was 
implementing unpopular policies. 
The new government was fortunate in the timing of the economic recovery: 
The peak. of unemployment was 1932-33, and while production and 
employment did not return to pre-Depression levels until 1938, 1933 was 
seen by many as the turning point. Scullin's government remained 
associated with the trough of the Depression, and with the most intense 
period of controversy and uncertainty over government responses.s The 
UAP also benefited from the politics of Labor in the largest state. A conflict 
between the Commonwealth and New South Wales governments over the 
latter's refusal to repay public debt culminated in May 1932 with Lang's 
dismissal by the Governor, Sir Phillip Game, for making an allegedly illegal 
instruction to public servants to withhold payments from the 
4. Hart, o:p. cit., p. 315. 
5
. J.R. Robertson, Ch. 10, in F.K. Crowley, (ed), A New History of Australia, Melbourne, 1974, 
p. 416. 
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Commonwealth. 6 Lang was defeated at elections in June, but continued as 
Leader of the Opposition, and a force within the federal Labor Party. His 
presence in national politics prolonged that threat of repudiation which had 
played such an important part in the rallying of the right in 1930-31. Federal 
Labor suffered Lang's hostility, but was also weakened by its supposed 
affinities with Lang-style rhetorical extremism. 
Lyons was able to claim that by renouncing inflation and repudiation his 
government had restored business and public confidence and that this 
psychology was responsible for the return of prosperity. Throughout the 
1930s the UAP government campaigned on its image of fiscal rectitude, and 
from 1934 was able to take credit for the restoration of the austerity cuts 
made in the first of three years of the decade. While the UAP boasted its 
adherence to unchanging economic nostrums, its economic policies were, 
by 1920s standards, less orthodox than UAP politicians would have had their 
constituents believe. Two issues may serve to illustrate this. Firstly, non-
Labor had revelled in the rebukes issued to the Scullin government by the 
governor of the Commonwealth Bank, Sir Robert Gibson; but Gibson, 
without making his opposition public, complained in December 1932 of the 
government's assumption that Commonwealth Bank credit comprised "an 
absolutely indefinite advance."7 If the government's domestic bank policy 
was unorthodox in the eyes of local guardians of financial probity, so was its 
commitment to the repayment of British debt, an issue symbolic of the 
UAP's British loyalism and economic 'honesty'. Despite his image as the 
6
. ADB, 9, p. 665. 
7
. Gibson to Lyons [copy] 13 Dec 1932. Latham papers: NLA MS 1009/52/233-34. 
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quintessential Anglo-Australian, the government's minister in London, 
Bruce, adopted an assertively nationalist policy on negotiating a relaxation, 
or even a waiving, of Australia's war debts.8 
None of these qualifications of financial orthodoxy and British loyalism was 
suitable for the public platform. Lyons, delivering his policy speech in the 
Sydney Town Hall, took credit for the recovery from Depression. He 
admitted that this revival was not entirely the government's doing - the 
resurgence of gold prices and the efforts of the Australian people had played 
an important part. But the government "by its policy of sound and honest 
finance created the atmosphere" for recovery. With the removal of Lang, 
"Australia had breathed freely again and the way had been opened for sane 
counsels and honest management." Lang and Scullin had not changed: 
they ·still desired to place banking under political control in order to inflate 
the note issue - "the alternative to the present government was a Scullin-
Lang combination." Lyons then set out the principles of UAP. Firstly, the 
party "prefer[ed] the preservation and improvement of existing economic 
structure to the adoption of wild and revolutionary schemes." Australia's 
interest lay in remaining a "loyal part" of the Empire. The nation must 
honour its overseas debts, and must work against the growth of economic 
nationalism by seeking trade agreements. The UAP stood against 
government interference in banking and currency. More specifically, 
Lyons promised to fix a guaranteed price of three shillings per bushel for 
wheat; to review the Ottawa agreement sympathetically when the time 
8
. Bruce to Lyons [copy], 3Dec1932. NLA MS 1009/52/268-70. 
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came; and to re-establish the Interstate Commission to police interstate 
'dumping'. The Commonwealth government had decided to take greater 
responsibility for unemployment, especially among young people, and 
would fund training schemes and major works projects such as afforestation, 
and the provision of sewerage works to large country towns. The 
government would also fund State programs to reduce maternal mortality, 
once a proper policy had been decided. Turning to defence, Lyons noted that 
while the British Empire had reduced its armaments, other nations were 
increasing their capacity to wage war. 
Nothing is further from our thoughts than any war in which 
Australia might become engaged .... The British Government 
still strives for peace, and so shall we. But the British 
Government has been forced by stark realities into increasing its 
defence provisions. This is also the position in Australia. 
The Australian policy will be "the lowest possible provision which is 
consistent with the defence of our continent." Lyons concluded with a plea 
to choose the party of confidence and to avoid the "general financial 
demoralisation" which a "Scullin-Lang Government" would bring.9 
Scullin, who gave his speech at the Richmond Town Hall on 15 August, 
denied that the Depression was finished. There were still 300, 000 
unemployed, while farmers had little income and much debt. Young people 
9. SMH, 14Aug1934, pp. 11-12. 
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had no prospects. The worst aspect of unemployment was the workless state 
of these school-leavers, whose unemployment was not recorded in union 
returns. Australia lacked money rather than productive capacity. "Money 
must be made the servant of industry, not its master." Labor would restore 
control of the Commonwealth Bank to a single governor, responsible to 
parliament: the board at present represented private interests. Staff of 
private banks had no reason to fear that nationalisation would cost them 
their jobs. Labor's opponents asserted that state control would create a 
government monopoly - but this was preferable to private monopoly; 
furthermore, over one-third of Australian banks were foreign-owned. "An 
Australian outlook is also needed, " Scullin complained. "The purchase of a 
cruiser overseas at a cost of £2, 280, 000 is monstrous, when thousands of 
Australians are unemployed." Pursuing his theme of economic nationalism, 
the Labor leader promised to restore tariff protection. On egalitarian lines, 
Scullin alleged that government financing had been unnecessarily expensive, 
to the benefit of banks and bondholders. Labor favoured a reduction in 
working hours. The Party retained its proposal to unify Australian 
government by vesting all power in the Commonwealth Parliament. Scullin 
closed his speech by reiterating that Labor would extend the power of the 
Commonwealth Bank in order to enhance the credit available for national 
developmen t.1 o 
The UAP campaign broadly followed the pattern of 1931: sound finance 
remained the keynote. Women were reminded that the Savings Bank of 
10. Labor Call, 23 Aug 1934, pp. 1-3. 
254 
New South Wales had closed its doors on them.11 In a radio broadcast, John 
Latham, who was retiring from politics at this election to take his place on the 
High Court, warned that while UAP policy had been rewarded by Australia 
being regarded with a new respect overseas, Labor remained committed to the 
deceptively easy solutions of currency inflation and politically-controlled 
banking, which would undermine confidence in the financial system to such 
an extent as to make money worthless.12 Speaking in Geelong, Richard Casey 
explained that the government's policy was to foster a recovery driven by 
private enterprise: this policy had resulted in unemployment falling by ten 
percent in every year since the government's election. Labor, by contrast, was 
intent on nationalising banking, and nationalisation of industry would be the 
next step.13 UAP speaker's notes explained, in scholastic style, that if banks 
acted on the populist demand to provide an unlimited supply of money 
loans this would remove the scarcity and therefore the value of money. 
Creditors, who had relied on the financial system's capacity to preserve the 
value of the medium recording their loans, would be so dismayed that they 
would never trust other people with their money again. 
The term credit, in its original sense, implies trust or 
confidence, It is derived from the Latin word, credo, which 
means 'I believe in', 'I have confidence in', or 'I trust'. This 
11Australian Women's Weekly, 8 Sep 1934, p. 25. This advertisement was authorised by the 
Sane Democracy League, a business-sponsored group founded in 1920 to fund non-Labor 
publicity. See K. Richmond, 'Responses to the threat of communism: the Sane Democracy 
League and the People's Union of New South Wales', Journal of Australian Studies, No. 1, June 
1977, pp. 70-83; Chris Priday, 'Sane Democracy in New South Wales, 1920 to 1940', BA hons 
thesis, Dept of Politics, Macquarie University, 1975. 
12. typescript of broadcast by Latham, Melbourne, 14September1934. NLA MS 1009/59/84-89. 
13. Geelong Advertiser, 30 Jul 1934. Casey papers: NLA MS 6150/5/32. 
trust or confidence is still the basis, the very foundation, upon 
which financial credit rests.14 
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Financial unorthodoxy was also linked with fear of social revolution: bank 
nationalisation was "communism's first step." Anti-Communism was an 
aspect of the 1931 campaign which seemed to receive greater emphasis in 
1934. UAP speakers were provided with details of the government's 
campaign against the Communist Party: an amendment of the Crime Act 
(1932) allowing the government to make "an express declaration" of 
unlawful persons or groups; censorship of seditious literature; deportation of 
revolutionaries., cThei;e m.eai;ui:ei; had caui;ed Com.m.uRilit Pai:ty m,Qm.b9i:ship 
to fall siR.68 the L~'ORS gov8l'Rmeat took offke.15 
Defence, which was almost entirely overlooked in the 1931 campaign, 
received more attention in 1934 from the UAP, but was still a minor theme. 
Such was the preoccupation with the Depression that the Japanese invasion 
of Manchuria in 1931 had gone almost unnoticed in Australia; but as the 
prospect of a second world war increased, so too did the resources which the 
government devoted to defence. In its 1932 budget, the Lyons government 
had reduced defence spending by £24, 876 to £3, 159, 960 - the lowest level in 
twenty years. Lyons was warned the next year that Australia's defence 
capability had been seriously impaired by budget cuts.16 Over the next two 
14. Nationalisation of Banking: United Australia Party Speakers' Notes no. 1, Melbourne, 
1934. Liberal Party papers: NLA MS 5000/9/333. 
15. Combating Communism. Ibid. 
16. Sir George Pearce to Lyons [copy), 28Apr1933. NLA MS 1009/52/435-38. 
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years the defence budget rose to £5, 457, 800. UAP publicity material explained 
that the government favoured peace but was prepared for war. "Though the 
League of Nations has been experiencing heavy weather, the Government 
refused to believe that the ideal of international co-operation for which it 
stands will fail to survive." Following Britain's example of defence 
preparation, Lyons had provided an increase of defence spending, and was 
developing both civil and military aviation.17 
Labor candidates showed Ii ttle interest in defence and foreign policy. 
Speakers' notes provided arguments on the unhealthy concentration of 
private bank ownership; the success of the State Labor governments of 
Queensland and Western Australia in reducing unemployment; and the 
parsimonious policy of the Lyons government towards pensions and public 
works.18 The Labor campaign mostly concentrated on unemployment. 
Casey's opponent in Corio, John Dedman19, asserted that the total of 300, 000 
people still registered as unemployed was probably an underestimation as 
there was no reliable method of compiling unemployment statistics. Casey, 
Dedman complained, had boasted of the workers re-employed in the 
Victorian textile industry, but had forgotten to attribute this to the high tariff 
policy of the Scullin government; in fact, the UAP had already reduced tariffs 
on one thousand items.20 The Labor argument was that the new prosperity 
17. Defence Policy, Civil Aviation, United Australia Party Speakers' Notes, Melbourne, 1934. 
NLA MS 5000/9/333; George Fairbanks, 'The Australian Foreign Policy and Defence Debate, 
1931-41', M.A. thesis, University of Sydney, 1966, pp. 37-38. 
18. J.H. Scullin, Facts for Labor Speakers, Melbourne, 1934. 
19. John Dedman, MHR for Corio (Vic), 1940-49; Minister for War Organisation of Industry, 
1941-45; Post-War Reconstruction, 1945-49; Trade and Customs, 1946; Aircraft Production and 
Munitions, 1946; Defence, 1946-49. 
20
. Geelong Advertiser, 17 August 1943. NLA MS 6150/5/32. 
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was an illusion. Voters in the seat of Melbourne were informed that on the 
same day that Lyons had boasted to the AWNL of Australia's recovery, 
homeless families with young children were gathered around dustbin fires in 
the back lanes of Fitzroy. Likewise, to be "[C]heered in 1914 I I [and] [E]victed 
in 1934" was the fate of R.T. Thompson, a veteran of Gallipoli, who had 
been removed from his War Services home in West Coburg for non-
payment of rent.21 
The government was returned with a reduced majority: perhaps people 
believed that their chances of falling into extreme poverty were lesser under 
the UAP than Labor. Labor's total vote fell slightly, but it gained four seats. 
Lang Labor improved its representation. Of the minor parties, the 
Communists again received an inconsiderable vote; Douglas Social Credit 
candidates appeared for the first time, and attracted over three times as many 
votes as the Communist ticket. 
1931 1934 
% seats won % seats won 
UAP 41.58 40 37.58 33 
CP 12.25 16 12.61 14 
ALP 27.09 14 26.81 18 
NSW ALP 10.57 4 14.37 9 
Soc Credit - 4.69 0 
Ind 8.2 1 3.18 0 
Com 0.27 0 1.34 0 
Elections for the House of Re12resentatives -1931 & 193422 
21. The Clarion, 1Sep1934. NLA MS 4738, Box 111, folder: '1930-39 newspaper clippings'. 
22. Hughes & Graham, op. cit., pp. 346 & 351. UAP returns include five Liberal Country 
League members, South Australia. 
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Round Table considered that banking had been the major plank of each 
party's platform. Labor blamed banks for the Depression; the government 
evoked the collapse of the Savings Bank of New South Wales, and German 
hyperinflation, but " .. .it was doubtful whether such crude appeals to fear were 
profitable in the present state of opinion."23 The Young Nationalists' 
Australian Statesman proclaimed that the Lyons government had been re-
elected because its successful programs had "steadied the morale of the people 
at a moment of crisis" and reduced the incidence of unemployment and 
poverty. The seats lost by the UAP had mostly been Labor strongholds which 
could never have been held for long.24 
Like the poll in 1934, the 1937 election was relatively quiet and uneventful, 
al though with the re-admission of the Lang rebels .to federal caucus in 1936, 
and the passing of the atmosphere of economic crisis which had prompted 
the formation of the UAP and its first sweeping success, the competition 
promised to be closer than at any election in the past ten years.25 The 1937 
election, however, was notable mostly for the prominence of defence and 
foreign policy, which for the first time since the 1914-18 war received as 
much attention as domestic matters. International relations were 
deteriorating rapidly, and Australians were forced to contemplate the 
prospect of another war. Even Labor, which tended to regard defence and 
23. Round Table, vol. 25, Sep 1934, pp. 181-2. 
24. Australian Statesman, 1 Oct 1934, p. 3. 
25. Warren Denning, Caucus Crisis: The Rise and Fall of the Scullin Government, Sydney, 1982 
(1937), pp. 22 & 144; Martin,~., p. 204; 
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international relations as plutocratic conspiracies, best left alone, began under 
its new leader, John Curtin, to develop a cogent defence policy.26 Defence was 
becoming controversial within the ranks of the government: Hughes was 
obliged in 1935 to resign from the ministry over his claims that Australia was 
unable to defend itself. Nonetheless the government increased defence 
spending steadily, so that by 1937, the defence budget of £11, 531, 000 was more 
than double the commitment for 1934.27 
The situation was far from reassuring, however. In July 1937, Japan began a 
full-scale military assault on China, and the original indifference in Australia 
gave way to concern.28 Some feared that Japan's expansion into China would 
whet its appetite for further, Southward expansion; others hoped that Japan 
would become preoccupied with absorbing its Chinese conquest. The Sino-
Japanese war, however, provided Australians with a frightening example of 
the techniques of modern warfare: the aerial bombing of Chinese cities 
provoked frightened and angry responses in the Australian press.29 More 
distant geographically, but perhaps more immediate because Europeans 
were involved, was the Spanish civil war, which also provided stories of the 
airborne war on civilians. Australian interest in external policy was further 
heightened by the 1937 Imperial Conference which, because of German and 
Italian aggression, had assumed an unusual importance. Britain impressed 
26. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 62. John Curtin, secretary Victorian Timberworkers' Union, 1911-15; 
secretary Anti-Conscription League, 1914; editor Westralian Worker, 1917-28; member for 
Fremantle, 1928-31; 1934-45; Leader of the Opposition, 1935-41; Prime Minister and Minister 
for Defence, 1941-45. 
27. Fairbanks, op. cit., p. 126. 
28
. T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations since 1788, Sydney, rev. ed. 
1991 (1978). 
29. Ibid., pp. 67, 118. 
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on the Dominions that it intended to acquiesce in the annexation of 
Czechoslovakia and Austria, but was prepared to fight for France and the Low 
Countries. The Australians offered no objections. The secrecy which 
surrounded the proceedings obliged Lyons to deny that his government had 
made any commitments " 'incompatible with complete local control and 
determination in any emergency.' " It was evident that he was sensitive to 
the isolationist mood of the electorate, and its susceptibility to Labor 
suggestions that the UAP was unwillingly to pursue an independent policy. 30 
In his 1937 policy speech, delivered in Deloraine, northern Tasmania, Lyons 
once again affirmed that recovery from Depression had been accomplished by 
the people, but made possible by a government "sound in methods, and 
above all, sound in finance." Lyons placed greater emphasis on the need for 
defence than he had three years earlier, explaining that the international 
scene was marred by "suspicion and fear". The government's undertakings 
at the Imperial Conference were to protect Commonwealth trade and 
territory and "involve[d] no overseas commitments". But isolationism was 
dangerous: Australians must cooperate with the Royal Navy to prevent an 
enemy from reaching their shores. 
The world has recently seen the horrifying spectacle of 
defenceless men, women and children being bombed from the 
air. Any isolationist policy which would leave us unguarded 
30 Ritchie Ovendale, 'Appeasement' and the English-Speaking World: Britain, the United 
States, The Dominions and the Policy of 'Appeasement', 1937-1939, Cardiff, 1975, pp. 33-40; 
McCarthy, op. cit., p. 113; Paul Twomey, 'Munich' in Carl Bridge (ed.), Munich to Vietnam: 
Australia's Relations with Britain and the Unites States since the 1930s, Melbourne, 1991, p. 
24. 
until the enemy was actually at our shores would expose us to 
the frightful danger of having our coastal cities and towns 
destroyed in: the ruthless manner which is occurring in another 
part of the world. 
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To meet the needs of this time of danger, the government had spent £31, 500, 
000 on defence since 1931 - a peace-time record. UAP strategy was to make 
Australia self-sufficient in armaments and munitions, but also to retain the 
"traditional association with Britain". 
Lyons boasted that his governments had always balanced their budgets. Also, 
UAP banking policy had been vindicated by the Royal Commission on 
Banking which (with one dissenter) had recommended against 
natio_nalisation. The government would retain the Commonwealth Bank's 
board system, and develop a new programme of mortgage lending, and a 
contributory national insurance scheme. Lyons expressed concern about the 
falling birth rate and warned that if present trends continued the population 
would begin to fall in twenty years time. "We are losing more lives in one 
year than were lost in two years of the greatest war in all human history". 
Greater population was needed for defence and to provide home markets. 
The government intended to renew assisted British immigration but, 
believing that "[T]he Australian-born child is the best migrant", would also 
increase the salary limit on maternity allowances by £26 to £247 per annum, 
and raise the rate to £7 /10 for the fourth (and further) child. The attention to 
international relations was a development from early 1930s preoccupations, 
but in other ways UAP rhetoric remained the same. The Prime Minister 
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rounded off by warning of a revival of the Lang faction: "I do not believe 
the people will risk another dose of Lang dominance in Federal politics."31 
Speaking at the Fremantle Town Hall, Curtin insisted in his policy speech 
that "the workers ... [,] ... farmers" and "many of the middle classes" were not 
sharing in Australia's new prosperity. Instead the benefits were being taken 
by "the powerful financial groups ... stock market investors ... commercial and 
speculative classes ... certain inter-locked manufacturing interests" and arms 
traders. 32 The government had broken its promise to build homes - no 
advances had been made "for several years" under the Commonwealth 
Housing Act. Relief for primary producers had been slight; only £200, 000 had 
been provided to relieve youth unemployment - most of the responsibility 
had been left with the States. Taxation was at the highest per capita level 
since Federation, and remissions favoured the rich.33 The Scullin 
government's banking policy had been vindicated by the Royal Commission, 
which found that the Commonwealth Bank should have expanded credit 
during the Depression, with most of the money being spent by the 
government. Labor would ensure that the government's authority was final 
in any dispute with the board; require private banks to deposit a certain 
percentage of their liabilities; and remove the statutory requirement for a 
gold or sterling reserve for the note issue. The Commonwealth Bank should 
31. SMH, 29 Sep 1937, pp. 17-18. 
32. Speech by John Curtin, Fremantle, 20 Sep 1937, pp. 1-2. NLA MS 4738, Box 73, 'John Curtin' 
folder. 
33. Ibid., p. 3. 
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become the medium for national control of banking and currency, and 
direction of investment.34 
The Opposition leader insisted that Labor was aware of the dangerous 
realities of the world situation. The Party had since the days of the Fisher 
government stood for national defence. Australia's military strength must 
now be in aviation, as the development of air power had the effect of 
"endangering the civilian population in time of war to an extent without 
precedent in history." The nation's military efforts must be directed to 
defending the Australian continent; Labor opposed conscription for "foreign 
battlefields". Curtin's interest in defence led him in other sections of the 
speech to note the military significance of railway gauge unification, and oil 
exploration. 35 
Curtin argued that population would only increase if the standard of living 
improved: employment was the key.36 Labor would ratify the 1936 
International Labour Convention resolution in favour of the forty hour 
week.37 The government had received several reports on national insurance 
for unemployment, but had left the responsibility with the States, which 
levied taxes on low incomes to a disproportionate extent. Labor would fund 
unemployment benefits out of consolidated revenue rather than 
34. Ibid. ' p. 5. 
35. Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
36. Ibid., p. 8. 
37. Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
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contributions,38 and introduce a pension of one pound per week, with ten 
shillings per child, for widows with dependent children. 
The best way in which a widow with dependent children can do 
her greatest work in Australia is not by competing for wages but 
by carrying on to the best of her ability in her home the work of 
mothercraft so that her children may be given the best maternal 
guidance to become the future citizens of a great 
Commonwealth. 39 
Sir George Pearce told Western Australians that the two issues of the election 
were defence and finance. The government would ensure cooperation with 
Britain in both: 
... an isolation policy on these issues is suicide. We cannot 
adequately defend this country by ourselves, but allied with 
Britain we need have no fear. 
The Labor Party's policy is isolation. Mr Curtin says that there 
can be no confidence in collective security; on the other hand 
we stand for collective security within the Empire ... we do not 
propose to commit to any 
WILD ADVENTURES OVERSEAS.40 
Labor's policy was also for isolation from Britain in trade, Pearce maintained: 
it would impose tariffs on Britain as high as those on "foreign countries". 
38. Ibid., p. 17. 
39. Ibid., p. 19. 
40. Sunday Times, 17 Oct 1937, NLA MS 1827 /252. R 
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Australian self-interest lay in preferring British goods and receiving 
reciprocal treatment.41 
UAP candidates were not solely concerned with external affairs, however. 
The Attorney-General, Robert Menzies, told one audience in Adelaide that 
British working men and women now enjoyed unprecedented security by 
virtue of a contributory national insurance scheme. The Australian working 
man likewise "wanted a scheme that would put him in the dignified position 
of drawing from a fund to which he contributed." In a radio broadcast, he 
asserted that Labor's insistence on a non-contributory scheme funded from 
revenue was incompatible with "national respect and solvency".42 UAP 
speakers' notes listed reversals of the 1930s austerity cut in public service 
wages, old age, veterans' and invalid pensions, and maternity allowances. 
The government had - in the slogan of 1931 - "restored confidence", allowing 
private enterprise to increase its workforce: thus trade union unemployment 
had fallen from 27.4% in 1931 to 12.2% in 1936.43 The Commonwealth 
Arbitration Court had raised the basic wage by six shillings in recognition of 
the economic recovery. Taxes had fallen.44 Casey warned that Labor could 
destroy overnight the confidence which the Lyons government had taken six 
years to develop.45 
41. Ibid. 
42. Adelaide Advertiser, 5 Oct 1937. Menzies papers: NLA MS 4936/28. Album: 1937-38, p. 52; 
Argus, 22 Sep 1937. Ibid., p. 50. 
43. The Record of the Lyons Government, 1932-37, Melbourne, 1937, pp. 5-7, 72-74, 76-78, 90, 
105-07. 
44. Lyons Leads the Way, Sydney, 1937. NLA MS 5910 
45
. Sunshine Advocate, 27 Sep 1937. NLA MS 6150/5/35. 
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At the local level, a pamphlet for the UAP member for Barton, Albert Lane, 
contained a mixture of local advocacy, boasts of national recovery from 
Depression, warnings about Lang and repudiation, and premonition of war, 
which was characteristic of the UAP campaign. Lane had "attended 
personally to the cases of between 800 and 900 pensioners and [had] been able 
to have their rate of payment increased" - although he did not say how this 
had been arranged. Lane noted that Australia-wide factory employment had 
increased from 337,000 in 1931-32 to 518, 000 in 1936-37. But the lessons of the 
past pointed to a threat to this prosperity. "Your experience of the Lang 
Government's handling of the Savings Bank of New South Wales should be 
a warning to prevent Labor from tampering with the principles of banking". 
The international scene was also menacing. 
The Lyons' Government's defence policy has been based on 
advice given by the best experts available in Australia and Great 
Britain. 
The present wars in Spain and China have displayed the 
horrors of modern warfare. 
To keep these horrors from Australia's shores, the fullest 
cooperation between our defence forces and those of the Empire 
is called for. This policy does not involve participation by 
Australia in wars which are not of vital concern for her own 
safety from invasion. 
Labor's policy of isolation carries no guarantee that it will be 
endorsed by an enemy. It has been evolved out of the heads of 
the leaders of the Labor Party without regard for the realities of 
the world situation. 
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EMPIRE CO-OPERATION WILL KEEP WAR AWAY.46 
Labor's campaign also emphasised the danger of war, and the Party's attitude 
was, as its opponents alleged, isolationist, although not noticeably pacifist. 
"There is international dynamite in all these places [Berlin, Moscow, China, 
Mediterranean] - it may explode at any moment." 47 The Lyons government 
had through its conduct at the Imperial Conference "displayed an 
inclination" to involve Australia in foreign wars, alleged Labor member for 
Dalley, J.S. Rosevear. Labor would provide for national defence, but refused 
to "make the Australian people a police force or salvage corps in the 
permanent disorders of Europe."48 Labor claimed in conspiratorial style that 
the Australian delegation to the Imperial Conference had made a secret 
agreement for conscription for overseas service. Conscription, 
recommended by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Sir 
Maurice Hankey, during his visit to Australia three years before, could be 
introduced at any time by amendment of the Defence Act - without any 
requirement for a referendum. 
The Lyons Ministry has an undisclosed understanding with the 
Tory Government of Britain in the event of war. It is the pliant 
tool of British Brass Hats and of the sinister Agents of Secret 
Diplomacy. 
WHAT WENT ON BEHIND THE LOCKED AND GUARDED 
DOORS OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON? 
46. Albert Lane, M.P., Sydney, n.d. (1937]. NLA MS 5910. 
47. Keep Australia Out of War!, Sydney, n.d. (1937]. Ibid. 
48. Dalley Electorate. Vote 1, Rosevear, J.S, Sydney, 1937. Ibid .. 
Lyons and Parkhill, who represented Australia, committed us 
to war measures of which we know nothing. 49 
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Defence received the millions which could not be found for the alleviation 
of poverty, Labor complained. The campaign manual cited Keynes' 
observation that governments were the most willing to borrow when their 
purpose was war.so Labor appealed both to the desire for peace, and for 
economic security: in Curtin's words, "a policy which will give adequate 
security both against invasion and against the black despair of the next 
Depression". The candidate for Corio asserted that per capita wages had fallen 
from £208 in 1927 to £127 in 1937.51 Labor remained convinced of the need to 
bring banking under national control. This unorthodox policy was given a 
conservative aspect by the formula that the Commonwealth Bank would be 
"restored to its original charter."52 
A Queensland newspaper commented that both parties should be disturbed 
by the quietness of the campaign. Radio had decreased attendance at public 
meetings, but generally the most prominent politicians could still attract a 
crowd. In Queensland, candidates had found it difficult to generate public 
interest once the party leaders had completed their tours of the State. Casey 
49. Beware of Conscription!, Sydney, 1937. NLA MS 5910. See also 'Collective Security' Plan, 
Sydney, n.d. [1937]. NLA MS 5910; "Mr Lyons would involve Australians in conflicts outside 
Australia", Curtin asserted. Sunday Times [W.A.], 17 Oct 1937. Pearce papers: NLA MS 
1827 /252. 
50. Labor's Challenge: Why Australia Should Vote Out the Lyons Government, Perth, 1937, 
pp. 80 &45. 
51. 'The Issues at Stake'; Geelong Advertiser, 13 Oct 1937, NLA MS 6150/5/35. 
52. Anon., 'The Senate. Mr J.M. Fraser's Candidature', West Australian, 20 Oct 1937. NLA MS 
1827 /248. See also Labor's Challenge, pp. 6-10. 
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had attempted to provoke interjections at one Brisbane meeting, but had 
succeeded only in prompting "academic exchanges with Social Creditors."53 
Lyons and his colleagues were re-elected once again. The total UAP vote rose 
by 0.73%, but the Party lost two seats, Bendigo and Grey (South Australia), to 
the Country Party; while Ballaarat was taken by Labor. The incorporation of 
the Lang Labor group accounted for most of the increase in 'official Labor' 
representation, but in 1937 the Labor share of the valid primary vote (43.17%) 
exceeded the 1934 total of Federal and Lang Labor returns (41.18%). 
1934 1937 
% seats won % seats won 
UAP 32.97 33 33.7 28 
Ind UAP 0.71 1 
CP 12.61 14 15.55 16 
ALP 26.81· 18 43.17 29 
NSW ALP 14.37 9 
Soc Credit 4.69 0 2.2 0 
Ind 3.18 0 4.18 0 
Com 1.34 0 0.48 0 
Elections for the House of Re12resentatives -1934 & 193754 
Despite the formal re-admission of the Beasely faction to federal caucus, 
Australian Worker editor, Henry Boote, blamed the corrupt tactics employed 
by the Lang 'Inner Group' for depressing the Labor vote in New South Wales. 
This was the reason the UAP still held seats such as Barton and Parkes. In 
53. Sunday Daily Mail [Brisbane], 17 Oct 1937. NLA MS 6150/5/35. 
54. Hughes & Graham, op. cit., pp. 351 & 357. 
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industrial electorates - East Sydney, for example - the Labor vote had fallen 
even though enrolments .had risen.SS The government lost the Minister for 
Defence, Archdale Parkhill, to a non-Labor independent, Percy SpenderS6. 
Another notable casualty was the Senate leader and Minister for Territories 
and External Affairs, Sir George Pearce, who had begun his ministerial career 
with the Defence portfolio in the first Fisher ministry, continued as 
Nationalist minister for Defence after 1916, and served as one of Bruce's 
principal counsellors in the 1920s. Pearce's supporters blamed his demise on 
the animosity of West Australian secessionists, whom he opposed; and on 
the failure of the UAP member for Perth, Walter Nairn, to include Senate 
directions on his how-to-vote card. Pearce attributed his defeat to the burden 
of ministerial responsibilities preventing him from engaging in publicity 
work. A Victorian Senator, James Guthrie, told Pearce that the UAP would 
have held the seat of Ballarat if not for the lack of organisation, and the last-
minute selection of the candidate. There had been virtually no work on 
behalf of the Senate candidates, and many booths had not been supplied with 
how-to-vote cards: " ... unless there is a clean sweep in certain quarters and 
real organisers and branches established, we will lose several seats in the 
SS. H.E.B., Why We Lost the Elections, Labor Council of NSW, Sydney, n.d [1937). ALP 
papers: NLA MS 4985. Box 187. In 1934, Lang Labor had won 35.93% and Federal Labor 9.36% 
of the vote (a total of 45.92%), giving the parties nine and one seats respectively. In 1937 
Labor candidates stood on one ticket and won 42.25% and eleven seats. In the Federal elections 
since 1914, Parkes had been won by Labor once, in 1929, and was reclaimed by the Nationalists 
in a by-election the next year. The seat of Barton was created for the 1922 election, and had 
been won by Labor in 1922, 1928 and 1929. Hughes & Graham, o-p. cit 
S6. MHR for Warringah (NSW), 1947-51; Honorary Minister, 1939; Treasurer, 1940; Vice 
President of the Executive Council, 1940; Minister for External Territories, 1949-51; Australian 
Ambassador to USA, 1951-59; KBE 1952; KCVO 1957. 
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House of Representatives in Victoria at the next election, and lose control of 
the Senate for certain.1157 
The UAP's uninspiring performance at the 1937 election led some members 
and backers of the government to question whether Lyons was still an 
effective leader. The Prime Minister's position was also undermined by his 
refusal to countenance the introduction of conscription which, with the 
increasingly ominous international situation, was becoming a rallying issue 
for the disaffected within the party. Lyons' biographer argues that by 1937 
conscription had become as much a core element of non-Labor belief as 
'sound finance' had been in the early 1930s. In March 1939 the Herald, whose 
proprietor, Keith Murdoch, had become disenchanted with Lyons, estimated 
that four out of five UAP parliamentarians favoured universal service. 
Lyons' views remained those of the Great War 'no' campaigner he had once 
been; as with Hughes, non-Labor politicians discovered that in building a 
coalition based in part on the supposed vote-winning power of an ex-Labor 
leader they were forced to accommodate some of his, and his constituents', 
beliefs.58 Lyons' principal rival was Menzies, who had entered federal 
politics in 1934 on the understanding that he would eventually succeed to 
the Prime Ministership. Tension between the pair grew, and peaked over the 
issue of national insurance. The government had promised in the 1937 
campaign to introduce a comprehensive scheme, and subsequently prepared 
57. Thomas White to Pearce, 2 Nov 1937. Pearce papers: NLA MS 1927 /3/870; John Simmons 
(Sunday Times) to Pearce, 13 Nov 1937. lbid./890-91; Pearce to Eggleston [copy], 17 Nov 1937. 
Ibid./912; Senator J.F. Guthrie to Pearce, 18 Nov 1937. Illli!./914. Sir Thomas White, MHR 
for Balaclava (Vic), 1929-51; Minister for Trade and Customs, 1933-38; for Air and Civil 
Aviation 1949-51. KBE 1952; James Guthrie, Senator (Vic), 1915-38. 
58. Hart, op. cit., pp. 248-51. 
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for its administration; but the hostility of the Country Party, and the growing 
financial burden of def~nce led Cabinet in March 1939 to abandon its 
proposal. Menzies resigned from Cabinet in protest. 59 
The next month, Lyons suffered a heart attack and died. He was succeeded 
by Menzies, after the Country Party leader, Earle Page, had served as 
'caretaker' for three weeks. Menzies was experienced in administration, 
well-connected with Melbourne's business and professional elites, and 
intellectually gifted. There were some reservations about his tendency to 
arrogance, but his position as first man within the parliamentary UAP was 
obvious. Robert Menzies was born in 1894 in the wheat town of Jeparit, in 
western Victoria. His parents, James and Kate, ran a general shop, and while 
their income was modest their status in the community was high. James 
Menzies was a leading figure in the Methodist church, and in local 
associations; and from 1911 to 1920 he was MLA for Lowan. A precocious 
and diligent student, Robert Menzies won a series of prizes and scholarships 
which, by 1913 had taken him to the University of Melbourne, where he 
excelled in arts and law. Menzies enjoyed his period of compulsory military 
service in the Melbourne University Rifles, and as president of the student 
council and editor of the university magazine was an enthusiastic patriot 
and supporter of conscription. He was old enough to enlist in the AIF, but 
both his brothers were already serving in France, while the only other 
sibling, Belle, had eloped with a soldier. If Robert had enlisted and both he 
and his brothers were killed or disabled, there would have been no one left 
59. Martin, op. cit., pp. 261-64. 
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to provide for their elderly parents; the Menzies decided that Robert should 
stay. By the standards of the time, this decision would have been considered 
reasonable by many, but the war had engendered resentment against those 
who were thought to have evaded their duties; and Menzies' decision 
dogged him for at least the first ten years of his political career. Menzies rose 
quickly in the Melbourne legal fraternity, acquiring an expertise in 
industrial law; and in 1920 he married Pattie Leckie, the daughter of a 
manufacturer and Nationalist politician, and established a home in Kew. 
Menzies' interest in politics had been stimulated by his work on industrial 
law, and in 1926 he made a number of speeches for the Federal Union, set up 
to oppose the Bruce government's attempt to transfer all arbitration powers 
to the Commonwealth. In 1928, Menzies was elected Legislative Councillor 
for the East Yarra Province, and the next year was returned as member for 
Nun\awadding, and served as Minister for Railways. During his time in 
State politics Menzies developed as a skilful public speaker: he learned to 
base his speeches on a few simple points. By non-Labor standards, he was a 
conservative, sceptical of innovation, and jealous of the rights of property. 
He became concerned about public extravagance, and the sectional banditry 
of the Country Party, and in 1930-31 emerged as one of Victoria's most 
prominent champions of sound finance. Menzies' response to the 
Depression was to insist that any relaxation of contractual obligations would 
result in disaster. He earned notoriety by saying that it was better for 
Australians to starve than to repudiate their debts. In 1934, Menzies replaced 
Latham as member for Kooyong, and Attorney General. He attempted to 
oppose the government's strict political and moral censorship, but had no 
quarrel with the attempt to exclude the Communist anti-war speaker, Egon 
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Kisch. Menzies' visits to England confirmed his idealised image of the home 
of liberty and culture, but in trade negotiations he was a tough advocate of 
Australia's distinct national interest. Menzies was as impatient with the 
Federal as with the Victorian Country Party, but the trade visits had forced 
proximity with Page, and their mutual dislike increased. A fortnight after 
Lyons' death, Page made an extraordinarily vicious speech against Menzies, 
accusing him undermining and then betraying Lyons by resigning from 
cabinet; and arguing that Menzies' failure to enlist in 1914-18 had rendered 
him incapable of eliciting a full war effort from the people. This last point, 
in particular, was regarded as beyond the pale, and probably increased 
support for Menzies, who in the subsequent party room ballot easily defeated 
his nearest challenger, Billy Hughes. Menzies formed an all-UAP minority 
government, with the provisional support of the Country Party. In the 
following months, Australian and British policy was to prepare for war 
while hoping until the last minute that peace could be preserved by making 
concessions to Hitler. On 3 September, when the ultimatum for the 
evacuation of Poland had expired, radio listeners heard Menzies announce 
that as Britain was at war with Germany, so was Australia.60 
Labor, too, was experiencing problems in discipline: the reconciliation of its 
rival factions was shown to be superficial; and as war approached these 
divisions became the most obvious in attitudes to defence. Evatt had 
remarked in May 1939 that Lang was showing "all the characteristics of a 
60. This paragraph is based on Martin, op. cit. 
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corrupt leader who is fast approaching the end."61 Four months later Lang, 
whose extremist positions and divisive internal politics had been a handicap 
for federal Labor since 1930, was replaced by W.J. McKell. But New South 
Wales Labor remained turbulent. In April 1940 the branch split into three 
sections: a group led by McKell and recognised by the federal Party; a leftwing 
bloc identified with the Senior Vice President, J.R. Hughes, and the State 
Secretary, A.W. Evans; and a new Langite faction, styled 'Australian Labor 
Party (Non-Communist)'. ~~ly and four other Lang adherents then left b ... s/~1 
s,1.-I J.. .. e/ /;u"· f'..-cc.f:1/A/f'vCwhe,..._ ~ __.) 
federal caucus. ( ThefHughes-Evans group secured control of the State 
conference and passed a resolution calling for a cessation of the war, and 
'hands off Russia.') Since the middle of the decade there had been a 
sometimes bewildering variety of Labor attitudes to external affairs: the 
isolationism and support for appeasement which had characterised Curtin's 
pronouncements; the even more uncompromising isolationism of Lang; and 
an idealist demand for war to be prevented by the international unity of 
labour.62 
The government made much of this confusion, but its own conduct of war 
policy was also criticised as inept and indecisive. By 1940 there was a well-
established cry from the Packer and Murdoch press for 'weak' ministers to 
be removed and Cabinet reconstituted on national unity lines to include 'big 
men': a notable cliche of the time. That the constitution required ministers to 
61
. Evatt to Curtin [copy], 11May1939. NLA MS 4738, Box 73, Folder: 'John Curtin and H.V. 
Evatt'. 
62
. ADB, vol. 9, p. 666; Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law, vol. 2, 1929-
1949, Melbourne, 1963, pp. 100-01; Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People, vol. 1, 1939-
41, 1952, pp. 248-49_) · fr.,J1 ,......._ hY:vc/f'.'lt~~ 1 fuc_~ /g.,.,,-c: ~ ~,#z1-...,,--;. 7r/~.4.~~-. ... 
c/ ~ N<'< Sc--£. l-~e.lc<.:,. &?,-<4 ./A_ /fvs"/r'>I/~ L.e--J,,,r /<./,.( <;;:_v(,,,,. c,( 
. ..... . .. ·-· ... .. . .. . .. . . .. . . ..;; / __., ) , / 
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be responsible to parliament did not feature in this campaign. The giants 
were thought to include the New South Wales Premier, B.S.B. Stevens63, and 
High Court Justice, H.V. Evatt. For his part, Menzies made repeated offers to 
Curtin of Cabinet seats in a national government, but these overtures were 
spurned. Advocates of national government were influenced by the British 
model.64 
At the onset of hostilities, the Prime Minister was convinced that the nation 
must avoid confusion by making an orderly transition to war organisation. 
The slogan he hit upon, however, 'business as usual', was flung back at him 
as evidence of complacency.65 In June 1940, Menzies told Herbert Brookes, 
... the clamour will go on. However, I am convinced that we 
have done the right thing and that the last year has seen a 
tremendous consoliaation of our strength. If we had begun this 
war with disruption of ordinary life we should not now have 
been able to meet this tremendous strain .... 66 
63. Premier of New South Wales, May 1932-Aug 1939. 
64. Martin, op. cit., Ch. 13. The Daily Telegraph identified Stewart, Gullett and Fairbairn 
as the weak links, but printed fulsome eulogies when the last two, along with the Minister for 
Defence, Street, were killed in an aircrash on 13 August: Daily Telegraph, 10 and 14 Aug 1940; 
see also SMH, 10Aug1940. NLA MS4936/28, Album: Jul-Oct 1940. Sir Frederick Stewart, 
MHR for Parramatta (NSW), 1931-46; Minister for Commerce, 1932-34; Parliamentary Under-
Secretary for Employment, 1934-36, Minister for Health and Social Services, 1939-41, for the 
Navy, 1939-40; for Supply and Development, 1940; for External Affairs, 1940-41; Kt. 1935; Sir 
Henry Gullett, MHR for Henty (Vic), 1925-40; Minister for Trade and Customs, 1928-29; 
Minister without portfolio, 1934-37; Minister for External Affairs, 1939-40; for Information, 
1939-40; Vice President Executive Council, 1940; KCMG 1933; James Fairbairn, MHR for 
Flinders (Vic), 1933-40; Honorary Minister, 1939; Vice President Executive Council, 1940; 
Minister for Air and Civil Aviation, 1940; Geoffrey Street, MHR Corangamite (Vic), 1934-40; 
Minister for Defence, 1938-40. 
65
. Martin, op. cit., p. 295. 
66
. Menzies to Brookes, 3 Jun 1940. NLA MS 1924/1/16 986. 
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The source of the clamour, according to one minister, included members of 
the UAP government of New South Wales, whose allegations that the 
Menzies administration was "not serious about its war efforts" were 
contributing to the development of a defeatist mood.67 If the government 
indeed lacked serious purpose, then this malaise was also apparent among 
the general public. Part of the problem was that, until the invasion of the 
Low Countries and France in May-June 1940, the war seemed remote and 
unreal: in April 1940, Henry Boote could comment on the German invasion 
of Denmark that "[T]he Second World War seems imminent."68 
By July 1940, however, there were no British troops left in continental 
Europe, and a war in the skies over Britain had begun which was thought to 
presage a German invasion. -In view of the increased danger, there were calls 
for the suspension of the elections, due by September, but the government, 
while continuing to offer an all-party coalition, proceeded with the only 
practical course open to it, and elections were set for 21 September. 
Menzies gave his policy speech at the Camberwell Town Hall, in his 
electorate of Kooyong. His themes were the government's achievements in 
building a war capacity, and the need for national unity - most importantly, a 
national government. The Prime Minister stated that his ministry had 
recruited and equipped 130, 000 men in the AIF and 100, 000 in the militia; 
67. Spender to Menzies, 1Jul1940. NLA MS 4936/37 /13. 
68
. Diary, 9Apr1940. Boote papers: NLA MS 2070/2/1, pp. 32-33. 
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built army camps; begun shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing programs; 
developed the munitions. industry; controlled primary product marketing, 
thus preventing "chaos"; restrained inflation; and fostered employment 
growth. Menzies reiterated his call for an all-party administration, and 
explained that Curtin had rejected his offer of five or six cabinet places: " 
' .. .let the party fight go on' " was Labor's attitude; the policy of Labour in 
Britain was quite different. Labor represented uncertainty: it could only 
govern with the support of Beasley's Non-Communist Labor Party; and there 
was the added complication of the third, 'hands off Russia' party in New 
South Wales. The Opposition had a disturbing record on defence. In 
November they had opposed sending troops overseas. Labor only recently 
agreed to support the Empire Air Training Scheme, and the provision of 
further forces. At the last election, Labor's policy was isolationist. On 20 June 
1940, when the German invasion of France was nearly complete, nine Labor 
members voted against the National Security Act. "You know where we 
stand, but who knows where Labor stands?" Menzies closed with a quote 
from Churchill: " 'Let us go forward together in all parts of the 
Empire ... There is not a week, nor a day, nor an hour to be lost.' "69 
Curtin, broadcasting from Perth, also urged national unity, but in socialistic 
terms: " ... everything must go into the common pool". The profit-based 
system must make way for wartime needs, but union and other civic rights 
must be maintained. Curtin depicted the UAP as the source of political 
instability: the government had changed ministers frequently since the last 
69. SMH, 3 Sep 1940, pp. 9-10. 
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election. Labor was best qualified to administer war policy: its decision to 
emphasise aviation - criticised by the UAP in 1937 - had been vindicated by 
the success of air power in Europe. The party supported co-operation with 
the Empire Air Training Scheme. Labor's 1937 policy speech had stressed the 
need for mechanisation of the armed forces: but the government had not, 
in the last three years , been building aeroplanes, docks, and fuel storage. 
Labor would raise the weekly pay for an AIF private with a wife and one child 
from 77 /- to 87 I 6. The Party's non-military policies remained in the mould 
of the 1930s: control of interest rates, banking policy and investment via an 
expanded Commonwealth Bank; a more progressive tax regimen; 
guaranteed wheat prices. Curtin opposed the government's petrol rationing 
scheme which, he argued, should have been introduced earlier and less 
severely, and might have been avoided altogether if other foreign exchange-
consuming imports had been blocked with tariffs. Curtin extolled the 
military benefits of Labor's proposal for. a pension for widows with 
dependent children. "We cannot expect to have a physically fit manhood to 
defend the nation in the years ahead unless proper nurture is assured to the 
children of each generation." The Party was already planning for postwar 
reconstruction and would ensure through state intervention that there 
would be no return to pre-war conditions, as had occurred in 1918. "We 
have to plan with the entire resources of this nation to win the war and we 
also have to plan with the entire resources of this nation to win the peace."70 
70. The Policy of the Labor Party, Melbourne, 1940. NLA MS 4738, Box 30, Folder: '1940 1943'. 
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UAP speakers' notes urged that the government had ensured that living 
standards were protected· from the effects of meeting the financial cost of the 
war. Taxes were based on ability to pay, and were levied more on companies 
than on individuals. Price control on a cost-plus-profit formula, and a low 
interest rate policy, had also protected living standards.71 Unemployment, 
Spender told a meeting at Manly, was the lowest since the First World War, 
and this was the best proof that the government had directed all available 
national resources in to the war effort. Spender condemned the motor service 
industries for conducting a poster campaign designed to punish the 
government for proposing petrol rationing. One UAP pamphlet, reviving a 
slogan of the 1922 election, 'Safety First', warned that Labor's impractical and 
inflationary monetary policies were a "path to danger."72 
Another theme was Labor's unreliability on defence: in New South Wales 
the Evans-Hughes ('hands off Russia') and Non-Communist Labor (Lang) 
Labor parties opposed dispatching expeditionary forces. The opposition had 
resisted the rearmament program which the government had been carrying 
out since 1934; in November 1939, Ward and Brennan spoke against the 
war.73 Australia now produced a fighter and trainer aeroplane, the Wirraway, 
and would in the future manufacture a bomber. Australia had made great 
progress in armaments production - an achievement ignored by the 
71. UAP Speaker' Notes 1940, No. 1, Budget Points, Melbourne, 1940; Ibid., No. 2, Protection 
of Workers. 
72. Manly Daily, 10 Sep 1940. Spender papers: NLA MS 4875/9; SMH, 14 Sep 1940, Ibid. 
Safety First, Melbourne, n.d [1940]. NLA MS 4738, Box 110, Folder: 'early political matters, 
1926-'. 
73. UAP Speaker' Notes 1940, No. 10 - Labor's War Policy: Which Party? Which Policy?; see 
also: These Men Stand for A National Government and an 'All-In' War Policy, Sydney, n.d 
[1940}. 
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government's cynical critics.74 Menzies was not the obstacle to a national 
government: he had offered to resign the premiership if Labor would join a 
coalition. Labor's only response was to propose a time-wasting advisory war 
cabinet.75 Voters should "back the government that's backing Churchill"; one 
UAP pamphlet juxtaposed quotations from patriotic speeches by Churchill 
and Menzies.76 When Menzies addressed a meeting of three thousand 
people in the Sydney Town, every mention of Churchill's name was cheered 
by the crowd; but speaking in his electorate the next day, Menzies was asked 
by an interjector whether he had supported Churchill or Chamberlain during 
the appeasement controversy of 1937-39. Menzies acknowledged that he had 
endorsed Chamberlain's policies, and insisted that the Munich agreement 
had provided valuable time for British re-armament.77 
Not all Labor people were lukewarm in their support for the war. The 
candidate for Wimmera, M.M. Nolan, was depicted on his campaign 
pamphlet wearing his AIF sergeants' uniform. Nolan argued that the war 
was no excuse for postponing domestic reform: the Commonwealth Bank 
should provide more credit for home-builders and primary producers.78 
Campaigning for the outer suburban Sydney seat of Barton, H.V. Evatt 
pledged to work for a war effort which would bring national renewal: 
74
. Broadcast by Menzies. Courier Mail, 23 August 1940. NLA MS 4738/28. Album: Jul-Oct 
1940; UAP Speaker' Notes 1940, No. 8, Aircraft Construction 
75. Ibid., No. 9, Why Australia has no National Government. 
76
. Australia Must Have a United Government, Melbourne, n.d [1940]. NLA MS 4739, Box 110, 
Folder: 'early political matters, 1926-'; Appeal to Action and Call to Sacrifice, Melbourne, n.d 
[1940]. Ibid. 
77
. Sun [Sydney], 11and12Sep1940. NLA MS 4936/28, Album: Jul-Oct 1940. 
78. M.M. Nolan, Melbourne, 1940. NLA MS 4738. Box 30. '19401943' folder. 
The last war brought us victory, but not security. For the 
mistakes of the statesmen of that period, the rising generation is 
now suffering .... Let us place in office a reborn Labour party 
which will again become a great national Australian party, and 
will help to save Australia from disaster.79 
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The UAP did not win a majority, but formed government with the support of 
two independents, Alex Wilson (Wimmera), who favoured the Country 
Party, and A.W. Coles (Henty) - who was generally supposed to sympathise 
with the UAP. The government's worst performance was in New South 
Wales, where Labor took three seats from the UAP, and two from the 
Country Party. 80 
1937 1940 
% seats won % seats won 
UAP 33.7 28 30.22 23 
Ind UAP 0.71 1 
CP 15.55 16 13.71 14 
ALP 43.17 29 40.16 32 
NSW ALP 5.23 4 
State Labor 2.61 0 
Soc Credit 2.2 0 
Ind 4.18 0 8.07 1 
Com 0.48 0 
Elections for the House of Re12resentatives - 1937 & 194081 
79
. Form letter: Evatt to electors of Barton, 19 Sep 1940. Evatt papers, Flinders University of 
South Australia. File: 'elections - federal 1940'. 
80. Sawer,~., p. 125; Hasluck, ~., p. 259. 
81. Hughes & Graham, op. cit., pp. 357 & 363 .. 
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Press criticism of the Government had been the most intense in New South 
Wales; and there -may have been something in Menzies' complaint that the 
hostility of the Sydney press had been responsible for his failure to secure a 
majority.82 If so the press campaign was merely negative in its effect: the 
Sydney Morning Herald 's much-vaunted 'big man', Bertram Stevens, who 
stood as a non-Labor independent, had been unable to win the seat of Lang. 
Perhaps voters were dissatisfied with the government but unsure or 
unenthusiastic about Labor. During the campaign, A.B. Piddington had 
warned that Labor's neglect of programs of social reform had weakened its 
popular appeal: 
What voters want to know is what a Labour government will 
do in the next three years. 
Since 1914 it has done nothing and proposed nothing for 
. human enrichment. Yet the 'Condition of the People' is the one 
thing everyone is thinking about. .. If Labour had a social policy, 
any social policy, there would be some legislation for which to 
ask a mandate. 83 
For Menzies, the 1940 election proved to be not so much a victory as a stay of 
execution; in the months that followed the demand for a national 
government was heard again from within the ranks of the UAP, and as the 
Prime Minister had been unable to obtain a pact with Labor, the implication 
was that he must go. The opinion was growing among Press and politicians 
that Menzies was clever but indecisive, and too aloof to inspire loyalty. In 
82. Advertiser [Adelaide], 23 Sep 1940. NLA MS 4936/29, Album: 'Jul-Oct 1940'. 
83
. Piddington to Evatt, 7 Sep 1940. Evatt papers, Flinders University of South Australia. 
File: 'correspondence- miscellaneous - 1940'. 
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January 1941, he left for England, to represent Australian views on the 
Commonwealth war effort; and particularly the need to reinforce the base at 
Singapore; Menzies visited the island garrison en route and was disturbed by 
the fatalistic attitude of its commander. As well as undertaking meetings 
with the British government, during which he became alarmed at Churchill's 
dictatorial methods and refusal to countenance independent advice, Menzies 
spoke at many public meetings. Speech-making was his forte, and he was 
feted by the British press, as Hughes had been in 1916. Menzies prolonged 
his visit until May, and on his return found that his position had been 
further undermined. 84 
Menzies complained that Australia had achieved little of the wartime 
national unity he had observed in Britain. Whether or not Britain was as 
united as Menzies claimed, certainly he and his ministers were unable to 
devote themself exclusively to war policy, but were obliged also to engage 
with the usual peacetime issues of intervention and laissez faire. On these 
matters, UAP supporters offered contradictory advice. On the one hand, 
Menzies was advised that financial orthodoxy remained a strong suit for the 
UAP, because in New South Wales, at least, many voters continued to 
associate Labor with the closing of the State Savings Bank, and with 
Theodore's fiduciary notes proposal. "People are not prepared to take risks 
where money is concerned. The greatest concern is usually displayed by those 
who have little or nothing to lose."85 On the other hand, another supporter 
84. Martin,~., Ch. 14-16. 
85
. R.W., [?]Memo for Mr Menzies, 17 Jul 1941. NLA MS 4936/410/1. 
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warned Menzies that voters were disenchanted with the postwar experience 
of laissez faire. 
You must overcome the thought in the minds of probably 753 
of the people that though thousands of millions of Pounds can 
be found for war, as soon as the war is over nothing will be 
found for the correction of many ills which exist under 
democracy. It is not even a panacea to say to them that after all 
democracy has less evils than any other system of government 
they know.86 
The government had already made a step in this direction by introducing an 
endowment of five shillings per week for every child after the first. This had 
been Labor policy at the previous election, but was announced unheralded by 
the government. Child endowment was the first new social security benefit 
to be introduced by the Commonwealth since Fisher's maternity allowance 
of 1912. In that the funding was from payroll tax and general revenue rather 
than individual contributions, this programme represented a significant 
departure from non-Labor policy, and anticipated post-war directions. As the 
young Minister for Labour and National Service, Harold Holt, promised, 
child endowment was a /1 'foretaste and pledge of the full reconstruction that 
will be possible when we can again turn our surplus productive forces to the 
purposes of peace.' /1 87 
86
. H.B. de Berenger, Ivanhoe, to Menzies, 15 Aug 1941. NLA MS 4936/38/18. 
87. T.H. Kewley, Social Security in Australia, 1900-72, Sydney, rev. ed. 1973 (1965), pp. 
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But perhaps this was insufficient to dispel the perception that Menzies was 
remote from the needs and aspirations of the people. Another well-wisher, 
who maintained a keen sense of an improvident and undeserving working 
class, advised him that 
[T]his particular class say, you are too domineering, too 
dogmatic, too English, you want to create class distinctions, you 
and Stanley Melbourne Bruce are a good pair, what do they 
want to send a Minister to England at all for?; that when you 
came back from England you described them as common 
people. 
The fact of the matter is that you are too much of a gentleman 
for them.88 
The secretary of the UAP, H.W. Horsfield, suggested to Menzies that he might 
overcome his image problem by making direct appeals to the people through 
radio broadcasts. This, Horsfield explained, had been Roosevelt's method in 
his second presidential campaign, and helped him to overcome the 
opposition of the press. Menzies replied that he was interested in the 
suggestion, and had in fact been considering it over the past few weeks.89 But 
while radio talks in the intimate, Roosevelt style were to play a part in the 
revival of Menzies' fortunes over the next three years, it was by now too 
late to rescue his position. Menzies made Curtin a last offer of national 
government and, when he was rebuffed, resigned on 31 August. In a private 
88
. Kathleen O'Sullivan, East Brisbane, to Menzies, 10 Sep 1941. NLA MS 4936/40/31. 
89
. Horsfield to Menzies, 20Aug1941; Menzies to Horsfield, 21Aug1941. NLA MS4936/40/33. 
Also cited Martin, op. cit., p. 399. 
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document he gave as his reasons the difficulty of maintaining a minority 
government; opposition from within the party; and the hostility of the 
Sydney Morning Herald and the Murdoch newspapers.90 
Under the leadership of the Country Party's Arthur Fadden, the minority 
government continued for another month, until October when the two 
independents switched their support to Labor in the hope of achieving a 
more stable administration. It seemed that Evatt's wish that Labor would 
once more be called upon in a moment of national crisis had been 
answered.91 Labor took office just as the war entered its most dangerous 
phase for Australia. On 7 December the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, and 
began invasions of Thailand and Malaya. At the beginning of the new year, 
Boote had written: 
All Australia taking the Pacific situation very seriously. A lot of 
people really scared, fearing a Japanese invasion. Government's 
acting as though bombing raids were almost certain to take 
place. Manila has gone. Penang has gone. Singapore is in grave 
danger. All the young men being called up for home defence.92 
Singapore surrendered on 15 February 1942, and four days later Japanese 
aeroplanes bombed Darwin. Although Eddie Ward created controversy by 
alleging that the Menzies government had planned to surrender to any 
90
. Ibid., p. 380. 
91
. Evatt had in fact been manoeuvring for Labor to take office in a national government ever since 
his election in September 1940. See Boote diary, 23Apr1941. NLA MS 2070/2/2. 
92. Boote diary, 2 Jan 1942. Ibid. 
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invading Japanese army all Australia territory north of Brisbane, and that the 
documents proving this were missing, the call-up became become the most 
pressing issue in national politics.93 Australia's defence forces comprised the 
Australian Imperial Force, composed entirely of volunteers; and the Citizen 
Military Forces, made up of both volunteers and conscripts, which under the 
Defence Act could be deployed only within Australian territory. This 
included New Guinea, but excluded Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. 
The Opposition and press were strongly of the view that all Australian forces, 
including conscripts, should be able to be deployed wherever they were 
needed, particularly as American conscripts were liable to serve anywhere in 
the Pacific. It was known that there was much opposition within the labour 
movement to conscription for overseas service, and the defeat of the 1916-17 
plebiscites might also have cast doubt on the likelihood of public support; 
hence the government's critics seldom advocated unconditional conscription 
as such, rather the demand was for a 'single army', to have the territorial 
reach of the AIF. The government's response was that the transfer of soldiers 
from CMF to AIF ensured sufficient men for extra-territorial service. 
Nonetheless, Curtin succeeded in obtaining Labor Party approval for an 
extension of CMF responsibilities northward to the Equator, but this did not 
satisfy the Opposition, which pointed out that only the AIF would be able to 
advance to Singapore. Nevertheless, in February 1943, the UAP party room 
determined to support the bill providing for this extension: UAP members 
feared that if they opposed the bill it might be defeated by a combination of 
Opposition and Labor members, and resolved to accept a limited step toward 
a single army. This position provoked the rebellion of bloc of UAP members, 
93
. MHR East Sydney, 1931; 1932-63; Minister for Labour and National Service, 1941-43, for 
Transport and External Territories, 1943-49. 
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led by Menzies, styled the National Service Group. The rebels claimed that 
the amendment was too weak to merit support, and pledged to act as a 
'ginger group' to the UAP on the conscription issue.94 
As the danger of invasion receded in 1942, however, non-Labor people came 
to think more about the problems of the post-war world, and particularly 
about the need to resist what seemed to be a powerful trend towards 
government control. In September, the Victorian Chamber of 
Manufacturers formed an Institute of Public Affairs, to promote among 
business people and the public a 'free enterprise' version of the new wartime 
politics of heightened social duty and responsibility. By June 1943, separate 
IPA organisations had been established in New South Wales, Queensland 
and South Australia. While there was no single IP A line, the general theme 
was that non-Labor must make concession~ to the popularity of Labor's 
policies of full employment and greater social security provision. Non-Labor 
should offer a modern, centrist alternative to the harsh deflationary 
orthodoxy of the 1930s and the overarching state socialism threatened, 
apparently, by the Curtin Government's suspiciously enthusiastic 
supervision of wartime regulation.95 Resentment of wartime controls was an 
element of public opinion which promised an opportunity for non-Labor 
revival. Even socialists could grumble, "[T]his is the Age of Regulations, and 
94. This paragraph is based on Martin, Q12.....ci!., pp. 405-10; Geoffrey Bolton, The Oxford 
History of Australia, vol. 5, 1942-1988, The Middle Way, Melbourne, 1990, pp. 15-17; 
Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 326-53. 
95. Simms, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
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many of them are stupidly unnecessary and arbitrary."96 In March 1943, 
Evatt was warned that 
With the increase in the feeling of security the people are no 
longer willing to accept continued or added restrictions. The 
Government that is forced to interfere with the beer, bets and 
tobacco of the multitude is in a very difficult situation ... The 
middle class, which certainly was strongly in your favour when 
things were bad, will swing away if propaganda comes from the 
right quarter.97 
Since losing office in August 1941, Menzies had been trying to encourage this 
movement of opinion and to re-establish himself as its leader. Released 
from official duties, he took the opportunity to follow Horsfield's advice, and 
commenced a series of informal, Roosevelt-style broadcasts. Menzies' 
weekly talks· began in January 1942 and finished in April 1944.98 Every Friday 
night, at a quarter past nine, listeners who tuned:-in to Sydney' 2UE and 
associated stations in Victoria and Queensland could hear the former Prime 
Minister discuss current topics. Menzies' style was both conversational and 
polished. He usually presented himself not as a UAP politician but as a 
thoughtful man reflecting on his reading, and his experiences in public life. 
His topics ranged from 'Sea Power' (as vital now as in the days of Elizabeth) to 
'The Importance of Cheerfulness' (it was the British and Australian antithesis 
96. Boote diary, 2Apr1942. NLA MS 2070/2/2. 
97
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to the "gloomy fanaticism" of the dictators). Menzies praised the industrial 
and military auxiliary work of 'Women in War' and argued that while in 
postwar Australia motherhood would remain women's most valuable 
national work, 
.... we shall be completely unrealistic if we do not realize that 
when this war is over there will no more be a return to the 
status quo for women than there will be such a return to many 
of our older notions of life.99 
The assumption underlying this and Menzies' other broadcasts was that, 
whatever the post-war order might be, it would entail a transformation of the 
politics of the 1920s and 1930s. Menzies accepted that post-war politics would 
bring a greater role for state intervention, but was concerned that the new 
Australia should be built on a more individualist pattern than that 
anticipated by the wartime ethos of greater civic duty, and entitlement. For 
example, he insisted that Roosevelt's 'freedom from want' must not be taken 
to mean that the government would provide for alI.100 But Menzies also 
sought to reassure his listeners that he, for one, had abandoned some of the 
more unpopular notions associated with the pre-war non-Labor politics: 
essentially, the enforcement of the deflationary 'discipline' of sound finance, 
at the cost of high unemployment and inadequate social services. The theme 
is addressed squarely in 'Has Capitalism failed?'. Menzies argues that 
capitalism has been responsible for both progress and poverty; and that 
99. Menzies, op. cit., pp. 146-50, 192, 87-88. 
100. Ibid., pp. 26-29. 
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Australians should choose neither state socialism nor laissez faire, but a 
'middle way'. Contemporary problems required greater state intervention: in 
addition to the old remedy for "sweating", arbitration, the Commonwealth 
should provide unemployment insurance; work towards the adequate 
provision of food, clothing and shelter, and stabilise the trade cycle so as to 
maintain "steadier" levels of employment.101 
The most famous of these talks, 'The Forgotten People', was broadcast on 22 
May 1942, and published that year as a pamphlet. Menzies avoided 
mentioning the names of any politicians or parties, but his main subject was 
obviously the dominance of the Labor Government and the threat it posed to 
the middle class. He began by insisting that in Australia class divisions were 
asserted and created by misguided people, such as the Bishop who had 
recently demanded 'justice for the workers.'102 This demand rested on the 
false belief that society was comprised of two groups: industrial workers, and 
the idle rich. Australia lacked Britain's hierarchical divisions, so the notion 
of class war was false; but it could also be dangerous in that those who 
believed in it sought to create it. Menzies professed himself reluctant to talk 
about Australia in terms of classes, but was moved to make the case for the 
value of the group forgotten in the struggle between rich and the poor, the 
middle class.103 Menzies celebrated the communal benefits of middle class 
individualism, and warned that the middle class was threatened by a malaise 
101. Ibid., pp. 112-15. 
102. This may have been the Anglican Bishop of Goulburn, Ernest Burgmann, who wrote 
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caused by the false doctrines of class conflict, and state dependence: "[l]n war, 
as indeed at most times, we become the ready victims of phrases."104 
Menzies argued that Communists hated the bourgeosie because they were the 
bulwarks against revolution: the absence of a substantial middle class had 
made the French and Russian revolutions possible. The Australian middle 
class likewise had a " 'stake in the country ' " - not capital, but their homes -
and were thus a force for stability. But the Australian home was also the 
cradle of progress.105 Within the walls of the 'physical home', that haven of 
inviolable domestic life, was the 'human home' where parents raised their 
children to become independent citizens, not "leaners but lifters". The 
'spiritual home' was the source of the best in the human spirit: devotion to 
God and independence among men. In the home, parents raised their 
children in the middle class values of economic ambition, intellectual 
curiosity and artistic sensibility, and devotion to education, and in doing so 
provided the dynamic of the nation's progress towards greater material and 
cultural wealth.106 As Allan Martin comments, Menzies' 'The Forgotten 
People', 
... has the ring of sincerity because so much of it is in fact 
autobiographical. The middle class home he idealizes is the 
home in which he grew up ... the boy who, like a Scottish 
farmer's son, receives an assured future 'not by the inheritance 
of money but by the acquisition of that knowledge which will 
give him power', is Bob Menzies.107 
104. Ibid., p. 5. 
105. Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
106. Ibid., pp. 3-5. 
107 M · . 403 
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'The Forgotten People' also has a negative side. Judith Brett remarks on the 
loneliness and isolation suggested by Menzies' glorification of individualism, 
and his converse lack of regard for the charitable, social virtues of inter-
dependence. 
The description 'forgotten' captures well the dangers of self-
reliant individualism. If you give little or nothing to others, 
even though you ask for nothing in return, others are unlikely 
to recognise your virtues and to come to your aid when you are 
in difficulty .108 
Martin notes Menzies's scorn for " 'the dull offspring of stupid and 
improvident parents' " and remarks on his "frankly and fiercely elitist'' view 
of society.109 It seems that Menzies was intent on reminding those who 
thought of themselves as 'middle class' of their superiority to the "flabby" 
leaners; and the "[L]andless men [who] who smell the vapours of the street 
corner." Menzies insists that "[T]he case for the middle class is the case for a 
dynamic democracy as against a stagnant one. Stagnant waters are level, and 
in them the scum rises." Menzies' idealises the "achieved superiority" of the 
middle class, and reinforces the lesson by denigrating those who do not live 
up to the ideaI.110 In my opinion this was the language of a class hatred born 
of insecurity. Menzies appeals not only to pride, but also to self pity, and the 
fear of dispossession by the have-nots. What has been forgotten, Menzies 
108. Brett, op. cit., p. 72. 
109. Martin, .Qp.,_Q!., p. 403. 
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argues, is that the middle class have earned, and deserve their superior status. 
'The Forgotten People' was an artful, and heart-felt rendition of a traditional 
story, updated to 1942. Menzies warned his listeners that present conditions 
favoured "the levellers": full employment, he implied, made unions 
powerful; the Curtin Government might use wartime powers to install 
peacetime socialism, and the thriftless might use their votes to confiscate 
through taxation the wealth they were too lazy to earn and too improvident 
to save.111 The time had come for the economically dynamic and culturally 
enlightened middle class to translate its energy into politics and so to save 
itself, and Australia. 
'The Forgotten People', and Menzies' other broadcasts contributed to the 
revival of non-Labor morale and the formulation of a more positive and 
modern image, but in 1942 there was still a long way to go. Such was the 
weakness of the UAP, led since Menzies' defeat by the eighty year-old Billy 
Hughes, that few had confidence in its ability to provide a credible alternative 
to Labor. In July 1943, the Sydney Morning Herald contended that the apathy 
which gripped former UAP supporters was the effect of undemocratic 
organisation, and ideological poverty: the party needed to prise control of its 
finances from the unrepresentative Consultative Council, and to develop a 
progressive set of policies rather than relying on opposition to Labor 
proposals.112 While these were problems requiring extensive work, one 
immediate step was to find a credible leader. Menzies, Casey and Spender 
remained the obvious contenders, but the desperation of the non-Labor forces 
111
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may be gauged from the attempts apparently made by "influential parties" to 
persuade Sir John Latham, the Chief Justice of High Court, to resign from 
the bench in order to re-enter politics and take up the UAP leadership.113 As 
the 1943 elections drew nearer, the UAP's decline encouraged a number of 
independent non-Labor parties to enter the field. In New South Wales, 
UAP defectors formed a Liberal Democratic Party; while the Commonwealth 
Party, presided over by a Sydney accountant, C.G. Hill, attracted a considerable 
number of middle class ex-servicemen. In Victoria, the Young Nationalists, a 
youth wing of the Nationalist and United Australia Parties, in which 
Menzies had been active, broke away to form a Nationalist Party of Victoria; 
other groups included the Services and Citizens Party, led by a senior Shell 
executive, W.H. Anderson114, and the Middle Class Organisation.115 In the 
rapidity of their growth, these new organisations recalled the upsurge of 
rightwing leagues in 1930-31; this time, however, there was no obviously 
attractive leader to unite the groups. 
The weakness and disunity of the UAP was underlined by the necessity for 
the Country Party to provide the official Leader of the Opposition; the 
tensions this produced were to become obvious during the 1943 election. 
Fadden broadcast the Opposition's policy speech from the 4BK studio, 
Brisbane. He defended the previous government's war record, and 
condemned the isolationist and socialistic tendencies evident in Labor policy. 
113. Dunphy to Evatt, 31Mar1943: op. cit., note 91 above. 
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Curtin, claimed Fadden, had admitted before and after becoming Prime 
Minister that the Menzies government had made commendable progress 
with war organisation. A national government was still needed. A UAP-
Country Party government would increase the leave for men serving in 
tropical areas, and ensure that no youths under the age of nineteen served in 
battle areas. Fadden repeated the demand for a single army. Curtin had 
waited fourteen months before proposing to extend the service area for the 
militia; then his initiative was only made possible by the granting of 
permission by the trades hall bosses who dictated Labor government policy. 
"You can no longer afford to trust the control of this country to men of 
parochial or pacifist tendencies." The government's war policies had been 
subordinated by Labor to socialistic peace-time programs. Fadden promised 
that, unlike Labor, the Opposition would give unqualified preference in 
employment to ex-servicemen." The UAP and Country parties would 
restrain "the octopus of control". There would be no further tax increases; 
one third of wartime tax revenues would be refunded after the war; the pay-
as-you-earn system would be introduced. Fadden condemned the 
government's "weak and vacillating" policy on strikers. Servicemen 
performing the work of strikes (on the wharves, for example) would be paid 
the difference between service pay and the appropriate award. There was no 
room for shirkers in industry. Strikes were fomented by 
... the ascendancy gained in the councils of the Labor Party by 
members of the Communist Party ... They differ from the 
Russian Communists they profess to follow in that they have 
not learned the virtues of patriotism, hard work, and selfless 
devotion to the war against Fascist Powers. 
What a contrast they present to our Australian 'Reds' - and I use 
the word 'Reds' with no disparagement of our gallant, 
intelligent, progressive Russian Allies .... 116 
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The Communist Party, Fadden continued, remained committed to 
overthrowing the Constitution, despite the Curtin Government lifting the 
ban on them. A UAP-Country Government would prohibit strikes, and if 
necessary take over businesses which obstructed the war effort. But this last 
pledge was at odds with the general tenor of Fadden's speech, which was anti-
socialist. "Ministers ... ", he complained, " ... are using the war emergency to 
smuggle this alien system into Australia .... Socialisation of industry has crept 
into the policy of the Curtin government in the exact ratio as the Communist 
wing has joined up with it." There was a danger that Ward, backed by Lang, 
might gain control of the government; savings and insurance policies could 
never be safe with Labor. in power. Even with Australian soldiers fighting 
Japanese forces in New Guinea, the dangers which had featured in the 1931 
sound finance emergency remained a theme in non-Labor propaganda.117 
Nor did the war prevent conflicts within the Opposition from becoming 
public. Two days after delivering his policy, Fadden was obliged to defend it 
from his most incongruous follower. Launching his own campaign at 
Camberwell, Menzies had rejected Fadden's proposal to refund income tax, 
arguing that refunds would stimulate inflation, likely no doubt to become 
the most serious of Australia's post-war problems. " 'This stab in the back at 
116. SMH, 23 Jul 1943. 
117. Ibid. 
299 
this juncture", Fadden retorted, " 'makes another in the series for which Mr 
Menzies has become notorious.' 11118 
Curtin broadcast his policy speech from Canberra. The war record of the 
government was his main theme; and he attacked the lack of preparation 
which Labor had found when it took power in 1941. "Blind to the dangers in 
the Pacific, the Menzies and Fadden Governments had left Australia very 
much unprepared. " The UAP had relied on the invulnerability of 
Singapore, but with its fall, "Australia was as menaced and as helpless as the 
Philippines." Curtin did not repeat the Brisbane line accusation as such, but 
by pronouncing that Labor " ... rejected the concept that the little islands to the 
north of Australia would be taken and that upper Queensland and the 
Darwin area would be over-run by the enemy", seemed to imply that the 
Opposition favoured such a course. The C~rtin government had increased 
the number of men in the fighting services from 431, 000 to 820, 000; the 
women's force had risen from 3, 600 to 40, 000. Munitions and aircraft 
workers had increased from 71, 000 to 144, 000. The government had 
achieved this expansion without causing inflation. Labor had "applied the 
lesson of the Depression - that the financial problem was fundamentally one 
of man-power and resources, not of money." This was in fact the opposite 
of the Depression lesson which Labor had been reading throughout the 1930s 
which was that economic problems derived not from weaknesses in labour 
and capital but from a shortage of finance. Experience of administration had 
led Labor to forget - for the time being - its fixation with banking. Labor was 
118. Sunday Sun and Guardian, 25 Jul 1943. NLA MS 4875/18. Fadden alluded to Menzies' 
supposed undermining of Lyons. 
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still, however, convinced of the value of public works; a major post-war 
programme, involving the construction of single gauge railway from Broken 
Hill to Port Pirie, and eventually to Fremantle, would be pursued in co-
operation with the States. A Curtin government would ask the new 
parliament to legislate for the necessary powers. Social services could not 
wait for the peace. The government had already provided increases in 
maternity allowances, pensions, and other benefits to the value of £10, 000, 
000. Only 8,000 man-days per week had been lost in strikes during the Curtin 
government, compared to 21, 000 during the Menzies and Fadden 
Governments. The crisis of the war had passed and Australia could look 
forward to victory. The Opposition was disunited, but Labor could stand on 
its record: "the security of the nation over the last twenty months". Labor 
stood for victory in war; and the attainment of a peace in which the 
unemployment and inflation which followed the last war would be 
avoided.119 · 
Party publicity usually appeared to be addressed either to a man, or to an 
archetypal voter assumed to be a man. An exception to this rule was 
provided in the 1943 election by the Australian Women's Weekly, which 
printed responses by Menzies and Curtin to questions posed by the editor, 
Alice Jackson. This type of material is so unusual that is worth looking at 
the article in detail. To the first question, "should women take a special 
interest in the election?", Curtin replied that they should, because the 
interests of their husbands and sons were at stake. The position of 'woman' 
119. SMH, 27 Jul 1943, pp. 5-6. 
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had changed, and she now paid more attention to the economy. ''The home 
remains her citadel, but factory and workshop have become her arena": for 
this reason, Labor supported equal pay. Menzies agreed that women were 
more involved in industry than ever before; and simply stated that men and 
women had a common interest in the war. Jackson's second question was 
'what aspects of national life should women study before making up their 
minds?' Curtin's response was conventional for the Labor campaign: that 
Australia needed united government, and already had a single army - but 
with different responsibilities. Menzies made the converse response: women 
should realise that Australia needed a national government and a single 
army. Asked to comment on rationing and rising prices, Curtin answered in 
terms of household security and income: a home was not only an economic 
unit but also an atmosphere; the greatest threat to home life in the past had 
been the cessation of income through unemployment or sickness. Menzies 
asserted that as budget-makers, women were "the natural enemies of 
inflationary finance". Rationing must be safeguarded against bureaucratic 
excesses, and this accomplished by having housewife representatives on 
rationing committees. Curtin agreed with the proposition that rural women 
were "having a particularly hard time" - because they lacked adequate water 
supplies, electricity, and refrigeration. Menzies disagreed with the Prime 
Minister's assertion that no hardship had been caused by a shortage of 
working age men in rural industries. 
The Weekly enquired how women's outlooks had been changed by their 
entry into the Services and industry. Curtin seemed convinced that their 
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views were the same as those of most men: women wanted to win the war 
first, and settle other questions later. Menzies believed that women's 
thinking had become more practical and less sentimental and emotive. 
"What are women entitled to expect in the post-war world?" Economic 
security was Curtin's answer; particularly, an Australia-wide education 
standard, and national insurance funded from tax. Menzies considered that 
women should expect to be released from the anxieties connected with illness 
and unemployment; and to be provided with better amenities; electricity, 
water, sewerage, refrigeration. Education must be improved by raising the 
pay and status of teachers. Next, the party leaders were asked, "[A]fter the war 
will women from Services and industry resume a home life and the pre-war 
monotony of poor pay and dull jobs?" Curtin asserted that while most 
women would always want to marry, they should enjoy equal pay so that 
they were able to choose marriage for the right reasons. Menzies thought the 
number of women in industry would continue to exceed pre-war levels; and 
that the question of income and family size would need to be addressed 
through child endowment programs. The Weekly's final question was 
whether any woman should be nominated to take part in the peace talks. 
Curtin replied phlegmatically that while no women occupied the necessary 
executive positions, they might advise the male negotiators. Menzies 
insisted that women should be represented; and nominated the Chinese 
Nationalist, Madame Chiang J<.ai Check.120 
120
. Australian Women's Weekly, 14 Aug 1943, pp. 9-10. NLA MS 4936/18: Album: Aug-Dec 
and Apr-Jun 1943. 
303 
Despite the tax refunds controversy, the Opposition campaign generally 
continued Fadden's themes of the need for a single army, and the dangers of 
the government's tolerance of strikes and enthusiasm for bureaucratic 
control. The issue of individualism threatened by corporate power ran 
through UAP publicity. Speakers' notes called for an end to "the regulation-
making mania. [and] Justice for the small traders, who are being persecuted to 
the point of bankruptcy by an army of bureaucrats."121 Spender, broadcasting 
on 2UE, asked 'Who Governs this Country?'. His complaint was that Curtin 
had no answer to industrial lawlessness except rhetoric. For example, a 
Sydney factory engaged in war work had been on strike for nearly two 
months over the refusal of ten workers to join the Ironworkers' union. To 
the Conciliation Commissioner's reminder that no law compelled union 
membership and that the war was being fought for liberty, an Ironworker's 
official replied, "[W]e are in the position to wave the big stick. Our majority 
makes the big stick ... " . Spender concluded by warning that the entire country 
would be subjected to such treatment if Labor were returned to office.122 
Menzies, in a scene which anticipated the turbulent 1951 referendum 
campaign, was heckled vigorously at a meeting in Fremantle. He turned the 
situation to his advantage, however, by depicting his opponents as 
extremist enemies of free speech, and seemed to take some pleasure in 
provoking the audience: "[T]his does not surprise me ... because before I came 
down I was told there would be a certain number of Communists at the 
meeting. (Uproar) .... Whoever is against this mob," Menzies declared, perhaps 
for the benefit of a radio audience, " ... will vote for my side."123 Fadden set 
l21. UAP (NSW), Federal Elections, 1943: Speaker's Notes, Sydney, 1943, p. 4. 
122. Truth, 11 Jul 1943. NLA MS 4875/ 18. 
123. Advertiser [Adelaide], 3 Aug 1943. NLA MS 4936/28, Album: Aug-Dec and Apr-Jun 1943. 
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out the electorate's choice in equally stark terms. " 'You must decide between 
a path leading to the maintenance of individual liberty and a free way of life 
and one that can only lead to complete regulation and socialisation.' "124 
The result was a debacle for non-Labor in general and the UAP in particular. 
Labor won forty nine seats, two thirds of the House, and gained control of the 
Senate for the first time since 1914; the UAP were reduced from twenty three 
to twelve seats; non-Labor had seventeen in total. 
1940 1943 
% seats won % seats won 
UAP 30.22 23 16.05 12 
Ind UAP 
Lib Dem 1.02 0 
CP 13.71 14 
LibC. 3.53 1 
C-Nat 4.04 3 
QldC. 1.48 1 
ALP 40.16 32 49.93 49 
NSW ALP 5.23 4 
State Labor 2.61 0 
One Parl. 2.11 0 
Ind 8.07 1 12.15 1 
Com 1.98 0 
Elections for the House of Re12resentatives -1940 & 1943125 
124. Anon., ' 'Momentous' Poll. Mr Curtin & Mr Fadden Make Final Appeals', SMH, 20 Aug 
1943. NLA MS 4738. Box 73. 'Statements by John Curtin' folder. 
125. Hughes & Graham,~., pp. 363 & 369 .. 
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The Canberra Times considered that the popular endorsement of the 
government was due to Labor's undertaking not to commence a programme 
of socialisation, and to allow private enterprise a significant role in post-war 
Australia. According to the Age, voters reacted to the attempted vilification 
of individual ministers: for example, John Dedman, the Minister for War 
Organisation of Industry, who had been ridiculed for his allegedly doctrinaire 
socialist pronouncements, and over-zealous pursuit of austerity, increased 
his primary vote. The electorate also seemed to have rejected the national 
government proposal, which had been so prominent in the Opposition 
campaign. 
For the Opposition parties the event may not be without its 
lessons, some of which are rooted in the anomaly by which the 
ablest leader within the parties' ranks came before the electorate 
as a private backbencher. The debacle must prompt a thorough 
stock-taking; but a period of adversity can have uses to those 
who can see the precious jewel.126 
In a privately circulated report on the election defeat, Menzies was too 
modest to repeat the Age's first point, but he seemed determined to take the 
opportunity to effect a complete rebuilding of non-Labor. Menzies identified 
three main reasons for the result: firstly, the prestige of Curtin, which had 
been built up by the efforts of his press secretary, Don Rodgers: the Leader of 
the Opposition must have a press secretary of equal ability. Secondly, "Don't 
shoot Father Christmas", which presumably meant that the electorate 
126
. Canberra Times, 25 Aug 1943; Age, 23 Aug 1943. Evatt papers, Flinders University of South 
Australia. File: 'press clippings - elections, 1943'. 
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appreciated the social security provisions introduced by the government.127 
Thirdly, "why should my son have to go thousands of miles from Australia 
to defend it?" This last recalled an attitude commonly attributed to women 
voters, although Menzies did not say as much. 
Menzies identified many other reasons, all derived from the UAP's failures 
in organisation and leadership. The time had come to form a new party, and 
in doing so it was necessary to work with the groups which had appeared in 
the first half of 1943. The failures of the UAP were too severe to be remedied 
within the existing organisation. Preselections had been late, preferences 
irrational, and State electioneering neglected to the party's detriment in the 
corresponding federal seats. The UAP had "acknowledged its own 
bankruptcy" by serving under a Country Party leader. There must be a 
more than nominal membership fee, in order to es.cape the stigma of big 
business funding synonymous with the National Union's sponsorship. 
Financial independence would also release non-Labor from the obligation of 
selecting the mediocre candidates sometimes nominated by these backers. 
The new party would require a federal structure similar to Labor's, with a 
national executive; the director would need to be paid a salary equivalent to 
that commanded by the manager of a major firm. He should supervise a 
public relations officer capable of serving as a principal writer on one of the 
leading newspapers. There should also be paid organisers in each of the key 
electorates; and preselection must be carried out well in advance of the 
127
. The principal changes were the introduction of widows' pensions (1942), funeral benefits 
(1943), and allowances for the dependents of invalid pensioners (1943); the abolition of the 
means test on the maternity allowance (1943); and increases in the old age and invalid 
pensions (1942). Kewley, op. cit., pp. 213, 263, 259, 255, 284. 
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elections. Policy, too, must be developed in advance. In sum, Menzies 
wrote, the party's losses were the result of a complete political collapse. The 
name of the UAP had fallen into such disrepute that many former followers 
refused to work for it. A new name was needed, one which signified one of 
the major divisions in politics: Menzies proposed the title, 'Liberal 
Democratic Party' _128 
128
. R.G.M., 'Some Lessons of the Election', n.d. [1943). NLA MS 4936/489/1. 
Chapter 7. Opposing socialism and austerity, 1944-49 
While UAP politicians were considering how defeat might provide the 
opportunity to form a new party, the Government pressed on with its 
program, in August 1944 seeking fourteen constitutional amendments to 
enhance for a period of five years after the armistice Common weal th powers 
needed for reconstruction. In 1942, when the danger of Japanese invasion lent 
credence to arguments for national unity and extension of central powers, the 
Opposition had agreed to support the Government's attempt to acquire 
additional powers. Delegates from all the parties discussed reconstruction at a 
Constitutional convention, the first since Federation; but this meeting did not 
prove to be the portent of a new national settlement. Rather, the magnitude 
of Labor's victory in the 1943 election, and its apparent determination to use 
the power of wartime government to prepare for a socialist regime in 
peacetime, led the UAP to turn against the referendum proposals.1 During the 
referendum campaign both parties depicted their agenda as progressive, a 
rejection of 1930s laissez faire, but while the Depression featured in both the 
'yes' and 'no' cases, each side drew different lessons from the recent past. 
Labor insisted: 
WE CAN'T GO BACK TO THE OLD DAYS. 
1
. W.J. Waters, 'The Opposition and the 'Powers' Referendum, 1944', Politics, vol. 4, no. 1, 
May 1969, p. 43. 
Looking back to the days before the war when the shops offered 
luxury lines, when foodstuffs were plentiful, when we could 
buy cigarettes, stockings, clothing, pots and pans, and the other 
everyday articles of civilised life, there is some excuse for the cry 
of a war-weary people: 'Let's go back to the good old days before 
the war'. · 
They forget that unemployment, malnutrition, housing 
shortages, and muddled markets were also part of the 'good old 
days.'2 
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Menzies denied that additional powers were needed to prevent a recurrence 
of the Depression, which had been caused not by the distribution of 
constitutional powers, but by a reaction to the boom of the postwar years. The 
Depression had been a worldwide disturbance, which did not spare countries, 
such as Britain and France, with unitary governments.3 While Labor claimed 
that the UAP desired to make the postwar world exactly like the prewar 
world, non-Labor hoped for a new social order, without poverty. The UAP 
wanted plentiful housing, but favoured private construction; unemployment 
and sickness benefits, but on a contributory basis so as to allow the abolition 
of the degrading means test. The Commonwealth already possessed ample 
powers: it chaired and exercised a second vote on the Loans Council; levied 
all income taxes; and could make grants to the States on whatever conditions 
it chose.4 
2. Temporary Alterations to the Commonwealth Constitution - Speakers' Notes,, Melbourne, 
n.d. [1944], pp. 13-14. 
3. Typescript of broadcast by R.G. Menzies, The Referendum and the Depression no. 104, 31 Mar 
1944. NLA MS 4936/256/33. 
4. Typescript of broadcast by R.G. Menzies: The Referendum and Reconstruction no. 105, 14 Apr 
1944. Ibid. 
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The referendum was defeated by a margin of eight percent of formal votes, 
with only South Australia and Western Australia voting 'yes'.5 Australian 
Gallup Polls found that the fear of socialisation and war-style industrial 
conscription were the principal motivations for 'no' voters.6 As one scholar 
has commented, the apprehension of danger which in 1942 had militated 
towards support for increased government powers had largely passed by 1944; 
furthermore, the ALP's 'yes' campaign was handicapped by the party's State-
based organisational structure, and by Curtin's inability to devote much time 
to the referendum.7 Evatt's most recent biographers suggest that voters were 
deterred by the sheer number of amendments proposed.8 
The defeat of the referendum provided a boost to the Opposition's morale, 
and Menzies, proclaiming a resurgence of anti-socialism, decided that the 
time was right to re-organise non-Labor.9 Menzies had announced in 
September 1943 that he intended to work for a reformation of the UAP, but it 
was not until September 1944 that he issued an invitation to the various non-
Labor groups, whose proliferation had become both an encouraging 
indication of anti-government sentiment and a source of organisational 
confusion.10 Over the past twelve months, the groundwork had been laid by 
5. Sawer, op. cit., p. 173. 
6. Waters, op. cit., p. 54. 
7. Bridget Griffen-Foley,' 'Four More Points than Moses': Dr H.V. Evatt, the Press and the 
1944 Referendum', Labour History, 68, May 1995, pp. 67-68. 
8. Buckley et al, op. cit., pp. 198-99. 
9
. Williams, 'The Emergence of the Liberal Party', p. 17. 
10
. Telford Simpson to Menzies, 29 Jun 1944. NLA MS 4936/ 410/l(a). Simpson, a Sydney 
solicitor and company director, was chairman of the UAP's NSW fundraiser, the Consultative 
Council, between 1936 and 1941. Lex Watson, 'The United Australia Party and its Sponsors', in 
Cameron Hazlehurst (ed.), Australian Conservatism: Essays in Twentieth Century Political 
History, Canberra, 1979, pp. 75-76, 104. 
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unity negotiations conducted privately in New South Wales and Victoria, 
under the auspices of each State's IPA. So, when in October 1944 delegates 
and observers gathered in Canberra, the principle of unification had already 
won general support.11 The Canberra conference comprised approximately 
seventy people representing eighteen groups. With 40, 000 members, the 
AWNL was thought to be the largest; League women continued to espouse 
their themes of protection of the family and opposition to socialism and 
Communism. Similarly defensive in tone was the Australian Constitutional 
League, formed prior to the referendum, which took as its main line the 
threat to democracy from collectivism. New South Wales' Services and 
Citizen's League, organised by W.H. Anderson, was more progressive, with 
an emphasis on post-war social justice reminiscent of the Victorian IPA 
pamphlet Looking Forward.12 In his address to the conference, Menzies also 
enunciated a centrist and modernising ethos for non-Labor which drew on 
Looking Forward. Although in his opening speech he described the 
conference as a meeting of anti-socialists, he went on to argue that non-Labor 
needed to avoid being provoked by Labor into taking a position of automatic 
rejection of reform, and complacency about the present state of society. 
Menzies concluded with a quotation from Looking Forward which 
enunciated a new attitude to the state, based on the assumption that "the state 
and private enterprise are regarded as partners" and that there was no 
"fundamental divergence of interest" between them.13 His proposals for the 
organisational reform necessary to pursue the new politics were largely those 
11 Peter Aimer, 'Menzies and the Birth of the Liberal Party', in Ibid., pp. 220-24. 
l2 This had been the title of a collection of Franklin D. Roosevelt's writings on the New Deal 
(New York, c. 1933). 
13. R.G. Menzies, opening speech to Canberra Conference, 13 Oct 1944. NLA MS 4936/243/14 
(ii). 
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spelt out in his report on the 1943 election. Delegates endorsed this plan, and 
also agreed to call the new party 'Liberal', to signal that it would be neither 
conservative nor socialist.14 
Two months later, at Albury, a second conference was held to formulate a 
constitution: a permanent national organisation was created, and the party 
became responsible for its own fundraising: these were belated and valuable 
reforms, and might have been accomplished decades earlier if not for the self-
perpetuating power of the finance committees, and non-Labor's traditional 
aversion to 'machine politics' .15 A Federal Council represented 
parliamentary and non-Parliamentary Liberals, but while the Council was on 
occasions to prove an influential forum, its rulings were not binding on the 
State divisions. The parliamentary party remained the authority on policy, 
but issues were discussed by State representatives on a Joint Standing 
Committee on Federal Policy. Federal Executive supervised business between 
Council meetings, while Federal Secretariat was responsible for co-ordinating 
the work of the State Divisions, and liaising between the parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary parties. Just as the British Conservative Party responded 
to its comprehensive defeat in the 1945 general election by resolving to 
develop a positive alternative to Labour and to improve the quality of its 
campaigning through the work of a Conservative Research Department16, so 
14. J.R. Hay, 'The Institute of Public Affairs and social policy in World War II', Historical 
Studies, vol 20, no. 79, Oct 1982, p. 212; P.G. Tiver, The Liberal Party: Principles and 
Performance, Brisbane, 1978, pp. 31-36. 
15
. Ian Hancock, 'The Liberal Party Organisation: 1944-66', in Scott Prasser, J.R. Nethercote 
and John Warhurst (eds), The Menzies Era: A Reappraisal of Government, Politics and Policy, 
Sydney, 1995, p. 85; and see Loveday,~· 
16
. Kenneth 0. Morgan, The People's Peace: British History, 1945-1989, Oxford, 1990, p. 32. 
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the Liberal Secretariat was charged with research, and with executing one of 
Menzies' main original ideas: continual campaigning. To this end the 
Secretariat organised a Federal Public Relations ('Staff') Planning Committee, 
comprising the Director and senior Secretariat staff, and the State secretaries, 
which reported to Federal Executive on public relations business. These 
central groups, however, were superimposed on the structure of State 
branches inherited from the UAP. The State divisions remained wholly 
responsible for pre-selection, and partly responsible for publicity and fund-
raising. Organisation varied from State to State, but the basic pattern was a 
professional secretariat, paid organisers, an essentially advisory State council, 
and pre-selection by a combination of popular ballot and executive fiat.17 But 
it would be misleading to suggest that the UAP had merely changed its name: 
on the contrary there was a determination to replace ad hoc organisation with 
what Liberals regarded as the more systematic methods of the Labor Party. As 
Menzies commented in June 1946 of a weekend convention of New South 
Wales candidates, "[W]e are gradually learning something from our 
colleagues on the other side."18 
The Liberals had to some extent adapted to the new policies of 
Commonwealth social security: this was suggested by their support for the 
Government's attempt to secure a constitutional amendment to confirm 
Commonwealth powers to provide benefits. The Opposition, however, could 
not countenance Labor's other alteration Bills, for organised marketing of 
primary products, and the direct Commonwealth regulation of 
17
. Tiver, .QJ2.....ill., pp. 40-44. 
18
. Menzies to H. Brookes, 21Jun1946. NLA MS 1924/1/20 456. 
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employment.19 Non-Labor politicians remained relatively sceptical of 
government intervention; and while this was more a difference of degree 
than of kind in attitudes to particular policies, the distinction was of the 
utmost importance in the image-making and rhetoric of inter-party politics. 
For example, Labor and Liberal policies on public housing differed in 
emphasis: the former was concerned to increase the stock of rental 
properties; while the latter pressed for the sale of houses to tenants. When 
the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, John Dedman, objected that the 
government had no intention of 'making little capitalists of the workers', he 
provided the Opposition with valuable material for propaganda. Here, it 
seemed, was evidence of Labor's contempt for the individualist aspirations of 
its constituents; and this at a time when the housing shortage was acute, and 
in contrast to the pre-war years, a problem seen to affect not only the inner-
city poor but also the middle classes.20 
Liberals tended to blame shortages of housing and consumer goods on strikes 
fomented by the Communists, and contended that the government tacitly 
encouraged this disruption by its refusal to deal firmly with breaches of 
industrial law. At the end of the war the Communist Party was near the 
peak of its influence. The prestige of Soviet resistance to Hitler had attracted 
new recruits to the Party, including, for the first time, some white collar 
workers and intellectuals. More importantly, perhaps, the Party's activists 
had also made considerable progress within organised labour: in 1945, 
19. Sawer,~., p. 173. 
20. Ibid., p. 167; Alastair Greig, The Stuff Dreams are Made Of: Housing Provision in 
Australia, 1945-60, Melbourne, 1995, pp. 34-37. Dedman: see note 19, Ch. 6. 
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Communists were in the majority at the ACTU congress; and twenty six 
percent of Australia's 1, 200, 000 unionists belonged to unions with 
Communist-controlled executives.21 





















The postwar years saw an upsurge of industrial conflict: in 1945, one million 
working days were lost in industrial disputes, the highest level since 1929.23 
Communists were involved in the leadership of the largest strikes which 
affected Australia in the second half of the 1940s: in meat processing, rail, 
tram and maritime transport, steel, and most importantly, coal mining; 
between September 1945 and December 1947, disputes involving Communist-
led unions accounted for eighty four percent of the total time lost in 
stoppages.24 But as one historian of industrial relations in this period has 
argued, the causes of post-war militancy were not so much the machinations 
of Communist officials as the desire of their members to overcome the 
21
. Alistair Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History, Stanford, 1969, p. 
92. 
22. Ibid., pp. 83 & 120. 
23
. Tom Sheridan, Division of Labour: Industrial Relations in the Chifley Years, 1945-49, 
Melbourne, 1989, p. 2. 
24. Davidson, op. cit., p. 132. 
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weakness of the 1930s and the relatively strict conditions of the war years, and 
to win some benefits from the booming labour market.25 
Three months after the end of the Pacific war one of the most powerful 
Communist unions, the Waterside Workers' Federation (WWF), gave the 
Liberals another useful example of the menace of Red unionism and the 
Chifley Government's supine attitude to this danger. During the war the 
Netherlands East Indies (NEI) had been occupied by Japanese forces. Japan 
surrendered in August 1945, and when the Dutch endeavoured to restore their 
administration, nationalist guerillas who had been campaigning against the 
Japanese began to fight to keep the Dutch out. In November a Dutch 
submarine bound for the NEI stopped for re-fuelling at Fremantle harbour. 
The Fremantle branch of the WWF, however, refused to re-fuel the vessel; 
and workers at the Rose Bay flying boat base blacklis~ed Dutch seaplanes. The 
Chifley government sympathised with the Indonesian nationalists but, 
mindful also of public hostility to strikes, opted to ignore the bans while not 
offering any overt support for them: Geoffrey Bolton has aptly described this 
policy as one of "embarrassed tolerance. "26 The Opposition protested at the 
time, and recounted the story of the Government's suspicious inaction during 
the following year's election campaign. 
The 1946 Federal Election was the first since the end of the war, and the first 
contested by the Liberal Party, whose candidates campaigned vigorously on 
25. Sheridan, op. cit., pp. 227-29. 
26. Bolton, QJLci!., p. 50. 
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the issues of war socialism and unnecessary austerity. The Party's 1946 
speakers' notes listed the Commonwealth Employment Office, along with the 
Departments of Aircraft production, Supply and Shipping, Information, and 
Postwar Reconstruction as the principal institutions through which the 
Chifley Government was attempting to extend state ownership and control. 
Fortunately, hot-headed Ministers always gave the game away. Dedman was 
quoted as telling the Melbourne University Labor Club in 1943 that '"I am a 
socialist and the whole of my experience in the Department of War 
Organisation of Industry has been to get nearer to socialisation of industry.' "27 
Declarations like these made it easier for Liberals to contrast their own love of 
freedom with the left's obsession with control (see figure 7.1). The 
Communists made no secret of their intention to use violence to establish an 
authoritarian state. Labor claimed to be committed to Parliament and the rule 
of law, but had brazenly ignored the people's rejection at the 1944 referendum 
of a Labor mandate for centralised planning, and was proceeding regardless 
with its plans to nationalise cable services, airlines and banking. These 
develop men ts were condemned by the Opposition. 
Menzies declaimed in his policy speech, 
"We all desire ... ", 
... to build a new national structure .... Shall we keep what is good in 
the old foundations? Or shall we scrap the foundations altogether? 
Shall we ... as the Communists desire, overthrow not only the 
individual but the democratic system ... ? 
27. Liberal Party ,_Speakers' Notes, Federal Election 1946, No. 58, 'State Enterprise'. Liberal 
Party papers. NLA MS 5000/9/333. 
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Figure 7.1 'We want to retain our freedom!' 
Australian Women's Weekly, 3 Aug 1946, p. 24. 
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Menzies linked the Communists' revolutionary audacity with the steady 
encroachments of. " ... the Labour Socialists ... " who wished to " .. carry forward 
in perpetuity the war system ... ". Labor's war system, Menzies reminded an 
audience still contending with butter, tea, meat, clothing and petrol rationing, 
fostered " ... the growth of Departments and the multiplication of rules and 
regulations .... "28 But Liberalism would offer a middle way between socialism 
and laissez faire; and Liberals gave no credence to the philosophy which 
dictated that "those who fall by the way side must be left to fend for 
themselves."29 Menzies proclaimed that Liberalism, by fostering private 
initiative, would build such a strong economy that "all depression talk can be 
banished for the rest of our lives."30 
Chifley's policy speech differed more in tone than in content. He saw greater 
merit in regulation, boasting that planning had enabled the government to 
maintain full employment despite repatriation. In a somewhat defensive 
style, however, he insisted that Labor was committed to removing wartime 
controls and taxation. Defence spending must be kept to the minimum 
compatible with security, and Labor would look to economic development 
and immigration to generate the strength needed for Australia to continue to 
play its role as "the great bastion of the English speaking race south of the 
equator." But as well as encouraging newcomers, Labor would seek to increase 
the birth rate, and to this end was examining the question of marriage loans. 
The way to boost the coal production so vital to national development was to 







enhance the morale of the miners by improving pay and conditions. The 
equally important field of. banking and credit should continue to be influenced 
by the Commonwealth Bank, restored now to its original executive of a single 
Governor accountable to the Treasurer; but ministers would refrain from 
interfering with routine business. Chifley implored voters to choose Labor as 
the party which, against the opposition of both the Communist and Liberal 
parties, offered stable government and the best chance to "win the peace".31 
In other publicity material, Labor assured women that the Prime Minister 
knew they were troubled by high taxation and industrial disputes; and that 
the government was trying to make life easier by ensuring secure jobs for their 
husbands, restraining prices and rents, lowering taxes gradually so as to avoid 
inflation, and providing social security benefits to ease anxieties over loss of 
income. Menzies, on the other hand, sought to exploit women's resentment 
at industrial conflict, but could offer no solution,32 Writing for Australian 
Women's Weekly, Evatt contended that Labor recognised women's 
importance in maintaining family life, "the basis of our whole civilisation", 
and was determined that women responsible for the household budget would 
never again have to suffer the effects of the male unemployment of the 1930s. 
Labor's program of full employment and social security was aimed above all at 
protecting the welfare of children. 33 
31. Australian Worker [NSW], 4 Sep 1946, pp. 2, 4-5, 8, 12, 16. 
32
. Australian Women's Weekly, 21 Sep 1946, p. 20. 
33
. Ibid., 28 Sep 1946, p. 9. 
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Labor publicity directed at men, or at both sexes, also took a defensive tone. 
One advertisement reproduced a statement by Dedman in which he affirmed 
his belief in the right of every head of a household to own his own home.34 A 
message from Chifley addressed three aspects of the Opposition's critique: 
industrial conflict, taxation, and freedom. Voters were told that the Press 
exaggerated the severity of industrial strife, and that while Labor would 
continue to support the arbitration system, the Liberals would only provoke 
further disputes. Taxes had been reduced by thirty seven million pounds. 
Australians now enjoyed more freedom of speech than ever before, and had 
also been liberated from high rents and prices.35 Labor emphasised Chifley's 
reputation for caution and justified Labor's more gradual schedule of tax 
reductions with a slogan strongly reminiscent of the UAP: 'sound government 
depends upon sound finance.'36 Voters were reminded that they had to 
choose between Chifley and Menzies, who had been denounced by his own 
colleagues (Page in 1939, and Fadden in 1943) as a coward and back-stabber.37 
Labor stressed the role of the Commonwealth as a guardian against poverty; 
but government was linked in Liberal rhetoric to scarcity, increases in official 
regulations, and other hardships and inconveniences of the home front. 
Menzies and his colleagues condemned 'bureaucrats', shortages, queues, and 
blackmarkets, as well as the 1945 coal strike-induced '"black Christmas'"38. In 
doing so they particularly sought women's votes. Federal officials had 
34. Advertise1)([Adelaide], 29 Aug 1946, p. 12. 
35. Mercury [Hobart], 2 Sep 1946, p. 10. 
36
. SMH, 4Sep1946, p. 4; Sun [Melbourne], 2Sep1946, p. 22. 
37. Herald [Melbourne], 6 Sep 1946, p. 6. 
38. Speakers' Notes 1946, No. 53, 'Port Kembla Strike (1945)'. 
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recommended the appointment of a full-time women's organiser in 1945 on 
the ground that "[l]t is. a specialised task and one that requires constant 
attention."39 Party managers recognised the importance not only of organising 
women within the Liberal Divisions, but also of mobilising women's votes. 
Time and again Liberal campaigners proclaimed their empathy with the 
beleaguered housewife. "A year after the war, shortages of goods are acute; 
housewives stand in queues and have to transport such goods as they can get 
to and from their own homes."40 In his article for the Australian Women's 
Weekly, Menzies argued that there were no distinct women's issues; but went 
on to identify social security, which he promised to maintain, as one "special 
interest'' of women. 41 
Housewives featured in Menzies' speeches as the forgotten battlers. He cited 
the housewife when contending that Labor could not claim to be the only true 
workers' party. As Judith Brett has pointed out in her study of Menzies' 
political language, housewives, along with small business people, farmers, 
professionals, skilled tradesmen, and clerks were the heroes of Menzies' 
populist rhetoric. This language was echoed in other Liberal publicity, such as 
this advertisement for the Queensland Senate team, which identified the 
people neglected by Labor as 
The servicemen, disillusioned and misled. 
39. Federal Public Relations Planning Committee [hereafter FPRPC], Report and 
Recommendations for the Consideration of Federal Executive, 26 November 1945, p. 11. NLA 
MS 5000/7 /177. 
40. 1946 Policy Speech, p. 6. 
41. Australian Women's Weekly, 28 Sep 1946, p. 9. 
The homeless, disgusted with futile planning. 
The housewife, sick of the privations which endless strikes 
impose. 
The common man, crushed with penal taxation, and with his 
future security threatened through industrial strife.42 
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This was the optimistic side of the Liberals' pitch for women's votes - an 
appeal to the pride and independence of the housewife. The negative side of 
the message addressed women's resentment of shortages, which Liberal 
publicists blamed on Communism (strikes) and socialism (rationing). The 
anti-strike message was often directed specifically at women, who, Menzies 
pointed out in his 1946 Policy Speech, were particularly inconvenienced by 
strikes - especially coal strikes which forced them to cook dinner and bathe 
their children by lamp or candle light. "This winter has been one in which 
there have been irritating and even heart-breaking shortages of fuel and light 
and power and transport. Housewives have borne the brunt of domestic 
restrictions .... "43 
Although Communist influence on unions such as the Miners' Federation 
was their usual focus, sometimes Liberal publicists would emphasise the 
danger posed by the Party itself. Speakers' notes for the 1946 election stressed 
the professionalism and suspicious affluence of Communist functionaries. 
The Communist Party of Australia was "the best organised political party in 
42
. Cairns Post, 31 Aug 1946. Australian Labor Party Papers: NLA MS 4985/187. 
43. 1946 Policy Speech, p. 5. A Queensland Liberal advertisement appealed to "[T]he 
housewife, sick of the privations which endless strikes impose." Cairns Post, 31 Aug 1946. 
ALP papers. NL MS 4985, box 187. 
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the Commonwealth", with a large staff and a well appointed office in Marx 
House, Sydney. From this headquarters it produced five newspapers, and a 
great number of pamphlets and books. New South Wales was the centre of 
Communist agitation. 
Their aims, according to the Communist Manifesto, are civil war 
and the revolutionary overthrow of the State; the objective, the 
setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat .... Following the 
directions of the now defunct Communist International in 
Moscow, they use the 'Trojan Horse' method to gain control of 
trade unions and infiltrate the official Labour Party.44 
Abstract criticisms of Leninist ideology were remote from most people's 
experience; that the lights went out when Communist miners struck in 
Lithgow was something everyone could understand. Liberals offered direct 
and mundane examples - usually industrial - to illustrate the problem of 
Communism. Communism's industrial dominance, anti-Communists 
asserted, threatened the viability of Australia's defences by rendering the 
armed forces vulnerable to disruption of supplies. Communist-inspired 
strikes also damaged the export trade and thus depleted foreign reserves. 
Strikes retarded production, created shortages and fuelled inflation - 'too 
much money chasing two few goods' in the oft-repeated formula of Liberal 
publicity. This kind of economic 'sabotage' - the word recalled wartime 
treachery - was, Liberals argued, part of a plan to hasten the crisis of 
capitalism. 
44. LPA Speakers' Notes, no. 51, 'Communism in Australia', NLA MS 5000/9/333. 
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Unions such as the Miners' Federation and the WWF had taken industrial 
action on many well-publicised occasions in the course of the war: this 
provided another important theme in the anti-Communist electioneering of 
1946. Publicists also stressed the Party's policy reversals : for a few months 
after September 1939, Communists applauded the long-awaited struggle 
against fascism; then, until Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, 
they reviled the war as a sordid imperialist adventure. Their support for the 
war after June 1941 did not erase this memory.45 Finally, Communist union 
control entailed a symbiotic relationship with the ALP, the largest party of 
organised labour. Trades Hall Councils and union executives were the nexus 
between the Reds and their paler but ultimately no less dangerous comrades, 
the Labor socialists. 'Appeasement' had become an all-purpose political swear 
word, a conventional usage which allowed Liberal politicians to condemn 
Labor's appeasement of Communist-influenced unions.46 
The government's alleged 'appeasement' of the Waterside Workers 
Federation (WWF) boycott of Dutch shipping formed part of the Liberal 
campaign.47 According to Menzies the Government's capitulation to the 
WWF entailed not only a surrender to industrial militancy, which 
jeopardised Australia's trade with Holland, but also a usurpation by the 
WWF of Australian foreign policy.48 Chifley was usually identified as the 
main culprit, but the Liberal Party also criticised Evatt's conduct of External 
45. Ibid. 
46. Ibid., No. 54, 'Appeasement of Coal-Miners'. 
47. Ibid., No. 25, 'Waterside Workers and NEI'. 
48. 1946 Policy Speech, p. 28. 
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Affairs. Critics alleged he ran the Department as a one-man show and 
disregarded expert public service advice. Furthermore, his conduct in the 
United Nations verged on treachery to Britain and to Australia's new ally, the 
United States. Evatt saw himself as the champion of the small and medium 
nations against the superpowers, and in some ways he was.49 In the United 
Nations he campaigned for the rights of the General Assembly, and 
vehemently opposed the use of the Security Council veto. Of the four 
permanent members of the Council (Britain, France, USA, USSR) the Soviet 
Union used the veto power most often; consequently its delegates endured 
many Evatt tirades. This was ironic, considering the subsequent vilification of 
Evatt as a fellow-traveller. His critics, however, ignored his clashes with the 
Soviets, and concentrated on the misdemeanour of snubbing Britain and 
America and consorting with small independent countries such as Sweden 
and Argentina.so 
While charges like these impugned Labor's patriotism and loyalty, the 
Parliamentary Liberal Party could claim as a badge of its patriotism an 
impressive cohort of ex-servicemen. Liberal speakers were able to boast that 
while six members of Menzies' nine-strong War Cabinet (1939) were ex-
servicemen, only one member of the present Chifley Ministry had served in 
either World War.51 The Chifley Government was also, its Opposition 
alleged, weak on defence. Although Menzies had served as a senior Cabinet 
Minister from 1932 to 1939, and as Prime Minister in the 1939 to 1941 'phoney 
49. Bolton, op. cit .. pp. 51-53. 
50. 1946 Policy Speech, p. 24. 
51. 1946 Speakers' Notes, No. 67, 'Defence'; Sun [Sydney], 10 Jul 1946, p. 10. NLA MS 
1538/28/ 4162. 
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war' period which Britain devoted to hurried rearmament, he was moved in 
his 1946 Policy Speech to criticise Australia's lack of defence preparation in the 
last war. The western powers' reluctance to re-arm, Menzies contended, 
made the survival of the democratic nations doubtful in the early years of the 
war, and delayed victory in its long, 'final' phase. Menzies alluded to the war-
weariness and pacifism of the 1920s and argued that disarmament, while in 
some ways the natural response of a peace-loving people to the end of a brutal 
war, was dangerous twenty years ago and remained foolish in 1946. " We 
have a lesson to learn from this. We must never again allow our defences to 
fall below a reasonable minimum." In order to maintain this standard, 
Australia must co-operate with Britain, but not rely too much on "certain 
Empire military or naval strongholds". This tactful reference to the fall of 
Singapore was accompanied by an exhortation for Australia to accept its 
defence "responsibilities", although Menzies did not commit a Liberal 
government to any specific increase in defence spending.52 
The Government was returned with a loss of three seats to the Opposition. 
Labor's share of the lower house vote barely changed (from 49.93% to 49.71 %), 
but its majority fell from twenty five to fourteen. Voters also approved the 













53. Sixteen counting the Labor independents, Lang and Blackburn. Hughes & Graham, op. cit., 
pp. 369 &375. 
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LangLab 1.59 1 
UAP /Liberal 16.05 12 32.39 15 
Lib-Country 3.53 1 0.67 1 
Country 12.48 11 10.69 11 
Services Party 1.24 0 
Prot. People's 0.48 0 
Com 1.98 0 1.49 0 
Ind 12.15 1 1.83 1 
Elections for the House of Re12resentatives1 1943 & 194654 
Towards the end of the campaign, Casey had remarked that there seemed to be 
less of a swing to the Liberals in Tasmania than was evident on the mainland, 
and that this was probably because the hydro-electric State had been little 
affected by coal disputes. He also complained that the quality of Liberal 
candidates was disappointing, the Party's publicity "amateurish", and 
broadcasting "lacking in imagination and appeal".55 In a paper setting out the 
Liberals' publicity requir~ments in the period leading up to the next election, 
the Director, Don Cleland, noted that while Labor's 1946 publicity had been 
unified, the State Division of the Liberal Party had run separate, 
uncoordinated campaigns; and Federal Council unanimously endorsed a 
resolution that Liberal publicity should in future be centrally controlled.56 
Menzies' press secretary, Charles Meeking, also attributed the defeat to a lack of 
coordination, and laid the blame on the State Divisions for refusing to co-
operate. Meeking found fault, too, in the Federal office, where work had been 
impaired by bad relations between Cleland and his senior staff members. 
54
. Ibid. Country includes (for the 1943 election) Country-National and Queensland Country. 
55. Casey diary, 19 Sep 1946. NLA MS 6150/26, vol 10, p. 33. 
56
. Don Cleland, Public Relations, [report to Federal Executive] 9 Aug 1947. NLA MS 
4936/414/27; Hancock, .Q12,..£i1., p. 83; Minutes, Federal Council, 29 Oct 1946. NLA MS 
4936/415/43. Cleland was LPA federal director, 1945-51. 
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Meeking warned Menzies that the parliamentary party might criticise his own 
conduct of the campaign on two points: firstly, that the tax reduction proposal 
had been publicised too early, allowing Labor to develop its response; and 
secondly that his style of public speaking had been too aggressive. It could be 
said, for example, 
... that you hit too hard at meetings, especially in the 'convict' 
reply at Launceston ... people generally seem to be becoming a 
little 'sissy' in their politics. This was probably because they were 
accustomed to be talked to over the wireless, without the 
chance of any interjection .... Another point, and one which is 
pretty generally expressed, is that you are both too clever and 
too experienced for your interjectors, who therefore tend to get 
the sympathy of the crowd.57 
Menzies' style, and the co-ordination of State campaigns were, no doubt, 
. 
important issues for the Liberal Party, but the basic task was to continue to 
build a credible alternative to the government; and to this end the image of 
the Party was as important as its policy on any particular issue. During its five 
years in opposition, 1944-49, the Liberal Party tried to present its own ideas 
and people as young and modern, and those of its opponent's as outmoded 
and dogmatic. This theme was an important part of the identity the new 
party's leaders and image-makers were creating. For example, youth and a 
'modern' outlook were amongst the key qualities which J.V. McConnell, 
General Secretary of the Victorian Division, sought in a Liberal candidate. 
57. Charles Meeking, Election Campaign, 15 Oct 1946. NLA MS 4936/414/28. 
a) Youth: Not all candidates need to be young but the Party 
needs a large number of candidates between the ages of 25 and 40 
..... Character and Siricerity ... Ability ... Personality .... 
e) Contemporary: Candidates must be modern. There is a belief, 
perhaps not unfounded, that we are on the threshold of a new 
age. Candidates whose political beliefs are unalterable are fatal. 
Candidates must be prepared to assimilate new ideas, in other 
words [to] have Vision.SB 
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Menzies, the most important candidate, had already done much (particularly 
through his radio broadcasts) to establish himself as a credible alternative 
Prime Minister, but the task remained unfinished. Gallup polls showed that 
Liberal-Country Party support had risen from 44 percent in the 1946 Election to 
50 percent in November 1947. Nonetheless, senior Liberals decided a few 
months later that Menzies needed a "'build-up' campaign on his 
leadership."59 Menzies himself had been depressed by his defeat in the 1946 
election, and considered l~aving politics. The next year he prepared a letter of 
resignation as leader, in which he stated that the enmities generated by his 
own fourteen years in Federal politics had created impossibly mistrustful 
relations within the party, and that it would be better for a new leader to take 
over.60 But Menzies never used this statement and, despite the rumours that 
Casey would replace him61, stayed at the head of the parliamentary Liberal 
Party. While Menzies seemed convinced that his authority within the party 
58. J.V. McConnell to D.M. Cleland [Fed. Dir.], 28 January 1947. NLA MS 5000/5/134. folder: 
'Selection of Candidates' . 
59. Gallup polls: NLA MS 5000/8/301. '1949' folder. Support for Labor had fallen from 53 to 
46 percent in the same period. 'Build-up' campaign: J .R. Willoughby [Parliamentary Officer 
to the Leader of the Opposition] to Alan Dawes[Public Relations Officer], 6 February 1948. 
NLA MS 5000/8/301. 
60
. Statement by the Right Honourable R.G. Menzies, K.C., M.P., n.d. [1947]. NLA MS 
4936/412/20. 
61. Hudson, op. cit .. pp. 182, 191. 
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was weakened by the associations of the past, Liberal publicists strove to 
replace the memory of the failed Prime Minister and leader of a now-defunct 
party with a new image of reliability, conviction, and modernising zeal. By 
emphasising youth and modernity, Liberals suggested that the Chifley 
Government was mired in the discredited socialist doctrines of the 1920s and 
1930s. The world was entering a new and exciting era of modernisation, 
economic growth and individual freedom - without a dynamic Liberal 
government, Australia would be left behind. 
Menzies' spirits were lifted and his party's fortunes revived by the reaction to 
the government's attempt to nationalise the trading banks, which Chifley, 
frustrated by a High Court ruling against elements of the 1945 Banking Act, 
had announced on 16 August 1947.62 The issue galvanised non-Labor 
throughout Australia, contributed to the defeat of the Labor government in 
Victoria, and brought a significant increase in membership and donations. A 
month after the announcement, Casey noted that donations to the Liberal 
Party in New South Wales were five times the amount that the UAP had 
received ten years ago. Between November 1947 and April 1948, Casey raised 
approximately £100, 000: "an enormous sum", as his biographer remarks.63 
Bank nationalisation seemed to confirm the suspicion of non-Labor people 
that the government was intent on a sweeping programme of socialisation: 
these misgivings may be judged from a comment made in 1949 by one of 
Billy Hughes' well-wishers: "[T]he Commonwealth Bank lets the Taxation 
62. Crisp,~., pp. 326-28. 
63. Casey diary, 16 Sep 1947. NLA MS 6150, box 26, vol. 10, p. 113; Hudson, op. cit., p. 193. 
332 
Department know all about the Deposits .... "64 Just as the British Medical 
Association argued that government health care provision would damage the 
bond of personal trust that existed between doctors and patients65 , so 
opponents of bank nationalisation claimed that while bank managers were 
known and trusted by all customers and made decisions on the just and 
objective basis of ability to repay, the managers of a government bank might 
allow commercial decisions to be swayed by prejudice towards the customer's 
political opinions.66 
Above all, opponents of bank nationalisation resisted what they considered 
an unnecessary and menacing extension of government powers: the 
Government already had " .. all the necessary financial powers to prevent 
depression".67 The Liberal Party, however, along with an array of well-
organised and financed bank employees' groups, campaigned vigorously 
against Chifley's 'bank grab', claiming to see in it the beginning of the end of 
private property. Menzies valued the apparent neutrality of organisations 
such as the Citizens' Protest Committees, and considered that although the 
members of these groups should eventually be persuaded to join the Liberal 
Party, for the moment it was more effective to have organisations suitable for 
Labor supporters reluctant to change their party loyalties.68 
64. 'G.U.' to Hughes, 22Nov1949. NLA MS 1528/28/5061-63. 
65. Bolton, op. cit., p. 74. 
66. Ibid. 
67. Liberal Party Speakers' Notes, Victorian State Election 1947, No. 22. 
68
. Menzies to Cleland [copy] 1 Dec 1947. NLA MS 4936/ 410/3. 
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There is evidence that bank nationalisation enjoyed little support even before 
the banks' campaign began in mid 1947. 32.5% of respondents to a Gallup Poll 
taken in 1946 had favoured government ownership of trading banks; 51.4% 
favoured private ownership.69 Opposition to nationalisation certainly 
received extensive and expensive encouragement.70 However low the 
support for bank nationalisation may have been, the Liberal Party did not take 
the failure of 'the bank grab' for granted: the urgency of Liberal rhetoric 
conveyed to the electorate that this was risky choice. In a speech at the Sydney 
Town Hall, in August 1947 Menzies seemed to suggest that bank 
nationalisation was a threat to Australian liberty almost as severe as that faced 
in the Second World War. 
[T]he importance of the banking issue cannot be exaggerated. This 
is a proposal for a bank monopoly and goes far beyond pounds, 
. shillings and pence, far beyond shareholders and bank employees. 
It penetrates into the whole structure of life and liberty in 
Australia .... What is to be taken from the Australian citizen is his 
right to live and to work and to conduct his affairs in his own 
fashion, which was the right for which this war was fought.71 
When in his speech on the Second Reading Menzies called the Bill "a 
tremendous step towards the Servile State ... the product of totalitarian 
thought. .. hateful to all democrats" he linked nationalisation with both the 
wartime enemy and the enemy that soon took the place of fascism, Soviet 
69. Australian Gallup Polls, Nos. 328-397, Sep-Nov 1946. 
70. The bank officers' campaign against nationalisation is described in A.L. May, The Battle 
for the Banks, Sydney, 1968. 
71. Ibid., No. 10, 'Royal Commission on Banking, 1936'. 
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Communism. 72 One supporter agreed, writing to the Pflnce Minister that 
"Hitler's power grew from smaller beginnings than this. We do not wish a 
similar menace to peace and freedom in Australia."73 
Bank nationalisation produced a favourable climate for Liberal publicity in 
the last three years of the decade, but the Party's workers were not content to 
concentrate on banking. Continuous, nationally-co-ordinated campaigning 
between elections was the ideal cherished by federal politicians and officials; 
intermittent and separate State campaigns on similar 'enterprise versus 
socialism' themes was the reality. Liberals concentrated, although not 
exclusively, on the three groups regarded as particularly receptive to its anti-
Communist and anti-socialist message: skilled tradesmen, housewives, and 
Eastern European 'New Australians'. Cleland wrote to State Secretaries 
suggesting doorstep canvassing of the first two groups.74 Party workers were to 
identify themselves as representatives of the Liberal Party, but not to advocate 
a Liberal vote. The survey for the skilled tradesman, once he was identified as 
such, should begin with this preamble: "[W]e're for democratic trade 
unionism and would like to have your views on it."75 Questions concerned 
72. Liberal Party Speakers' Notes, 1948 Prices Referendum, No. 41, 'Mr Menzies. Second 
Reading Speech on Banking Bill 1947'. NLA MS 5000/9/333. 
73. Alice Hume, Balwyn, to Menzies, 8Sep1947. NLA MS 4936/410/4. 
74. Cleland estimated that out of an electorate of 4.5 million people, Labor and the coalition 
parties each enjoyed the traditional support of around 1.5 million, leaving 1.5 million as 
'floating' voters. The Federal Director commented that many floating voters came from Labor 
families. The group consisted mainly of clerical workers; small business people; contractors; 
shopkeepers; skilled trade unionists; workers in distribution and transport industries; "junior 
professional men"; nurses; "modest property owners and the like". D.M. Cleland to State 
General Secretaries, c. 1949. NLA MS 5000/5/134. 
75. In 1949 those New South Wales unions with Communist-controlled executives were: 
Ironworkers-Munition Workers; Boilermakers; Sheetmetal Workers; Amalgamated 
Engineering Union; Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association; Miners' Federation; 
Gas Employees'; Building Workers' Industrial Union; Waterside Workers' Federation; 
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secret ballots; the efficacy of the arbitration system; and the comparative merits 
of owning one's own home, and renting from the government. The canvasser 
was to conclude by asking " ... how we could help Moderate Trade Unionists to 
keep the Communists out of control of the Unions - and to help the 
moderates to regain control?" 76 
The women's survey began with an assurance that " ... we want to have the 
benefit of your views and ideas as to how we can best give help in a practical 
way to the women of Australia- the hardest workers in the community." 
Questions addressed were: a return to pre-war style home delivery of groceries; 
the availability of labour-saving devices such as washing machines; child care; 
and "domestic help".77 
Cleland also enclosed the report on an opinion poll carried out house-to-
house in "middle class to poor" suburbs of a Queensland city (presumably 
Brisbane). The main questions asked how the cost of living should be 
lowered, and how production should be increased. The survey was designed 
to encourage respondents to reflect on the connection between those things 
the Liberal Party reviled - government pools and control boards, strikes, 
Seamen's Union; Road Transport Union; Federated Clerks' Union; Public School Teachers 
Federation; Hospital Employees; Australian Association of Scientific Workers; 
Amalgamated Postal Workers. The Australian Railways Union was strongly influenced by 
Communists. Communists commanded majorities on the following Trade and Labour Councils: 
Newcastle; Illawarra; Lithgow; Wagga; Orange; Bathurst. Source: Liberal Party Federal 
Secretariat, Facts about Communism, April 1949, pp. 14-15. NLA MS 5000/3/82. 
76. Cleland to State General Secretaries, c. 1949, op. cit. note 74 . 
77. Anon., Report on Public Opinion Census for week ending 12 February 1949. Qld. Division, 
NLA MS 5000/5/134 
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excessive wages, low production - and those things that most people reviled: 
scarcity and high prices. · As polling was carried out during the day, a large 
number of the respondents were women, but women, apparently were less 
likely than men to draw the right conclusions. 
One canvasser make [sic] the following comment: 'Many women 
quote high wages as a cause of high prices, but are quite useless 
when asked for a method of reducing cost of living. Obvious that 
housework is no stimulus for constructive thinking.' The same 
canvasser reported a conversation with an intellegent [sic] 
shopkeeper, who stated that 90% of people today buy without 
questioning the price.78 
Nevertheless, the most popular methods of reducing prices were to increase 
production (32%); increase working hours (23%); and reduce wages (20%). 
Thirty one percent thought that liigh wages were the main cause of low 
production; and twenty percent answered 'the forty hour week'. The survey's 
compiler claimed this experiment had demonstrated that 
... by a simple explanation of the facts and with no attempt at 
persuasion whatever, a remarkable number of middle class 
voters and even voters of the poorer and more uneducated type, 
will support quite a drastic policy to bring down the cost of living 




Different methods were used to sell the Liberal Party's anti-Communist and 
anti-socialist credentials to New Australians. Although the British were the 
largest ethnic group amongst the one million migrants who arrived in 
Australia between 1946 and November 1955, many came from Eastern and 
Central Europe, and quite a few detested the new Communist governments 
established in the second half of the 1940s. Liberal Party workers, salaried 
and voluntary, devoted much time and effort to courting the New Australian 
anti-Communist vote. Fremantle was the first point of call for ships arriving 
from Europe, and Liberal canvassing was thus particularly thorough in the 
Fremantle-Perth area - so much so that the efforts of women from the 
Western Australian Division were commended by the Federal Women's 
Committee as exemplary.so Throughout Australia, women's organisations 
did most of the vote-seeking, visiting recently arrived migrants in hostels, 
camps and at home, offering charitable assistance such as pots and pans, 
English lessons, and social ""evenings, and distributing pamphlets. The Staff 
Planning Committee, however, rejected a recommendation that the Party 
distribute leaflets on compulsory voting and enrolment requirements, 
considering perhaps that this was more properly a duty of the Electoral 
Commission. Nonetheless, the Department of Immigration supplied lists of 
names and - where possible - addresses of New Australians, and of recently 
naturalised citizens to the Liberal Party office in each state.Bl 
These were some of the ways in which Liberal campaigners canvassed 
particular demographic groups: broadcasting, of course, had to appeal to the 
80. Minutes, 26 July 1948. NLA MS 5000/1/3. 
81. M.E. Morrissey, Secretary State Women's Committee [W.A.], Report, July 1948. NLA MS 
5000/1/3. 
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widest possible audience, and as such the subjects raised in the 'John Henry 
Austral' advertisements ·provide a broad outline of the emphasis of Liberal 
campaigning in the late 1940s. A plain-talking Aussie bloke, the fictitious 
Austral starred in a series of short, dramatic sketches which sought to present 
political issues in an exciting and memorable fashion. The series was devised 
by Casey, and Sim Rubensohn of the Hansen-Rubensohn agency, which had 
handled federal Labor advertising until poached by Casey in 1947. The 
campaign commenced in February 1948, and 170 advertisements had been 
broadcast by July 1949. In May 1948, the secretary of the Victorian Division 
remarked that the series was "doing well and, apart from other things [is] 
having a very good effect on our own people."82 After reviewing the series' 
reception over this period, Federal Council decided to continue the campaign, 
but to make its tone and content "more constructive" - State Secretaries had 
reported in 1949 that some people found the series relentlessly negative. The 
government had been sufficiently concerned abou.t Austral to amend the 
Broadcasting Act so as to prohibit the dramatisation of current politi~al events 
and personalities; since 1942 such a prohibition had applied during election 
campaigns. The new Act came into effect in November 1948, and from then 
on the Austral broadcasts became, by necessity became less topical. The 
Opposition denounced Labor's amendment as a dangerous restriction of free 
speech; in 1960 the relevant clauses were still in place.83 
82
. The Secretary was J.V. McConnell. Casey diary, 12 May 1948. NL MS 6150, box 26, vol. 10, 
k' 131. 
3. Sawer, Ql2&.t., p. 200; May, op. cit., p. 113. 
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The Austral series was intended by Casey as public relations rather than 
advertising: that is, the intention was to create a favourable atmosphere for 
the Liberal message rather than to make an explicit appeal in party terms.84 Of 
seventy seven Austral advertisements broadcast or written by September 1948, 
the most common topics concerned the economy, Communism, and 
socialism: 
John Henry Austral radio scripts. 1948, by topic 
black market. .............................................................................. 1 
defence ......................................................................................... 1 
women, marriage, the family ................................................. 5 
industrial relations, strikes ..................................................... 7 
Communism ............................................................................. 11 
population, and rural 
or national development. ...................................................... 11 
socialism, regulation, 
bureaucracy (including 'free medicine', 
and 1948 prices referendum) .................................................. 12 
economics (particularly inflation, tax, 
production, employment 
education) ................................................................ : .................. 16 
other ............................................................................................. 13 85 
The creators of the Austral series favoured a sensational, sometime ominous 
style. 'Does shopping shorten women's lives' condemned shortages. 'The 
Forgotten Women' reminded listeners that there " .. .is no forty-hour week for 
the housewife. She works a twelve to fourteen hour shift five or six days a 
week. .. usually for less than union wages." 'Happily Ever After' alluded to the 
84
. Memo on public relations, forwarded by Casey to Menzies, 16 Sep 1947. NLA MS 
4936/4010/3. 
85. Federal Council, Programme & Agenda, Annual General Meeting - September 1948, pp. 27-
37. NLA MS 5000/7 /275. The categories are my own. 
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lack of privacy for married couples forced by the shortage of housing to live 
with their in-laws: "[T]o what extent are the irritations and repressions of 
modern living conditions in Australia affecting married happiness and 
domestic life generally?" 'Even sparrows have nests' was a " .. dramatic 
indictment of go-slow methods in the building of homes for the Australian 
people. In play form, John Henry Austral exposes the results of official 
muddling and mismanagement". 'Creeping Paralysis' drew attention to 
" ... the growing problem of 'key man' strikes." Advertisements on the dangers 
of Communism highlighted the subversion of trade unions; espionage; links 
between Soviet-trained Communists and Labor; living conditions in the 
USSR; Communist influence in Asian countries. Two of these 
advertisements had generic titles. 'The enemy within' warned that Australia 
could not insulate itself from " .. a world torn by suspicion and 
intrigue ... [and]. .. foreshadow[ed] what can happen when the agents of a foreign 
power are permitted to work unmolested." 'The threat' pointed to " ... the 
menace of the over-crowded, under-privileged Asiatic nations, all with a high 
and rising sense of nationalism, and the Russian influence on these peoples." 
Austral sketches dealing with bureaucracy and socialism reminded listeners of 
the proliferation of official regulations; urged a vote of 'a thousand times no!' 
to the 1948 price-and rent-control referendum; and played on fears of the 
invasion of the privacy of the home. 'Is your home your castle?' asserted that 
"[G]overnment regulations have conferred upon government officials even 
greater powers of entry and search than are possessed by the police." Most 
broadcasts on the economy concerned the need for Australians to work harder: 
one urged listeners to follow the example of the thrifty and industrious 'Little 
Red Hen' - the only Red for whom Austral had a good word. 'How not to 
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Live on Six Pounds a Week' and 'Let's Get Busy' claimed that only a rise in 
production could -reduce inflation.86 
It may be that governments, whose members can administer as well as 
fulminate, are in a better position to win - and for matter, lose - votes than are 
oppositions. Despite the party's inter-election campaigning, in January 1949, 
the Hansen-Rubensohn agency advised Casey that the Liberal position had 
deteriorated since 1948, as swinging voters had been attracted by the 
government's programme of tax reductions and social security benefits. 
Hansen-Rubensohn anticipated that the party's major challenge in the next 
ten months would be to counter-act the other 'sweeteners' which the 
government could be expected to introduce, including perhaps the abolition of 
petrol rationing.87 But the government's supporters considered that the anti-
socialist campaign had worked; and four months before the election, Chifley's 
press secretary, Don Rodgers, was warned that: 
... the big danger to the Government in the next elections as [far 
as] this State [Western Australia] is concerned, is the fear that it 
is going to nationalize everything. 
Anti-Labor propaganda on this matter has been pretty shrewd 
and a lot of people have got the wind up - even down to the 
small shopkeeper who almost imagines he might wake up one 
morning to find Ben Chifley personally slicing some cooked 
ham or poloney for the customers.88 
86. Ibid., pp. 27-37. 
87. Hansen-Rubensohn to Casey [copy], 10 Jan 1949, NLA MS 4936/412/19. REF 1955 
88
. F. Davidson, editor-in-chief, Sunday Times [Perth], to Rodgers, 24 Aug 1949. NLA MS 
4738/1/4, folder: '1949'. 
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For the Liberal Party, however, anti-socialism and anti-Communism were 
more than simply publicity issues. Leaders such as Casey and Menzies 
regarded anti-Communism as a means of winning votes from Labor, but their 
private comments reveal a genuine concern about the threat posed to 
Australia and other Western powers by Soviet military power; and by 
Australians who seemed to owe loyalty to the USSR. For exam pie, the 
Opposition sought to embarrass the government over its alleged negligence in 
guarding state secrets; but Casey, for one, also expressed these concerns in his 
diary.89 Similarly, in his private correspondence, Menzies, perhaps from 
habit as much as conviction, insisted that there was "no middle course" 
between Communism's direct action and the rule of industrial law. 90 
The international situation was no less alarming. A direct Soviet attack 
seemed unlikely, but in South East Asia, where Britain was no longer a major 
force, de-colonisation was accompanied by the rise of Communist-influenced 
nationalist movements in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), Malaya, and 
French lndo-China. Soviet power was more obvious in Europe, and by 1947, 
Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and East Germany had come under 
Soviet control. In February 1948, the local Communist party staged a 
successful coup in Czechoslovakia; this seemed particularly ominous to 
Menzies and his colleagues, as it was the first time a Communist regime had 
been established by internal subversion rather than direct military force.91 At 
89. Casey diary, 4Feb1947. NLA MS 6150/26, vol. 10, p. 49. 
90. Menzies to H. Brookes, 6May1947. NLA MS 1924/1/20 799. 
91. A.W. Martin, 'Mr Menzies' Anti-Communism', Quadrant, May 1996, p. 50. 
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its conference the next month, the Liberal Party, under pressure perhaps from 
the Country Party and from anti-Communist 'ginger groups' resolved to ban 
the Australian Communist Party.92 Menzies, visiting Britain, was still not 
convinced, telling Clement Attlee he agreed that Communists should be 
prosecuted under general industrial laws rather than " 'martyred by special 
legislation' ".93 According to A.W. Martin, however, Menzies seems to have 
changed his mind while visiting Britain; where he was, like many others, 
alarmed by the confrontation over the Berlin blockade, the most dangerous 
incident in the early phase of the Cold War. On his return, in January 1949, 
Menzies launched into a series of public meetings, telling his audiences that 
Berlin demonstrated that the world was virtually at war, and that 
Communism, the creed of the enemy, should be suppressed as treason. 94 
The mood of danger was further increased in 1949, when Communist forces 
took control of China, and the USSR exploded its first atomic bomb. More 
powerful in its immediate effect on Australian lives, however, was the coal 
dispute, which lasted from June to August 1949. Visiting the Newcastle fields 
in 1948, Casey had found that the miners in militant mood. 
Any miner who raised his voice against the present methods 
[short stoppages designed to keep stockpiles low] would be asked 
if he wanted to give up voluntarily the very powerful 
92. John Warhurst, 'The 'Communist Bogey': Communism as an Election Issue in Australian 
Federal Politics, 1949 to 1964', PhD thesis, Flinders University of South Australia, 1977, p. 
180. 
93. Menzies' diary, 1948, cited Martin, .QJ:LQ.!., p. 50. 
94. Ibid., p. 48. 
bargaining position and put himself back into the hands of 'the 
boss' - with a reminder of the wholesale 'sackings' of the 1930s.95 
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The aims of most strikers were probably those set out in their log of claims - a 
thirty five hour week, long service leave, higher pay and improved facilities. 
Nevertheless, some historians and contemporaries also interpreted the strike 
as an attempt by the Communist Party leadership to discredit Labor and to win 
back the union support which the Party had lost since 1945.96 Coal was at the 
time Australia's single most important source of energy. The strike - which 
coincided with the coldest months of winter - drastically reduced the supply of 
electricity and gas and caused a great deal of hardship and economic 
disruption, particularly in New South Wales. Soup kitchens appeared in 
Sydney's working class suburbs, half a million workers were stood down in 
New South Wales and South Australia, and a majority of heavy industrial 
plants shut down.97 One report on a Liberal Party rally in Evatt's Sydney 
electorate of Barton noted " ... the number of old age pensioners and young 
men and women (out of work through the strike) who listened attentively -
there were no interjections throughout."98 
The Federal Government dealt harshly with the Miners' Federation, 
attempting to freeze its strike fund, banning donations to it, jailing officials for 
contempt of court, and using troops to work open-cut mines. These decisions 
95. Casey diary, 15 Jul 1948. NLA MS 6150/26, vol. 10, p. 73. 
96. Golian, op. cit., p. 212 & 246; Ross McM\:lllin, The Light on the Hill: the Australian Labor 
Party, 1891-1991, Melbourne, 1991, pp. 251-52. J. Hagan, History of the ACTU, Melbourne, 
1981, pp. 118-119, cited Bolton, QJ?....d1, p. 70. 
97. Soup kitchens: Golian,~., p. 252. Unemployment and production stoppages: Leicester 
Webb, Communism & Democracy in Australia: A Survey of the 1951 Referendum, Melbourne, 
1954, p. 18. 
98. Eileen Turner [Acting Chairman, NSW Women's Group], Report on Women's Activities, 
NSW, June-July 1949, NLA MS 5000/1/3. 
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made the Government unpopular with some of its supporters, but did not 
prevent Labor being reviled by the Press as 'appeasers' of " .. the Communists 
and their mine-working dupes".99 For the Liberal Party and those who 
supported Liberal policy, the strike provided yet another demonstration of the 
need to ban the Communist Party. 
Hansen-Rubenson had anticipated the abolition of petrol rationing prior to 
the election; but Chifley, in order to conserve the dollar reserves of the 
sterling bloc, persisted with the rationing; on the other hand, tax reductions 
came into effect in July 1949. The government had reduced the consumer 
ration of petrol by approximately twenty percent in 1947; but in June 1949 the 
High Court ruled that rationing was ultra vires. According to the Age, the 
shortages which followed were worse than any during the war; rationing was 
restored in November; but the Opposition had a more attractive policy: to 
abolish rationing altogether. The Liberals also opposed Chifley's decision to 
devalue the Australian pound against sterling by thirty percent: promising to 
'put value back into the pound', Menzies decried the effects of devaluation on 
inflation and, perhaps, national pride.100 
So, as the parties prepared for the 1949 federal election, the result was too close 
to predict. The September Gallup poll put the Coalition and Labor at forty six 
and forty three percent, with two percent choosing independents, and nine 
99. Gollan, op. cit .. p. 241. 
100
. L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Biography, London, 1960, p. 309; David Lee, 'The 1949 Federal 
Election: A Reinterpretation', Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 29, no. 3, Nov 1994, pp. 
512-16. 
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percent undecided.101 People on each side of politics considered that the 
Liberal publicity work carried out since the election had improved the 
opposition's chances; yet the government presided over full employment; 
and could point to an impressive record on social security. 
In his policy speech, delivered at Canterbury, Menzies brought ideological 
conflict to the foreground, warning that the election represented a turning 
point in Australian history. 
This is our great year of decision. Are we for the Socialist State, 
with its subordination of the individual to the universal 
officialdom of government, or are we for the ancient British faith 
that governments are the servants of the people ... ?102 
The dramatic clash of philosophies was combined with some quite prosaic 
issues: inflation entailed the theft by socialists of the 'little people's' hard-
earned savings; strikes were part of a campaign of 'class war•.103 Petrol 
rationing was linked to the socialist obsession with rationing, but also to 
Labor's suspiciously ambivalent foreign policy. The Liberal Party would 
protect Australia by re-introducing peacetime compulsory military training. 
Menzies explained that the so-called petrol problem was unnecessary and 
generated by Labor itself: the sterling area produced plenty of crude oil, but 
Chifley had neglected to encourage the construction of refineries and, 
101. Australian Gallup Polls Nos. 619-630, Sep-Oct 1949. 
102. Joint Opposition Policy Speech, 1949, p. 6. 
103. Inflation: Ibid., p. 9; class war: p. 14. 
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antipathetic to private enterprise, had ignored alternative exporters of petrol. 
In peacetime, the NEI exported large volumes of petrol, but " .... the Australian 
Government, through its ban on Dutch shipping helped to prolong the East 
Indies dispute."104 
Menzies admitted that Australia enjoyed full employment now, but warned 
that this situation might not continue if the Government were returned. In 
order for industry to remain prosperous the Commonwealth should 
encourage immigration and develop infrastructure; also, coal must be readily 
available, costs must fall, and productivity rise. Labor-tolerated Communist 
obstruction, Menzies implied, prevented the achievement of the last three of 
these goals. Furthermore, while a Liberal government would extend 
endowment to the first child, Liberals would never forget that the ultimate 
source of national wealth was not redistribution but production. Labor's 
obsession with redistribution had led to a neglect of production. "The 
Socialists, so far from protecting you from depression, are pursuing policies 
which, if allowed to go on, will inevitably produce one."105 The 
Commonwealth Bank would be protected from government interference. 
Menzies declared that " the pre-war pound - the Liberal pound, the Country 
Party pound - has been converted into a Socialist pound, which ... .is worth only 
twelve shillings and not twenty ... ". In Britain, the value of the bonds paid in 
compensation to shareholders (" ... many of them financially small people ... " ) 
for the nationalisation of the railways and the Bank of England has been eaten 
104. Ibid., p. 19. 
105. R.G. Menzies, Joint Opposition Policy Speech, Canterbury, Victoria, 
10 November 1949, p. 12. NLA MS 5000/9 /334. 
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away by inflation. "In three years, Socialism has stolen away 20% of the price 
it paid."106 Menzies insisted that "the day has gone for treating communism 
as a legitimate political philosophy", and vowed that a Liberal government 
would outlaw and destroy this " ... alien and destructive pest."107 
Chifley's policy speech set out the government's achievements in a matter-of-
fact style, although there was a break from the stolid recital of policy when, 
recalling the miseries of the Depression, the Prime Minister declared: 
[W]e affirm for every man the right to receive a fair return for 
his labor, enterprise and initiative. But we do say that it is the 
duty and the responsibility of the community, and particularly 
those more fortunately placed, to see that our less fortunate 
fellow citizens are protected from those shafts of fate which 
leave them helpless and without hope. 
That is the objective for which we are striving. It is, as I have 
said before, the beacon, the light on the hill, to which our eyes 
11\1( are always turned and to which a~ efforts are always directed. 
But in the rest of his speech, Chifley said little about what the government 
would do in the future. Instead, he argued that the economy had been 
strengthened to withstand any return of the Depression; and that Labor 
rejected the pre-war assumption, still current in Liberal thinking, that a pool 
of eight to ten percent unemployment was required to ensure work discipline 
106. Ibid., p. 9. Labour nationalised the railways in 1946 and the Bank of England in 1947. 
Morgan, op. cit., pp. 33-36. Menzies' argument is that a fall in the value of money between 1946 
and 1949 has redistributed wealth from private creditors (bondholders) to state borrowers 
(bond-sellers). 
107. Joint Opposition Policy Speech, 1949., p. 15. 
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and productivity. Labor refused to accept that depressions were the result of 
immutable laws, but intervention had been tempered by caution. There had 
been five tax reductions since the war, and the budget remained in balance 
despite annual spending on social security increasing from eighteen million 
pounds in 1940, to over one hundred million pounds in 1949. Labor had 
only tried to nationalise the trading banks because the Commonwealth's 
ability to control inflation through regulation of credit had been jeopardised by 
the High Court's disallowance of the special reserves clauses of the 1945 
Banking Act. Labor would and could not go beyond the limits of the 
Constitution. Immigration would increase the population and foster security 
and development. Labor's defence policy included co-operation with Britain 
in developing missiles, but peace was impossible without social justice, and so 
the government supported the United Nations.108 
Considering that the country was enjoying full employment, the 
government's campaign was remarkably defensive. While Evatt was told by 
one supporter that the government's handling of the coal strike had helped to 
increase its stocks with the middle class109, it was evident that Labor politicians 
were convinced that the Liberal Party had made a powerful case against the 
Party's collectivism. Speakers were advised to explain that the idea of an 
omnipotent state controlling all industry was repellent to Labor, which strove 
instead for the freedoms of the Atlantic Charter.110 The candidate for the New 
108Australian Worker, 16 Nov 1949, pp. 1-2. 6-7. 
109
. Kenneth Gee, Sydney, to Evatt, 15 Aug 1949. Evatt papers, Hinders University of South 
Australia. File: 'elections - 1949 - correspondence'. 
110
. Labor Speakers' Notes: Federal Election 1949, Melbourne, n.d. [1949], p. 78. In January 
1941, Roosevelt, endeavouring to overcome isolationist opinion, proclaimed America's 
commitment to the 'Four Freedoms': freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, 
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South Wales country seat of Lawson sought to reassure voters that the 
Socialist Objective contained in Labor's preselection pledge was innocuous: 
this commitment had been in place since 1921, and had been current during 
the war years when the Labor government had virtually unlimited powers, 
and yet none of the dire consequences predicted by anti-socialists had 
eventuated. Socialism was not a threatening creed but should be understood 
as "social justice" in the form of full employment, public works, and welfare. 
The electors of Evans were told that only Labor could defeat Communism, by 
delivering a superior standard of living.111 One contributor to Labor Call 
defended petrol rationing as a duty to Britain, and the fairest method of 
distributing this scare resource. Rationing's opponents were "un-Australian 
and anti-British."112 According to speakers' notes, the Liberal Party's proposal 
to ban the Communist Party would be counter-productive: on the Herald's 
authority, Communists would revel in martyrdom and thrive in the secretive 
conditions which banning would create.113 
Labor publicity, however, concentrated on the standard of living in general 
more than on prices in particularly: the Labor line was that to elect a Liberal 
government was to risk the return of high unemployment. A cartoon strip 
told the story of the development of social security from the point of view of a 
freedom from want, and freedom from fear. These objectives were incorporated in the Atlantic 
Charter (August 1941) a joint statement by Churchill and Roosevelt, which signalled the end 
of United States neutrality. Kinder et al, op. cit., pp. 187 & 209. 
111. The Socialist Pledge, [H.E. Manning for Lawson], Dubbo, n.d. [1949]; To the Electors of 
Evans [candidate: Ron Nichols], Sydney, n.d. [1949]. NLA MS 4738/31, folder: '1949 election 
material'. 
112
. Labor Call, 28 Oct 1949. NLA MS 4738/111, folder: '1932, 1940s newspaper cuttings'; see 
also Courier Mail, 3 Nov 1949, Ibid. 
113. Labor Speakers' Notes, 1949, p. 83. (Herald: 29 Jul 1946). 
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family, whose adult members reflected on how their lives had become more 
secure as a result of the benefits introduced since 1941.1 14 Addressing General 
Motors Holden workers at Adelaide, Calwell explained that bank 
nationalisation would prevent the banks from exacerbating any future 
recession by forcing a policy of deflation. His slogan, 'vote Bob and lose your 
job', drew laughter from the crowd.115 The Liberals were not alone in seeking 
women's votes by promising domestic security through full male 
employment. 
Ladies! This is for you! 
Labor upholds The Home. 
'That's the last pay envelope until I get another job! And the 
Lord knows when that will be!' How many times have wives 
heard those words with a clutch of fear at their hearts? 
Unemployment, soul-destroying unemployment has ruined 
marriages, rpbbed men of their pride in their ability to work; 
has cheated women of happiness, and plunged children into 
misery! That's why the Chifley Government has made full 
employment, work for all, the foundation of its policy.116 
Liberal publicity during the election campaign will be treated briefly here as it 
continued the messages which had been promoted since 1946; except that anti-
socialism and anti-Communism were given specific forms in the proposals to 
114. You must read this story of how £18 million grew to £100 million under Labor, Melbourne, 
n.d [1949]. NLA MS 1633/924/2. 
115
. The News [Adelaide], 21 November 1949, p. 2. NLA MS 4738/111, folder: '1932, 1940s 
newspaper cuttings'. 
116
• The Esplanade Post [Isaacs, Victoria], Dec 1949, p. 3. NLA MS 4738/113, folder: '1949 press 
clippings'. See also Australian Women's Weekly, 12 Nov 1949, p. 53; and Events [Flinders], 
n.d. [1949], p. 2. NLA MS 4738/31, folder: '1949 election material'. 
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abolish petrol rationing and to ban the Communist Party. Readers of the 
Australian Women's Week-ly were told that as children could not vote against 
socialism, it was the special responsibility of women to vote on their behalf.117 
Women were also warned that their husbands or fathers might be 
'manpowered': forced into a job of the government's choosing. Already the 
Labour government in Britain had restrictions on certain occupations, and 
from the tenor of Australian Labor's thinking it was probable that the same 
situation might develop here. In this danger of compulsory allocation of work 
lay the socialist threat to family life.118 This was an aggressive advertisement, 
but other appeals to women were defensive, and concentrated as much on 
what a Liberal government would not do (lower social security benefits and 
wages) as what it would do (reduce taxes and the cost of living, extend child 
endowment to the first child).119 
On 10 December, the Liberal and Country Parties .won seventy four seats to 
Labor's forty seven, although Labor retained a majority in the Senate. 
1946 1949 
% seats % seats 
Labor 49.71 43 45.98 47 
LangLab 1.59 1 0.71 0 
Liberal 32.29 17 39.39 55 
Lib-Country 0.67 1 
Country 10.69 11 10.87 19 
Services Party 1.24 0 
117. Ibid., 19 Nov 1949, p. 24. 
118. Australian Women's Weekly, 26 Nov 1949, p. 20. 
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Roy Morgan, director of Australian Public Opinion [Gallup] Polls, remarked 
to Menzies that his campaign " ... should become a textbook example of the 
importance of adhering to the major issue - in your case, of course, anti-
socialism."121 Earle Page was told by one correspondent that co-operation 
between the Country and Liberal parties had contributed to the result.122 
Chifley attributed his defeat to resentment of the persistence of war-style 
austerity and regulation; but, naturally enough, disagreed with the 
retrospective prediction made by many of his followers that voters might 
have looked more kindly on a Labor programme which included new 
benefits and concessions - in particular, endowment for the first child. He 
considered that while Menzies' promise to iput value back in the pound' had 
been effective, the Liberals' most powerful weapon had been their radio and 
press campaign blaming industrial unrest on Communism and linking " 
'[C]ommunism with Socialism and Socialism with the Labour Party, [and so 
creating a fear complex in the minds of a percentage of the middle class vote'" 121 
'')'ff Calwell blamed "a whispering campaign that it was time for a change", 
the petrol rationing promise, and the antagonism of the trading banks; but 
120. Hughes & Graham, op. cit., pp. 375 & 380. The number of seats was increased from 74 to 12. I . 
~ 
121. Morgan to Menzies, 16 Dec 1949. NLA MS 4936/42/54. 
122
. S.E. Wilson, c/- Farmer and Co. Ltd, to Page, 12 Dec 1949. NLA MS 1633/925/145. This 
o~inion is endorsed by Brian Costar, 'The Politics of Coalition', in Prasser et al, op. cit., p. 95. 
1 3. Chifley to uncited correspondent, December 1949, in Crisp, op. cit., p. 374. 
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agreed that the main reason for Labor's defeat ,was that "for three years, a fear 
campaign had been conducted on the alleged evils of socialisation."124 
The 1949 result was a sweeping victory: the 5.1 % swing to the Liberal party125, 
and the increase in the number of House of Representatives seats from 
seventy four to one hundred and twenty one, had transformed Parliament: 
in 1946, seventeen Liberal members were elected; in 1949, fifty five; and the 
Party's share of lower house seats grew from 23% to 45%. The new seats 
were concentrated in the larger cities but, as C.A. Hughes has shown, the 
Coalition majority should not be regarded as a "triumph of the suburbs", 
because in the two most populous States, Liberal and Country Party gains 
were mostly in non-metropolitan electorates; while in the smaller States, the 
gains came more-or-less evenly from bush and city.126 The established 
politicians of each party took the safest seats - so the many Liberal successes 
in marginal seats created a new cohort of young backbenchers, all of them ex-
servicemen, while Labor's infusion of 'new blood' was relatively limited. 
This may have given the Liberals a long-term advantage127, but for the new 
Government, the immediate significance was that a mandate could be 
claimed for its program, including the prohibition of the Communist Party. 
124. Calwell to Forde, 16 Feb 1950. NLA MS 4738/4, folder: 1950. 
l25. Two-party preferred vote: Malcom Mackerras, 'Elections and Party Performance', in 
Prasser et al, op. cit., p. 74. 
l26. C.A. Hughes, 'The 1972 Federal Election', Australian Journal of Politics & History, vol. 
19, no. 1, Apr 1973, p. 20. Hughes has also argued that the redistribution did not provide a 
material advantage to either Labor or non-Labor. 'The 1948 Redistribution and the Defeat of 
the Chifley Government', Labour History, no. 34, May 1978, pp. 78-81. 
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In retrospect, the 1949 election acquired wider significance. In 1956, for 
example, Liberal president W.H. Anderson told federal council that 1949 had 
been the only poll which the party had won on its own merits, rather than by 
exploiting anti-Communism and Labor's disunity; and after near-defeat in 
the 1961 elections, Liberals called for the revival of the /1 'vitality, 
imagination, and emotional appeal' /1 of their founding year of 
government. 128 The 'famous victory' of 1949 continues to be regarded within 
the Party not only as a rejection of Labor but also as an endorsement of the 
Liberals' reformist mission. Thus in 1989, one of the more impressive of 
Menzies' successors, Malcom Fraser, wrote: 
We of the Liberal Party are confident in our belief that our basic 
principles are shared by the vast majority of Australians. This 
was demonstrated to us most clearly and unambiguously in 
1949 and 1975 when the people called upon our party to revive 
the national spirit.129 
We now know that the 1949 election began twenty three years of non-Labor 
administration; and this poll has been regarded as the earliest manifestation 
of a long-term shift in voter loyalties from Labor to non-Labor.130 John 
Warhurst's interpretation of the beginning of the Liberal ascendancy is more 
useful for our purposes, because he has examined not only the continuities in 
voting behaviour from 1949 to 1964, but also the origins of the 1949 result in 
128. Hancock, op. cit., pp. 89-90. 
129
. Graeme Starr (ed.), The Liberal Party of Australia: a Documentary History, Melbourne, 
1980, v. 
130
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vol. 6, no. 1, May 1971, pp. 87-91. 
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the issues of the late 1940s.131 Drawing on Gallup surveys of religion and 
voting intention, Warhurst classifies this election as the first phase in a drift 
of Catholic votes from Labor, evident between 1949 and 1958. He attributes 
the transition to the coincidence of organised Catholic anti-Communism 
with the upward social mobility of Australian Catholics who by 1947, 
according to the Census, differed little in occupational profile from the rest of 
the population. Middle class Catholics had a greater propensity to choose 
non-Labor, not only because of their economic position but also because as 
regular church-goers they were more likely to be exposed to the propaganda 
of Movement and hierarchy. Thus in Queensland and New South Wales, 
where the Bishops supported the Movement, the shift was apparent in 1949; 
whereas there was no marked change in Victoria until 1955, when Mannix 
finally gave his blessing.132 
The 1949 election has received more attention than most; and the main 
factors are thought to have been the Liberals' promises to extend child 
endowment to the first child, and to 'put value back into the pound', bank 
nationalisation, petrol rationing, the coal dispute and, more generally, the 
Cold War environment of anti-Communism and anti-socialism. Bolton 
considers that while the bank issue alone would have been unlikely to have 
131. Warhurst, op. cit.; Ibid., 'Catholics, Communism and the Australian party system: a 
study of the Menzies years', Politics, vol. 14, no. 2, Nov 1979, pp. 229-40. This strikes me as 
the more sensible approach, for despite postwar continuities in the electorate, parties and 
issues, we can not assume that the politics of affluence, or Catholic anti-communism, remained 
the same from 1949 to 1972. The relative stability of the party system leaves little doubt that 
party choices are habitual, but its fluctuations compel us to recognise that these decisions are 
also affected by short-term considerations. We know that the Liberals went on to win every 




defeated Labor, the Government was, as in its earlier conflict with the British 
Medical Association, damaged by the enmity of professional groups respected 
in an almost deferential fashion by lower middle class voters.133 Crisp and 
Lee note that by 1949 the lead in the Gallup polls which the Liberal Party had 
won following the announcement of nationalisation had disappeared; and 
Crisp suggests that the issue of bank nationalisation was influential through 
the enthusiasm, and funding which it generated for the Liberals and pro-
Liberal groups.134 May emphasises the vigour of the bank officers' campaign. 
Love contends that Labor's populist assumption that the power of the banks 
was exercised only by a small clique of bankers led the Government to 
underestimate the strength of the reaction against nationalisation; and 
implies that the success of this "capitalist mobilization" was inevitable.135 
Lee makes a good case for the importance of petrol rationing, noting that 
sixty percent of voters who changed from Labor to non-Labor in the 1949 
election told Gallup poll-takers that they had considered the rationing issue. 
Less convincingly, he cites a study of United States electoral behaviour to 
justify the proposition that as voters only consider the past and not the 
future, the anti-Communism of 1949, while undoubtedly a source of the 
non-Labor majority, is better regarded as a "retrospective" reaction to the 
Chifley government's failure to resolve the coal dispute than a "prospective" 
mandate for banning the Communist Party.136 No one at the time seems to 
have made this nice distinction. Rather, the scene was set for Menzies and 
133. Bolton, op. cit., p. 73. 
134. Crisp, op. cit., pp. 339-40. 
135. Love, op. cit., p. 186. 
136. Lee, Q1L.£i!., pp. 516 & 502; M. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National 
Elections, New Haven, 1981. 
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his colleagues to make good their promise to take drastic action against a 
political movement they regarded as a threat to prosperity and safety.137 
The impression one gains from the literature is that after eight years in 
power there was a concentration of grievances against Labor, encouraged by a 
Liberal campaign identifying 'socialism' with problems ranging from 
unnecessary rationing, to Communist influence on the labour movement.138 
Most writers consider that while the Opposition offered attractive concessions 
and projected an image of modernisation and vitality, the Government's 
reform agenda was played-out, its wartime prestige faded, and its rhetoric 
oriented towards the past. In particular, the injustices of the 1930s and the 
failures of the first Menzies-Fadden government, both stock-in-trade of Labor 
propaganda, would have been of little interest to younger voters. In contrast, 
the Liberals promised remedies for current maladies. ~39 A strong state would 
suppress the Communists, and a free market140 would release petrol sales: a 
policy likely to appeal to the drivers, predominantly male, of Australia's 
1,250,000 motor vehicles.141 It was, however, well-known that petrol 
rationing prevented retailers from delivering groceries to the door142; so the 
promise of abundant petrol may also have appealed to women: more 
137. Lee, op. cit., pp. 516 & 502. 
138. Bolton, op. cit., p. 75; Crisp, op. cit., p. 366; Lee, op. cit., pp. 514-17; Love, op. cit., pp. 179-
80; David Stephens, 'The Effect of the Great Depression on the Federal Labor Governments, 
1941-49', Australian Journal of Politics & History, vol 22, no. 2, Aug 1976, p. 265. 
139. Bolton, op. cit., p. 73; Crisp, op. cit., p. 370. 
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precisely, to those who could afford to have groceries home-delivered, or 
who hoped to enjoy this service in the prosperous years to come. 
Chapter 8. Protecting Prosperity, 1950-54 
... the Depression was the start of things for us in Australia, which 
still is a vivid memory for many, and the great desire for 
something better (and for security) - then the war - and the great 
lust for 'things' that followed, for increased standards.I 
In Menzies' first term as Prime Minister, he had led a minority government 
and his authority within the UAP had been tenuous. Now, the Liberal and 
Country Parties enjoyed a considerable majority in the House and Menzies' 
position as Liberal leader was secure, although not invulnerable. During 
their first two years in office, the Liberals implemented much of their 1949 
agenda, but it became apparent that the Government was unable to provide a 
quick solution to the economic problems of the 1940s, and unwilling to 
embark on a crusade for. 'desocialisation'. Menzies and his colleagues set out 
to give private enterprise a greater scope in the productive economy, but 
seemed to work within an assumption shared with Labor: that the 
imperatives of social cohesion and stable economic growth demanded a degree 
of government ownership and regulation unthinkable before the conspicuous 
failure of laissez faire in the Depression, and the expansion of social 
entitlement and government functions during the Second World War. 
Moreover, despite an increase in Cold War international tensions, the first 
post-war Menzies Government discovered the limits of the domestic politics 
of anti-Communism. The failure of the 1951 referendum suggested that the 
pervasive rhetoric of anti-Communism had created a misleadingly ambitious 
1
. Casey diary, 6 Feb 1951, NLA MS 6150/26, vol. 113, p. 29. 
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expectation of how much anti-Communist coercion the public was willing to 
accept. This is not to say that the government's only political asset had been 
devalued, for the government's credentials as a guardian were based not only 
the suppression of the Communist threat, but also on the preservation of the 
benefits of postwar capitalism.2 
Labor's Senate majority was the immediate restriction on the Government's 
power. Petrol sales were controlled by regulation rather than statute, so the 
Government was able to abolish rationing in February 1950. Endowment for 
the first child was too obviously popular for Labor to oppose it outright; the 
promised benefit of five shillings per week was enacted in June, after 
Opposition Senators had abandoned amendments designed to raise the 
benefit to ten shillings per week, and to prohibit the Arbitration Court, which 
was investigating a revision of the basic wage, from considering child 
endowment. By June, however, this was the only significant measure 
enacted.3 Parliament was deadlocked on the Communist Party Dissolution 
Bill, and amendments to the Commonwealth Bank Act. The Bank had since 
1945 been directed by its Cabinet-appointed Governor, H.C. 'Nugget' Coombs, 
the most influential of the cohort of Keynesian, planning-oriented 
economists appointed by the Curtin Government. The new Bill proposed to 
transfer directive power to a ten member Board, consisting of five business 
and five official members. Coombs would continue as Governor, and would 
chair and be responsible to the Board, while Cabinet would maintain ultimate 
2
. Nicholas Brown, Governing Prosperity: social change and social analysis in Australian in 
the 1950s, Cambridge, 1995, p. 114. 
3
. Bolton, op. cit., p. 80; Kewley, op. cit., pp. 200-202; Round Table, no. 160, Sep 1950, p. 378. 
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authority over Bank policy. Labor opposed any retreat from the policy of 
government-controlled central banking. The proposals were moderate, 
however, and disappointed those in the parliamentary and organisational 
Liberal Party who had been led by the 1940s rhetoric of 'free enterprise banking' 
to expect a greater curtailment of the Commonwealth Bank, whose state-
subsidised competition with private banking created, they feared, the 
conditions for the state absorption of all banking business. The Liberal Party in 
Opposition had mobilised support by presenting the party division on banking 
as a choice between private enterprise freedom and state 'totalitarianism'. In 
office, Liberal policy was to manage credit and, despite the Country Party, to 
separate the Commonwealth Bank's trading and central bank functions.4 
From the outset, however, the Government had to deal with a more 
pressing problem than reform of the Commonwealth Bank. Inflation, which 
Menzies had promised to quell, instead gathered. pace. The annual rate of 
price increases had already reached 10.1 % in 1949, and began to accelerate in 
the second half of 1950. The average rate for the 1950-51 financial year was 
19%.s In April 1951, for example, the cost of canned fruit rose by 14%, and at 
the Homebush markets in Sydney, lamb was fetching record prices.6 In the 
later 1940s, politicians and economists had feared that peace would be followed 
by a trade slump: this had been Australia's fate after the Great War. But it 
became be apparent that 'the lust for things', along with the effects of currency 
4
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depreciation, public spending on defence, immigration, and capital 
development, and a commodity prices boom (particularly in wool, following 
the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950), had combined to make inflation 
the main economic problem of the early 1950s.7 
Concerns over the cost of living and economic security would later erode the 
Government's support, but not all the economic news for 1950 was dispiriting. 
The Government's economic policy was basically expansionist, and oriented 
towards consumption and state-fostered growth rather than deflationary 
discipline. There was even a new Department of National Development, to 
replace Postwar Reconstruction: the minister, Casey, was principally 
responsible for the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation, and the continuation of the ambitious Snowy Mountains hydro-
electric project.8 Despite Labor's fears that the extension of child endowment 
would provide the Arbitration Court with ~n excuse to restrain wage growth, 
at the end of the year the male basic wage was increased by one pound to 
£7 /18/- per week; and the ratio of the female basic wage, in some industries as 
low as 50% of the male award, was increased to 75%.9 A Gallup poll reported 
that 76% of interviewees were satisfied with their housing. Another asked 
respondents if they were better off now than when they were children: 60% 
said they were better off; 26%, worse off; while 12% thought there was no 
difference and 2% did not know.10 
7. Ibid., p. 180. 
8. Brown, op. cit, p. 101; Hudson, op. cit., p. 208. 
9. Round Table, no. 161, Dec 1950, p. 94. 
10
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While there was evidence of prosperity, 1950 also saw a dangerous escalation 
of the Cold War, and with it a shift in Australian anti-Communism's focus on 
threats to prosperity, to dangers to national security.11 This was a change in 
emphasis rather than an abrupt transformation. By 1950 the Industrial Groups 
had made considerable progress in reducing the influence of the CPA within 
the union movement, but Menzies and his colleagues continued, as they had 
in the 1940s, to highlight the inconvenience and hardship caused by industrial 
conflict (see figure 8.1) and to blame economic problems (inflation typically, 
rather than shortages) on the restriction of production by Communist 
unions, particularly the New South Wales Miners' Federation. But the 
Government regarded the problem of domestic Communism in terms of war 
preparation, and the danger of war between the Communist and Western 
blocs seemed greater than ever. The Government's policies and rhetoric were 
predicated on the assumption that Australia should prepare not so much for a 
full-scale war with the Soviet Union or China, but for smaller conflicts, in 
South East Asia or, perhaps, the Middle East.12 Percy Spender, the new 
External Affairs minister, nominated "[N]ational security in the face of the 
thrust of Communism in Asia" as his main priority, to be achieved through 
alliance with Britain and the United States.13 (The new Government rejected 
as dangerously unworldly utopianism Labor's notion that Australia could, in 
part, enhance its national security by supporting attempts to negotiate 
through the United Nations a peaceful resolution of international conflict.)14 
11. David Lee, Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia's Postwar Foreign and 
Defence Policy, Sydney & Canberra, 1995. 
12. Davidson, op. cit., p. 138; Martin, 'Mr Menzies' Anticommunism', pp. 53-55. 
13. Round Table, no. 159, Jun 1950, p. 275 
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In May, the Government despatched a squadron of military aircraft to assist 
the British in suppressing Communist insurgency in Malaya. Defence 
spending increased in the 1950-51 Budget, and the Government prepared to 
introduce a National Service scheme.15 
One of the most alarming phases of the Cold War began in June, when North 
Korea invaded South Korea. A force of United Nations troops, dominated by 
the United States and including Australians, was quickly despatched to assist 
the South. By September the Americans had reached the Korean-Chinese 
border, and Chinese soldiers joined forces with the North. The United States 
commander, MacArthur, favoured attacking Chinese bases with atomic 
bombs, but was opposed in this by Truman, who eventually dismissed the 
General for disobeying civilian orders. The war reached a stalemate by mid 
1951, with each side entrenched around the original 38th parallel border; a 
negotiated armistice two years later re-established the division of Korea on 
this pre-war boundary.16 
Thus the controversy over banning the Communist Party took place at a time 
of war between the United States and its proxies, and a client State of the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, the Cold 
War intensified concerns about espionage and 'subversion' - a conveniently 
ill-defined term, usually thought to describe the undermining of political 
15
. Peter Edwards, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's 
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support within Western nations for assertively anti-Communist policies.17 In 
1950, Communist influence within the West seemed to explain two 
disturbing problems: the USSR's early acquisition of atomic weapons (in 1949); 
and the United States' failure to prevent the accession to power of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Western defence experts had not expected the USSR to 
explode an atomic test bomb as early as 1949. It became apparent that British 
and United States atomic secrets had been passed to the Soviets, and in March 
v..\r."7 1950, the first of the post-war atomic spies, the physicist K~l Fuchs, was put on 
trial in the Old Bailey. In the United States, politicians seeking explanations 
for the 'loss' of China scrutinised the loyalty of government employees.18 The 
Commonwealth Government had similar concerns. Menzies and his 
colleagues had always mistrusted Evatt's appointments to the Department of 
External Affairs, and even suspected the young political scientist he had 
appointed as Secretary, Dr John Burton, of being a Soviet spy.19 From the 
point of view of those who lookecl to the United States for leadership in a 
western alliance, the embargo on shared military intelligence imposed by the 
United States on the Australian government in 1949 had been an indictment 
of Labor's anti-subversion credentials. The Chifley Government had been 
pressured by the embargo and by pressure from the Opposition and its own 
Catholic rightwing, into setting up the Australian Security and Intelligence 
Organisation, and one of the incoming Government's first acts had been to 
place ASIO under the directorship of a career army officer, Colonel Charles 
Spry. Under Spry, ASIO's investigative and counter-propaganda activities 
17. David McKnight, Australian Spies and their Secrets, Sydney, 1994, p. 38. 
18
. Rebecca West, The Meaning of Treason, London, 1982 (rev. ed. 1965), p. 214; Ellen Shrecker, 
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were directed against Communist influence, especially in the trade unions and 
the organised peace movement.20 
These were some of the circumstances of the debate on the Communist Party 
Dissolution Bill introduced by the Government in April. The Bill was made 
under the defence powers, to preserve "peace, order and good government", 
and was justified on the grounds that the ACP: 
.. .in accordance of the basic theory of communism, as 
expounded by Marx and Lenin, engages in activities ... designed 
to assist or accelerate the coming of a revolutionary situation, 
in which the Australian Communist Party, acting as a 
revolutionary minority, would be able to seize power and 
establish a dictatorship of the proletariat ... 21 
The ACP was responsible for the use of violence, fra1:1d and intimidation in its 
attempts to disrupt vital industries, and as "an integral part of the world 
communist revolutionary movement" engaged in "operations of a 
treasonable or subversive nature".22 A 'communist' was defined as one who 
"supports or advocates the objectives, policies, teachings, principles or 
practices of communism, as expounded by Marx and Lenin". 23 The Bill 
"dissolve[d] the Communist Party and appoint[ed] a receiver for its property"; 
dissolved by executive order other "substantially Communist" organisations; 
20. Laurence W. Maher, 'The Years of Living Dangerously: The Chifley Government, 
Pragmatism, Ideology and 'The Communist Menace' ', unpublished paper given at 14th Annual 
Law & History Conference, Canberra, 30 Jun-2 Jul 1995, pp. 23-25. 
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allowed for the jailing of officials of Communist organisations; prohibited the 
employment by the Commonwealth of persons "declared" to be a menace to 
the "'defence or the execution or the maintenance of the laws of the 
Commonwealth"'; and also prohibited declared persons from serving as 
officials in unions covering "key" industries - specifically, building, transport, 
metalworking, coalmining, power, engineering.24 The Bill would operate 
retrospectively from the ratification of the ACP constitution in 10 May 1948 
permitting, for example, the prosecution in 1950 of someone who had been 
the official of a declared organisation on 11 May 1948 but was no longer a 
member of the Communist Party.25 
In June 1950, Gallup recorded that virtually all of its sample group had heard 
of the bill, and 80% approved.26 One Liberal sympathiser, a Sydney building 
contractor, advised Menzies that removing income tax from overtime would 
help to counteract the Communist influence .which caused industrial conflict, 
for "[A]s citizens earned more money they would slave to build their own 
homes, and the voice of the disruptionist would not be listened to .... "27 Casey, 
however, was worried about the difficulty of distinguishing lawful from 
unlawful union activities, remarking in November: 
(I]t seems probable that strikes will occur in communist-
controlled key unions on apparently legitimate industrial matters 
in the next month or two. Then, when we 'declare' their 
communist leaders, it will be made to appear that we are doing so 
as a means of combating their legitimate industrial demands.28 
24. Gollan, op. cit, p. 258. 
25. Ibid., p. 264. 
26. Australian Gallup Polls, nos. 677-689, May-Jun 1950. 
27. Norman Ranger, Marrickville (sp?), to Menzies [copy], 24 Jul 1950. NLA MS 4936/528/31. 
28. Casey diary, 22 Nov 1950. NLA MS 6150/26, vol. 12, p. 190. 
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Casey kept his doubts to himself, but anyone following the political news 
would have been aware that Labor was bitterly divided over the best way of 
responding to domestic Communism.29 The Bill exacerbated these divisions; 
and Menzies told one minister that he relished the prospect of a 'first class 
split in the ranks of the opposition.'30 At first, Caucus appeared relatively 
united - at least in its opposition to those clauses of the Bill which placed the 
onus of proof on the defence. That prosecutors should not have to call 
witnesses in order to prove the fact of Communist activity was justified by 
those who supported banning Communism on the grounds that if prosecutors 
were compelled to provide exhaustive evidence of Communist activities then 
the security service's network of informers would be compromised. So, the 
Labor Party and its affiliated unions were divided between two imperatives: to 
delete clauses which might be used against themselves; and to avoid a double 
dissolution in which Labor's obstruction of the Dissolution Bill would 
inevitably provide the main target for Government attack. Gallup Polls had 
found in July-August 1950 that if the onus of proof issue led to a general 
election, 533 would vote for the Liberal and Country Parties, and 383 for 
Labor; with 83 undecided.31 After six months of tortuous and well-publicised 
internal dissension, Labor Senators were directed by their Federal Executive to 
29
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pass the Bill in its present form: that is, with the minor amendments already 
accepted. 
The situation, however, was not without its problems for the Government. 
Its constituents were accustomed to think of non-Labor governments as 
guardians not only of order, but also of liberty.32 The onus of proof question 
was more controversial than the Bill itself: according to Gallup, only 34% 
agreed that the burden of proof should rest on the 'declared' person.33 
Menzies was warned by a Western Australian sympathiser that Liberal 
publicity on this issue lacked clarity.34 The Victorian secretary of the Council 
of Churches advised that while he and his fellow churchmen agreed with the 
purpose and general method of the bill, there was some unease about the 
clause which stipulated evidence of Communist activity. 
To many of us it lacked definition and was something of a 
dragnet which could catch many innocent and idealistic 
ministers and laymen. For instance, we know of several 
churchmen who became involved with the peace movement 
here who would never support marxian communism .... This 
clause (22) as it now stands would declare such men who would 
feel the stigma greatly.35 
Nonetheless, Menzies had made 1950 a very difficult year for the Opposition, 
and its travails continued after the enactment of the Dissolution Bill in 
October. The next month, deputy leader H.V. Evatt accepted a brief on behalf 
32. The current Liberal Prime Minister, John Howard, has characterised Menzies' attempt to 
ban the Communist Party as an aberration in the Liberal Party's libertarian record. 'Some 
Thoughts on Liberal Party Philosophy in the 1990s', Quadrant, vol. 38, no. 7-8, Jul-Aug 1994, p. 
22. 
33. Ibid., nos. 677-689, May-Jun 1950; 690-699, Jan-Jun 1950. 
34. J.L. Paton, Perth, to Menzies 30 May 1950. NLA MS 4936/528/32. 
35. Rev. Courtney Thomas to Menzies, 19May1950. NLA M54936/44/64. 
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of the WWF, one of ten unions which, along with the Communist Party, were 
mounting a High Court. challenge to the Act's constitutional validity. In 
March 1951 the Court declared six to one, with Latham dissenting, that the Act 
was unconstitutional: essentially because Australia was not, for the purposes 
of the Commonwealth defence powers, 'at war'; nor did the Commonwealth 
require such an Act in order to preserve the Constitution. Convinced that this 
was an ideal opportunity to secure a majority in both Houses, Menzies 
persuaded the Governor General to grant a double dissolution, on the 
grounds that the Senate had failed for a second time to pass the 
Commonwealth Bank BilI.36 
Menzies' policy speech set out the Government's superior credentials on 
national security. Only the Government realised the threat of Communism; 
Chifley persisted in regarding it as a legitimate philosophy. Under the 
Liberals, Australian defence and foreign policy was 'realistic' and recognised 
United States responsibility for the Pacific. It was not hysterical to warn of and 
prepare for the possibility of war. Even with its increased expenditure 
Australia was spending less per capita on defence than were the United States 
and Britain. The Korean experience demonstrated that well-trained troops 
suffered a lower rate of casualties. Compulsory military training should not be 
thought of as war-mongering but as a precautionary measure. "Do we want 
our sons thrown into war without the skill that training can give them?". 
Menzies also expounded the Government's superior record on living 
standards; but here the Communist issue was also relevant, for the best means 
36. The Governor General (1947-53) was Sir William McKell, Labor Premier of New South 
Wales, 1941-47; Gavin Souter, Acts of Parliament: A Narrative History of the Senate and 
House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 1988, pp. 417-18. 
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of lowering inflation was to increase production, and the barrier to greater 
production was the go-slows and absenteeism encouraged by Communist-
controlled unions. Menzies concluded with a plea that the Government, faced 
with the challenges of securing prosperity and averting military danger, must 
be given control of both houses of Parliament.37 
In his broadcast of Labor's policy speech, Chifley stated that in the last year 
housewives, and their husbands, had known the effects of inflation. The 
Liberals' defeat of the 1948 referendum had left the Commonwealth powerless 
to control prices. Labor would encourage production and industrial peace by 
consulting the trade unions, avoid the useless and dangerous policy of 
repression pursued by the Government, and maintain the law it had passed 
in 1949 to regulate union ballots. The Opposition was opposed to 
Communism, but would not be stampeded into authoritarianism, and had 
delayed the Dissolution Bill, which had now been shown to be 
unconstitutional, in order to expunge the worst abuses of "British liberties". 
Labor would not proceed with bank nationalisation: the proposal was defunct. 
Chifley had been advised by Leslie Haylen that marriage loans were "one of 
the Election winners"38; and in his broadcast the Opposition leader announced 
that the Party would aid "legitimate home makers" with low interest loans. 
The rate of immigration, Chifley said, would be reviewed in regard to the 
housing shortage. On welfare, it was Labor policy to move towards the 
abolition of the means test on old age pensions: the first step would be raise 
the level of permissible income and assets.39 A Labor government would 
37. R.G. Menzies, policy speech, Canterbury, 3 Apr 1941. NLA MS 4936/258/48. 
38. Haylen to Chifley, 20 Mar 1951. Evatt papers, Flinders University of South Australia. 
file: 'correspondence - miscellaneous - 1951'. Leslie Haylen, MHR for Parkes (NSW), 1943-63. 
39. Income to be raised 10/- per week; assets to be raised from £750 to £1000. 
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investigate the health and working conditions of Aborigines. Labor would 
reverse Coalition policy by co-operating with the United Nations, and 
opposing the rearmament of Japan. In conclusion, Chifley asked voters to 
throw out Menzies' "do nothing" administration.40 
Much of Labor's campaign centred on inflation: newspaper advertisements 
detailed price increases, and blamed the frustration of the Chifley 
Government's price control proposals. 
We ask you 
DID MENZIES PUT VALUE BACK IN THE POUND? 






Bricks, per 1000 














171 /- ., 
Evatt took this domestic message to the streets of Sydney, where on one day 
he spoke at nine street meetings in two and a half hours. Most of the 
meetings were outside hotels, and the majority of the listeners were men, 
who stood outside with their glasses of beer. But women coming out of shops 
40
. typescript of policy speech by J.B. Chifley, 28 Mar 1951. NLA MS 4738/32, folder: 'ALP 
policy speech, 1951'. 
41
. Sunday Sun Guardian, 5 Apr 1951. Evatt papers, Flinders University of South Australia. 
file: 'press clippings - elections - 1951'. 
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with their parcels cheered Evatt as he declaimed " 'The value of the 
Australian pound ls being cut to pence.' 1142 
Labor tried to evade the embarrassing issue of Communism by turning the 
election into a plebiscite on inflation; the Government attempted to blame 
high prices on 'Red wreckers' in the unions, and to make every issue a 
question of Communism versus freedom. Voters must break the Labor 
"stranglehold" on the Senate if the Government was to have any chance of 
protecting Australia from Communism. Menzies warned that Communism 
.. .in this country as elsewhere, is the enemy of religion, the sworn 
opponent of democratic government and the constant friend of 
industrial disorder, of power shortages, of grossly inadequate coal 
production, of avoidable hardship for millions of Australian 
men and women.43 
The Liberals, whose slogan for Tasmania asked voters to choose between 
'Menzies or Moscow', promised to seek broader constitutional powers to deal 
with Communism, and to strengthen national defences. Menzies argued in a 
radio speech that while Chifley claimed to have developed Australian 
defences in the later 1940s, as Leader of the Opposition he 
... plays the communist game by denouncing as warmongers a 
government which regards effective defences as the first 
obligation of any government worth the name .... the families of 
those gallant Australians fighting in Korea and Malaya will 
indeed be shocked to be told that peace is secure .... 44 
42. Sunday Telegraph, 22 Apr 1951. Ibid. 
43. R,G. Menzies, Speech for broadcast, City Hall, Brisbane, 24 Apr 1951, p. 7. NLA MS 
5000/5/112. 
44. Ibid., p. 3. 
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Few would have been shocked to learn that the Government had secured 
victory: Labor was demoralised and disunited, and the Liberal and Country 
Parties were returned to power (albeit with a loss of five seats) and secured a 
much-needed Senate majority. Evatt was returned only narrowly in Barton. 
1949 1951 
% seats % seats 
Labor 45.98 47 47.63 52 
LangLab 0.71 0 
Liberal 39.39 55 40.62 52 
Country 10.87 19 9.72 17 
Com 0.89 0 1.0 0 
Ind 2.16 0 1.02 0 
Elections for the House of Representatives, 1949 & 195145 
The Staff Planning Committee's report is uninformative, but records that the 
secretary of the New South Wales division, J.L. Carrick, noticed a favourable 
response to the Government's emphasis on secret ballots for trade union 
elections. 46 A Gallup poll conducted one month before the election, but 
published a month afterwards, suggested that for Liberal and Country Party 
voters, the Coalition's attitude to Communism was its most appealing policy; 
while more Labor voters nominated the cost of living than any other issue; 
and relatively few were attracted by Labor's policy on Communism. On both 
sides, many said that habit was the major influence on their choice. 
45. Hughes & Graham, op. cit., pp. 380 & 387. 
46
. FPRPC minutes, 19 Jul 1951. NLA MS 5000/1/5. file: 'Public Relations (Staff) Planning 
Committee - Minutes'. 
Reasons for party choices April 195147 
Intending to vote Liberal-Country Party 
(523) because .... 
L-CP opposes Communism 
General policy of L-CP 
L-CP opposes socialism 






Admire Menzies 2 
L-CP look after farmers 2 
Good defence policy 2 
Oppose nationalisation of banks 2 
Approve L-CP handling 
of industrial disputes 
Habit (always vote L-CP) 
Other 






Intending to vote Labor (473) because ... 
High cost of living 
Labor is workers' party 





policy is best 4 
Admire Chifley 1 
Favour nationalisation of banks 1 
Labor best for social services 
Prefer Labor's foreign policy 
Other 
Habit 








Within the Labor Party and the unions, the ascendancy of Catholic Action was 
generating an increasing level of tension. Labor's problems worsened after 
47.Australian Gallup Polls, nos. 756-774, c. Jun 1951. 
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Chifley died on 13 June, and Evatt was elected leader. Chifley's personal 
opposition to extreme anti-Communism had made him unpopular with 
Catholic Action. Evatt's attitude was even more provocative, and he had 
none of his predecessor's talent for managing internal party conflict.48 These 
were auspicious circumstances for the new Government's referendum on 
powers to outlaw the Communist Party. Polling day was 22 September. 
At a July meeting of the Staff Planning Committee, all Secretaries except J.L. 
Carrick, New South Wales (the most unionised State, which had returned 
Labor majorities at the last State and Federal elections), professed confidence 
in the prospects for their own State. T. Lockhart (Tasmania) reported that the 
Cosgrove Government was not opposing the referendum, and that the 'yes' 
case should have an easy run. H.F. Sleath (Queensland) predicted a strong 
'yes' vote - in line with recent Senate results - but added that Queensland 
voters were traditionally loath to give Canberra an 'open cheque'. C. Palmer 
(Western Australia) expected a strong result, as did J.V. McConnell (Victoria), 
for many Labor politicians there favoured the referendum and would be 
publicly non-committal. The Victorian Division, however, " ... was particularly 
anxious that a favourable atmosphere should be created by way of press 
report[s]. With this end in view, it was earnestly and respectfully submitted 
that the Prime Minister should ... call a conference of leading newspaper 
proprietors." Carrick could not predict a 'yes' majority, but thought the result 
would be close: the New South Wales Labor Party was strongly against the 
proposals; Evatt "could be relied upon to put a strong legalistic case"; and there 
48
. Crisp, op. cit., pp. 382-83; Peter Crockett, Evatt: A Life, Melbourne, 1993, p. 279. 
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was also "collective sectarian" opposition. Furthermore, the referendum 
should not be 
... considered independently of the Defence Preparations Bill and 
the Government's anti-inflationary proposals. Under 
circumstances of economic strain, it might not be easy to sustain 
the drama which communist activity has provided in the past.49 
A month later, the State Secretaries' opinions remained essentially 
unchanged. Lockhart was "still optimistic", as was Sleath who warned, 
however, of apathy: many people complacently assumed the Government 
would win. Prospects appeared to be good in Western Australia, where the 
Labor member for Perth, Tom Burke, a prominent Catholic layman, was well-
known as a supporter of the Dissolution Bill and a critic of Evatt. McConnell 
considered that the 'yes' case was gaining ground in Victoria, and noted that 
many unions were making only nominal financial contributions to the 'no' 
campaign. The South Australian Secretary believed that the referendum 
proposal was endangered in that State by the unpopularity of the 
Government's belt-tightening policies and rhetoric: Fadden's "'tax until it 
hurts"' style was particularly resented. Carrick reported little public apathy 
but much confusion; unions remained strongly opposed. "The response of 
individual trade unionists to the 'Yes' case was most important .... Dr Evatt 
should not be underrated." Speaking of Australia as a whole, Carrick argued 
" ... that we should not be too obsessed with the need to answer the 'No' case 
and that there should not be too much reference to the Commonwealth 
49. FPRPC minutes, 19-20 Jul 1951. NLA MS 5000/1/15. South Australia did not report. Loan 
and import res~rictions were the principal anti-inflationary measures . The Defence 
Preparations Bill allowed the Federal Government to make regulations to prepare swiftly for 
war. The Act, which expired in 1953, was never used. Souter, op. cit., pp. 423-24. 
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Security Service." Federal Public Relations Officer E.G. Holt contended that 
" ... the first essential was to convince people that Communists and 
Communism were a menace. If this was achieved, then it would not be 
difficult to reply to minor criticisms." Menzies also addressed the meeting and 
" ... was strong in his assertion that the Labor Party should not be tied with the 
Communist Party in the 'Yes' campaign" - advice at odds with Federal 
Secretariat instructions, and Liberal advertising.so 
In his careful study of the referendum, Leicester Webb remarks that electors 
who had been following the Government's attempts to legislate against 
Communism would probably have assumed that " ... they would be asked 
simply to say 'yes' or 'no' to the proposition that the Commonwealth 
Parliament should have power to deal with communists ..... " For many years 
Menzies had insisted voters make a stark choice between Communism and 
democracy. He continued to do so in the referendum campaign. "Let me 
remind you of the simple, undeniable facts. Don't forget them."51 The terms 
of the ballot itself, however, required voters to endorse a complicated and 
ambiguous set of powers, as Webb pointed out: 
... the Government was now asking for three things: the right to 
legislate with respect to Communists and Communism, the right 
to enact the Communist Party Dissolution Act, and the right to 
amend that Act within certain limits. And it was asking for these 
things in language which a layman would comprehend with 
difficulty - if at all. 52 
50. FPRPC minutes 13 Aug 1951, NLA MS 5000/1/15. 
51. R.G. Menzies, Final Broadcast for the Referendum Campaign, 19 Sep 1951. NLA SM 
5000/5/117. 
52. Webb, op. cit., p. 245. 
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For all the complexity of these constitutional questions, both the 'yes' and 'no' 
campaigns rested on appeals to fear; in many ways the referendum was a 
contest between fear of Communism and fear of government power. The 
Liberal Party's Federal Secretariat set out three approaches. 
(1) Our major line of attack [is] that this is a clear issue - the Free 
World versus Communism. 
(2) A second line of attack [is] to meet the party political 
opposition of the Labor Party. 
(3) A third line of attack showing the Labor Party as disruptors 
and champions of the Communist cause.53 
In summary, Menzies and his Liberal colleagues argued that Communists 
posed such a dire internal and external threat to national security that the 
nation was effectively at war, or could be soon, and required for its protection 
pre-emptive and extraordinary war-style powers. Communists worked best 
under the protection of the law, and illegality would severely hamper their 
activities. The legislation would benefit most trade unionists and only bring 
within the criminal law those who happened to be Communists. Labor had 
itself supported the Dissolution Bill, admitted that the Crimes Act was 
insufficient, and only wanted a 'no' vote in order to embarrass the 
Government. These were the main 'yes' case arguments, which were 
frequently combined with the third, fellow-traveller line of attack. 
Firstly, Liberal campaigners contended that " ... [T]he deadly dangers of war .. .in 
such places as Korea, Indo-China and Malaya, in two of which our fellow 
Australians have been fighting and sustaining casualties, are all the creation of 
53. Anon. [Liberal Party Federal Secretariat], The Referendum. Notes on Campaign Tactics. 
1951. NLA MS 5000/5/117. 
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Communist lmperialism."54 Russia was more powerful in 1951 than 
Germany had been in 1939.55 The Americans, Menzies said in his opening 
speech, have already lost more men fighting Communist aggression in Korea 
than they lost in the First World War - they have not hesitated to say 'yes' to 
extra powers against Communism. Nor have "[O]ur own brave men in and 
above Korea .... "; or the Liberal and Labour Governments in Canada and 
Britain.56 Liberal Campaign notes stated that Australia and the other Western 
powers were engaged in an undeclared global war, " .. .in a military sense ... " in 
Mala ya, Korea, and In do China, and "[P]olitically" within Communist 
countries. The war also raged in " .. free countries where its [the Communist] 
Fifth Column uses the weapons of industrial and economic sabotage, to 
promote strikes and to increase inflationary pressures .... "57 All industrial 
conflicts involving unions with Communist officials, apparently, were 
treasonous military acts. 
As Australia was in grave danger no reasonable person could expect the 
security services to be constrained by standards, such as the judicial 
assumption of innocence, appropriate for a time of peace. "Fancy 
conducting your Intelligence Service m time of war by advertising the 
names and faces of your secret service! And are not the Communists waging 
a 'cold war' against us today?"58 Common sense, the Prime Minister 
insisted, was firmly on the side of the 'yes' case; he was at a loss to 
understand why anyone might vote 'no'. 
54. Ibid., The Case for 'Yes', p. 1. 1951. NLA MS 5000/5/117. 
55. Notes on Campaign Tactics, p. 1. 
56. R.G. Menzies, Opening Speech in the 'Yes' Campaign, Canterbury, Victoria, 4 Sep 1951. 
NLA MS 5000/5/117. . 
57. Notes on Campaign Tactics, pp. 1-2. 
58. The Case for Yes, p. 3. 
Now, why should the Parliament not have powers to deal with 
Communists? No one has seriously attempted to suggest one 
sensible reason! Can you? How can you charge your national 
parliament with responsibility for national defence, and then 
leave it without power to deal with our worst enemies at 
home?59 
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Menzies gave a dramatic illustration of the limitations which a requirement 
to call prosecution witnesses would impose on the Government. He himself 
happened to know that at the recent Communist Party congress, " ... held 
behind closed doors at the Ironworkers' Hall...", delegates were told they 
should concentrate on securing control of the steel industry. 
Now, if I wanted to prove in a Court of Law the facts which I 
have just stated, quite obviously I could not prove them except 
by putting my source of information in the witness box. Yet any 
child knows that the .consequence of that would be to close up 
one avenue of information after another and make it more and 
more difficult to keep a tab on the nefarious activities of these 
people.6° 
Furthermore, the Communist Party Dissolution Bill only placed the burden of 
proof on those who refused to swear that they were not Communists. 
Menzies professed that given this reasonable concession and under present 
circumstances of national danger he could not understand why " ... an alleged 
59. Final Broadcast for the Referendum Campaign by R.G. Menzies , p. 4.19 Sep 1951. NLA MS 
5000/5/117. 
60. Opening Speech in 'Yes' Campaign. NLA MS 5000/5/117. In essence, this had been 
Menzies' argument in The Rule of Law During the War, in which he had quoted approvingly 
the opinion that: 'Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole judges 
of what the national security requires. It would be obviously undesirable that such matters 
should be made the subject of discussion in a Court of Law or otherwise discussed in public.' 
The Law Reports, 32, p. 436, in The Rule of Law During the War, Melbourne, 1917, p. 26. 
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communist should be relieved from the simple responsibility of declaring on 
oath that he is not one."61. He insisted that the powers he sought could not be 
used to suppress non-Communist dissent. 
Look at the first branch of the amendment. It gives power to 
make laws 'with respect to Communists or Communism'. Does 
anyone seriously pretend that the Labor Party, the trades unions, 
Church societies, come within these words?62 
Apparently, Menzies feared that many people would answer this rhetorical 
question in the affirmative. He must also have been keenly aware that only 
four of the twenty three constitutional alterations proposed to date had 
succeeded. 63 Menzies had begun his political career campaigning against the 
Bruce Government's unsuccessful Industrial Powers referendum (1926), 
warning the audience at one public meeting not to "'take a leap in the 
dark"',64 and had in recent times opposed extensions of Commonwealth 
powers in 1944, 1946 and 1948.65 Now, advocates of the 'no' case were using 
similar arguments - 'do not trust the government, it has too much power 
already' - against him. In the last week of the campaign, Casey wrote that the 
government's case had been weakened by Evatt's cultivation of fear about the 
uses to which the government might put its additional powers, and that 
officials from the New South Wales Division were especially pessimistic.66 
61. Ibid. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Webb, op. cit., p. 51. There had been eleven referenda. 
64. Martin, op. cit., p. 50. 
65. Webb, op. cit., p. 132. In 1946 Menzies had supported the primary products and social 
services and opposed the.employment conditions proposals. Only the social services proposal 
was accepted. Sawer, op. cit., p. 180. 
66
. Casey diary, 17 Sep 1951. NLA MS 6150/ 26, vol. 13, p. 180. 
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'Yes' advocates were asking voters to entrust the Government with more 
power and to view the 'no' case with suspicion, so perceptions of integrity 
were important. One way in which Liberal campaigners attempted to make 
their case more credible was by defending the Government's and attacking 
Labor's intentions and leadership. In passing the Communist Party 
Dissolution Bill and then opposing the referendum which would enable this 
same law, the FPLP had made itself an easy target for such criticism.67 At best, 
Liberals suggested, these reversals in policy betrayed a "party political" 
insincerity; at worst they indicated Communist manipulation. Federal 
Secretariat's 'Notes on Campaign Tactics' suggested this argument. 
The Labor Party opposes the Referendum in the name of justice 
ANSWER: This means 'justice' for the Communist Fifth 
Column; in other words [this] is a plea for the right of the 
Communist Party to carry out its treasonable activities. Thus, in 
carrying out its Party warfare to the limit, the Labor Party emerges 
as the defender and protector of Communist Imperialism .... / n 
this final stage the Labor Party uses the propaganda and jargon of 
the Communist Party itself - and here there should be no 
punches pulled in identifying Dr Evatt as the champion of 
Communism in Australia.68 
The Menzies Government had won a double dissolution election in April 
using very similar campaign tactics - there had been a 0.5% swing to Labor, but 
the Liberals, now with a Senate majority, were manifestly the dominant Party. 
Labor was disunited; Evatt embarrassed; and the newspapers full of stories 
about Communist expansion. Despite the Opposition's internal divisions, the 
Labor and Liberal parties were now conspicuous partisans of the referendum, 
67. Opening Speech for 'Yes' Case. 
68. Notes on Campaign Tactics. 
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and the 'no' and 'yes' cases could be expected to follow their respective 
fortunes. Not surprisingly then, eighty percent of respondents to a Gallup poll 
taken in June had said that they would vote 'yes', but thereafter the 
proportion fell to 73% in July and 53% percent in September.69 Press 
commentary followed a similar pattern: for the most part, journalists began 
the campaign predicting an easy win and finished by admitting that the contest 
was too close to predict. 70 
On 22 September the 'no' vote was 50.48%, a winning margin of 53, 082 - about 
ten thousand less than the total number of informal votes. New South Wales 
produced the largest 'no' (104, 030) and Queensland the largest 'yes' (77, 137) 
majorities. The 'no' total exceeded the Labor vote at the 1951 Federal Election 
in all states except Western Australia, which had a history of approving 
referenda. According to studies reviewed by Webb, about 14% of non-Labor 
voters chose· 'no', and 11 % of ALP voters chose 'yes'. The biggest swings from 
the last Federal Labor vote to the 'no' total occurred in country seats.71 
Webb concluded that the results were inconclusive. Fremantle, a seat with a 
vigorously anti-Communist local member, Kim Beazley, produced a small 
'yes' majority, but the electorates of two of the principal Catholic Action-
influenced Labor member, Yarra (Stan Keon) and Gellibrand (John Mullens) 
69. Australian Public Opinion Polls were accused in the Labor press of trying to boost the 
referendum. Webb remarks that one (unspecified) newspaper received the APOP press release' 
Referendum will be close, Gallup Poll predicts' and printed a story under the headline "Yes' 
vote forecast by Poll'. op. cit. pp. 132-35. 
70. Ibid., p. 129. 
71. Ibid. p. 145-47. 
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voted 'no' in overwhelming numbers.72 Those seats which voted 'no' by 
atypically high margins (in comparison to seats with similar voting histories 
and in similar regions) tended to be rural, but so were the three States -
Tasmania, Western Australia, and Queensland - which returned 'yes' 
majorities. Also, there was no apparent correlation between recent State 
Election results and the referendum returns.73 
Nor could the referendum's partisans agree on the causes of the defeat, 
although both Evatt and Menzies attributed the result to fears that the 
Government might set up a police state. In the opinion of Menzies and other 
Liberal politicians these unwarranted anxieties had been encouraged by Evatt, 
and there were many complaints that the Labor Party had lied its way to 
victory. Liberals also complained that the electorate had been distracted by 
secondary issues. That dairy farmers resented the Menzies Government's 
refusal to subsidise them might explain the high 'no' vote in some rural seats. 
Other local issues may have been important: the Victorian Division of the 
Liberal Party, for example, blamed the Country Party Premier J.G.B. Macdonald 
(who had made large numbers of public servants redundant and harshly 
criticised Menzies and Fadden over loan restrictions) for the poor 'yes' result 
in that state. While politicians and journalists disagreed on the extent to 
which the result entailed a rejection of the substantive proposal rather than a 
by-election-style 'slap on the wrist', there was a consensus that the 
interventions of church leaders and academics were influential in persuading 
72
. Stan Keon, MHR for Yarra (Vic), 1949-55; John Mullens, MHR for Gellibrand (Vic), 1949-55. 
Yarra voted 'nq' by 59% to 39% 'yes'; Gellibrand, by 70% to 28%. Statement showing Result of 
Count in each Division NLA MS 5000/5/117. 
73. Ibid., pp 147-50. 
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Liberal voters to vote 'No' and Labor voters to vote 'yes'.74 Frank Cain and 
Frank Farrell suggest that the rowdiness of pro-Government public meetings 
may have been self-defeating in that this disruption made the referendum 
appear to be the prelude to a period of violent social division.75 This is a 
reasonable surmise, and although no one can explain precisely the causes of 
the referendum's defeat, it does seem that on this occasion the Liberal Party, 
enthusiastic practitioners of this technique, were the victims of a scare 
campaign. 
Over the next four and a half years, anti-Communism, and the equation of 
Labor socialism with austerity, and Liberal free enterprise with plenty 
continued to be central to Liberal electioneering. In the period between the 
referendum and the 1954 Federal Election, however, the Government's own 
economic management faltered. Immediately after the referendum, Fadden 
brought down a severely deflationary 'mini budget' which raised taxes and 
interest rates. High demand continued to draw in imports nonetheless, and 
in March 1952 the Treasurer, who had over the last two years been adamant in 
his opposition to import restrictions, imposed just such a policy; Fadden's 
budget of that year was similarly unpopular. By mid 1953 inflation had 
subsided,76 but in September the Arbitration Commission suspended, for the 
first time since 1923, quarterly cost of living adjustments of the basic wage. 
74. Ibid., pp. 80, 160-62. 
75. 'Menzies' war on the Communist Party .. .' in Ann Curthoys & John Merritt (eds.), 
Australia's First Cold War, 1945-1953, vol. 1: Society, Communism & Culture, Sydney, 1984, 
p. 133. . 
76. J.C. Horsfall, The Liberal Era: A Political & Economic Analysis, Melbourne, 1974, pp. 71-
73. 
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Labor attributed this decision to pressure from employers and the Federal 
Government. 77 
A 'political appreciation' prepared by the Staff Planning Committee in March 
1952 commented that the Government's prospects, as it approached the Senate 
elections due in May 1953, were weak. The Senate elections would be 
regarded by press commentators as a preliminary round to the next Federal 
Election. The abrupt decision to impose import restrictions was one of the 
main causes of the Government's unpopularity, which was so severe that for 
the first time since 1944 a State Liberal Party - Victoria's - faced electoral defeat 
due to resentment of its Federal counterpart. To regain support the 
Government should eschew gloomy 'bitter medicine' rhetoric; promote its 
achievements more vigorously; cultivate better relations between State and 
Federal Liberal governments; and revive the enthusiasm of supporters by re-
affirming Liberal "basic beliefs". In particular, the report continued, Liberal 
supporters were disappointed that the Government had failed to promote a 
Constitutional amendment requiring any future attempt to nationalise the 
banks to be tested by a referendum. While the time had come to announce 
that the Government considered this impossible, it was necessary to reassure 
the Liberal-minded that the Government was indeed committed to protecting 
private banking, by relaxing credit restrictions.78 
Four months later the Staff Planning Committee remained pessimistic: fear of 
unemployment posed a grave political danger. In New South Wales by-
77. Bolton,~ p. 104. 
78. FPRPC, Political Appreciation, Mar 1952, NLA MS 5000/7 /126; FPRPC minutes, 20-21 Mar 
1952. lbid./1/15. fldr: 'P.R. 'Staff' Planning C'ttee - Minutes File. 
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elections that year a 3.7 per cent swing against the Liberal Party in Liverpool 
(May) had increased to 8.9 per cent in Ashfield (June). "The all important 
political task at the moment is the conquest of fear. Until widespread public 
fears are allayed the swing against the Government will continue." Ministers 
might disperse economic gloom by releasing an expansionary "incentive 
budget" and a policy document on unemployment; they should promise not 
to interfere with wage cases, and let voters know they were serious about free 
enterprise by de-regulating the banks and ensuring that any future 
nationalisation would require a referendum. The Government's 
unpopularity seemed to be underlined when Labor took the federal Victorian 
seat of Flinders in a by-election in October 1952.79 
Launching the Senate campaign in April the next year, Menzies once again 
spelled out the dramatic choices facing Australia, and reminded listeners of 
the mundane hardships they had endured in the 1940s. 
Housewives were tempted to make unnecessary purchases to get 
just a little of this or that from a patronising store-keeper. Your 
life was regimented. You knew the meaning of standover tactics. 
You carried heavy loads in string bags. Your housing problem 
was a nightmare. These were the living conditions under a 
Federal Labor Government four years after the war ended.BO 
Setting Labor's war austerity regime against the new Liberal era of brimming 
petrol bowsers was a powerful argument, but encouraging fear of invasion 
and treason was still a principal tactic of Liberal propaganda. The main 
development was an increased emphasis on leadership, responsible economic 
79. Ibid., Jul 1952. 
80. 'Living Standards', Campaign Notes, 19 Jan 1953, NLA MS 5000/9/333. Italics in original. 
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management, and Labor Party disunity, and Evatt himself was central to these 
contrasts: the Labor leader was the Communists' best friend; his extravagant 
promises demonstrated the Labor Party's financial irresponsibility. In Liberal 
demonology Evatt, flanked by Calwell and Ward, presided over an unholy 
Trinity. 
There is no middle course. Either the voters confirm us in a 
Senate majority, or they accept the imminent risk of having Dr 
Evatt in charge of our foreign relations, Mr Calwell in charge of 
our relations with South East Asia, Mr Ward in charge of our 
territories, and the Treasury conducted by a group of people 
whose policy is more expenditure, more inflation, and sheer 
irresponsibility. 81 
Labor continued to criticise the Government's economic management and 
claimed that its approach to resisting Communism was the more democratic. 
The Opposition reminded voters that Menzies had promised to reduce the 
cost of living, and that breaking this commitment also meant that the 
Government had been unable to maintain the value of pensions.82 
Launching the campaign in Brisbane, Evatt noted that unemployment had 
exceeded 100, 000 - the first substantial unemployment since the war. The 
Government's restriction of credit, which entailed more heavy-handed 
economic control than any wartime regulation, was responsible.83 Labor 
81. R.G. Menzies, Opening Speech in the Senate Campaign, Brisbane City Hall, 14 Apr 1953. 
NLA MS 5000/9/334. 
82
. Labor Speakers' Notes: Senate Election, 1953, Sydney, n.d. [1953], p. 11. 
83
. Cairns Post, 16 Dec 1953. Evatt papers, Flinders University of South Australia. file: 
'elections - 195~ Senate - correspondence' (the file also contains newspaper cuttings); Daily 
Telegraph, 7 May 1953. NLA MS 4738/114, folder: 'political topics - 1953 - newspaper 
cuttings'. 
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speakers were prompted to deny that the Menzies Government could take 
credit for the secret union ballot legislation, which had been introduced by 
Menzies as a private member's bill in the last year of the Chifley Government. 
Labor had opposed the "totalitarian" methods proposed in the 1951 
referendum, and would continue, through its Industrial Groups, to work 
against Communist influence in the unions.84 
That the Liberal Party was sensitive to the unpopularity of Government 
economic policy may be judged from the refusal of the State branches to 
allow the Treasurer, Arthur Fadden, to speak in their campaigns. Casey 
complained of "an uphill campaign, lacking in public interest."85 Voters 
confirmed the Government's majority, but reduced its margin from four to 
two; the Opposition received 50.61 per cent of the formal vote, up from 45.88 
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This was one sign of a nation-wide swing to Labor. State politics provided 
another: in February the New South Wales Labor Government had been 
84. Labor Speakers' Notes ... 1953, p. 15. 
85
. Casey diary, 20 Mar l953. NLA MS 6150/27, vol 15, p. 47; Ibid., 7 May 1953, p. 78. 
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. Hughes & Graham, op. cit., pp. 386 & 391. 
393 
returned with an eight per cent swing, and Labor won narrowly in Western 
' (o"/1-frJ p-J.Js Australia despite. a poorly-funded campaign. Although the Liee1al par Ly's 
successful defence of the federal electorate of Gwydir in the December 1953 by-
election was a hopeful sign, by 1954 all State Governments except for South 
Australia's were held by Labor - and even in that malaportioned electoral 
system the Party received its highest vote since 1927. 87 
Liberal Party activists, particularly women, devoted time to canvassing New 
Australians when the Party's electoral fortunes were on the rise, that is, 
approximately from 1947 to 1951; this type of electioneering remained 
important over the next three years. Liberal Party workers used information 
provided by the Department of Immigration to establish contact with 
immigrants: in fact, there seemed to be some confusion about the respect1 . .._ 
roles of the Party and the Public Service. Assistant Secretary of the Western 
Australian Branch, Lel Thc5mas, wrote to Federal Director J.R. Willoughby 
recommending the employment of a migrant liaison officer at Australia 
House, London. In his reply Willoughby asked whether the officer "would 
be a Liberal Party one or a Government appointment [?] .... obviously, the 
Migration Department at Australia House now have a pretty good liaison with 
migrants and intending migrants ..... "88 
87. McMullin, ~., p 266 & p. 269. Labor also benefited from malaportionment: in 1950 the 
Hanlon government consolidated Labor's Queensland hegemony with the introduction of a 
zonal gerrymander system giving votes cast in the west of the State approximately twice the 
value of urban votes. The increasing mechanisation of agriculture and shrinking of the bush 
population would in later years tilt Queensland's electoral system in favour of the Country 
Party. . 
88. J.R. Willoughby to Lei Thomas 13 Sep 1954. NLA MS 5000/7 /158. The Liberal Party in 
Western Australia was officially known as the Liberal and Country League of W.A. 
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Approximately 100, 000 immigrants were arriving each year, and an increasing 
number were being naturalised. Staff of the Federal Secretariat remarked in 
their 1954 Campaign Plans that many immigrants would be voting for the first 
time and that local campaign workers should " .. endeavour to contact these 
new electors and to convey our message to them."89 Eileen Furley, Chairman 
of the Women's Group (NSW), spoke at naturalisation ceremonies and was 
an executive member of the New Settlers' League; she reported that the 
Women's Group had "played an active part in all assimilation activities .... "90 
T. Heyes, Secretary of the Department of Immigration, addressed the 1954 
Annual General Meeting of the Federal Women's Committee, and " ... and 
answered numerous questions on problems which are being constantly set by 
our people during their day to day work in the interests of the Party and the 
Government. "91 This routine work included distributing anti-Communist 
pamphlets, such as the Western Australian Division's What you hate we 
fight, which was translated into a number of languages including 
Lithuanian.92 
Al.though it appeared that the Party's volunteer and professional workers 
were assiduous in their pursuit of the migrant vote, the Federal Secretariat 
89. 1954 Federal General Elections. Campaign Plans, p. 7. NLA MS 5000/5/134. 
90. Eileen Furley, Report of Women's Group (NSW) Oct 1953-0ct 1954 NLA MS 5000/1/1. 
91. J.R. Willougby [Federal Director, Liberal Party] to H.E. Holt [Minister for Labour & 
National Service ] 18 Nov 1954. NLA MS 5000/7 /158. 
92. May Porter [Secretary to JR Willoughby] to Lei Thomas [X,WA Division] 29 Sep 1954. 
NLA MS 5000/7 /158. (I have been not been able to find a copy of What you hate we Fight, 
nor discover what other languages it was translated into.) The Federal Women's Committee 
distrusted some foreign language publications. Their Jun 1946 meeting considered the 
resolution 'That it be co111pulsory for all newspapers, printed and/or published in Australia, in 
a foreign language, to have a fair English translation column by column.' The minutes do not 
show whether this was carried. NLA MS 5000/1/2 
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would have liked to have done even more, and explained to potential 
business donors that: 
WE WOULD LIKE to extend and greatly build up our New 
Australian Liberal Movement, educating New Australians in 
civics and politics. Their votes will soon make or break 
governments in Australia. They are potential supporters of the 
Liberal Government cause - strong opponents of Socialism. Here 
again, lack of funds frustrates us. The numbers of new electors 
from Immigration is likely in the near future to reach a great 
total of 480, OOQ.93 
In a letter to Menzies discussing "general 'slants"' for the 1954 election, W.S. 
Bengtsson (Senior Research Officer) reminded the Prime Minister that Central 
and Eastern European migrants were particularly predisposed to the anti-
socialist message. 
You will recall that you had some well chosen words in 1949 on 
the subject of socialism. We are firmly· of the opinion that there 
is a growing consciousness of the fact that the disturbing decline 
in moral values when the socialists were in office has been 
arrested in our Government's term. The decline we witnessed in 
the post-war years (and still frequently the subject of Royal 
Commissions etc in Labor governed States) were and are 
invitations to totalitarian forms of government. New 
Australians recognise these trends.94 
93. Politics is Your Business! c. 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. Federal Secretariat 1954 Election 
file. 
94. W.S. Bengtsson to R.G. Menzies, 21 Apr 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/134. Bengtsson may have 
been referring to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into matters relating to the Joshua George 
Arthur and Reginald Aubrey Doyle, 1953. The Commission investigated allegations of 
improper or corrupt association between Arthur, a minister in the NSW Labor government, and 
Doyle; and found that there had been impropriety, but no corruption. D.H. Borchardt, 
Checklist of Royal Commissions, part 4: New South Wales, 1885-1960, Melbourne, 1975, p. 335. 
J. Arthur was MLA for Hamilton, 1935-50; for Kahibah, 1950-53; Minister without Portfolio, 
1949; Minister for Tourist Activities and Immigration, 1949-50; Minister for Mines and 
Immigration, 1950-53. 
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Many immigrants admired the Liberal Party's anti-Communism and anti-
socialism because they had witnessed the effects of Soviet power in their old 
homes; but many must have chosen Australia because they thought it would 
be a good place to live. Liberal electioneering then, did not simply exploit the 
fear of Communism and socialism, potent as those fears were - rather, the 
Party's advertising celebrated the prosperity Australia had achieved under the 
Menzies Government and warned that this new world of comfort and 
security would be destroyed by a Labor Government. 
This message could only have been reinforced by the Petrov affair. On the 
evening of Monday 13 April, one day before Parliament adjourned for the 
election, the Prime Minister announced that a Soviet spy, Vladimir Petrov, 
had been granted political asylum and that the Government would appoint a 
Royal Commission to investigate his allegations of espionage in Australia. 
"'These matters ... "', Menzies told the. House, "' .... concern not only the 
activities of M.V.D. agents in Australia, but also the position of some 
Australian citizens named in the documents under 'cover' or 'code' names."' 
Menzies regretted the timing of the announcement. 
'[W]hile I would have been agreeable for all of us to defer an 
appointment of such importance until after the new Parliament 
had been appointed, there should be no unavoidable delay of 
investigation of what are already beginning to emerge as the 
outlines of systematic espionage and at least attempted 
subversion. •95 
95. Cited Nicholas Whitlam and John Stubbs, Nest of Traitors: The Petrov Affair, St Lucia, 
1985 (1974), p. 75. 
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The Prime Minister held a press conference the same night , and Tuesday's 
newspapers carried front page stories speculating on the dramatic revelations 
which the enquiry could be expected to make. 
The proximity of the Petrov defection to the elections aroused much suspicion 
in the minds of the government's critics, but Menzies had at least one other 
motive for holding the poll in mid April: the Queen and Prince Phillip had 
left Australia only recently, on the first of that month, after a highly popular 
two month tour.96 Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of the election and the 
Petrov controversy, whether or not this was planned before the defection, 
created compelling publicity. The Commission began its hearings less than a 
fortnight before polling day; more powerful, perhaps, in its impact on public 
opinion was the spectacle - captured by photographers - of Evdokia Petrov 
being hustled across the tarmac of Sydney airport towards the aeroplane 
waiting to take her back to Russia. While the aeroplane was refuelling at 
Darwin, Petrov's thuggish-looking escorts were disarmed by airport police 
and, after a phone call from her husband, Evdokia agreed also to accept an 
offer of political asylum.97 
Retaining the slogan of the Senate elections - 'don't gamble with your 
prosperity' - Liberal campaigners encouraged voters to fear Communist 
influence on the Labor Party and the trade unions. Labor's association with 
Communists made its leaders unreliable in fending off foreign aggression and 
96 L 't 
. owe, Q.12.:_Q!· 
97. One newspaper headlined a picture of the courier Karpinsky being disarmed by a burly 
policeman 'We can be tough, too!' Whitlam & Stubbs, QJ2,....ill.., pp. 89-93. 
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domestic subversion. When in office, Evatt and his colleagues had failed to 
stand up to Communists in the unions; this, along with Labor's obsession 
with economic controls, had caused the shortages, strikes and low production 
of the 1940s. To return a Liberal Government was to chose a proven 
philosophical and economic alternative - the free enterprise way - to Labor's 
discredited program of restriction and regulation. Menzies alone possessed 
the courage and integrity to lead Australia safely and comfortably through the 
challenges of the 1950s, an era every bit as testing as the last war. 
Menzies, delivering the Government policy speech, boasted that since 1949 
Australian society had become more prosperous, fair, and well-defended, 
"with more friends abroad than ever before." The alliance with America had 
been sealed with ANZUS, through which "we are in the closest communion 
with our friends." A Coalition government could always be trusted to 
preserve internal security, but Labor had been converted to the anti-
subversive cause belatedly and under pressure of public opinion. Liberals had 
proved equally reliable in quelling inflation, by lowering the taxes which had 
inhibited production. National development was being pursued in both the 
public sector (the Coalition had provided all the funding for the Snowy River 
project) and in private enterprise, with the encouragement by tax concessions 
of oil refining. Security in old age would be enhanced by a relaxation of the 
conditions of the old age pension; but the total cost of welfare had grown to a 
point where the complete abolition of the means test was impossible. The 
Government would work in co-operation with charities to provide care for 
the elderly, matching, pound for pound, private spending on old age homes. 
Menzies reiterated -the Liberal commitment to combine "social obligation" 
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with "free enterprise" and warned that only Liberals realised the basic truth 
that if the individual "becomes submerged in the mass, and loses his personal 
significance, we have tyranny."98 
Evatt's policy speech concentrated on the Government's economic 
management. He complained that while Menzies had boasted of progress, 
there had only been a small and recent improvement after four years of 
inflation and intermittent unemployment. Inflation had meant that the 
Government had broken its promises to restore the value of the pound and 
maintain the value of social security benefits. Old age pensioners, in 
particular, deserved a "New Deal", which Labor would provide by abolishing 
the means test within its first term in government. Defensively, Evatt insisted 
that the money could be found without tax increases by switching spending on 
capital works, which benefited future generations, from current revenue to 
loans. Evatt endorsed the means test proposal in language reminiscent of 
non-Labor themes: abolition would remove a penalty on "thrift and energy". 
Anticipating other criticisms, Evatt reminded his audience that the Chifley 
Government had passed laws to protect the Woomera rocket site from 
Communist interference, and promised that Labor would continue to 
safeguard the Commonwealth against espionage.99 
The Labor campaign continued these themes of material well-being and anti-
communism. Labor advertising directed at women recalled the inflation of 
98. R.G. Menzies, policy speech, Canterbury, 4 May 1954. NLA MS 4936/259/57. 
99. Australian Worker [Qld], 10 May 1954, pp. 1, 5, 8-9. 
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the early 1950s and, pointing to the social security reforms of the Curtin and 
Chifley Governments, insisted that "[H]appy, contented home life is Labor's 
objective for all."100 Speaking at the Warragul RSL Hall, the Labor leader 
claimed that Menzies had a "vested interest" in preserving Communism; 
there had been no prosecutions or convictions, and the issue was merely 
designed to draw attention away from the Government's failure to keep its 
promises. Labor would prosecute Communists engaged in treachery, but 
would also strive to free the world from the fear of a third, atomic world war. 
Workers at the Launceston railway yards were told by the Opposition leader 
that Australian warehouses were full of Japanese goods ready to be released on 
the local marketlDl Addressing a lunchtime meeting at the Caltex refinery in 
Kurnell, Evatt turned to a more idealistic variation of this theme, insisting 
that only through Labor could Australia " 'fulfil its manifest destiny as a great 
outpost of European and British civilisation in the Pacific." Labor considered 
that agricultural production must be increased because plentiful food was one 
of the West's best defences against Communism.102 Writing in the Courier-
Mail, the secretary of the Queensland branch of the Labor Party, Jack Schmella, 
al~o made the common Labor argument that the real answer to Communism 
was to raise living standards, a reform only Labor could achieve. Schmella 
insisted that while the Liberals had used the Communist issue effectively in 
1949 and with less success in 1951, the issue was too tired to be effective a third 
time. 103 On the other hand, ALP federal secretary J.A. Ferguson urged that 
100. Australian Women's Weekly, 12 May 1954, p. 26 & 26 May 1954, p. 50. 
101
. Daily Mirror [NSW], 27 and 25 May 1954. Evatt papers, Flinders University of South 
Australia. file: 'press clippings - elections - 1954'. Evatt did not specify the promises. 
102. Sun [Sydney], 27 May 1954. Ibid. 
103
. Courier-Mail, 29 Apr 1954. NLA MS 4738/114, folder: 'articles by Jack Schmella, 1954-55'; 
and see Sam Brown, Canberra, to Evatt, 17 May 1954. Evatt papers, Flinders University of 
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the Petrov issue required a re-orientation of the Labor campaign towards 
another, suitably distracting issue. Ferguson's suggestions were the re-
armament of Japan, and control of the atomic bomb; but he considered that 
abolition of the means test would only have a limited popularity, because 
many people were not affected, some would not believe the promise, and 
others were opposed to granting concessions to the rich.104 
The Liberal Party, however, was determined to prevent Evatt from escaping 
his past. Liberal publicists recalled that he had lifted the wartime ban on the 
Communist Party; defended it before the Arbitration Court and the High 
Court; led opposition to the Government's secret ballot legislation; 
campaigned against the Dissolution Bill; and failed while Attorney-General to 
suppress Communist-fomented strikes.105 All this made for a poor record: but 
the implication was that while Communists posed a direct threat to Australia, 
Labor represented more of a risk - an uncertain prospect - than a definite 
menace. 
You know the Menzies Government will continue to fight the 
Communists, but can you be certain that a Labor Government 
would? Remember that Labor's appeasement of the Reds 
promoted strikes, created shortages, and arrested Australia's 
development. 
Recent events have surely demonstrated that 'IT CAN HAPPEN 
HERE'. You dare not gamble when you vote next Saturday.106 
104. Ferguson to Evatt, 4 May 1954. Ibid., file: 'elections - 1954 - congratulations'. 
105. handbill, 1954. Mercury [Hobart] 26 May 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. 
106. Advertiser [Adelaide] 26 May 1954. 
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'Recent events', a notable .euphemism of the 1954 campaign, referred of course 
to the Petrov affair. As Robert Manne insists, Menzies did not directly refer 
to the Petrov affair in his policy speech or in any other public meeting during 
the campaign. Manne errs, however, in asserting that after a few outbursts 
early in the campaign, Menzies succeeded in suppressing all reference to the 
Petrov affair in Liberal Party publicity material.107 Liberal literature published 
during the campaign did indeed refer to the Petrovs' defection. In one article-
style Liberal newspaper advertisement, 'Dan' shared his feelings about these 
dramatic events. 
This week the Petrovs have shown all free men for a moment 
past the Iron Curtain. We saw Communism stripped to its 
hideous reality .. .! know what my own reaction was. The thing 
smashed at all I believe in the soul of every freeman. I thought: 
'By the living Harry, if I'd been born into Communism that 
could have been my own wife in those newspaper pictures -
terrified, hysterical, man-handled by strongar.m Soviet escorts 
and being frog-marched off, God knows where and to what fate'. 
That thought will have occurred to a lot of men; so will the 
question mark that stands as large as all Australia over the Petrov 
affair. 'How does Dr Evatt reconcile all this with the way he has 
acted in regard to Communism?' I ask that not with a political 
motive, but a national one. 
Labor have called me 'Disillusioned Dan'. In one sense they are 
on the ball. I am disillusioned about Labor. One good thing 
though - I've more than an idea that a lot of Labor people, 
107. Robert Manne, The Petrov Affair: Politics & Espionage, Sydney, 1987, p. 106. Manne 
complains that the myth is all students know about Petrov. The myth, in Manne's account, 
has three points: firstly, that for the sake of publicity Menzies and ASIO arranged for Petrov 
to defect just before the ~lection; secondly, that Menzies and the LPA exploited the issue 
during the campaign; third, that the government would have been defeated if not for the 
Petrov affair. Ibid., pp. 93-94. 
women especially, will use their own judgement this time and 
will vote Liberal.108 
403 
'John Doe', another copywriter's representation of the disenchanted Labor 
voter, offered a similarly disingenuous account of the Petrov affair in an 
article published in the Isaacs Standard, newsletter of the Liberal member for 
that seat. Doe insisted 
... [T]here is no doubt that the impending Royal Commission into 
espionage, following the sensational disclosures by the Russian 
ex-diplomat Petrov, cannot be allowed to become an issue at the 
forthcoming Federal Election. 
The matters that will be placed before the Royal Commissioner 
are above all party considerations. [sic] They are matters of vital 
national security. The Prime Minister himself has made it very 
clear that he regards iLas unfortunate that so grave a crisis should 
have arisen so soon before an election. 
The Royal Commission's findings, Doe continued, must be pursued by a 
reliably anti-Communist government. "And that is the thought to carry to the 
polling booth: We must be sure. We must be certain. "109 
Dan, and John Doe were, like John Henry Austral, characters intended to 
sound like working men. The Party was determined to win the support of 
skilled tradesmen, and here anti-Communism came into its own, for secret 
108. 'Dan', 'An Outlook on the Election', Sunday Times [W.A.] 25Apr1954. NLA MS 
5000/5/113. Italics in the original. 
109. Isaacs Standard 17 May 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. The Member was W.C. Haworth. 
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ballots provided one of the Government's most important selling-points in its 
pitch for the votes of working class men. Advertisements in the Adelaide 
News and Advertiser asserted that the Government's provision for 
Commission-supervised ballots was the main reason why "workers voted 
Liberal and Country League in 1951 and will again vote Liberal and Country 
League on May 29". To date, the amendments to the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act allowing court-ordered ballots had been invoked sixty three 
times, demonstrating that the Liberal Party's reforms were not anti-union, 
rather they gave rank and file unionists the opportunity to get rid of ballot-
rigging Comm uni st cliques.11 o Speakers' Notes con tended that the 
Government was able to break Communist-led strikes in Melbourne, 
Geelong, Mackay (New South Wales) and Bowen (Queensland) because it 
enjoyed " ... the support of an overwhelming majority of loyal, industrious, 
rank and file members in the unions concerned. "111 
In denying that the Labor Party was the only authentic political voice of the 
W<?rking class, Liberal campaigners also liked to point out that their party stood 
for strong national defence, without which no worker could be secure.112 
Labor, however, could not be trusted to safeguard Australia against 
Communist aggression. Once again, the 1945-46 Netherlands East Indies 
episode was recalled: Evatt, Attorney-General at the time, was found guilty in 
one pamphlet of "appeasement" of the WWF: " .. .in consequence, in place of a 
strong Netherlands screen between us and the Red thrust from Asia, we now 
110. News 19 May 1954 .. Advertiser 8May1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. 
111. Liberal Party Speakers' Notes 1954 Federal Election, 'Industrial Peace'. 
112. R.G. Menzies, Joint Policy Speech, Federal Election 1954, p. 12. NLA MS 5000/5/113. 
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only have the eggshell Republic of Indonesia." If not for the election of a 
Liberal Government in 1949, New Guinea would surely have gone down the 
same path. "Evatt has always appeased Red China. He won't stand up to the 
Communists in Indo China, which is now a Red Spear aimed at the heart of 
Australia." Weakness carried the threat of deracination: the pamphlet these 
quotations were drawn from warned that a Labor victory would mean "[P]olicy 
Red' ... Markets ... Black ... Australia ... Brindle ... Labor's Communist allies are the 
enemies of White Australia."113 
The back cover of this pamphlet featured the slogan 'Keep Labor out!' 
superimposed over a red sun reminiscent of the Japanese flag; most 
arguments about Evatt's inability or unwillingness to stand up to 
Communism cited his lifting of the ban on the Communist Party during the 
war; and his weakness in the face of wartim~ industrial "sabotage" 1942-1945. 
Another complaint was that during the 1940s Evatt and other Ministers 
appointed Communists, such as the Federated lronworkers' Association 
secretary, Ernest Thornton, to positions of official responsibility. "Don't you 
think it fair in view of all this, that Labor and its leader, Dr Evatt, be judged by 
the company they kept?"l 14 
Furthermore, the Chifley Government had neglected to protect Australia's 
northern approaches. "The insular Mr E.J. Ward, with an outlook limited to 
113. Coloured Labor: being a color chart to the principles of the Australian Labor Party. , 1954. 
NLA MS 5000/5/113. NSW file. 
114. Dr Evatt & the Communists. 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113 Qld file 
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the electoral boundaries of East Sydney, was Minister for External Territories 
from 1943 to 1949." Under the Ward regime, shipping and flights to New 
Guinea were restricted, and " ... a mood of depression settled upon the islands, 
disturbed only by the timber and war disposals scandals." The latter was 
duplicated, according to Liberal politicians, on Manus Island - an important 
American-Australian base used in the invasion of the Philippines, which the 
Chifley Government had allowed to fall into a state of disrepair. "Mr Ward 
could not see our Northern Territories as a defence frontier any more than Dr 
Evatt could see Manus Island as a link in our chain of defences."115 Although 
the United States Government had offered to share responsibility for the 
upkeep of the base, Evatt - External Affairs Minister at the time - gave this 
offer the "cold shoulder". Evatt had failed to safeguard Australia from 
Communist subversion during the war; nor could he meet the new threats of 
the post-war world. 
Japan had been defeated. No man could have know better than 
Dr Evatt that in the alliance of Communist Russia with 
Communist China a vast Asiatic threat was developing in 
Australia. Manus might have been made into a mighty base for 
the defence of the Commonwealth. 
By 1949, the United States had abandoned Manus Island "in disgust" - leaving 
the way clear for "Chinese dealers" who " ... bought at disposal sales an 
otherwise unprocurable mountain of vital equipment which went to bolster 
the Chinese Red Armies."116 
115. Liberal Party Federal Secretariat, Achievement, 1949-1954, p. 31. NLA MS 5000/5/113. 
116. Dr Evatt & the Communists. 
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Further evidence of Labor's uncertain commitment to defence was that 
between 1945 and 1949 Communism appeared so rife in Australia that the 
Attlee Labour Government " ... withheld from us its defence secrets."117 In 
contrast, the Menzies Government could, from October 1952, cite its hosting of 
the British atomic tests as proof that Australia was loyal to Britain and trusted 
by her in return. Also, total defence spending had risen from £169, 000, 000 in 
the last three budgets of the Chifley Government (1947-50) to £585, 000, 000 
between 1951 and 1954.118 This expansion - of the Air Force in particular - was 
claimed in the 1954 campaign as one of the Government's principal 
achievements: for example, a pamphlet for Bill Grayden, Member for Swan 
(Perth), described under the heading 'A Strong Australia' the neglect of Manus 
Island; and stated that the Federal Government now spent £200, 000,000 a year 
on defence. Casey told his constituents: 
... we have closer links with our powerful friends than at any time 
in our history .... Through our defence policy and our mutual 
defence arrangements with our powerful friends we will do 
everything possible to make Australia secure for the future.119 
Grayden also argued that the Government " ... has succeeded to such a degree in 
making powerful friends and allies that Australia no longer runs the risk of 
having to stand alone." As well as supporting plans for future defence, 
117. 'Defence'. 5 Mar 1954. 
118. Achievement, 1949-54, p. 35. 
119. R.G. Casey, 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. Vic. file. 
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Grayden, who left the army as a Captain, could note that he had already seen 
active service in Syria, New Guinea, Borneo, and the Celebes."l20 The Member 
for Swan was at the time thirty-three years old, one of the young ex-
servicemen elected as Liberal Members of Parliament in the decade after the 
war. Liberal speakers were advised to remind voters that no less than sixty-
nine Government members of the last Parliament had served in the armed 
forces, including thirty two in Japanese combat areas; five were prisoners of 
war under the Japanese.121 
Of course, while national security was an issue which promised to attract 
support from wavering Labor voters and from specific groups such as New 
Australians, Liberal electioneers hoped the Government's defence credentials 
would appeal to voters of all backgrounds. Defence was an issue in relation to 
which all members of the community, rich or poor, could depend on the 
integrity and determination of Menzies and his supporters. 
Another Liberal argument intended for general consumption was that 
Labor's commitment to the socialist objective demonstrated its identification 
with the Soviet Communist Party. After all, Article Four of the Soviet 
Constitution stipulated that '"the economic foundation of the USSR is the 
Socialist system of economy and the Socialist ownership of the instruments 
and means of production'", while Labor candidates were pledged to 
" ... actively support and advocate at all times the Party's objective: the 
120. Bill Grayden, 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. WA file 
121. 'Defence'. 
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socialisation of Industry, Production, Distribution and Exchange."'122 Leftwing 
firebrands such as Eddie Ward and Clyde Cameron (Member for Hindmarsh, 
Adelaide) made defiant statements about the Objective, and these were cited as 
evidence that Evatt and Calwell were only pretending to eschew 
nationalisation and that any future Labor government would try to finish the 
job Chifley started.123 
Do you want a Prosperous Australia? It's here .... More goods in 
the shops, more money to spend and more money in the bank in 
your name. Remember 1949! Labor will drag your back to 
that ..... Do you want a Free Australia? Under Labor we CAN lose 
it. They still want to socialise YOU and YOURS .... Don 't gamble 
with your prosperity and security.124 
Chifley's failures stood in contrast to Menzies' successes: the Liberal 
campaign relied heavily on contrasts between "happy" 1954 and gloomy 1949 
(see figure 8.2).125 The Menzies Government claimed credit for an 
unprecedented level of sustained prosperity. As Willoughby's letter to Myer 
suggested, this positive claim was equally important to fellow traveller scare 
tactics - the two arguments complemented each other. Australia's quality of 
122. advertisement on behalf of the Sane Democracy League., Mercury [Hobart] 24 May 1954. 
Tasmania file. 
123. Take no risks ... reject Labor . 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. Vic. file 
124. flyer, 1954, NLA MS 5000/5/113. Vic. file. Italics in original. 
125. Menzies is Australia's Choice ... [original, newspaper advertisement] 1954. NLA MS 
5000/5/113. 
410 
Figure 8.2 'The Customer is always right!' 
Popular Pictorial, n.d. [c. May 1954] 
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life had improved since 1949 - more (and more varied) goods were available: 
cars, refrigerators, washing machines, radios.126 People could afford these 
things because real wages had risen, and were willing to buy them because full 
employment gave them confidence. Consumer goods were available because 
the crack-down on Communism in the unions had increased industrial 
efficiency: " ... we have attained the great economic goal of stability .... Australia 
is set for a period of great progress in which the good things in life will be 
enjoyed by all."127 
The supply of housing, according to Liberal publicity, had risen substantially: 
the Menzies Government had spent £115, 000, 000 over the previous three 
years; Labor had spent only £56, 000, 000 in its last three years in office. Despite 
this generosity, the Liberal housing policy (like that of the Conservatives in 
Britain) was a free enterprise one: the Commonwealth gave "support" to 
lending institutions, and enabled tenants to buy war service homes. 
Remember, Labor discouraged the purchase of homes to stop 
people becoming, in their [Dedman's] famous phrase, 'little 
capitalists'. The Menzies Government believes in home 
ownership and aids it.128 
126. Achievement, 1949-1954, p. 6. 
127. Peter Howson [pamphlet - Liberal candidate for Fawkner]. 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. Vic. 
file. 
128. Advertiser, 29 May 1954, NLA MS 5000/5/113. SA file. John W. Young remarks that the 
Conservatives" ... were able to establish their identity as the party which stood for freedom by 
ending rationing in 1954.". By relying on private contractors the Churchill and Eden 
Governments a.lso presided over the construction of 300, 000 houses a year, taking credit 
" ... where Labour had failed ... " Cold War Europe, 1945-89: a political history, London, 1991, p. 
111. 
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Furthermore, a health benefits scheme (which supplemented friendly society 
benefits) had been accepted by doctors and was actually working: hospital, 
pharmaceutical, and tuberculosis benefits had been increased. 129 Public 
hospitals received higher revenues; the Commonwealth Government now 
paid for one in three prescriptions; treatment and medicine for old age 
pensioners were free; the tuberculosis death rate had fallen by more than one 
third. These achievements were possible because the Government repudiated 
coercion and embraced co-operation: " ... all this has been done without 
regimentation .... "; but Liberal backbencher W.C. Haworth, a former 
pharmacist, warned that 
'[I]t would be a tragedy to see this service ruined in the hands of 
Labor planners, who would certainly use it iI\ their schemes to 
nationalise the medical and other professions concerned. '130 
Every celebration of present wealth was accompanied by a warning that the 
bad old days could return with Labor. 
Remember the Guilty Men! 
When Evatt, Calwell > 
and Ward were in > 
power they were > 
responsible for > 
Controls and restrictions 
Communist domination 
Bank nationalisation 
Industrial chaos and strikes 
Manus Island defence sell-out 
129. Good Health! [original, newspaper advertisement] NLA MS 5000/5/113. 
130. "Satisfaction' in National Health', Isaacs Standard. 
Don't Gamble with your prosperity131 
Ration tickets and queues 
Blackmarkets and black-outs. 
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Shoppers were reminded of the "squalid" extortion of the black marketeers; 
motorists of Chifley's stubborn and unnecessary refusal to import petroI.132 
Literature on the austerity of the late 1940s was often directed at women, who 
where mainly responsible for shopping and household budgeting. Not all 
such material, however, was written with housewives (described by Menzies 
as " ... the hardest workers of all...") in mind.133 
'Sorry ... no beer' it said. 
Down at R.T. Taylor's licensed grocery at St Kilda Junction 
they've got a relic of th~ bad old days. It's a sign that reads 'Sorry, 
no bottled beer, no tobacco, no cigarettes'. 
It's a battered and dusty sign now, not used any more. Since the 
Menzies Government took over there isn't any need for it. 
But Taylor's are keeping it just to be on the very safe side. They'll 
need it again if by any chance there should be another Labor 
regime.134 
Labor politicians, opponents alleged, were themselves looking battered and 
dusty. Discredited by their performance in the post-war years and clinging 
131. Courier Mail, 22 May 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. Qld. file. 
132. AchievemerJ.l, 1949-1954, p. 6. 
133. Ioint Policy Speech, p. 12. 
134. Isaacs Standard . . 
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blindly to socialist dogma, Labor was outmoded but refused to change. "In 
this new era the Labor Socialists are out of step: Time has marched on and left 
them behind!"135 Menzies, however, offered the strength and wisdom to 
guide Australia through the post-war world: he was committed to winning for 
Australians the comforts of modern life while preserving the reassuring 
boundaries of old fashioned authority and responsibility. The Liberal Party, 
with its cohort of young ex-servicemen, offered the energy of youth; Menzies 
provided the wisdom of experience. 
Liberal candidates could not mention the issue of capable leadership often 
enough. The candidate for Perth, Bob Phillips, adopted the slogan "[A] vote 
for Phillips is a vote against Evatt!".136 In Fawkner, a pamphlet on behalf of 
Peter Howson warned that there could be " .. no neutrality in this matter. If 
you vote against the Menzies candidates, you vote to make Dr Evatt Prime 
Minister of Australia." Paul Hasluck asked constituents to "MAKE UP YOUR 
OWN MIND" on a number of questions: the first was whether Menzies or 
Evatt possessed " .. the qualities needed to be Prime Minister of Australia." The 
Leader of the Opposition, all four questions and answers made clear, would be 
a uniquely unreliable custodian of both prosperity and national security.137 
135. Australia is on top of the world with the Menzies Government, 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. 
Vic. file. 
136. pamphlet, 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. W.A. file. 
137. Paul Hasluck, 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113, W.A. file. MHR, Curtin (WA) 1949-69; 
Minister for Territories, 1951-63; for Defence, 1963-64. 
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Evatt, however, was depicted as both incompetent and malevolent. Notes on 
his policy speech. suggested that the proposal to abolish the means test on 
pensions constituted a plot to destabilise the economy as a prelude to the 
imposition of socialist controls. The plan might proceed as follows: increased 
lending and taxation "deliberately" induce hyperinflation; Evatt then secures 
emergency powers over prices and employment, and thus implements the 
Socialist Objective.138 Non-Labor had long warned against ruination of the 
currency. Now, once again, Labor had revealed its true colours: Evatt's 
promise could only be financed by tax increases or the 
.. .'expansion of credit' and that means printing more money, 
which would again plunge Australia into the maelstrom of 
inflation - and swiftly following Inflation comes a resurgence of 
Communism. 
Communism and Inflation! 
Communism and inflation are closely linked. One avowed 
Communist aim is to wreck the national economy and, as a 
means to this end get control of unions, foment strikes - thereby 
reducing production, creating unemployment and by reducing 
supplies of goods, induce inflation.139 
Evatt was irresponsible because he had made extravagant promises; provoked 
disunity in his own party; and associated with Communists. Another 
shortcoming which made Evatt a foil for Menzies was that the Labor leader, 
through his activities in the United Nations, had shamed Australia in the eyes 
of the world, and caused particular displeasure to our powerful friends. In a 
138. 'Dr Evatt's.Policy Speech'. 10 May 1954. Campaign Notes, NLA MS 5000/9/333. 
139. Advertiser, 27 May 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. S.A. file. 
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letter to Lel Thomas, Willoughby advised against printing an (unspecified) 
rumour about Evatt - there was plenty of verifiable material. Willoughby 
suggested Thomas "play up" 
1. His term as the one man foreign policy in which Australia's 
prestige abroad suffered tremendously in his toadying to the 
small Latin nations as against the U.K and U.S.A.140 
No leader, Liberal advertising proclaimed, could differ more from Evatt than 
Menzies did. 
For Australia, the hour has produced the man, Robert Gordon 
Menzies, Australia's greatest statesman! Not only Australia, but 
London, Washington, and the whole free world have 
acknowledged his superlative capacities. 
Few men have had to grapple with problems· of such magnitude 
as those which have confronted Menzies. And no man has more 
successfully met the challenges of his time ..... MENZIES' MIGHTY 
ACHIEVEMENTS .... the winning of the Battle of Production .... the 
Victory over inflation, and the attainment of industrial 
peace ... .141 
The standard leaflet for Victorian candidates spelt out the differences between 
Labor and Liberal leadership in distinctly war-like terms: Labor "appeased" the 
unions; its nationalisation plans " ... menaced the home front...".142 "Menzies 
140. J.R. Willoughby to Lei Thomas, 12 Apr 1954. The other points concerned Communism and 
Labor disunity. 
141. Advertiser, 28 May 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. S.A. file. 
142. NLA MS 500/5/113. Vic. file. 
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will never compromise with the Communists", a South Australian 
advertisement trumpeted. "Menzies has fought them tooth and nail 
everywhere .. .in the Federal Parliament. .. the High Court ... on the Wharves .. .in 
the Factories .... "143 Had the list included 'beaches' and 'airfields' the 
Churchillian references could hardly have been more obvious. 
Liberal advertising featured the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition 
to such an extent that the campaign became a presidential-style contest. 
Menzies was by far the more skilful of the two; and this marked difference in 
political skills may have been decisive in ensuring the return of the 


























Elections for the House of Representatives, 1951 & 1954144 
One of Evatt' s supporters remarked: 
143. Advertiser,.26 May 1954. NLA MS 5000/5/113. S.A. file. 







Another such victory for Menzies and he would be undone. I 
never believed that you could beat the good season and the high 
employment. To have gained seats was a triumph. But you have 
too much to carry with the Wards and his like. Socialism is as 
dead as the dodo, despite Calwell. You have to get a new 
objective, the democratisation of industry. The old shirt sleeves 
stuff is dead.145 
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But another correspondent, the Department of External Affairs officer, Alan 
Renouf, thought that Evatt had been too hasty in replacing 'the shirt sleeves 
stuff' with new policies, hidden from the public until the last minute: " ... What 
Labour did was to present the 'New Look' of the party - the first really post-war 
model; what I feel is that for such a momentous step the presentation was a bit 
too sudden .... " Renouf also blamed insufficient party support, especially from 
the Catholic Action-influenced Victorian Branch: five months later, Evatt 
triggered a party split by making this accusation. Renouf agreed with Claude 
that Labor needed a new image, one more acceptable to middle class Australia. 
In these times people are not satisfied, as they were before the 
war, with the old trade-union representative, irrespective of his 
ability or personality. New blood with education, and with some 
status in the community, is needed. Examples are Whitlam, and 
the new man in New South Wales, Manning.146 
145. Claude (labour Press cartoonist Claude Marquet?) to Evatt, 11Jun1954. Evatt papers, 
Flinders University of South Australia. file: 'elections - 1954 - congratulations'. 
146. Renouf to Evatt, 30 May 1954. Ibid. E.G. Whitlam, MHR for Werriwa (NSW), 1952-78, 
Leader of the Opposition, 1967-72, 1975-78; Prime Minister, 1972-75. There was no Labor 
POiitician of the time named Manning, and Renouf way ba11e beeR thiRkiRll pf l\Tarrn?n A.f? .... ;., 
~..:> Ja,,.,.e. ~Cit ~0 ~ 4'4~ -"f'..,....,;~,, -""-=' ,~ /i j" 
/t1-/-~ ;;e. """'', Je"""'D ~res~-~~?- •.;;? .?""4- .t!J4'~ ,~ ;v S w . 
P-~, ~J "'l-d4/.,j / ?e,. ""'-""""'.A'.;: ~I>~ /~~ ./ b*' ,_ c, I~ 7 'I-./ ~/" • ""If-,. 2 S- • 
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In its report on the election result, Federal Executive summarised the 
emphases of the Liberal campaign and nominated the return of working class 
voters as the single most important cause of the Liberal victory. 
The lines followed in all the literature and propaganda were:-
a) the Government's achievement; 
b) Leadership in the national interest, with strong emphasis on 
the Prime Minister's role; and 
c) The 'fear' of what Labor had done and might do. 
Some had advocated a promises campaign, but the Party decided 
on "achievement as the most potent vote-winner, with the fear 
issue (what Labour might do) as the second line of attack. " 
The result is the more interesting when one recalls that although 
the great issues of 1949 - Communism and Bank Nationalisation 
- drew many votes away from Labour, those votes went back to 
the Labour Party in the unpopular days of the Menzies 
Government. Gallup polls and by-elections show that clearly 
enough. The inflationary and post-inflationary periods restored 
. to the Labour Party the votes lost in 1949. Yet in 1954 a big 
proportion of what might be called the swinging working class 
vote came back to the Menzies Go.vernment and the Liberal 
Party .... The Liberal Party cannot govern without a big percentage 
of 'worker' votes!147 
At the general election in December 1955 the Government increased its 
' 
majority from seven to twenty eight. The arguments prominent in 1954 were 
repeated by Liberal electioneers, but now the divisions within the Labor Party 
which had become increasingly apparent over the last six years had reached 
fruition. Furthermore, the unemployment and inflation of the first four years 
147. Report of Federal Executive to Federal Council, pp. 9-10, in minutes, Annual General 
Meeting, Federal Council. Nov 1954. NLA MS 5000/7 /275. 
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of Liberal government were under control. The Liberals were consolidated in 
government and Menzies' authority over the Party was confirmed.148 
Between 1944 and 1954 the Liberal Party moved from weakness to strength. 
The Party appealed to those wearied by strikes and shortages, and frightened by 
the prospect of another world war. Liberal electioneers presented the Party as 
modern in the sense that a washing machine was modern: a Liberal 
government would bring in a prosperous and comfortable future. Liberals, 
however, also promised to guard Australia against the evils of the modern 
world - or, from the viewpoint of the Eastern and Central European 
immigrant, against the evils of the old world. Fear of war with the Soviet 
Union, actual war with Soviet proxies, and sabotage by the USSR's 
Australian agents permeated Liberal election campaigning in the 1940s and 
1950s. Bolton's summary is that "[F]ear of communism dominated political 
debate between 1945 and 1951. ... "149 A more accurate generalisation would be 
that anti-Communism was the most consistently recurring issue, but was not 
invariably paramount. In Liberal Party planning, press commentary, and the 
statements of both Labor and Coalition politicians, Communism was often 
less prominent than other issues - child endowment, pensions, or wage cases 
for example - but it was always present, and in the aftermath of a dramatic 
event could be called forth by party publicists to become the subject of intense 
debate. As anti-Communist rhetoric intensified in the post-war years, so 
Communist Party membership fell away. Nevertheless, industrial strife 
148
. Katharine West, Power in the Liberal Party: A Study in Australian Politics, Melbourne, 
1965, p. 223. . 
149. Bolton, op. cit, p. 59. 
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involving Communist-influenced unions, and the expansion of the Soviet 
Union in Eastern. Europe and its sponsorship of nationalist movements in 
South East Asia made Communism seem dangerous.1 50 In presenting the 
choice between Labor and Liberal as a struggle between socialism and 
freedom, Liberals gave voice to community impatience with strikes and 
wartime shortage and regulation. They also shared, and played on, the fear 
that the traumatic experiences of the last forty years - war, revolution, and 
Depression - would come back, and that this time, in an age of atomic bombs, 
Australian could not be protected from war. Government members liked to 
claim they had safeguarded Australia's future by winning the protection of 
'powerful friends'. The Liberal Party sold Menzies himself as a powerful 
friend, the little person's ally against dangers at home and overseas. 
A common assumption in studies of non-Labor in the Cold War is that anti-
communism, if genuine, was foolish. It is often alleged, or implied, that 
anti-Communism was to a large extent a phoney war, an exercise in electoral 
scaremongering. For example, Stella Lees and June Senyard set the political 
scene for their analysis of 1950s boys' adventure stories by asserting that "[A]s 
soon as Menzies became Prime Minister in December 1949, the bogey of 
communism was brought out, dusted off, and used to consolidate his 
government. "151 Accounts of 1950s Australia emphasise 'hysterical' anti-
communism, the dominance of those fanatics who struck a "note of wild 
150. Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
151. Stella Lees & June Senyard, 'Cold War, Hot Books: An analysis of boys' adventure books 
published during the 1950s', Journal of Australian Studies , 13, Nov 1983, p. 3. 
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alarm" at dissidence and difference.152 In his Inventing Australia, Richard 
White argues that from the late 1940s a new media cliche of national identity 
- the Australian 'way of life' - began to be invoked as a " ... mental bulwark 
against communism, against change, against cultural diversity ... "153 For the 
authors of 'The social context of postwar conservatism', the counterpart to 
prosperity and optimism was fear of a vaguely-imagined enemy which 
might take this new prosperity away.154 Thus Australians were in the 1950s 
" ... petrified of numerous threats and fantasy enemies challenging [its] 
traditional existence."155 Alomes et al suggest that such fears were 
unwarranted: 
It did not matter that the Asian theatres of war were thousands 
of miles away or that the Chinese had no navy worth speaking 
of. It did matter that an isolated conservative community 
undergoing change was easy to scare.156 
The problem with these arguments is that they verge on anachronism in 
breezily dismissing the fears of the time; and on contempt for democratic 
choices in dismissing as folly the majorities voted by a literate electorate in 
secret ballots. Australians could not know in the 1950s that there would be 
no 'hot war' with the Sino-Soviet bloc; and, furthermore, while the definition 
152. Robin Golian, Revolutionaries & Reformists: Communism & the Australian Labour 
Movement_Canberra, 1975, p. 170. 
153. White, Richard, Inventing Australia: images of identity 1688-1980, Sydney, 1981; see also 
Ibid., ''The Australian Way of Life' ',Historical Studies, vol. 18, no. 73, Oct 1979, pp. 536-
537. 
154. Alomes, Stephen, Dober, Mark & Hellier, Donna, 'The social context of postwar 
conservatism' in Curthoys & Merritt, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 4. 
155. Ibid., p. 8. 
156. Ibid., p. 10. 
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of Communism in non-Labor electioneering was conveniently vague, the 
problems and dangers attributed to Communism - housing shortages, black-
outs, an atomic world war - were acute, and specific to contemporary 
knowledge and expectations. 
But since the publication of Australia's First Cold War, there have been 
studies which should prompt historians to reconsider the assumption that the 
electoral politics of non-Labor anti-Communism involved nothing more 
complicated than the exploitation by cynical politicians of a naive electorate's 
baseless fears. On published sources alone, it would take a resolutely myopic 
historian to deny that the Liberals were alive to the political benefits of anti-
Communism. Moreover, work published in the 1980s and 1990s, mostly by 
historians critical of the domestic and external national security policies of the 
Menzies years, has accumulated archival evidence that Liberal politicians 
were genuinely concerned that Communism was a threat to Australian 
security, in that the USSR was the ultimate power behind Communist forces 
in Asia, and the object of the misguided loyalty of Australia's own 
Communists.157 Some recent studies of the Menzies years attribute non-
Labor's anti-Communist electioneering to both conviction and calculation:158 
an argument supported by the private communications researched in this and 
the previous cha pt er. 
157. Cain, 'All the Way to Vietnam', p. 117; Lee, Search for Security, p. 108; Les Louis, 
'Operation Alien and the Cold War in Australia, 1950-53', Labour History, 62, May 1992, p. 
18; Jllli!., 'Communism as a Hanging Offence in the Cold War in Australia', 1950-53', Journal of 
Australian Studies, 46, Sep 1995, p. 11; Moore, The Right Road, p. 54. 
158. Bolton, .QJh.£!1., p. 154; Brett, op. cit., p. 82. 
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How effective was Liberal anti-Communism? One historian has referred to 
the "incalculable" electoral advantage which the Menzies-era Liberal Party 
derived from the Red Menace.159 This is precisely the point. Given the secrecy 
of the ballot, we can not gauge precisely the effectiveness of anti-Communism 
as a motivation for voting. Careful studies of elections160 demonstrate the 
difficulty of attributing voting behaviour to issues. It is undoubtedly true that 
anti-Communism accompanied the Liberal triumph of 1949, but this issue 
was no less prominent in the preceding general election, in which the Liberal 
Party made no real gains, except for the almost inevitable reversion of some of 
the seats won in the Labor landslide of 1943. Gallup polls tend to confirm the 
conventional wisdom that anti-Communism was an electoral advantage for 
non-Labor. The last two chapters of this thesis have also shown that the while 
the Liberals considered anti-Communism to be a powerfully advantageous 
issue, they never believed that anti-Communism alone was sufficient to win a 
majority of seats. Positive electioneering was also important. Liberals 
demonised Communism and socialism, and they also idealised the 
advantages of capitalism. 
Admirers of the Liberal tradition in Australian politics tend to explain the 
success of non-Labor after 1949 as a just reward for superior economic 
managemen t.161 The extent to which the policies pursued by the Menzies 
Government contributed to the relative prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s is 
159. Louis, 'Communism as a Hanging Offence', p. 13. 
l60, Carboch, op. cit., and Webb, Q12,....Q!., are exemplary in this regard. 
l61. C.D. Kemp, 'The Menzies Era', IPA Review, vol. 40, no. 1, Autumn 1986, p. 49. 
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beyond the scope of this thesis. But one point that should be made is that the 
changes in the positive politics of non-Labor in the 1940s and early 1950s 
provide evidence that non-Labor adapted its policies to changes in intellectual 
assumptions and 'real world' conditions, and has been neither been 
indifferent to ideas, nor uncompromisingly conservative. For example, in 
1931 Menzies was among those die-hards who had refused to countenance the 
compulsory conversion of bonds to lower rates of interest. Perhaps, as Allan 
Martin suggests, the humiliation of 1941 made him less dogmatic. But it is 
also possible that the experience of wartime national government was 
influential: even before the Beveridge-influenced re-thinking associated with 
the Liberal renaissance there had been, in 1940, a portent of the new non-
Labor politics: child endowment, a policy which broke the prevailing non-
Labor dogma that benefits must be financed entirely from individual 
contributions. There is also some evidence in the policies of the third and 
fourth Menzies Governments for the 'initiative and resistance' theory: in 
office, the Liberals made an electoral virtue out of social security programs 
which, in opposition, they had denounced as vitiating extensions of state 
provision. As one sympathetic commentator has remarked, as a policy-maker 
Menzies became a kind of "super-Butskell" and was, perhaps, all the more 
successful for it. 162 
162 J.D.B. Miller, 'Thinking about Menzies', in Prasser et al, op. cit., p. 59. 
Conclusion 
It is a truism that non-Labor has been in Commmonwealth government more 
frequently than Labor has, but that more has been written about the latter. Non-
Labor persuasion has often been dismissed as transparently opportunistic scare-
mongering. There was plenty of this, of course, but I have tried to show that the 
story of non-Labor attempts to win elections, 1914-54, has been more 
complicated than some writers have assumed. 
In concluding this study, it may be useful to look again at previous 
interpretations of Commonwealth party political history, and to ask why non-
Labor electioneering has attracted so few studies. It still seems reasonable to 
surmise, as Mayer did in the mid 1950s, that the scarcity of studies of non-Labor 
organisation and the relative abundance of studies of the organisation of the left 
suggests that writers have assumed that non-Labor political action has been 
automatic and has not required organisation.1 Perhaps similar assumptions 
underly the neglect of non-Labor campaign issues and rhetoric. One reason 
may be that historians have regarded non-Labor publicity work as superfluous. 
Historians have noticed the prevalence of the typical non-Labor values of 
economic individualism, and orthodox nationalism2 and, perhaps, have 
assumed that these values were too widespread to have required substantial 
promotion by the non-Labor parties. Through electioneering, however, non-
1. Mayer, op. cit., p. 256. 
2
. Geoffrey Serie, From Deserts the Prophets Come: The Creative Spirit in Australia, 1788-1972, 
Melbourne, 1973, p. 20. 
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Labor politicians have worked to reinforce these values, as if they were afraid 
that without reinforcement sound values, and for that matter their political 
representatives, would be lost, with foreign replacing native allegiances, and 
the discipline of sound finance succumbing to the temptations of socialistic easy 
money. 
Historians also seem to have regarded non-Labor beliefs as too homogenous 
and persistently conventional to warrant close study. The electioneering 
studied in the preceding chapters has varied in content and style, however, and 
it is to be hoped that historians will continue to explore non-Labor's different 
versions of liberal and conservative politics. Janet McCalman's history of the 
middle class residents of Melbourne's southeastern suburbs has shown that 
social experiences varied within the middle class, and were contfe;t on those 
circumstances, such as war and economic Depression, which affected broader 
Australian society.3 There may be a lesson here for political historians: that 
despite the appearance that non-Labor ideology has been simplistic and 
resistant to change, its story can be told in terms of diversity, and 
transformation over time. 
Scholars might also gain new perspectives by re-examining the assumption that 
non-Labor politics has been essentially resistant. Mayer commented that his 
contemporaries tended to regard the left as ideologically dynamic. This is one 
explanation for the neglect of non-Labor, and we can see the preference in the 
3. McCalman, op. cit. 
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literature of Australian politics 1914-1954 for studies of the left as appropriate 
for studies of a time when the principal innovations in the theory and practice of 
government seemed to have been generated by those parties descended from 
a 1890s-early Commonwealth politics of organised labour, and socialist and 
new liberal ideas.4 
Interpretations shaped by the Labor initiative theory could be summarised as 
follows. In 1914, the Labor program was influenced by the Liberal initiative of 
New Protection; but non-Labor creativity, already stifled by the Fusion of the 
Liberal Protectionists with the Free Trade party, was extinguished by Great War 
loyalism. During the Great War, social experimentation became the antithesis of 
loyalist concentration on supporting the AIF. Between the world wars, social 
welfare initiatives were restricted to returned soldiers; defence and external 
affairs were based on the falllacy that Britain continued to be a Great Power in 
the Pacific; and fiscal and monetary orthodoxies .were glorified as British 
traditions. Innovation reappeared only with the Curtin and Chifley 
governments; and then was smothered again by the onset of the Menzies era. 
Menzies' policies were derivative adaptions of the welfare extensions 
engineered by Labor in the 1940s; resistance remained important in LPA 
rhetoric and in the motivations of its members.s 
4
. Since 1979, Margaret Thatcher's governments have transformed British politics, and there is 
now an abundant literature on Thatcherism (some recent studies are discussed by Jeff Archer, 
'Elections, Contemporary History, Policy and Ideology: Current Writing on Mrs Thatcher', 
Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 309-316.) Australian non-Labor has yet to 
embark on such a crusade, and has no equivalent literature. 
5
. Stuart Macintyre, Winners and Losers: The Pursuit of Social Justice in Australian History, Sydney, 
1985, p. 56; Hart, op. cit.. pp. 235-36; Stuart Macintyre, The Labour Experiment, Melbourne, 1989, 
p. 62; Peter Aimer, Politics, Power and Persuasion: The Liberals in Victoria, Sydney & Melbourne, 
1973, p. 149; Hancock, 'The Liberal Party Organisation', in Prasser, op. cit.. p. 90. 
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Much of the evidence presented in this thesis supports these generalisations, but 
some qualifications need to be made. Firstly, the non-Labor rhetoric of 
resistance sometimes concealed changes in policy. For example, the Lyons 
government continued throughout the 1930s to insist that its polices preserved 
those sound finance British verities the UAP had rescued in 1931, but this 
concealed a relaxation of government borrowing requirements, and attempts to 
negotiate the waiving of British bond debts. Moreover, the non-Labor parties 
were not alone in clinging to past certainties. Nationalist and UAP thinking 
about external affairs was based on a desire for the pre-war global dominance 
of Britain to continue. Labor, however, was also slow to adapt its 
attitudes to the challenges posed by Japanese, Italian and German militarism, 
preferring in many instances to respond to the approach of war in the 1930s by 
asserting pacifist and internationalist sentiments derived from reactions to the 
Great War. Finally, non-Labor innovation was not unique to the early 
Commonwealth. For example, in 1940, the Menzies government introduced a 
significant new policy, child endowment, and might have legislated for further 
innovations in welfare if it had stayed in power. Non-Labor could also force the 
pace in electoral politics: Evatt's adoption in 1954 of the 'reward for thrift' policy 
of asset test abolition demonstrated the influence of Liberal on Labor. 
In Australia, both Labor and non-Labor have claimed to be progressive, and 
have argued that progressive reforms were both necessary and possible in a 
new society. Non-Labor has always contrasted its progressivism with an 
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unacceptably extreme type of the politics of change, socialism. Yet while non-
Labor has always been anti-socialist, this politics has changed along with the 
evolving meaning of socialism itself. As a disposition, socialism h~e been \..."' c, 
distinguished by communitarianism and radicalism; but as the modest 
increments of state ownership, regulation and provision added over the years 
by Labor have lost their controversial novelty, so too has their relative 
communitarianism and radicalism. For example, non-Labor initially regarded 
the Commonwealth Bank as socialist, but in time it became less remarkable. 
Thoughout 1914-1954, non-Labor suspected the Bank as a launching point for 
wholesale socialisation, but the actual state ownership of a trading bank became 
less contentious with the passing of time, as opponents ceased to fear and 
advocates to hope that the Bank would provide the starting point for the 
elimination of private banking. 
Militant anti-socialism has been the hallmark of the threat and loyalty style. In 
contrast, the anti-socialist fears expressed in the limited style of non-Labor 
politics have been less intense. Limited propaganda has expressed social 
contentment: its proposals have been measured and its style has lacked 
fervour. Historians have found little romance in such moderation, and have 
preferred to study the non-Labor politics of denunciation and alarm.6 Perhaps 
party ideology is more interesting when formed in adversity, whether real or 
perceived by the party's champions. An historian of British Liberalism has 
commented that while the Great War precipitated the terminal decline of the 
Liberals as the principal party of reform, the War's crisis stimulated an 
6
. As Harrison (op. cit., pp. 317 & 356) remarks of British political history. 
431 
outpouring of Liberal doctrine, which had never before required strenuous 
justification. 7 It may also be significant that the broadcast many consider to be 
one of the most remarkable instances of Australian non-Labor propaganda, 
Menzies' 'The Forgotten People', was made in 1942, when the UAP was not only 
out of government but felt itself to be at odds with the mood of the times.s 
Admittedly the tone of 'The Forgotten People' is moderate, but its message is a 
warning to the middle class that powerful trends were at work to increase their 
present disadvantages. Perhaps adversity sharpened Menzies' political 
consciousness, and the challenge of 1940s collectivism drew from him an 
unusually cogent statement of non-Labor's conception of the middle class home 
as the source of material and spiritual wealth. 
Nevertheless, 'The Forgotten People' 's measured tones are atypical of the style 
of non-Labor politics that has most int~rested historians, who have 
concentrated on threat-and-loyalty arguments made by politicians who 
believed, or claimed to believe, that non-Labor values were in danger of being 
overpowered by a radical, foreign challenge. This is the political style labelled 
'pseudo-conservative' by Hofstadter, and others have noticed its adherents' 
anger at what they have regarded as a 'progressive establishmenf.9 Threat and 
loyalty politics has received much attention from historians fascinated by its 
violence and authoritarianism. While political scientists have speculated that 
7. Bentley, op. cit., p. 3. 
8
. Eric Hobsbawm remarks that when Friedrich von Hayek's The Road to Serfdom was first 
published, in 1944, the liberal philosopher considered himself a prophet crying in the 
wilderness. Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, London, 1994, p. 177. 
9
. Richard Hofstadter, 'The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt', in Hofstadter, op. cit., pp. 41-65; esp. 
pp. 43-48; Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism, 
London, 2nd ed. 1994 (1988), p. 68. 
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parties seek advantage by offering extreme policies they know they will never 
have to implement, historians of Australian non-Labor have seen threat and 
loyalty rhetoric as a product of the same ideas which motivated non-Labor 
governments to discard liberal scruples against the draconian suppression of 
dissent.10 
Since studies of non-Labor have concentrated on threat and loyalty politics, it is 
necessary to review these interpretations in respect to electioneering. Warhurst 
comments that the assumptions prevalent in the literature on non-Labor anti-
Communism (1949-64) in electoral politiccs have been that the 'red bogey' was 
contrived, effective, and recurrent.11 These themes are also common in the 
literature on threat and loyalty politics 1914-54, and offer a useful way of 
drawing together some of the implications of the research presented in this 
thesis. 
The question of whether non-Labor politicans were sincerely concerned about 
existential social threats is important because anti-Irish and anti-Communist 
politics were discredited, at the time, and since, by accusations that non-Labor, 
10. Ware,~., p. 64; Macintyre, The Succeeding Age, pp. 227, 308, 312; 
K. Richmond, 'Reactions to Radicalism: Non-Labour Movements 1920-29', Journal of Austrlaian 
Studies, 5, 1979, p. 50; Henderson, op. cit.; Raymond Evans, 'Radical Departures: Paul Freeman 
and Political Deportations from Australia following World War One', Labour History, 57, 1989, p. 
19; Stephen Alomes,' 'Reasonable Men': Middle Class Reformism in Australia, 1928-39', PhD 
thesis, ANU, 1979, p. 124; Moore, op. cit., 
p. 27; Frank Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia, Sydney, 1983, esp. 
p. 19. 
11
. John Warhurst, 'The 'Communist Bogey': Communism as and Election Issue in Australian 
Federal Politics', 1949-1964', PhD thesis, Flinders University of South Australia, 1977, pp. 443-
448. 
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while claiming to act in the interests of the nation as a whole, was only or 
mostly interested in exploiting popular fears for party advantage.12 The 
conclusion of this thesis is that non-Labor politicians were genuinely concerned 
about disloyalty, but deliberately exaggerated it for political effect. There is no 
doubt that Menzies and other non-Labor leaders were adept at exploiting 
misgivings about Labor's loyalty - and to admit this is only to admit that they 
were professional politicians. But it is also apparent that they believed in their 
stock-in-trade, the middle class values of patriotism and self-reliance. A.W. 
Martin comments that even as a student, Menzies could speak effectively for 
Melbourne University loyalists, because he shared their opinions; and in a 
recent essay on Menzies' post-1949 career, J.D.B. Miller remarks that Menzies 
reduced issues to simple oppositions between good and bad because that was 
how he thought voters wanted to see public questions, and also how he himself 
saw them. As Judith Brett remarks of the elaborate efforts made by Liberal 
leaders in the 1990s to gauge values and devise symbols, Menzies had no need 
for market research to understand and appeal to middle class beliefs, for these 
were his own and he understood them intuitively.13 
There is other evidence of non-Labor sincerity and insincerity to consider, and 
again it leads to different conclusions. On the one hand, the views expressed 
privately by Hughes and Bruce during the Chanak crisis of 192Z,.matched the 
independent-nationalist arguments they condemned Labor politicans for 
making. Nonetheless, in the interwar years Empire-minded politicians like 
12. Ibid., p. 16; McKnight, Australian Spies, p. 87. 
13. Martin, op. cit., pp. 30-31; J.D.B. Miller, 'Thinking about Menzies', in Prasser, op. cit., pp. 57-
58; Judith Brett, 'The Liberal Party Blues', Arena Magazine, Apr-May 1993, p. 6. 
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Bruce and Hughes were genuinely disturbed by the Empire's centrifugal 
'drift'.14 Similarly, Bruce's industrial law-and-order politics was motivated by 
electoral opportunism, and a determination to safeguard economic 
development, and social cohesion.15 This combination of exaggeration and 
literal belief in the danger of disloyalty was also present in the Cold War years, 
when the political advantages for non-Labor of highlighting Communism were 
obvious, but there was also evidence, in the domestic influence of the Comunist 
Party, and the influence of the USSR in Europe and South East Asia, to impress 
non-Labor politicians with the dangers of Communist opinion in Australia.16 
In the forty years from 1914, stresses generated by war, industrial conflict, and 
the challenge of Communism created a mood of alarm conducive to the 
effectiveness of an alarmist politics reliant on a rhetoric of stark choices between 
anarchy and order. War and its apprehension encouraged a politics of extreme 
measures against those citizens whose actions or words seemed to weaken the 
cause of, or for that matter merely question, orthodox patriotism. A comment 
made by one member of Lloyd George's Liberal Party in 1916, 11 'war seems to 
arouse so many bad passions that Liberalism cannot live in its atmosphere' 11 
seems apposite of Australian politics in the decades shaped by the experience, 
and memory of mass international violence.17 In the Great War, non-Labor 
people were afraid for the survival of the Empire and intensely hostile to any 
dissent from the loyalist understanding of national duty. The idea of 
14. Cumpston, op. cit., p. 33; Sales, op. cit., p. 108; Fitzhardinge, op. cit., pp. 459-61. 
15. Potts, op. cit., p. 344; Richmond. 'S.M. Bruce and Australian Economic Policy', op. cit., pp. 
256-57. 
16
. Moore,~., p. 54; Murray, op. cit., p. 29' Golian,~., p. 130; Bolton, op. cit., p. 154; 
Brett, Forgotten People, p. 82. 
17. Richard Holt diary, 6 Aug 1916, Holt MSS, cited Bentley, op. cit., p. 41. 
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honourable service was highly valued as a consolation for the suffering brought 
by the war, and non-Labor politics expressed anger at criticism of the justice of 
the aims and prosecution of Britain and Australia's war. In the 1920s, the 
organised working class expressed its frustration at the stagnation of living 
standards. The Nationalist government, increasingly irritated as the decade 
went on by the persistence of industrial conflict, identified strikes as the reason 
why the great prosperity made possible by Australia's natural resources was 
slow in arriving. Radical responses to the economic crisis of the early 1930s 
made non-Labor people fear that the discipline of contractual obligations would 
be breached. Faced with challenges to the legitimacy of sound finance 
discipline, non-Labor waged an emotive campaign against dissent from 
economic orthodoxy. The growth of Australian Communism in the 1940s, and 
the power of Soviet and Chinese Communism in the 1950s greatly intensified 
traditional fears about espionage and radical influence in trade unions. 
Perhaps the power of threat and loyalty politics to motivate non-Labor voters 
and party workers has also been aided by uncertainty about the shape of the 
socialist future, for socialism has always been more of an expectation than a 
plan.18 Socialist ambitions to radically reform or replace capitalism and lack of 
definition about the alternative has made the idea of socialism an attractive 
philosophical objective for projects as distinct as Fabianism and Stalinism. But 
this vagueness has also enabled anti-socialists to present socialism as a threat to 
a variety of practices, agricultural land ownership, savings bank accounts, 
18
. Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, London, 1995 (1994), 
p. 169. 
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home ownership, choice of employment, marriage, which offered physical 
benefits, and psychological benefits through the expression of individuality. 
These are some of the circumstances which made threat and loyalty politics 
credible to non-Labor minds, although at the same time there is no reason to 
doubt that threat and loyaly politics was contrived for effect. The efficacy of 
this vote-winnning politics is impossible to determine precisely. I have 
approached the question here in terms of the highlighting of issues in election 
campaigns. My assumption has been that the secrecy of the ballot makes it 
impossible to ascertain precisely whether parties won elections because of the 
issues they raised in the preceding campaigns. But the records of non-Labor's 
private considerations leave no doubt that its politicians believed that threat and 
loyalty politics were effective. 
Non-Labor politicians had, like proponents of any creed, to devise arguments 
calculated to motivate supporters. Some non-Labor people have seen the non-
Labor constituency as particularly difficult to arouse. Eggleston argued that 
non-Labor's supporters were relatively diffuse. Labor's most reliable 
supporters, the urban working classes, worked and lived together in factories 
and inner-city neighbourhoods, and this concentration of experience produced 
a common outlook, in that working class people believed that they belonged to 
a distinct group and required a distinct party to represent their interests. In 
contrast, Eggleston contended, non-Labor's core supporters were more 
heterogeneous in situation and therefore in outlook. Consequently, non-Labor 
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political identity was 'residual', defined negatively as believing oneself to be 
unlike Labor-voting people.19 Although Judith Brett does not refer to 
Eggleston's argument that non-Labor was disadvantaged by its 'residual' 
constituency, her interpretation of the power of Menzies' political language is 
that Menzies solved the problem of diffusion by calling on those who identified 
as middle class to recognise themselves as the members of a singular, ideal 
home. 
The persuasive power of 'The Forgotten People' 's call to middle class arms was 
remarked on when it was broadcast in May 1942, and Brett's study has made it 
one of the best-known set-pieces of non-Labor advocacy. We should remember, 
however, that in 1942 Menzies was trying to position himself as the politician 
who could lead non-Labor's recovery from a position where it had lost much of 
its capacity to mobilise voters. Menzies did not return to power until 1949 and 
in that seven years non-Labor rhetoric was based, although not exclusively, on 
alarmist themes. In the 1940s no less than at other times, non-Labor politicians 
have found their constituency difficult to motivate, and have blamed the middle 
class's lack of an ideological sense of purpose. Threat and loyalty politics has 
been used by non-Labor as a means of mobilising these apathetic voters and 
party members. Non-Labor people considered themselves disadvantaged by 
Labor's resources of ideological motivation, and emphasised threat and loyalty 
issues in order to activate their own supporters. Before the introduction of 
compulsory voting at the 1925 election, non-Labor people tended to assume that 
there was a natural majority for their party, which would return non-Labor to 
19
. Frederic Eggleston, Reflections of an Australian Liberal, Melbourne, 1953, p. 134. 
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power if only it could be persuaded to go to the polls. Even after voting was 
made compulsory, non-Labor politicians sometimes complained that their cause 
was hampered by the apathy and complacency of their potential supporters: 
that is much of the middle class, and those of the working class who accepted 
the non-Labor ethos. Here was the promise of alarmist rhetoric: the mobilisation 
of voters, by direct persuasion and via the greater efforts of party activists. It 
seems that the argument that the competition for swinging voters has tended to 
produce a centrist politics20 requires qualification: the threat and loyalty 
tradition suggests that this competition to attract the support of non-partisan 
voters has also motivated the issuing of extremist rhetoric; and extremist 
rhetoric has, on occasions, helped to establish the conditions for extremist 
policies. 
The interpretation in this thesis of threat and loyalty politics has drawn on a 
tradition in political studies that emphasises the capacity of parties to use 
irrational ideas to manipulate the public. Liberals and socialists have tended to 
believe that the exploition of irrationality, in the form of unreasonable fears of 
innovation, has been the basic method of conservative persuasion, and that 
conservatives have been successful when their prophecy, that irrationality will 
defeat reform, has through popular persuasion become self-fulfilling.21 In the 
United States, most notably, Cold War anti-Communism prompted liberal 
intellectuals to emphasise the tactical advantages enjoyed by those politicians 
20. Dean Jaensch, Power Politics: Australia's Party System, Sydney, 1994, p. 175. 
21
. R. Bennett, R. King & N. Nugent, 'Introduction: The Concept of the Right', in N. Nugent & R. 
King (eds.), The British Right: Conservative and Rightwing Politics in Britain, Westmead, 1977, pp. 3-
10. 
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who alleged conspiracies too vast and secret to disprove.22 To some extent, 
historians of Australia's red scares have also ascribed non-Labor power to its 
facility for ill-defined, irrational denunciation. But while threat and loyalty 
politics was vague about the definition of disloyalty and threat (and this 
vagueness was convenient, allowing Labor to be associated with Communism) 
it was highly specific about the problems attributed to threat and loyalty 
politics. These were always part of popular experience, or expectations. For 
example, while the early Commonwealth Liberals could never specify the exact 
difference between legitimate union demands, and socialist-inspired class 
warfare, they could specify the damage threatened by the A WU's rural workers' 
log of claims: the delay of the harvest; the depression of farm property values 
prior to absorption by the state. During the 1914-18 war, Nationalists spoke 
often of 'disloyalty'; this was an ill-defined term; but it was associated with 
opposition to conscription, and blamed for the AIF's lack of reinforcements and 
the ensuing casualities. At the 1925 election, the Nationalists never defined 
'disloyalty'; but predicted that if it prevailed, home-owning, savings account-
keeping workers might lose their modest property. The UAP gave Theodore's 
proto-Keynesian policies the general label of un-British, but predicted the 
specific consequence of German-style hyperinflation if his policies were 
implemented. For all the lack of distinction between Labor 'tyranny' and non-
Labor 'freedom' in 1943, UAP politicians found particular examples, such as the 
closure of factories, to illustrate the problem of mob rule under Labor. In 1951, 
22
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America (1835, 1840) and Alexis Moisei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Politcal 
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Menzies condemned the Communist Party as both the enemy of religion, and 
the cause of low coal production. 
These tactics probably made threat and loyalty politics useful, but not always 
sufficient to win elections. There is some evidence to suggest that threat and 
loyalty politics could incur disadvantages for non-Labor, in that its divisiveness 
seemed on occasions such as the 1951 referendum to threaten the very social 
cohesion which non-Labor politicians were supposed to preserve. Moreover, 
non-Labor never considered threat and loyalty politics to be sufficient, but had 
always to remind voters of the benefits under threat. Threat and loyalty politics 
was recurrent (the final assumption identified by Warhurst) but always in 
combination with promises of positive solutions, and moderate criticism of 
Labor error: the style termed 'limited politics' in this thesis. Non-Labor's 
limited politics, while lacking the extremism which has made threat and loyalty 
politics the object of scrutiny, deserves to be studied because in its prosaic way 
it expresses opinions which have always been an important part of non-Labor 
politics. 
Non-Labor has contended that national allegiances should override sectional 
loyalties, and has insisted that national unity through the avoidance of class-
driven political, and industrial conflict was essential for economic development. 
The benefits of social cohesion and class co-operation have been central to this 
politics. In 1914, Cook appealed to Australians to reject preference for unionists 
in government employment and to preserve social harmony by eliminating this 
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divisive form of discrimination. In 1917, the Nationalists argued that the 
Government offered national unity. Nationalist literature for the 1929 
campaign asked industrial workers to consider the benefits of industrial peace: 
freedom from entanglement in others' disputes; wages paid without interuption. 
The United Australia Party, in 1931 and at subsequent elections in the 1930s, 
called on people, regardless of class, to rally together to protect sound finance 
and so restore economic confidence. In 1954, the LPA proclaimed its credentials 
as the party of industrial peace through secret ballots. 
Non-Labor has insisted that Australians would benefit from modelling domestic 
politics on the example of Britain. Cook offered a Whig justification of his 
proposal to abolish union preference, explaining that this advanced a British 
history of incremental reform of privilege. During the Great War, the 
Nationalists promised to keep Australia true t~ the British tradition of martial 
valour. Bruce's Nationalists insisted in 1925 that British practices were the 
source of law and order and constitutional government. Lyons proclaimed the 
the British pedigree of sound finance. Menzies, in Opposition to the Chifley 
government, implored voters to reject socialist regimentation and preserve 
British individualism. 
Non Labor has also insisted that it has been Australia's self-interest and duty to 
maintain allegiances wih Britain and, from approximately 1942, the United 
States. During the Great War, Nationalists argued that national unity within 
the Empire was necessary to ensure British protection of its distant dominion 
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during and after the war; and to protect Australian women from being raped 
by German soldiers. Responding to the pacifist mood of the interwar years 
Bruce pointed, during the 1928 election, to Australia's duty to follow Britain, the 
main supporter of disarmament and the League of Nations. At the 1934 poll, 
Lyons claimed that in order to retain the protection of Empire membership, 
Australia must pay its British debts, and promote Empire trade. After 1945, 
non-Labor insisted that self-interest and duty alike made Australia's allegiance 
with the western alliance a more compelling commitment than United Nations 
internationalism. 
The non-Labor case has depended not only on the dangers of socialism, but on 
the benefits of capitalism. In 1914, Cook spoke of the opportunities Australia's 
expanses of land offered to the dilligent man. At the 1925 poll, Nationalists 
reminded respectable workers of the-benefits - savings accounts, homes entirely 
or partly owned - they already enjoyed. The UAP's campaign against inflation 
and repudiation was accompanied by an argument, sometimes implicit, that 
with sound public policy the natural resiliance of business would restore 
employment. In government after the war, Menzies' Liberal Party claimed that 
abundant consumer goods were the fruits of its free enterprise policies. 
Non-Labor has contended throughout 1914-54 that small property owners were 
protected by the preservation of the property system, even though large owners 
had the greatest stake in the system's preservation. This theme has antecedents 
in British political thought. According to a recent study of the extreme right in 
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Australian politics, 'Burkean conservatism' has been one of the main influences 
on non-Labor. (Only two effects of this influence are asserted: mistrust of 
human rationality, and dislike of change.)23 This is not the place to canvass 
Australian non-Labor's Burkean antecedents, but one passage from Reflections on 
the Revolution in France may be quoted to illustrate the general idea underlying 
non-Labor's contention that all property-owning citizens, and not merely the 
rich, should favour the preservation of capitalism. Property, Burke wrote, 
... must be represented [too] in great masses of accumulation, or it is 
not rightly protected. The characteristic essence of property, formed 
out of the combined principles of its acquisition and conservation, is 
to be unequal. The great masses therefore, which excite envy, and 
tempt rapacity, must be put out of the possiblity of danger. They then 
form a natural rampart about the the lesser properties in all their 
gradations.24 
That Australians should preserve these ramparts has been a common line in 
non-Labor electioneering, and in reviewing its history we should consider the 
celebration of capitalism as well as the denigration of Communism. This could 
be done by looking again at non-Labor's use of stereotypes. Interpretations of 
threat and loyalty politics have drawn from the sociology of deviance the ideas 
of manufactured 'folk devils' and 'moral panics'; but demonology relies on belief 
in the existence of good, and accounts of fearful stereotypes need to be 
supplemented by studies incorporating political debates on the opposite of the 
23
. Moore, Qlh.lli., pp. 4-5, 10-11, 12, 22, 25, 42, 82, 128. 
24. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the proceedings of certain societies 
in London relative to that event, Harmondsworth, 1969 (1790), p. 140. 
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folk devil, the ideal person.25 For much of the time, non-Labor's 'folk devils' 
have been Communist trade unionists. The mobilisation of the law-abiding 
public against the rebellious 'men' has always been a important element in non-
Labor politics, but in addition to the negative stereotype of the anti-social, 
disruptive unionist, non-Labor politicians have evoked positive sterotypes: the 
sensible, self-reliant working man; and the pragmatic housewife struggling to 
maintain her household despite the disruption of industrial action.26 
The argument of this thesis has been that non-Labor federal electioneering has 
relied on a variety of rhetorical tactics, some fearful, and some hopeful. 
Similarly, Brett contends that Menzies' homely politics congratulated middle 
class people for their contribution to society and warned that their creativity and 
independence was threatened by the 1940s politics of state regulation. In other 
words, Brett's account, despite its interesting but unconvincing speculations on 
the psychological origins of Menzies' political attitudes, offers a nuanced 
interpretion of non-Labor which recognises its combination of limited, and 
threat and loyalty politics. Brett recognises that positive and negative non-
Labor politics have always been combined. By the same token, one expert on 
clashes between radicals and the state has argued recently that the focus of 
conflict studies should be expanded from instances of conflict, to the 
coexistence of conflict and accord.27 This has been the method of this thesis, 
25
. James Belich, review of Miles Fairburn, The Ideal Society and its Enemies: The Foundations of 
New Zealand Society, 1850-1900 (1989), Journal of Social History, vol. 24, no. 3, Spring 1991, pp. 672-
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and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, Oxford, 1980 (1972). 
26
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Public and Private Doctrine: Essay in British History Presented to Maurice Cowling, Cambridge, 1993, 
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which has described non-Labor's combinations of discontent and satisfaction, 
opposition and proposal. Non-Labor federal electioneering included both threat 
and loyalty, and limited elements and as such spoke to a society which in a time 
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